However, among real beings, it is necessary for some to belong to this line and gradation of predicaments directly, some to the side and, as it were, reductively. This is because not all things participate in the concept of being or the genus in the same way. In order to distinguish which beings are entirely separated from the predicament, which are placed in the straight line, which are placed reductively, and which are placed to the side, five conditions are enumerated that are required for something to be in the predicament. Although others may enumerate more conditions, all can be reduced to these.
The first condition is that it must be being per se and not by accident. The second is that it must be a complete being. The third is that it must be a finite being. The fourth is that it must be a complete being. The fifth is that it must be univocal.
Regarding the first condition, it is said that being per se must be present to exclude being by accident. The latter is excluded from the predicament because it does not signify one nature but multiple natures. Therefore, it does not constitute a thing with a single genus and difference but with multiple ones. This is the nature of being by accident. It is not placed in the predicament per se but through those natures, and each one is placed in a distinct predicament if they belong to different natures or in the same predicament if they are of the same nature but with different modes and multiplied natures. This is not being placed per se but with a single position.
Based on this condition, I believe that concrete accidental entities must be excluded from the predicament because they are not taken merely as formal but as a composite composed of both the subject and the accident. For example, in the case of color, it signifies not only the form of color but also the subject it inheres in. This means that it signifies the formal aspect only. However, concerning the substance, when we say, "The white thing is colored," we refer to the quidditative formal aspect that is implied in them. Thus, even though concrete accidents are not taken as total entities, they do not contradict the notion of genus and species, and consequently, the series of predicaments. Some may find difficulty in this mode of signification because they signify by way of an accident, not by way of quiddity. But this does not matter because, although they signify by way of an accident concerning the subject, concerning the very form of the accident and the essential predicables, there can be predication, as when we say, "The white thing is colored." This involves the formal aspect that is inherent in them.
The second condition required for the concept of predicamental being is that it must be a complete being. This refers to those entities placed in the straight line of the predicament, not reductively or to the side. We call something a complete being when it is signified as constituted and, in a sense, as a whole. This condition also applies to accidents since they can be seen as a complete entity within the genus of accidents, although relative to substance, they are incomplete.
The third condition is that predicamental being must be finite. This condition excludes the infinite simply and in the whole genus of being, as in the case of God, who is not infinite in any determinate genus. For example, infinite quantity or infinite quality would be excluded by this condition. The reason is that the infinite in a determinate genus is only infinite accidentally. From the perspective of essence, it consists in actuality and potentiality, which are the terms that define essence. These terms constitute essence when considered in their act; it is potentiality that gives rise to genus, and it is act that gives rise to difference. Therefore, it retains coordination and the series of superior and inferior predicables, such as genus and difference, which are placed in both the genus and the predicament.
However, infinite in substance or in the genus of being involves pure actuality, as it pertains only to the absence of the terms of essence. Thus, if it is in act, it is infinite actuality, which excludes all potentiality. When potentiality is excluded, the genus, which is a potentiality for differences, is also excluded. Therefore, pure actuality excludes all coordination of determinable and determining degrees, of being capable and being actual, which constitutes the gradation and the predicamental series, as will be explained further in the following questions.
The fourth condition is that predicamental being must be uncompounded. This condition excludes not only complex accidental beings and those that are beings by accident (which is excluded by the first condition) but also complex essential beings, such as definitions. For example, the complex expression "rational animal" is excluded. The reason is that these complex expressions correspond to two concepts that explain one and the same nature. The nature that is intrinsically placed in the predicament is the defined thing itself, which is the species. Therefore, if the species or the defined thing is intrinsically placed in the predicament, and the complex expression explaining the defined thing is also intrinsically placed in that predicament, the same thing would be placed in the predicament twice: once by its own nature and again by the nature contained in its complex definition. Sometimes authors do not have a single-word term to signify a particular thing, and they use a complex term to signify it. However, when they do so, it is because the thing signified is intrinsically simple. It cannot be argued that only the definition is placed in the predicament, not the defined thing itself, which is the specific nature. This would imply that the predicaments are merely formal intentions, namely, the intentions of definitions, which would be placed in the predicament, while the defined things themselves, which are real, would not be.
The fifth condition is that predicamental beings must be univocal. Equivocal terms do not signify one nature but multiple ones, and therefore, they do not denote a single possible thing in the predicament. Analogical terms are excluded because they do not have one contractible ratio, as is the case with genus through differences, nor are they constituted as a species derived from a genus that contracts to individuals. By excluding genus, species, and difference, the coordination of the predicament, which is based on these, is also excluded.
ARTICLE II. - Is Being Univocal or Analogous to the Ten Predicaments?
This controversy has been well-known between the schools of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Scotus believes that being is univocal with respect to the ten predicaments, and consequently according to his opinion, being signifies a concept that is one object distinct from its inferiors, which it is predicated of, and is contractible to them. However, Scotus also claims in certain passages that being is equivocal or analogous to the ten predicaments because, in his view, it does not have a sufficient univocation to be a genus or one of the five predicables. He always denies that being has the univocation of genus because, according to his explicit interpretation of Aristotle, he excludes it from being since it does not represent the essence of a thing. He often cites the explicit authority of Aristotle in Metaphysics (e.g., text 10 of book 3 and text 2 of book 4) to support this claim.
For the present discussion, we only need to address two questions. First, we must determine whether being is analogous or univocal with respect to the ten predicaments. Second, assuming that it is analogous, we must consider what kind of analogy it is. We will address the second question in subsequent articles and focus on the first question here. We will not delve into the analogy of being with God and creatures since it is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it can be resolved easily based on the resolution of the current question.
Scotus believes that being is indeed univocal with respect to the predicaments, but not as a genus. By univocal, he means that the concept of being is so precisely one that its unity is sufficient for contradiction, whether affirming or denying it in the same context. He explicitly states this in his Sentences (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 36). However, he also asserts in other places that being is equivocal or analogous to the ten predicaments because it does not have sufficient univocation to be a genus or any of the five predicables. Scotus dismisses the notion of being as a genus from his system, primarily due to Aristotle's explicit assertion in Metaphysics that being is not a genus but transcends it (Metaphysics 3.2, 1003a16).
Scotus's foundation for this position relies mainly on the principle that many philosophers, including some outside his school, admit: the concept of being and any analogous proportionality concept are precisely one and distinct from their analogates with the same precision. Scotus argues that if being had the precision of unity necessary for contradiction, it must contract to the things below it by addition, which determines and divides the superior concept. Therefore, nothing prevents being from being a univocal concept since the entire inequality or diversity in it arises from the different contracting differences, not from the superior concept itself, which is precisely one. Similarly, when we consider a concept like animal, the whole inequality in it arises from the differences contracting it, not from the superior concept, which is precisely one.
Scotus's position hinges on the idea that the concept of being cannot immediately represent multiple things in actuality or include them in the concept itself, as such inclusion would mean that multiple things are included within the concept explicitly. Therefore, being is necessarily univocal in his view, as its precise unity results from the fact that it includes in potency, not explicitly, everything that can be included in it.
Nevertheless, for the resolution, I first say: Common being with respect to the ten predicaments cannot have a univocal concept, whether it is taken as the complete concept of the knower or as abstracted from the complete and incomplete. This conclusion is undeniably the position of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and I am surprised that some authors want to deny it in the sense of Saint Thomas. Thus, he affirms in his work (Sententiarum I, dist. 2, quaest. 1, articulus 3, ad 2), where he states: "It is divided differently: equivocal, univocal, and analogous. Equivocal in terms of the things signified, univocal in terms of differences, but analogous in different modes. Therefore, since being is predicated analogically of the ten genera, it is divided in various ways." So, Saint Thomas expresses it very explicitly.
Furthermore, in the same work, in Distinction 25, Question 1, Article 2, and in his statement to Annibal, he sets forth the general rule that if things do not belong to the same most general genus, nothing can be said of them univocally. Now, being belongs to what is above the most general genera, namely, the ten predicaments. Similarly, in Distinction 19, Question 5, Article 2, he proves that being, and other transcendentals, are analogically predicated of the inferiors. In Question 1, Article 1, he proves that being cannot be contracted by addition (such as the contraction of univocity through differences) but through various modes that explain it. The idea that its concept is not entirely precise with respect to the inferior predicaments is derived from what he teaches in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially in Book 8, where he states, "It solves the above and so on," and it is clear that because the ten predicaments do not have being added to them in the way species have differences added to genera, what is essential, being, does not expect anything added to it to be this or that, that is, substance, quantity, quality, etc. Here, he clearly excludes the notion that being can be contracted by addition, and thus he assumes it is not univocal and that it does not include multiple things potentially. Therefore, it is not actually separated from them, even though it does not explicitly explain them.
Moreover, in Metaphysics 4, Lecture 1, he explicitly teaches that being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident and the other predicaments. You can also see this in Metaphysics 3, Lecture 5. It cannot be said that when Aristotle and Saint Thomas say that being is not predicated univocally, but only analogically, they are not speaking about being absolutely but being per se, which is the first being. This first being, they claim, is the only one that applies to accidents denominatively and attributively because, for example, accidents are said to be being because they participate in being. However, this claim doesn't hold because if being is taken there as substance, it would not deny being a genus, at least with respect to substances themselves. It could be a genus for substances even if it denies being as a genus generally.
In response to these arguments, some people say that the differential reasons are not being but a mode of being. Now, let's suppose that this differential reason is a mode of being. Then, this mode is either something in the nature of things or nothing. If it is nothing, then it makes things differ by nothing, which means there is no difference. If it is something beyond nothing, then it is being because, in this most general sense of being, being refers to anything other than nothing.
Some from the school of Scotus, like P. Merinero in his discussion on Univocity (Disputation 2, Question 1, and the following questions), distinguish between two considerations of being: "ens quid" and "ens quale." They say that "ens quid" refers to being as contractible and potential towards lower entities, while "ens quale" refers to being as actual and determining, or contracting, which is the differentia itself. They claim that "ens quid" is not included in the contracting differences because it would lead to an infinite regress. If the ultimate differences included "ens quid," they would share something in common and yet differ from each other, which would require another differentia to differentiate them, and this process would continue infinitely. Therefore, this process must terminate in something that does not include "ens quid" but is still "ens quale," i.e., a differentia.
However, this response is neither true nor does it resolve the difficulty. It's not true because "ens quale," or the mode of difference, either includes "ens quid" or it does not. If it does not, then it is nothing because "ens quid" is what is opposed to nothingness. If "ens quale" also opposes nothingness, then "ens quale" and "ens quid" share the concept of being something rather than nothing, i.e., having true and proper existence. This leads to an inquiry into how "ens quid" is intrinsically included in both "ens quale" and "ens quid." If "ens quale" includes "ens quid," it means that "ens quid" is intrinsically included in the intrinsic modes and ultimate differences since those are "ens quale." Therefore, "ens quid" cannot be entirely separated from them, even though it is not explicitly explained. If it were separated, we could perfectly understand it without them, just as an animal can be perfectly understood without being rational, even if it potentially includes it. If "ens quale" includes "ens quid," then "ens quid" is intrinsically and essentially included in those intrinsic modes and ultimate differences, as they are "ens quale."
Moreover, the idea that these intrinsic modes are distinct from each other due to added differences doesn't resolve the issue. If these modes are differentiated by some added mode or difference, we would need to inquire how they are in agreement and how they differ from each other based on this new mode, leading to an infinite regress. On the other hand, if it is claimed that these differences or modes entirely differ within the nature of "ens quale" and are not due to anything added, then why wouldn't the same reasoning apply to "ens quid," which shares commonality within the nature of "ens quid," yet the modes are primarily different? If adding some difference distinguishes the modes, then the question arises about how this new difference is in agreement and how it differs from other differences added in another way, and the infinite regress continues. If it is argued that these intrinsic modes entirely differ within the concept of "ens quale" and are not due to anything added, this doesn't address the problem because "ens quid" can also be argued to differ primarily within the concept of "ens quid." Therefore, the solution seems to admit that "ens" actually includes these modes but does not explain them, which aligns with our assertion and negates the univocity of the concept of being.
In response to this, some of Scotus' disciples, like M. Cabrero, concede that being is a genus and that Aristotle's claim (Metaphysics 3, Lecture 10) that being is not a genus applies to common complete being. However, they argue that this doesn't imply that the ten predicaments are genera distinct from the first genus of being. They only consider these distinctions as forms of denomination and intrinsic reality, not as distinct genera. But this argument doesn't hold since it undermines the entire structure of the ten predicaments. If the highest genus is only considered relative, then any lower genera would also be considered relative. This would result in an infinite number of higher-level predicaments, rendering the system incoherent.
The conclusion is that the concept of being cannot be perfectly separated from the modes that contract it, and it does not have a simple unity in itself. This conclusion aligns with the position of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who argued that being is not a genus because it is included in the intrinsic differences, contrary to the nature of a genus.
Regarding the arguments made from the beginning:
In the concept of being, several aspects are not explicitly represented or expressed as distinct, but they are present in a confused manner and under the proportion of having existence. This means that these aspects are implicitly conceived, but what is implicit in potentiality is not the same as what is implicit in actuality. Something implicit in potentiality denotes something determinate in itself, but it can be determined to multiple things by adding the determinable aspects, as in the case of "animal" concerning the rational and irrational. On the other hand, something implicit in confused actuality signifies everything without specific determination, as when we see a multitude from afar in a confused manner. To not represent in actuality is different from not including in actuality, and this distinction is essential.
It is argued that if these lower aspects of being are not part of the common concept of being, they can still be perfectly represented. The response is that these various aspects, when explicit, are not part of the concept of being as such. However, when implicit, they are part of the concept of being in common. In fact, being in common is nothing other than what pertains to the essence of being under confusion and without any specific determination, except for the proportion of having existence. This distinguishes it from the concept of "animal" and other univocal concepts, which not only include but also explain a specific degree that can be further determined by lower contracting differences. This is because a specific degree or aspect explicitly expressed cannot be contracted except by the addition of a higher degree or aspect. Conversely, an analogous concept does not determine any specific aspect explicitly but confounds them in a proportional relation, so contraction and distinction occur not by addition but by explication of the confusion, as explained in the preceding question.
As for the objections raised:
It is suggested that the same concept or notion can simultaneously represent something doubtful and certain, obscure and clear. This is considered in the context of faith where something may be clearly attested as credible under the aspect of credibility but remain obscure as the object of faith. It is also noted that sight can verify something seen from afar, such as an animal, but remain uncertain whether it's a horse or a cow, especially in the case of negative doubt. The response acknowledges that a single act can address multiple things under different aspects and may not equally clarify all of them. For example, a single act can fully certify one aspect while not providing the same certainty for another. The argument, therefore, does not support the notion of the univocity of transcendent concepts per se.
It is claimed that in predications like "substance is being" and "man is being," the predicate "being" does not attribute analogous particular analogates to the subject. The response reiterates that in such predications, "substance is being" signifies that substance has existence, but it does not attribute multiple, distinct aspects to it explicitly. It signifies existence under a proportional unity and confusion, and this is what is predicated there. The sense is that "man has existence," signifying that it has what pertains to the essence of existence under confusion. However, it does not explicitly signify substance, quantity, quality, etc., and it doesn't determine them in a specific and distinct manner.
Lastly, it is argued that being can be a medium in demonstration since it has demonstrable attributes and does not signify different aspects as if they were distinct. The response agrees that being can serve as a medium in demonstration since it possesses demonstrable attributes and signifies them in a proportional unity and some level of confusion. This is sufficient for knowledge and, consequently, for demonstration. Additionally, it can have transcendent and analogous attributes connected to the proportional relation it signifies, as mentioned in the previous article.
ARTICLE III. - How is Being Analogous?
Some hold that the analogy of being is neither a matter of proportion nor of a third thing, which they call transcendence, as discussed by Magister Cabrero in Disputation 4, Question 3, Doubt 3. Others believe that being, concerning substance or accident, only shares a common term and is like an analogous proportion. For example, they liken it to "healthy" concerning medicine and urine, as in the work of P. Vazquez in Volume 2, Part 1, Disputation 121, Chapter 2. However, these discussions are generally about all analogies, which they believe are only based on a common term. We are not addressing these viewpoints in this context, as we have addressed them previously. The others understand that there exists a proper analogy of proportionality, and this is more accurate.
Hence, there is only one conclusion: The analogy of being to the ten predicaments is not sufficiently explained by stating that it is transcendence. Instead, it must be said that it is the analogy of proper formal proportionality, although it virtually includes the analogy of attribution or proportion. The first part of the conclusion is evident because transcendence is not a species of analogy; it is the subject of analogy. Analogically, what is transcendent is denominatively analogous, just as "animal" is denominatively a genus. This is clear because transcendence is something real found in all things, whereas analogy, like univocity and equivocity, is a second intention. It pertains to the mode of predicability and universality and involves abstraction in the intellect. Therefore, to say that transcendence is a species of analogy is like saying that "animal" is a species of universality or predicable. It is necessary to assign the formal reason for analogy, which is found in being and the transcendent things, as it is in the subject.
The second part of the conclusion is clear because being and transcendence are intrinsically found in all things and not through extrinsic denomination. Otherwise, transcendence would not be what it is. Hence, St. Thomas Aquinas frequently teaches that accidents have their own existence and essence, truly and distinct from substance, as evident in the Fourth Distinction, Question 12, Article 1, Question 1, Article 1, Question 3, Reply to the Fifth, and in the Fourth Book Against the Gentiles, Chapter 14, Reply to the Ninth Reason, where he states that accidents are a certain form superadded to substance and caused by the principles of substance. Therefore, their existence is added above the existence of substance and depends on it. Similarly, he teaches that the quiddity of an accident is a reality that seeks existence through inherence. None of this could be the case unless accidents existed intrinsically and were beings in terms of their quiddity. When St. Thomas states in First Part, Question 55, Article 4, Reply to the First Objection, that accidents and non-subsistent forms do not have existence, he means that they do not have existence in themselves as they have existence when posited, not that they don't have existence at all.
Lastly, St. Thomas clearly teaches in the First Distinction, Question 19, Article 5, Article 2, Reply to the First Objection, that the analogy of proportionality, which is the analogy of proper proportionality, pertains to being and transcendent things. It is necessary that they have existence in each of those about which they are predicated. This can also be gathered from Question 7, De Potentia, Article 7. The reason is evident because the analogy of proportionality is distinguished from the analogy of attribution in that the latter is through denomination from one form that is intrinsically in one principal thing and denominatively in others. The former is with regard to forms intrinsically existing in each analogous thing but not concurring in one thing absolutely, only proportionally. Accidents are intrinsically beings because they truly exist apart from nothingness and truly adhere, producing real effects, such as being quantitative, colored, hot, etc. Therefore, being is said to belong to the analogy of proper proportionality.
The third part is proven by what we mentioned earlier, that philosophers and St. Thomas often compare the analogy of being, analogous to the Holy, to "animal" and "medicine," which are analogous attributively, as in the Fourth Book of the Metaphysics, Lecture 1, and the Eleventh Lecture of the Metaphysics, Question 2, Article 11. However, this is not because it is solely this kind of analogy. In the First Book of Ethics, Lecture 7, St. Thomas clearly attributes the analogy of proper proportionality to the Good. The same reasoning applies to being, but it does have intrinsic existence. Therefore, it is not formally called being by attribution, but it possesses being. Hence, it could be called "being" by attribution if it did not possess intrinsic being. As St. Thomas states in the Fourth Book of the Metaphysics, Lecture 4, being is said as "healthy" is with respect to substance and accident, not by the attribution of an efficient or final cause but by a material one, insofar as an accident inheres in a substance, as in a subject. Therefore, it is deduced that being must intrinsically possess existence, namely through inherence, not through extrinsic attribution to a cause or an extrinsic effect.
You state that the proportion of an accident to its existence or substance is a ratio, not a real proportion; therefore, it is insufficient to establish a real analogy and intrinsic suitability. The antecedent is argued as follows: Proportion is a relation, and that relation is a matter of reason because it does not exist between real extremes, as nothing is distinct from its existence. Therefore, it is a matter of reason. Additionally, the proportionality between an accident and substance is not signified by the term "being," nor does it suffice to constitute analogy even if it is exercised. For instance, proportionality can be exercised between two species falling under the same genus without signifying "being." Just as one species relates to its genus, so does another, and yet it does not eliminate univocity; thus, it doesn't do so in the case of "being."
Response: First of all, in the sense of St. Thomas distinguishing existence from essence in reality, it does not apply to this instance because here the extremes are found in which a real relation is exercised. However, beyond this point, we say that analogy is formally a second intention, and as such, it is not a real relation but a matter of reason, just as the intention of genus or species is. Yet, it has its basis in proportionality, not as a relation per se, but as a matter of suitability and proportional similarity among many, whether in real beings or matters of reason. This is similar to how the intention of a genus is founded on the suitability of generic similarity, whether in real beings or matters of reason.
Regarding the second part of your argument, our response is that the proportionality itself should not be taken to signify an act but to be exercised in analogical terms, just as equality or unity is not signified in univocal terms. Concerning the exercise of proportionality among species falling under the same genus, we mentioned in the previous question that this kind of proportionality relies on absolute and perfect suitability, and, as such, it does not solely rely on proportionality. In analogical terms, the entire unity or suitability is derived from proportionality itself, and no other greater unity is presupposed. This is the distinction between proportionality found in analogical terms and that in univocal terms.
ARTICLE IV. - Is an Accident Univocal with Regard to the Nine Categories?
There are authors who hold the affirmative position, especially if an accident is considered as a predicamental complete accident, not as abstracted from the complete and the incomplete. They consider an accident as a real accident intrinsically denominating. For, with respect to an extrinsically and intrinsically denominating thing, there is no univocal concept. Therefore, when speaking in this manner about a complete accident, many authors, even outside the Scotist school, believe it to be univocal with respect to those predicaments which are intrinsically denominating forms.
The foundation for this is that such an accident is not included in differences, but it behaves like a complete substance, which is indeed a genus, for it does not include differences. However, as it abstracts from the complete and the incomplete, it does not constitute a genus. Why then would a complete accident not be univocal, especially when not one accident, for instance, quantity, participates in the nature of an accident more than another, such as quality? The entire diversity of these accidents arises from their specific differences in which the complete accident is not included. Furthermore, it is not easy to determine the analogy of a complete accident, for it is not transcendent since it is not included in differences, nor is it an attribution or metaphor since all accidents are not denominating intrinsically but only accidentally. It is also not proportional in its proper sense since, in the opinion of these authors, it does not suffice to make something analogous, as it can also be found in univocal terms. On the contrary, there is the general rule of St. Thomas in Distinction 25, Question 1, Article 2: "Whatever does not agree in the most general genus cannot be said univocally of them. But the nine genera of accidents are the most general genera, being diverse predicaments; therefore, nothing can be said univocally of them, and consequently not of accidents."
I say, therefore, firstly, that an accident, as abstracted from the complete and the incomplete, is not univocal but analogous. This is commonly agreed upon by authors because the same reasoning applies to a common accident that is both complete and incomplete. Likewise, for a substance, even though they are abstracted differently, they are intrinsically denominating and transcend all things and modes. For these accidental differences are also accidents, albeit incomplete, as they are something existent and not substantial. Therefore, they are accidental. From this, it follows that there is not one but several ratios, as they are included in differences, completely abstracted from them and perfectly abstracted from them, for a ratio that is once included does not abstract from them since there are no other differences of such differences from which it could abstract, leaving them behind. Therefore, if it abstracts from differences, it abstracts from all, and only the common ratio remains in relation to the lower, not in relation to the differences, if it abstracts from them. So, for the common ratio to apply to them, it does not abstract from them, and this is to include them in act and to be one reason, not absolutely one.
Secondly, I say that a complete accident is also analogous to the nine genera even if they all consist of intrinsic denominating forms. This conclusion is based on what we discussed in the second article about a complete being. Although it is not included under the concept of completeness, the differences themselves must be included under it for it to be complete because it is only through them that completeness is achieved. An accident can only become complete by a mode that distinguishes it from the incomplete. However, this mode is either inherence itself, as in the case of substance making a substance complete, or the accident being in concrete, or the accident becoming predicamental. Here, the differences that make the accident complete pertain to the essence and form of the accident itself. Therefore, a complete accident is not rendered univocal by this process, particularly when a different accident, for example, quantity, has the essence of an accident just as another accident, such as quality, does. The entire diversity arises from the specific differences inherent in the nature of accidents. These differences do not include the complete accident, and thus, a complete accident is not rendered univocal through them.
The first point does not make a complete accident univocal because inherence does not lead to an accident being complete. Inherence is not oriented toward constituting a whole in itself, as in the case of substance, which is a complete whole within itself. Inherence is the proper form informing the subject. Thus, when an accident is conceived as inhering precisely, it is not abstracted or removed from the inclusion of the differences, as they are still inherent. In fact, through the differences themselves, completeness is achieved, and thus, a complete accident is rendered complete in essence and the nature of the form, not through inherence as such.
Thirdly, the third point is also inadequate because a predicamental complete accident is either understood to become predicamental through a second intention of ordering it to the predicate or through some first intention that makes it capable of such a second intention, which is found in the predicate. The first option does not complete a real accident because the second intention is something of reason, nor can it be suitable unless the first intention, which makes it a thing capable of being placed in the predicate, is presupposed. The second option is unassignable in terms of what makes complete accidents according to the modes by which each predicable is constituted and a predicamental accident is rendered, for there is no real mode common to the nine predicaments by which an accident, as such, can be rendered complete and distinct from the differences.
Therefore, it must be said that a complete accident is not a single concept superior to the nine predicaments, but it is immediately rendered a complete accident through the very modes that constitute the predicaments. If it is actually complete, it actually includes them and thus does not have a simple unity required for univocation. Instead, it takes on the diversity of the differences and modes themselves. For this reason, St. Thomas says in Metaphysics 5, Lecture 9, that those things into which being is divided first are the predicaments because they are distinguished according to various modes of predication. Hence, the division into ten predicaments is immediate, and the first is that of being. However, a complete accident does not require any complement separate from the ten predicaments.
Furthermore, this avoids the argument, for if a complete accident were univocal with the nine genera, then the genus would be univocal with those genera. Consequently, the nine genera would not be alternative; for everything univocal is equally divided into genus, species, and the other five predicables. As D. Thomas says in Cont. Gent. 32, "Everything that is predicated univocally of several things is either a genus, a species, a difference, a property, or an accident. But accident, in general, is not a species, much less a difference or a property in relation to its inferiors; therefore, it will be a genus if it is univocal."
Some deny this consequence and say that an accident is not a genus because it is divided unequally according to its essence. However, this does not destroy the genus; rather, it affirms the analogy. An accident is analogical because it is divided unequally according to its essence. But if inequality arises only from the differences themselves, it is also found in the genus whose differences are unequal.
Others say that an accident is not a genus because it does not signify quiddity but the being of the accident, which is in the substance, or if it signifies quiddity, it does not signify a distinct degree but what is included in whatever it is found. But this contradicts univocation because it includes everything, does not specify a distinct degree, and is not complete as a predicament. Thus, if it is included in whatever, why would it not be called a generic concept if it is univocal? For it is univocal and signifies quidditatively, just as quality is an accident quidditatively and not substantially. In this sense, it does not specify a distinct degree, which is why a complete accident is not considered complete if it is included in whatever, unless it is not included in differences. But if it is not included in differences, why would it not be called a generic concept since it is univocal, signifies quidditatively, and is predicable quidditatively?
Regarding the objections raised from the beginning:
Response to the first objection: The distinction between complete substance and accident is established because in substance, we assign something of one concept, namely, a predicate by which it is completed, namely, being a complete or total substance, as in "what it is." However, in the case of an accident, since it is a form, there is nothing assignable by which it could be completed except those predicamental modes by which it is measured against substance. Such a mode constitutes a determinate predicate if it is determinate. However, when taken in a confused and indeterminate manner as a predicamental accident, if the term "predicamental" refers to the second intention, then it is not a real completion of the accident but presupposes it. If it refers to the very complete nature of the accident, then it signifies all the predicamental modes in a confused manner because it is completed not by anything other than those modes. Thus, it includes differences and is analogical.
Regarding the statement that quantity is equally an accident with quality: Even though they share the nature of being accidents equally in terms of inherence, they do not share it equally in terms of arranging and measuring themselves with respect to substance. In this aspect, they are initially distinct and have an unequal relationship. However, the mode of inherence is not constitutive of the quiddity itself but pertains to the manner of existence as communicable. Just as substance makes substance incommunicable, equality in inherence does not make equality absolutely in the quiddity of the accident.
Response to the second objection: It equally applies to the accident as it is abstracted from complete and incomplete, which all acknowledge to be analogical. Therefore, we say that it is analogical in the case of proper proportionality because it is present in all analogates through intrinsic form. As for the possibility of finding a comparison of proportionality in univocals, it has been answered before that such a comparison is found not as the sole source of their unity but as that which presupposes and falls upon it. However, when it is found as the sole source, such that there is no other unity apart from proportionality, then it constitutes analogy, and thus it is not found in univocals.
ARTICLE V. - Whether the division into the ten predicaments is adequate?
This division into the ten predicaments is very ancient and famous, widely accepted by authorities over the centuries, and it is beyond question. However, many find it not so easy to provide a rationale for this division.
St. Thomas Aquinas, in his lectures on Metaphysics (Book V, Lecture 9) and Physics (Book III, Lecture 5), establishes its adequacy in the following way: Whatever can be predicated of a subject, or of the primary substance, can only be predicated in three ways. First, as pertaining to its essence, secondly, as inhering in it but not pertaining to its essence, and thirdly, as a predicate taken from something extrinsic, from which it derives its denomination.
If predicated in the first way, it constitutes a predicament of substance. If in the second way, the predicate that inheres is either absolute or relative and orders itself to another term. If it is an absolute form inhering, it either pertains to matter or to form, as a form is, whether spiritual or corporeal. If it pertains to matter, it is quantity, for this extends over material parts. If it pertains to form, it is quality, which has the function of qualifying and determining the mode of the form. If, however, it is a relative form, it is relation.
But if the predication happens in the third way, i.e., by taking its denomination from something extrinsic on which it depends, then it belongs to the six remaining predicaments. These are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, habit, and time.
Regarding denominations that depend on something extrinsic, it can either be a cause or a measure. The extrinsic cause cannot be material or formal since these constitute or denote intrinsically. Therefore, causalities of this kind do not constitute a special predicament as they are more oriented towards perfecting and completing matter and form through information and reception within them rather than perfecting or altering other things, as the causality of an efficient cause. Modes, on the other hand, do not constitute a special predicament when they merely indicate something complementing another thing because they are reducible to the thing whose modes they are. However, they do constitute a special predicament when they imply a specific commensuration to a substance and not just a complement or condition of its being.
As for the final cause, it only has metaphorical causality, and in the actual, it coincides with the causality of the efficient cause.
Hence, it remains that the extrinsic efficient cause that provides denomination is either denominating the subject, which is being changed (passion), or it is the cause from which an effect emanates, and it is action.
If the denomination comes from an extrinsic measure, this measure is either of place or of time. If it's a measure of place, it measures according to the absolute aspect of being in a place, concerning a diverse distance, and thus, it is "where." If it measures in terms of the order of parts in a place, it is "situation." But if it is a measure of time, it constitutes the predicament "when." There are no other extrinsic measures.
In this reasoning regarding the classification of the predicaments, some find difficulty, especially in two aspects. Firstly, because it is said that quantity follows matter and quality follows form. If this is understood as inhering in, then both inhere in the composite, as stated in the doctrine of St. Thomas in his books on generation. If it refers to emanation, quantity does not emanate solely from matter but from the composite, which is the body. The body, indeed, possesses three dimensions, but this doesn't merely indicate matter alone but matter informed by the form of corporeality.
Secondly, it appears that St. Thomas assigns the last six predicaments to extrinsic denomination, which we will show is false when discussing them. In particular, there is no doubt that passion is an intrinsic change. Nor can it be said that these are intrinsic modes that, nevertheless, depend on something extrinsic to which they are related. Otherwise, even relation would be considered an accident of extrinsic denomination because it depends on an extrinsic term.
Nevertheless, the aforementioned rationale is not hindered by these concerns. For the proposition that quantity follows matter and quality follows form is a common saying among philosophers and does not rely on emanation or inherence solely in matter but on the idea that quantity is the primary disposition of matter because division and indivision are considered with regard to quantity. This is evident from St. Thomas' statements in his works, such as his fourth distinction in De Potentia and questions on potentiality and actuality.
Regarding the second objection, St. Thomas does not establish the last six predicaments as based solely on extrinsic denomination, as seen in the examples of being known or being seen. These do not signify merely an inhering predicate. Instead, these denominations intrinsically posit something within the subject, although depending on something extrinsic, not just terminating or originating the denomination. Thus, these denominations are sometimes said to be derived from something extrinsic, not formally but derivatively. The denomination of these intrinsic modes indeed depends on something extrinsic.
