Sufficient Grace and Effectual Calling: A Refutation of the Jesuits and Arminians

 

The various divisions of grace are not contractions of a genus into its species, nor any material distinction. Rather, for example, when we speak of operating and cooperating grace, this is one and the same grace viewed with respect to different effects. Similarly, subsequent grace is not numerically distinct from the grace whereby we are first justified and regenerated, but is the same gift of God with respect to the effect of perseverance and the performance of good works that are pleasing to God. As one and the same effect can be prior in one respect, and posterior in another way, so is it with respect to grace; accordingly, Augustine said “It precedes in order that we might be healed, it follows in order that, being healed, we might dwell in life; it precedes that we might be called, it follows that we might be glorified.” (On Nature and Grace, chapter 31; PL 44:264) 

The Teaching of the Jesuits and Molinists

It is most interesting that some of the Semi-Pelagians had already approached some idea quite similar to the middle knowledge (scientia media) established and defended by Luis de Molina and the vast majority of the Jesuit order after him, and still to this day. Indeed, their Romanist opponents have charged them with this (Del Prado, De gratia et. lib. Arb., III.312). This therefore is how the Semi-Pelagians also considered the controversy of elect infants, by answering that God gave grace in baptism to those infants whom He saw conditionally would consent to the operations of grace had they lived to a mature age. See, example, the words of Faustus, where he makes the decree of God dependent upon foreknowledge (which itself is determined by secondary causes such as the human will), rather than the other way around:—“But still you say: Because works and wills of men begin from the nod and impulse of heavenly foreknowledge. It is not so; recognize rather this, that the foreknowledge of God takes its starting point from the matter of human acts. What God ought to foreknow and pre-ordain concerning us, insofar as it pertains to the future, consists in the advance and failure of man.” (Faustus of Riez, De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio, book II, ch. 2)

The Semi-Pelagians thus ultimately placed the source and root of our salvation in the will of man himself, and whether he would accept or reject grace. Thus John Cassian in his 13th Conference On the Protection of God.

However, some Papists have wished to defend the Jesuits and Molinists from the association with semi-Pelagianism. And that chiefly in three respects:—

[1]. Sufficient grace; Molina concedes the existence of a sufficient grace that inclines with the initial movement toward salvation, but that the distinction between a man who consents and a man who rejects this grace is to be found in free will first and foremost. And the most simple reply to this of course, is that there is no movement toward conversion in one who rejects sufficient grace, and therefore the distinction ought not be located with man. 

[2]. Molina teaches that God gives some greater help to the elect rather than the reprobate, since He gives more help to the former by virtue of His middle knowledge whereby He may see in what circumstances he will consent to the movement of grace on his will. 

[3]. Some of the Jesuit authors have divided sufficient grace into five different degrees, such as Johannes Malderus (1563–1633):— 1st, an imperfect degree by which ordinary sinners may avoid committing a mortal sin; 2nd, that given to the regenerate whereby they are able to avoid all mortal sin, but will not actually do so on account of their infirmity; 3rd, the grace given to Adam in the state of innocency, whereby it was sufficient for him to persevere if he so willed, but did not; 4th, the grace of special custody whereby God watches over and protects the elect; 5th, the grace of confirmation (Malderus, In primam secundae D. Thomae commentaria, Q. 109, article 10, dub. 1 [Antwerp, 1623], pg. 464). 

Nonetheless, the category of sufficient grace is also used in reference to such external helps and aids that God has appointed to bring men to conversion. And chiefly, this is the preaching of the gospel throughout the world, which is an ordinary means of grace and conversion. Things like miracles, signs and wonders, the proclamation of the Word, are such ordinances as do confirm the doctrine of the gospel, and act as a means to persuade the unconverted of its truth, as well as to convict them of their own sin, and the necessity of repentance and faith for salvation. These external means do not produce faith in themselves, for divine and supernatural faith is founded only upon the authority of divine revelation in Scripture. 

I now come to the actual teaching of these men themselves, and will seek to present it as truthfully and accurately as possible, according to their own writings and disputations.

[1]. With regard to efficacious grace, the Jesuits as well as the Arminians reduce operative grace  to a moral suasion, one that leads to indeliberate acts rather than physically producing the consent of the will; as one may see in Francisco Suarez, De auxiliis divinae gratiae, book III, ch. 5, §4. But cooperative grace for them works in the manner of simultaneous concurrence between God and man, where the will of the latter is the deciding factor in salvation which distinguishes him from others, so that a person assisted by the help of less grace may be converted, although another with a greater assistance of grace does not become converted and remains in the sin of unbelief. “It is within the power of the adult will — thus prevented and excited by God — to consent or not consent to God so exciting and calling through prevenient grace; and accordingly it is within the power of that same will either to render efficacious or not to render efficacious such prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit..we assert that the aids of prevenient and assisting grace which are conferred by ordinary law on wayfarers — whether they are efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification — depends on the free consent and cooperation of our will with them; and accordingly it is within our free power either to render them efficacious by consenting and cooperating with them in the acts by which we are disposed toward justification, or to render them inefficacious by withholding our consent and cooperation, or even by eliciting the contrary dissent” (Luis de Molina, Concordia, Q. 14, art. 13, disp. 40). Now that what Molina expresses here, is in fact not much different from the teaching of the Semi-Pelagians, shall be shown in due time. See again these words of Leonard Lessius (1554-1623), the Jesuit doctor of theology at Leuven: “That, of two men who are similarly invited, one accepts the preferred grace and the other rejects it, it may rightly be said to proceed from free will alone; not that he who accepts does so by his liberty alone, but because the difference arises from free will alone and thus not from any diversity of prevenient help.” (Lessius, De gratia efficaci decretis diuinis libertate arbitrii et praescientia dei conditionata disputatio apologetica, ch. 18, §7)

[2]. They also say that sufficient grace, according to either a proximate or a remote principle, is given to all men, including heathens and those who have not heard the gospel, whereby they may at least avoid sin and aspire to some good. Vazquez defines it in simple terms, and afterwards attributes to the majority of the scholastic theologians: “no one in this life—however hardened and rebellious—is sufficient help lacking, but that it is offered to all.” (Commentaria Ac Disputationes In Primam Partem, Q. 23, disp. 98, ch. 3). And as we shall further demonstrate, this is arguably the most poisonous of their teachings, and that which most nearly replicates and approximates to the Semi-Pelagians. 

[3]. What the Arminians and Remonstrants have thought on this matter is generally clear, although some of their theologians, such as Arminius himself, have been more subtle in expressing themselves. For he presents his opinion summarily as follows: “This vocation is both external and internal. The external vocation is by the ministry of men propounding the word. The internal vocation is through the operation of the Holy Spirit illuminating and affecting the heart, that attention may be paid to those things which are spoken, and that credence may be given to the word. From the concurrence of both these, arises the efficacy of vocation. But that distribution is not of a genus into its species, but of a whole into its parts; that is, the distribution of the whole vocation into partial acts concurring together to one result, which is obedience yielded to the vocation. Hence, the company of those who are called and who answer to the call, is denominated a church." (Jacob Arminius, Private Theological Disputations, disp. 42, §10, 11). I see here that Arminius has not directly answered the question of whether the efficacy of grace arises more principally from God or from man, yet his saying that “this is not the distribution of a genus into its species” seems to imply, from my own reading of this, that he is asserting that grace is made efficacious not intrinsically, but rather extrinsically—which is nothing but the opinion of Jesuits. And such things as he lists there in attribution to the internal work of the Spirit are such as may exist in an unregenerate man, i.e. such natural stirrings of the heart and conscience, and an intellectual assent to divine truth (James 2:19). I will bring forward a few more testimonies from their writings, so that their pernicious doctrine will be all the more manifest:—

1st, It seems that more clarity was provided on what these men teach during the great Synod of Dort, where they made their own thoughts clear to one degree or another. The whole corpus of Remonstrant writings were brought forth and examined therein. In particular, their striking statements during the Hague Conference (1611) were read by the Reformed delegation from Groningen and the Omlands, wherein the Remonstrants said, "We believe that the Spirit of God ordinarily effects no strength in us for conversion, except through the word.” (Acta Synodi Nationalis, In Nomine Domini Nostri Iesv Christi, Auctoritate illustr. Et Praepotentum DD. Ordinum Generalium Foederati Belgii Provinciarum Dordrechti Habitae, Anno 1618 & 1619 [Hanoviae: Emmelius, 1620], II:328). The Remonstrants in the 4th article of the 1610 confession, explicitly state that “with respect to the mode of God’s grace, it is not irresistable.” When they presented their opinion on the third and fourth articles of the Canons to the entire synod, they said “the efficacious grace, by which anyone is converted, is not irresistible.” (Donald Sinnema, The Synod of Dordt (1618-1619) and the Canons: Historical Perspectives [Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2025], pg. 434n58). These types of statements are contained in the Acta et scripta Synodalia Dordracena ministrorum remonstrantium in foederato Belgico (Harderwijk, 1620), II:29-34, the publication which the Remonstrants produced of their own states at the synod, where they openly teach their rejection of the Reformed churches on this matter. 

2nd, Arminius himself in his Declaration of Sentiments, Part II, §8, gives us his opinion:—“It is an infusion (both into the human understanding and into the will and affections,) of all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which appertain to the regeneration and renewing of man—such as faith, hope, charity, &c.; for, without these gracious gifts, man is not sufficient to think, will, or do any thing that is good. 3. It is that perpetual assistance and continued aid of the Holy Spirit, according to which He acts upon and excites to good the man who has been already renewed, by infusing into him salutary cogitations, and by inspiring him with good desires, that he may thus actually will whatever is good; and according to which God may then will and work together with man, that man may perform whatever he wills.” It all comes down to this, therefore, that the efficacy of grace consists in man’s cooperation with it, both in conversion and the life of sanctification. 

3rd, Johannes Arnoldus Corvinus (1582-1650), one of the leading Remonstrants, attempted to defend Arminius in this regard, and show that he did not think grace was only made efficacious by the event of the will consenting to it. However, he so explained it away, as still placing the discriminating cause (ratio discriminans) between the converted and unconverted in whether or not man will cooperate with the grace that is given him: “For although the one who rejects the Gospel and the one who embraces it may have grace that is the same in species—namely, so that each has internal grace, and indeed sufficient for the act—nevertheless, the one who embraces the Gospel, precisely insofar as he is said to embrace it, is said in this sense to have greater grace, insofar as he does not embrace the Gospel except by cooperating with that same grace. Therefore, if the grace given is considered according to the mode of a principle and as prevenient, it can happen that those who have equal grace do not produce equal effects—that is, that not all embrace the Gospel. But if grace is considered not only according to the mode of a principle but also according to the mode of concurrence, he who embraces the Gospel always has greater grace; because that very act of embracing it is also from grace—not prevenient, but accompanying in the act itself. For grace extends itself to the work.” (Defensio Sententiae D. Iacobi Arminii, De Praedestinatione, Gratia Dei, Libero Hominis Arbitrio, &c [Joannis Paets, 1613], pg. 440; emphasis mine). Although he tries to come near us in the end when he states that “grace extends itself to the work”, where is such extension and efficacy to be posited according to them? It is considered with respect to the mode of concurrence, by which they mean that very act in which man cooperates with the grace of God to accept the gospel. Such acceptance is what they place the efficacy of grace in. But will they say with us that God produces the very act of this, not in the sense of impressing some already pre-existent act onto the soul (for it is man, and not God, who repents and believes), but rather that God produces the very act of willing and working?

[4]. All in all, the teaching of Molina (and by extension, the Arminians) borders so closely upon Semi-Pelagianism, that a General Congregation of the Jesuit order chose to align itself more closely with what appeared to be the moderate views of Suarez, in order that it might seem as though they were of the same mind as Augustine. Thus in the 1610 decree of Claude Aquaviva (1543-1615), the Superior General of that order: “We ordain and command that in propounding the efficacy of divine grace . . . our fathers should in the future explicitly teach that between the grace which has an effect of itself, called ‘efficacious,’ and that which is termed ‘sufficient,’ the difference is not so much as regards second act, since it still obtains its effect by the use of free will possessed of cooperating grace, nor likewise the other, but in first act itself, which, assuming a knowledge of the conditionals, on account of God’s disposition and intention of most certainly effecting good in us, by His own activity selects those means and confers them in the way and at the time when He sees the effect will be produced infallibly, whereas He would have foreseen these as inefficacious under other circumstances. Wherefore, something more is always contained, morally, in efficacious than in sufficient grace, both by reason of its benefit and with respect to first act; and thus God effects that we may act of ourselves, not so much because He gives grace by which we are able to act. The same may be said of perseverance which, without any doubt, is a gift of God.”

The Molinists often use the analogy of two men pulling a boat, wherein both act as partial causes in the production of the same effect. So that although they may admit that it is not free will alone whereby man is converted, they nonetheless teach that when God stands at the gate of the human heart and knocks, it ultimately lies with the will of man to open unto Him. But as we will see, this heretical fiction is contrary to what the Scripture teaches, as well as what the ancient church taught against Semi-Pelagianism, led by Augustine, and then explained by the Second Council of Orange, which explicitly teaches that not only the power of doing good is given to us by God, but the actual will to do it, and that grace effectually produces the effect of our own work. Canon 9: “Whatever good we do, God operates in us and with us that we may operate.” And this is anything other than what the prophet said, when he proclaimed the word of God? “And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them.” (Ezek 36:27). Not only the power, but the very act itself is granted to us by the internal operation of the Spirit of God on our souls. 

Molina taught that unregenerate man may believe supernatural truths with a true divine formal motive for faith, even apart from special grace, so that faith is not supernatural and heavenly in its essence and substance, but only in its manner and mode (Luis de Molina, Concordia, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 38). For this, he has been attacked by the Thomists: “the formally supernatural object as such cannot be attained except by a supernatural act. This upsets the basic assertion of Molina, who maintains that the assent to faith from the motive of divine revelation is natural in respect to its substance, and supernatural in respect to its mode. . . .This opinion does not seem to us sufficiently removed from the error of the Semi-Pelagians.” (Charles-René Billuart, Summa summae S. Thomae sive compendium theologiae, I-II, Q. 109, art. 1). What Molina thinks of faith in this regard might be said of any natural virtue, simply as long as it is directed toward a supernatural end! Ultimately, it places the beginning of faith in our natural powers, and is therefore condemned. Indeed, any doctrine which would rob God of the glory in the work of our salvation is suspect ipso facto. 

The Molinists (along with Cardinal Juan de Lugo and Louis Billot, a Jesuit) say that man without special grace is able to fulfill such internal works as are correlated to the heavenly works of faith, love, and hope (the theological virtues). And this is based on their foundational view that the diversity of a habitual principle suffices to distinguish natural faith from heavenly faith that we observe in the regenerate, even if the formal object of the two acts may be the same. But once again, the Thomists hereupon have charged many of them with Semi-Pelagianism and even Nominalism (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St Thomas, la Hae, q. 109-14, pg. 125)

II. But against all of this, we may propose the following reasons, such as are sufficient in themselves to not only produce the ability of refuting the Molinists, but indeed the very refutation itself. And through such helps and reasons as this, I think our task in this first part is completed.

(1). If the efficacy of grace depended upon our free consent as foreknown by God, then grace also is not foreknown as efficacious without such consent—and this consent either flows from grace itself, or from some intrinsic causality of its own. I know few enemies of the grace of God that so exalt the idol of man’s will as to think the latter would be true; but neither can the former option be taken, since then the consent derives from grace, and not the other way around. And if that is so, then the cause is efficacious by itself to produce the effect, not determined by the effect considered a posteriori. 

(2). If efficacious grace is not distinguished from sufficient grace by something intrinsic, but only by the subsequent act of free will whereby it either chooses or rejects this grace that has been bestowed upon it by the Lord, then sufficient grace would be efficacious without any other operation of God thereupon. But if the will with this sufficient grace is altogether left alone, then it would fall of its own weakness and mutability. Therefore some work of God is required so that the will itself may operate, for all our sufficiency is from Him alone. But as the grace of God does not wait or depend upon us to operate in healing our will, it is therefore impious to assume that He would so found His decree to give us such grace upon our foreseen choice; as Augustine said, “Who is so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert the evil wills of men, whichever ones he wills, into good?" (Enchiridion, chapter 98)

(3). The omnipotence and powerful concurrence of God not only decrees the actions of man (secondary causes) as to their substance and futurition, but also to the mode whereby they are realized in time. God not only decrees what we will do, but He decrees also they would do so freely, with contingency preserved. No one will doubt that God can cause and actualize all possible things, and therefore also His power extends to preserving the freedom of creatures, even with the infallible certainty of predestination. Now the adversaries will indeed deny that God can so bring about a free action from a secondary cause as a free agent through efficacious grace; precisely because this grace is connected infallibly with the operation, and determines the will to one thing rather than another, excluding the contrary action, and therefore the act of man in believing is strictly necessary rather than free. On the contrary, any grace of God which does not infallibly produce the effect, such as they conceive in their pernicious doctrine, is an even more unsuitable way for God to bring about such free acts, considering that the effect may not even follow at all! Rather, if they will concede with us that the omnipotence of God extends to concurring in the free acts of creatures, extending both to the substance and mode of the work, and that whatever God decrees infallibly will take place, there is nothing unseemly in what we have defended here. Furthermore, the contingency and freedom of secondary causes does not consist, as the Jesuits erroneously think, in the ability for two opposite acts to exist simultaneously (which are incompossible), but rather that when one ability or power is actualized by the will, the ability toward the opposite act exists simultaneously. And insofar as efficacious grace does not extinguish the material ability of man toward the contrary act, it does not destroy the contingency of the will. 

(4). Insofar as God is the Creator and Absolute Lord over all things, He also possesses dominion over our wills, and can apply them to operation without any destruction of freedom or liberty (for the great mistake of the adversaries, is to provide a faulty definition of what liberty consists in, as we saw at the end of the previous point). Indeed, God may apply all secondary causes to operating precisely because of this supreme dominion of His, and do so with infallible efficacy. We can illustrate this point further by analogy: just as the will of man has dominion and mastery over its own actions, so also does God have dominion over it, even one which is greater—for I do not know who would be so foolish as to assert that the mastery we have over our own will is greater than what God possesses! “God has the wills of men more in his own power than they themselves have.” (Augustine, On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 14)

Some of the opponents will respond that this dominion that God has such a dominion over our wills which is civil and political nature, as a king has over his subjects—where it consists not in the efficacious movement to act, but rather in such moral movements as will allure, govern, and direct it. However, since God is the First Cause of all creatures according to their being and the manner of their existence, nothing prevents Him from so operating. And God operates upon secondary causes in a way which suits their nature; so that though His operation upon natural causes such as the weather, material objects, animal creatures, etc. is such as does not regard any freedom on their part (although contingency is still present), yet in the case of man, who is a rational creature endowed with corresponding faculties that befit his nature, God operates upon his will in such a manner as does not fight against his nature, but indeed rather preserves it and elevates it. “The king's heart is in the hand of the LORD, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will.” (Prov. 21:1) The comparison stands not in this, that as the rivers are moved by God without freedom, so also with the heart of thing; but rather that both are equally under the dominion of God, who may do with each as He wills according to His own inscrutable judgment. For God to have such absolute dominion, it is not sufficient merely for creatures to depend upon Him in the order of nature for acting—for if two men work together in pulling a wagon (this being the common effect),  which is a common illustration used by the Molinists, will it therefore prove that one of them has dominion over the other? Rather, by the force of such simultaneous concurrence as the Jesuits imagine, the will of man is not subordinated to God as a cause, since in this case, even upon the supposition of future consent foreseen by middle knowledge, the grace of God is rather subjected to the will of man, rather than the other way around. 

I further ask: should the will resist the saving grace of God, does God concur in such resistance or not? And here we may see how shaken the adversaries are by the force of this dilemma. For if divine concurrence in such a rejection of grace is to be posited, then it no longer indeed has the formal character of resistance, since it now operates according to the intentional concurrence and movement of God in creation. But if this resistance is not indeed from the concurrence of God, then it follows that a creature can move itself toward act and operate independently of the First Cause. 

(5). The grace of God in conversion is just as sure and infallible as the decree of predestination itself. All things which take place do so according to the most sure will of God, either commanding or permitting. And hence in the case of the conversion of sinners, our Savior tells us the certainty thereof with respect to the work of God upon the soul: “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me: And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand.” (John 10:27-29). 0For predestination to be sure and certain (Psalm 33:11; Prov. 19:21; Isaiah 46:10), the execution of it also takes place infallibly, and that by the will of God, rather than of man. Man in no way makes the decree of God to be certain (as the error of middle knowledge ultimately entails). The sufficient grace as imagined by the Jesuits and Arminians does not grant any certainty of the decree to be accomplished in the conversion of a sinner, but only a power and ability to do it, which may incline to either side. If the media through which God accomplishes His eternal purpose is fallible, then it certainly follows that His will can be frustrated, which is contrary to the Scripture. 

The adversaries may attempt to escape this difficulty by saying that the certitude of predestination is kept certain through middle knowledge, whereby God knows the occasions and external circumstances in which grace will not be resisted, and therefore be efficacious. Upon this supposition, the effect will follow infallibly. But such a certainty as this is only of foreknowledge, and not one of causality. It is not derived from the efficacy of grace itself (since it is only efficacious in an extrinsic sense, according to the doctrine of Molina), but rather from foreknowledge based upon the consent of the will. It is man’s will who is certain, and not that of the Lord—which pretense is as blasphemous as it is absurd. Predestination is, on these fanciful imaginations of the Jesuits, nothing above the common providence of God, which dispenses sufficient helps common to the elect and the reprobate. But thereupon, the purpose of God in election would not stand, contrary to what the inspired Word teaches us. 

If predestination is only certain upon foreknowledge, then the elect differs from the reprobate only by virtue of the free consent of the will which the former performs but the latter does not perform–because the elect would not differ from the reprobate except on account of such foreknowledge, which itself is only certain because God through middle knowledge has seen who will resist grace, and who will not. Of course, as all learned men are aware, the Scripture says the direct contrary, so often cited by Augustine: “For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” (1 Cor. 4:7). Since such sufficient grace does not have an infallible connection with the intended effect, it is an insufficient basis for the certainty of the will of God in predestination. But on the idea that God, with the supposition of the middle knowledge of a conditionally future event—decrees to concur with the creature in the act of consenting to grace, there is nothing which comes to grace on this basis that infallibly causes the effect, based upon an intrinsic efficacy of the cause, founded on God’s will. Thus, the certainty of foreknowledge is all that the adversaries are left with; the inadequacy of which has already been demonstrated. 

We can further press them upon this very point. Is this absolute will of God decreeing to concur with us in consenting to grace per se necessary for that grace to cause our consent, or is it not necessary? If it is not necessary, then the will of man is merely concomitant with the aid of sufficient grace, and no certainty is to be found therein. If it is necessary, then the will is then one of the very principles upon which its consent conditionally depends, for a conditional future effect will depend upon the same principles (posited conditionally) as if they were posited absolutely. Hence, the decree of middle knowledge in this respect would be “If I place John in this set of circumstances and will to concur with him in consenting to grace, then he will consent.” And there is on the side of the condition something posited which infallibly brings about the effect, and the entire proposition will be true absolutely, since it is contradictory to say that God wills absolutely to concur, and yet does not actually concur. From this, it pertains rather to God’s knowledge of simple intelligence whereby He knows that if John wills absolutely to act, then he will act. 

(5). The doctrine of the Arminians most certainly leads to the consequence that God awaits our wills in the work of salvation; a pernicious doctrine indeed! It is nothing less than a denial of the saving grace of Christ, which works within us not only the power, but the very will to believe (Phil. 1:29; 2:12). And it was this very thing which the Semi-Pelagians professed openly, as we’ll see in greater detail letter, and for which they were condemned by the ancient church: “If anyone contends that God awaits our will so that we may be cleansed from sin, but does not confess that it comes about in us through the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit that we are willing to be cleansed, he resists the Holy Spirit himself who says through Solomon: The will is prepared by the Lord; and the Apostle wholesomely preaching: It is God who works in us both the will, to accomplish for good will.” (Second Council of Orange, canon 4)

If grace is not efficacious intrinsically and of itself, but only becomes such by our will, then there is no way to deny that from this doctrine it results that God waits upon us, and that we are the final initiators of our own regeneration. Nor does it avail them to appeal to the invitations of the Gospel set down in Christ; such as Rev. 3:20, which is favorite place of theirs that they twist to their own devices: “Behold, I stand at the door, and knock: if any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me.” However, here Christ is speaking of the Church itself, inviting them to return from their backsliding and be renewed to a joyful fellowship with Him. Furthermore, if this is to be extended to all men, then it may be understood with regard to all who have the external preaching of the Gospel, “if any man hear my voice.” The Semi-Pelagians assuredly confessed the necessity of such prevenient grace as this, but that did not in any way alleviate the force of their heresy. Such grace as they imagine does not cause us to will and to act, but only to be able to will and act; only such a grace as is powerful and effectual of itself can cause us to will, precisely because it does not wait upon our wills, otherwise it would be dependent upon that very effect which it is designed to cause in order to work and operate, which is a contradiction. 

In the work whereby the Jesuits imagine that God prepares to work through such grace that is only sufficient and not also effectual, He does not absolutely intend our consent thereby—but only upon the condition of the will’s consent. But a condition such as that whereby the effect depends is not subject and subordinate to the effect, but rather the latter is subject to the former. The grace of God, on their scheme, is subject to the will of man, rather than the other way around. This grace either has the human will so subject to itself that it causes efficaciously to act, infallibly connecting it to the operation, or it does not so work upon it, and God is therefore made subject to man, who becomes the master of his own salvation. 

(6). The grace of God in regeneration works physically upon our wills, not merely through a moral suasion or allurement. In every work of God in man, the will of man has the character of an instrument in the hand of God; with respect to the works of temporal divine judgment, the following description is given of the Assyrians: “O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so; but it is in his heart to destroy and cut off nations not a few.” (Isaiah 10:5-7). Now we see it here declared that the king of Assyria was a secondary cause so moved to act by God. And yet, the following verses show that this effectual divine concurrence did not take away either his liberty or culpability: “For he saith, By the strength of my hand I have done it, and by my wisdom; for I am prudent: and I have removed the bounds of the people, and have robbed their treasures, and I have put down the inhabitants like a valiant man: And my hand hath found as a nest the riches of the people: and as one gathereth eggs that are left, have I gathered all the earth; and there was none that moved the wing, or opened the mouth, or peeped. Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it? as if the rod should shake itself against them that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself, as if it were no wood.” (verses 13-15). Such is the manner of divine working with respect to the general actions of men. When the same effect and action is produced by God as the primary cause, and by man as the secondary cause, there is to be found in the effect itself something which corresponds to the power of God alone and exceeds human nature, such as being able to move himself from potentiality to act without the concurrence of God. It ought to be clear that a secondary cause cannot of itself attain that effect proper to the First Cause, but only instrumentally through God working within us. Now that effect of regeneration is one that is physical in nature, insofar as a real renewal and new creation takes place in the soul; therefore, that work of God which accomplishes this is not merely a moral suasion, since the act must correspond in some way to the end. In every act, man acts not only morally but also according to existence and entity, which are physical.

But we are here particularly concerned with the work of regeneration and conversion. This is what particularly has troubled the Reformed churches in our controversies against the Arminians. But in this, we are not merely concerned with scholastic squabbles but with the saving doctrine of Christ, and how we are to understand the manner whereby men are converted to it. Such things as this most assuredly call for our greater contemplation and discernment. 

[1]. Speaking generally, it is the word of God which is the means whereby men are called to repent and believe. It presses us, warns us, and promises us all things according to God’s revealed will contained therein. The principal way where this means is applied to men is through the ministry of the church. This is the ordinary means of regeneration, externally speaking. And it is sufficient in its own kind as an outward means, and that in two ways:—1st, it is enough to render men utterly inexcusable, when they have sat long under such external mercies of God, and yet remain unmoved and unconverted. “He, that being often reproved hardeneth his neck, shall suddenly be destroyed, and that without remedy.” (Prov. 29:1). This was the whole state and condition of the Jews in their apostasies and idolatries: “Moreover all the chief of the priests, and the people, transgressed very much after all the abominations of the heathen; and polluted the house of the Lord which he had hallowed in Jerusalem. And the Lord God of their fathers sent to them by his messengers, rising up betimes, and sending; because he had compassion on his people, and on his dwelling place: But they mocked the messengers of God, and despised his words, and misused his prophets, until the wrath of the Lord arose against his people, till there was no remedy.” (2 Chron. 34:14-16). Take heed, therefore, of not improving such outward privileges of the visible church, for this is the surest way to damnation. 2nd, conversion is ascribed to the preaching of the Word insofar as it as an external means, and not an internal one. Thus Paul said, “for in Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel.” (1 Cor. 4:15); and again by Peter, “Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever.” (1 Pet. 1:23)

[2]. In the ordinary manner of men’s conversion, some common operations of the Spirit will precede and accompany the work of regeneration, and yet are not to be confused with conversion itself—for there are many who may go this far, and yet shall never be saved. The primary end of all divine revelation is to make known the will of God to us, and what He requires from us (Matt. 4:15-16; Luke 4:18-19; Acts 20:20-21). Men are to be instructed in the ways of the Lord, the nature and heinousness of sin, and the sweetness of Christ and His gospel. When men are taught outwardly in this way, there will usually be some inner conviction and persuasion of the truth and power of it. Christ is set forth unto them as a Savior and a Lord to whom they must come and surrender themselves, and God is set forth as both a Judge who will by no means clear the guilty, but also a Merciful Father who will forgive any who repent and take Christ as He is offered to them in this preaching. 

[3]. To assert that the grace of Christ that is saving is nothing other than such a moral persuasion and allurement, whereby the mind is illuminated, and the affections are moved in some measure, wherein no real strength or efficacy is given by God to actually convert the sinner, but simply that the will is at liberty to either consent to such movements or reject them—this, I say, is nothing but a complete overthrow of the gospel of Jesus Christ, rendering it lifeless and dead until unregenerate men should decide to make use of it. For to what purpose would we ever pray, that God would grant us the will to desire and believe, if this is already within our own power? Why do we ask for grace to keep the commandments if it is already ours? 

Such a pretended “grace” as this is indeed utterly unsuitable and unfit to the work of conversion; just as if a man acted to make a blind man see by giving him moral arguments and persuasions to such an end, and leaving it in his own will whether he will consent to it or not. For this indeed is the Arminians’ foundational error, that they do not truly believe that the will has been corrupted by sin, although they time and again wish to exclaim that they do in words. 

The divine power in the work of conversion is explicitly compared by the apostle, with respect to its greatness and might, to the resurrection of Christ; “The eyes of your understanding being enlightened; that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places.” (Eph. 1:18-20). See also Romans 8:11, “the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you.” And the resurrection of the Lord Jesus, as no sane man would deny unless he is an atheist or a Jew, was a work of effectual divine power, and this the Scripture states is that same might operation of God, with regard to its intrinsic nature (although the effects are different in each case, to be sure), whereby men are regenerated. 

The inability that is naturally in man as respects the act of justifying faith in Christ, is something they incurred by their own fault, both by the corruption of original sin which came by the disobedience of our first parents, but also by their own unbelief, whereby they harden their own hearts against the gospel to their own destruction. Hence the Scripture says of some that “they could not believe.” (John 12:39). Assuredly the words of our Savior are to be believed rather than those of Arminius, wherein he says “You will not come to me, that you may have life.” (John 5:40). It is not given to all men to know and believe the will of God in the mystery of the gospel; indeed, it is the will and judgment of God to conceal it from many (Matt. 11:25; 13:11), and we seek no further reason for this than that it is His good pleasure to do so. 

Insofar as it is in the will subjectively, the work of conversion is considered as operating upon man as passive; for he does not give himself the will to believe, but this is instead the gift of God. Regeneration is a creating work (2 Cor. 5:14; Eph. 2:10), wherein we do not convert ourselves. But if we consider this work efficiently insofar as what is produced by this divine operation, believing is a vital act of the will, wherein it acts. To believe upon Christ is something that it is “given” to us (Phil. 1:29). To repent is also something that is graciously given us of God (2 Tim. 2:25; Acts 11:18). And this very hardness of heart is taken away by the Lord in this work (Ezekiel 36:26-27), and it is not said there that God merely will endeavor and purpose conditionally to so take it away, if we will consent thereunto, but rather that He will take it away, and that He will produce our consent. 

[4]. The manner whereby this work is described shows it to be one which gives not only the power of believing, but the will and act itself. The Scriptures shows that this is infallibly efficacious, as when God described it to the Israelites: “And the LORD thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the LORD thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live.” (Deut. 30:6); and the denial of such work is also the ground whereby men are blinded (Deut. 22:4). This circumcision of the heart is certainly nothing other than regeneration itself, and that whereby we are turned to God; the “the circumcision of Christ” is the “putting off the body of the sins of the flesh” (Col. 2:11), and in that place it is ἀχειροποιήτῳ, “made without hands”; this work is not accomplished by the will of man, but by the power of God upon the soul. 

The Teaching of Thomism

There was some debate amongst the Papists (particularly during the Jansenist controversy) with regard to whether any distinction was to be recognized between exciting grace and assisting grace; a hint of which can be seen in the Council of Trent, Session VI, chapter 5: “It is declared, moreover, that the beginning of this very justification in adults is received from God through Christ Jesus by prevenient grace, that is, by His vocation, in that none are called on account of their own existing merits; that they who were turned away from God by sin, may be disposed by His stimulating and assisting grace to become converted to their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with the same grace.”

It is to be much commended that the Thomists generally place much more sound emphasis upon the efficacy of grace than the Molinists do; and this appears to be precisely because they see its distinguishing factor being that the whole operation of grace is the work of God, and that grace ought not be measured according to free will. “The gratuitous movement of God, whereby He impels us to meritorious good, is efficacious, not on account of the consent of the free will that has been moved, but on account of the will and intention of God who moves it.” (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St Thomas, la Hae, q. 109-14, pg. 182). The consent of the will is not the cause of grace, but rather the effect thereof. 

Nonetheless, neither do the Thomists altogether reject the category of sufficient grace, which is essentially distinct from that grace which is efficacious of itself. Sufficient grace consists in where efficacious grace is indeed offered to us, but if we resist, then we deserve for God to not grant us further grace so that we may will and act. As it is expressed by the French Jesuit Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704): “Our intellect must be held captive before the obscurity of the divine mystery and admit two graces (sufficient and efficacious) of which the former leaves our will without any excuse before God, and the latter does not permit the will to glory in itself.” (Oeuvres complètes de Bossuet [Paris, 1845], 1:644). There is thus some real difference for the Thomists between sufficient grace, in which God has the divine permission of sin, and efficacious grace, where not only the possibility for fulfilling His commands is granted, but also the effective fulfillment. This is in contrast to the Molinists, who teach that sufficient actual grace itself is either efficacious from its effect, or from our consent foreseen by the alleged middle knowledge of God, or else inefficacious and merely sufficient.

The Thomists say that there is such grace given which is truly grace, but yet merely sufficient; it really confers the power, but may fail in its effect through the fault of the human will that resists it. Such internal aids as pious thoughts, holy desires for spiritual objects that excite indeliberate acts within us would fall under the category of a sufficient grace that is transient in nature, while infused habits that also have the same intention would be permanent helps. Such things as sufficient in their own order, and confer the proximate power to certain acts. However, they are ultimately insufficient for such supernatural virtues as to coincide with true conversion and justification. For example, such a sufficient grace may lead to attrition, but is not enough in itself to give contrition. As it is thus expressed by Diego Álvarez (1555–1632), a learned Dominican opponent of Molina: “All help which is sufficient with respect to one act is at the same time also efficacious in the order of another act to the accomplishment of which it is ordained by an absolute decree of divine providence, so that it is sufficient absolutely (for example, with respect to contrition) and efficacious under a certain aspect.” (De auxiliis divinae gratiae, book III, disp. 80)

This sufficient grace of the Thomists is indeed insufficient taken broadly according to every order of working, but it is not insufficient in its own genus or category. Heat is sufficient for burning in the genus of its own causality, but the concurrence of another cause is required for actually acting and producing an effect; in this case, the heat must be applied to some type of combustible matter. Bread is sufficient to nourish someone, but they must also eat and digest it. Sufficient grace thus gives a proximate ability to do good and is sufficient in its own order, but it may be impeded by the resistance of the will. When God thus bestows this ability to do good that is sufficient, He also offers us efficacious grace therein (as a fruit is virtually contained in the plant or tree, but the growth thereof may be impeded), but when a man resists this sufficient grace, He is justly deprived of any further help from God. Thus Aquinas said, “God, to the extent that it lies with Him, is ready to give grace to all, for He wills all to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth (I Timothy 2:15); but they alone are deprived of grace who present some obstacle to grace within themselves. In the same way, since the sun illuminates the world, the blame is imputed to one who shuts his eyes if some evil results therefrom, although he cannot see unless preceded by the light of the sun.” (Summa Contra Gentiles, III.159). This appears again to be repeated by the Council of Trent, in Session 6, chapter 13: “If men did not fail His grace, God would perfect the good work, just as He began it, bringing about both the willing and the accomplishing.”

This sufficient grace can be considered either partially and inadequately, or totally and adequately. For the production of any work or act which is above nature, it is required that there be some habit or principle from which it may flow forth, as well as that the object is proposed, and some affection that arouses the will to exercise. The former would be physical influences, the latter would be moral influences. When such things together do not actually have their effect, then it is merely a sufficient grace, but inadequately in their own genus—since efficacious grace has its ultimate end the consent of the will, and not merely such preparatory dispositions or experiences (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus in primam secundae D. Thomae, Q. 101, disp. 24, art. 1). 

They also assert that such sufficient grace is required for the fulfillment of the precepts, according to whether it pertains to the natural or supernatural order of being—since it can only be given to one who has a capacity, in some respect, to fulfill it. All men universally do not receive such help from God in the same measure, nor to all of the same ends. 

They often cite the decisions of the Synod of Quierzy (AD 853) against Gottschalk on this matter; but even more pertinent with regard to the teaching of the Roman Church on this matter is what they have decreed against the Jansenists, wherein the following proposition is condemned: “Some of God’s precepts are impossible to the just, who wish and strive to keep them, according to the present powers which they have; the grace, by which they are made possible, is also wanting.” (Pope Innocent X, Cum occasione [1658]; Denzinger, no. 1092). These propositions of Cornelius Jansen (as they attempted to derive them from his magnum opus, the Augustinus) were again anathematized by Pope Alexander VII in the constitution, “Ad sanctam B. Patri Sedem” (1656), and again by Pope Clement XI against Quesnel in the famous papal bull, Unigenitus (1713). Similarly, the Papists have condemned the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia for maintaining that “ that alone to be properly the grace of Jesus Christ as creates holy love in the heart and causes us to act. . . and also that the grace whereby the heart of man is touched by the illumination of the Holy Ghost is not, strictly speaking, the grace of Christ, and that the interior grace of Christ is not really given to him who resists it.” (Denzinger, no. 1521)

In order to avoid falling under papal condemnation, there were a few Jansenist theologians that devised some explanations concerning interior grace to reconcile the relevant theological concepts. Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), a French follower of Jansen, taught that it may be admitted that there is some minor interior grace which is sufficient in the general sense, but not in the particular sense.  It is grace which may be given in general, but not here and now in particular; or it is sufficient for acting generally, but not sufficient with respect for an individual commandment to be fulfilled or a particular temptation or sin to be avoided. 

It is essential to the Thomistic view that the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will in God is properly understood; as Lagrange notes, “Hence the division into these two wills is the supreme basis of the distinction between sufficient grace which proceeds from the antecedent will and grace which is efficacious of itself proceeding from the consequent will. But man, on account of his resistance to sufficient grace, deserves to be deprived of efficacious grace.” (Grace: Commentary on the Summa theologica of St Thomas, la Hae, q. 109-14, pg. 198)

The Reformed View

This controversy over the efficacy of God’s grace in conversion troubled not only Augustine and the Pelagians, the Jesuits and the Dominicans, the Jansensists, but also the Reformed church in its controversy against the Remonstrants, led by Arminius—whose pernicious errors are still alive and well among us today.

Now the summary teaching of our divines in this matter has been established by the holy Synod of Dort, according to the rule of Scripture: “But that others who are called by the gospel obey the call and are converted is not to be ascribed to the proper exercise of free will, whereby one distinguishes himself above others, equally furnished with grace sufficient for faith and conversions as the proud heresy of Pelagius maintains; but it must be wholly ascribed to God, who as He has chosen His own from eternity in Christ, so He confers upon them faith and repentance, rescues them from the power of darkness, and translates them into the kingdom of His own Son, that they may show forth the praises of Him who hath called them out of darkness into His marvelous light; and may glory not in themselves, but in the Lord according to the testimony of the apostles in various places. But when God accomplishes His good pleasure in the elect or works in them true conversion, He not only causes the gospel to be externally preached to them and powerfully illuminates their mind by His Holy Spirit, that they may rightly understand and discern the things of the Spirit of God; but by the efficacy of the same regenerating Spirit, pervades the inmost recesses of the man; He opens the closed, and softens the hardened heart, and circumcises that which was uncircumcised, infuses new qualities into the will, which though heretofore dead, He quickens; from being evil, disobedient, and refractory, He renders it good, obedient, and pliable; actuates and strengthens it, that like a good tree, it may bring forth the fruits of good actions.” (Canons of Dort III, articles 10 & 11)

The grace whereby God saves men in Christ is not merely a moral suasion granted through external means, such as the preaching of the gospel. Rather, it is an interior work of God upon the soul—for though the preacher waters outwardly, it is God who truly waters inwardly. Augustine said, “This grace, if it is to be called doctrine, is certainly to be so called in the sense that God is believed to pour it in more deeply and interiorly with ineffable sweetness, not only through those who plant and water, but also through himself.” (On the Grace of Christ, ch. 13)

Consider the case of the Jewish scribes and Pharisees, who had a much greater exposure to God’s revelation in Christ and all of the appointed means whereby men are brought to salvation, namely His public ministry and all of the various miracles He performed in the sight of many. But yet since this hearing was not accompanied with faith, they did not come to Christ at all—indeed, all of these things were concealed from them, so that they did not inwardly perceive the mystery of the gospel He had revealed, while the apostles had indeed received it. But was the difference between them merely based upon their own will and liberty? No, for our Savior says “O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.” (Matt. 11:25), and the very reason and grounds thereof He declares in the next verse, “Even so, Father, for it seemed good in Thy sight.” (verse 26) And any of those who do come do so only by this interior work of God whereby it is given to them to believe in Christ, since “neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him” (verse 27). 

The work of regeneration, whereby we become a new creation, is such as supposes natural life to exist in man, but with respect to spiritual good, man is but a passive receiver, and his will is prepared by the Lord, who is the complete author of our salvation. Who would be so foolish as to suppose that the unregenerate man, who is compared to a dead and lifeless corpse, a slave of sin, a servant of darkness, etc. would be capable of rousing his own vivification and salvation? For he only begins to will that which is spiritually good when God comes before him and heals his nature, taking away his heart of stone. 

The promise of God in the new covenant is that He will bestow upon us new hearts of flesh, and the heart of stone will be taken away (Ezekiel 36:27), and what this new principle of spiritual life is which is infused within us is explicitly delineated by the prophet: “I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them.” Now, if this special grace were merely that which bestows the ability and power, but not the will and act, then this is nothing but to contradict the words of Scripture here, which say that God overcomes our resistance in regeneration. For on the Arminian scheme, men may have this grace and new heart which he promises, and yet not actually be converted, which is an absurdity that is plainly unworthy of any serious response or consideration. 

Thus therefore, God not only gives us the power, but the will and act of believing in Christ, whereby we are saved and converted. For the will is prepared by the Lord, and it is He who works within us to work according to His good pleasure. I do not desire so much to set forth my own personal thoughts upon this matter in such a way as to express anything different from what Augustine already said before me, who assuredly has said it far better than I could ever hope to do. “For it is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him for such a force of will as suffices to make us act by the willing. It is certain that it is we that will when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (as he has just now expressed it), The will is prepared by the Lord. Of the same Lord it is said, The steps of a man are ordered by the Lord, and his way does He will. Of the same Lord again it is said, It is God who works in you, even to will! It is certain that it is we that act when we act; but it is He who makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will, who has said, I will make you to walk in my statutes, and to observe my judgments, and to do them. When he says, I will make you ... to do them, what else does He say in fact than, I will take away from you your heart of stone, from which used to arise your inability to act, and I will give you a heart of flesh, in order that you may act? And what does this promise amount to but this: I will remove your hard heart, out of which you did not act, and I will give you an obedient heart, out of which you shall act? It is He who causes us to act, to whom the human suppliant says, Set a watch, O Lord, before my mouth.” (Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 16 [32])

A second class of Scriptural testimonies for the truth at hand may be seen from all those texts in which the people of God and believers pray to the Lord for His divine assistance that they might perform any good work or virtuous act. Such is the case of faith, “For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake” (Phil. 1:29), where it is said herein to be something that is ἐχαρίσθη, given to us, or granted by God, which indeed would not make any sense were it not that it is God who so works within us to believe. For the act of mortifying sin, we are indeed commanded to do so by God, but the manner of our so doing is also taught to us, and that is that it should be πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις, “through the power of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:13). In that same chapter, the apostle attributes to the Spirit all such works connected with our spiritual life, growth in grace, and weaning from the world: “dwelling in us” (verse 9), “quickening us” (verse 11), “makes intercession for us in our weakness” (verse 26). All ways and means of attempting any mortification of the flesh and the lusts thereof are completely vain and useless unless it is so performed through the divine assistance given by the Spirit of Christ to believers alone, and hence the apostle sums up such an exhortation by describing the state and manner in which it ought to put itself forth in acts: οὐκ ἐστὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλὰ ἐν πνεύματι; “not in the flesh but in the Spirit.” (verse 9). We see many men, especially among the Papists, who have attempted to mortify sin and live unto Christ, and have utterly failed in their undertakings, and this is first and foremost because a great ignorance abides upon the Church of Rome concerning the true nature of this work, and the means whereby it is accomplished in the children of God; they therefore have invented all such means of will-worship and self-mortification that are nowhere to be found in the entire Word of God, but are rather the inventions of men, and nothing but broken cisterns. Why should we be surprised therefore, when a great deal of men that profess these doctrines, nonetheless remain either in cursed licentiousness or Pharisaic self-righteousness? Thus all means of mortification and the avoiding of sin are effectual through the operation of God within us, and in no way otherwise do men go headlong into sin than through their own weakness and fault; hence the verse was commonly cited against the Semi-Pelagians, “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help.” (Hosea 13:9)

But commonly, the Arminians and Jesuits throw against us such places of Scripture as appear to contradict this, or where men are said to in some way resist the work of the Holy Spirit: “What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it? wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?” (Isaiah 5:4); “Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost: as your fathers did, so do ye.” (Acts 7:51); “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!” (Matt. 23:37). To this objection a few things may be said; 1st, such resistance to the work of the Spirit is particularly spoken in reference to the common and external operations of His, as gathered from Zech 7:12, “Yea, they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the LORD of hosts hath sent in his spirit by the former prophets: therefore came a great wrath from the LORD of hosts.” 

I come now to explain the manner in which the idea of sufficient grace is to be properly understood, and clear away all such pretenses as make any understanding difficult between the two sides—for strawmen are the common enemy of truth and doctrine. And this task has been undertaken by other Reformed divines in the past, especially the learned Richard Baxter (Catholick Theologie [London, 1675], 3:130-197). 

The word sufficient can be taken broadly for that which is in any way necessary for believing, and so in this sense we deny that it finds it proper meaning. Rather, in this controversy, the term refers to that which gives the posse agere, i.e. that which is absolutely necessary to the act, without which it cannot be done, and with which alone it can be done. And in this sense we do not altogether deny that there is such a sufficient grace as this. With respect to believers, there is also such sufficient grace to perform various good and gracious works, various acts of faith and love, which yet are never put forth into act. It may also be admitted for certain that this existed in the case of Adam before his fall, whereby he had the ability given him to stand if he so willed; so that it is true that God did permit the first sin to take place, but he is not therefore the Author of sin, since He was in no way obligated or bound to give Adam that grace which would infallibly result in his actual perseverance. However, it is too little to understand this sufficient grace as though Adam had only the ability to stand, but not the ability to persevere if he will (ad posse stare, non autem ad actum). For it is a plain contradiction to suppose that men have the power to act, and yet do not have that which is necessary to the act—for we are not here talking about such a passive power as brute animals and stones have (to be affected by some external agent), but that which is had by rational creatures who are created in God’s image, endowed with rectitude and the ordering of the soul to God. To say a man can believe, or has the power to do so, and yet does not have that without which he cannot believe, is contradictory. But we do assert that there is no grace sufficient for salvation that is not also effectual; all that persevere in faith and holiness are eternally saved, and those that do not do so, do not have grace sufficient to salvation. And such external acts as prepare for salvation, as weeping over sin, hearing the Word preached, seeking Christ in the gospel, are such things as men are bound to do, although they in no way merit justification, either condignly (which no men I know of have ever dared to assert) or congruously (as many of the late medieval scholastics erroneously taught). All men who have heard the gospel have in this sense a common grace which is more disposed toward salvation than those that are not; for who would deny that a man who has heard the gospel and feels some natural pangs over it, though he never actually is saved, is yet closer to salvation than the heathens that have never so heard, and still remain in blindness and idolatry? In this sense, some of the unregenerate and reprobate are nearer to conversion than others (Mark 12:34) although they may never actually be converted. And therefore when learned men and various theologians have conceded sufficient grace as to such external helps which, as to the works themselves, are intended to bring men to salvation, I do not think any real disagreement lies herein, except perhaps over the choice of words. For all such external things are helps indeed, and even called the mercies of God with respect to wicked and ungodly men, it being his revealed will that they should come to repentance; of the rebellious Israelites in the wilderness it is said, “Yet thou in thy manifold mercies forsookest them not in the wilderness: the pillar of the cloud departed not from them by day, to lead them in the way; neither the pillar of fire by night, to shew them light, and the way wherein they should go.” (Neh. 9:19; cf. verses 27-28, 31), the common mercies in God’s providential dealings with men are intended to move them towards that which is truly spiritually good, as faith, repentance, love for others, and the like (Matt. 18:33; Rom. 2:4). Such common operations as this are even called by the name of grace in some places, insofar as they broadly fall under that Scripture-definition of it, that they are given and bestowed by God upon undeserving sinners, common to the elect and reprobate. “And now for a little space grace hath been shewed from the Lord our God, to leave us a remnant to escape, and to give us a nail in his holy place, that our God may lighten our eyes, and give us a little reviving in our bondage.” (Ezra 9:8); “For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men.” (Titus 2:11)

I think the Rev. Baxter has well observed (Catholick Theologie, 3:151) that it is not genuine or true to frame the debate about whether two men, both of whom are equally disposed, and whether one will accept the grace of God and the other will reject it. With their minds and affections being varied between each other and amongst themselves according to the great diversity of objects that they are exposed to, it is absurd to think that any two unconverted can be utterly in the same position with regard to the effectual operations of the Spirit (I speak here considering the persons in themselves, for they are both condemned according to the judgment of God). Even if two such men were actually posited, they may differ as to the external impediments which lie before them, and which therefore necessitates that one may need a greater help of grace than another. Indeed, due to such impediments, a less degree of divine impulse may cause the act in one, while it does not so cause the act in the other. 

This then brings us to the common operations of the Spirit that touch the generality of men under the preaching of the Word, whether elect or reprobate. The chief among these is the conviction of sin and judgment which men may receive, although many of them never are converted or ever truly repent of their sins and believe in Christ. Such was the case with Felix when he listened to the preaching of Paul: “And as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled, and answered, Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season, I will call for thee.” (Acts 24:25). That such conviction as this is a common and ordinary work of the Spirit is testified to by our Savior, “And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment.” (John 16:8). And although we condemn the heresy of the Arminians and Jesuits as we have examined it above, we do not altogether reject that some internal operations of the Spirit may take place in the reprobate that relate to the universal and free offer of the Gospel. It is thus described in the Westminster Assembly’s Directory for the Publick Worship of God, in the section “Of Publick Prayer before the Sermon”, wherein the minister expresses the corporate repentance of the church: “which sins of ours receive many fearful aggravations, we having broken all the commandments of the holy, just, and good law of God, doing that which is forbidden, and leaving undone what is enjoined; and that not only out of ignorance and infirmity, but also more presumptuously, against the light of our minds, checks of our consciences, and motions of his own Holy Spirit to the contrary, so that we have no cloak for our sins; yea, not only despising the riches of God’s goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering, but standing out against many invitations and offers of grace in the gospel; not endeavoring, as we ought, to receive Christ into our hearts by faith, or to walk worthy of him in our lives.” (emphasis mine). And again in Question 68 of our Larger Catechism: “All the elect, and they only, are effectually called; although others may be, and often are, outwardly called by the ministry of the word, and have some common operations of the Spirit; who, for their willful neglect and contempt of the grace offered to them, being justly left in their unbelief, do never truly come to Jesus Christ.”

When men do obstinately spurn the wooings of Christ to repentance, and all the goodnesses God has shown them up, they are in some instances given over to a reprobate mind (as Paul describes concerning the Gentile pagans), or judicially shut in a seared and hardened conscience forever, having no desire to believe, repent, or be saved. Such a judgment was passed upon the world before the flood: “My Spirit shall not always strive with men” (Gen. 6:3). We are therefore exhorted to “Quench not the Spirit” (1 Thess. 5:19), which certainly implies that there are some among the reprobate who do this. To the unbelieving Jews, Christ said “But I receive not testimony from man: but these things I say, that ye might be saved.” (John 5:34), in which he shows the end and purpose of his preaching, namely their repentance and salvation, although this never in fact occurs for the reprobate. 

The distinction between exciting and assisting grace is also important for understanding to what degree some men speak when they say that the saving grace of God may be resisted by man. Insofar, as such grace is concerned which actually moves and concurs with men in the act of believing and converting, assuredly it never fails, and infallibly accomplishes what it purposes—but this is not always the case with exciting grace, as the Reformed say in agreement with Jansen, in the third volume of the Augustinus (De Gratia Christi, book II, ch. 27). But who can deny that many are internally moved in various ways, with convictions and pangs of conscience, some natural love of God and virtue, and yet are never saved? Many are illuminated in their minds to some extent, and have tasted of spiritual things, and yet ultimately fall away (Heb. 6:4-6), as is seen in the parable of the soils. Hence learned men distinguish between proper acts of willing and mere velleities, by which are meant such inclinations and movements of the soul which are yet in no way sufficient for a man to truly love or obey God—but they nonetheless cannot be obtained by man’s own will in a state of sin. For as the imaginations of the heart are only evil continually (Gen. 6:5), not even such imaginations can be healed apart from grace. 

For starters, let us propose to the Jesuits the case of one who has this sufficient grace: will they concede that he ought to pray for further grace in respect to his own spiritual condition and salvation? If they answer in the affirmative, then they concede that sufficient grace is really distinct from that which is efficacious, and that the distinguishing factor does not lie in the free consent of the will foreseen by their fiction of scientia media, but it is God who distinguishes one from the other; “for what has thou that thou didst not receive?” (1 Cor. 4:7)

The Teaching of Augustine

There can be no question, first of all, that in the mind of Augustine, the chief reason why one man is converted and another is not is not due merely to the free choice of the will, which either accepts or rejects grace, but rather to the will and decree of God; “Of two adults leading lives of great wickedness, that one should be called in such a way as to follow the call, while the other is not called, or not called in that way, is in the inscrutable judgments of God.” (On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 9)

Without doubt, the most famous passage of Augustine on this matter, which is also cited by the Council of Trent, is from his treatise On Nature and Grace, ch. 43: “God does not command the impossible, but by commanding He instructs thee both to do what thou canst and to beg what thou canst not, and He assists thee that thou mayest be able.” And again in chapter 67, when he refutes those who do not persevere and seek to blame God for not giving them grace: “Since God . . . recalls the hostile, teaches the believing, consoles the hopeful, encourages the loving, assists him who strives, and hears him who prays, thou art not condemned to sin because thou art ignorant against thy will, but because thou dost neglect to seek after what thou knowest not; not because thou failest to bind up the wounded members, but because thou disdainest the will to be healed.”

Similarly, some sufficient grace is granted in the case of Adam in the state of original innocence, insofar as God granted him the power to be able to stand in that grace which he received (auxilium sine quo non), but this is not the same as grace that would infallibly produce the effect and act of perseverance (auxilium quo). Adam had the former, but not the latter: “He had given help without which he could not continue therein if he would; but that he should will, He left in his free will. He could therefore continue if he would, because the help was not wanting whereby he could, and without which he could not, perseveringly hold fast the good which he would. But that he willed not to continue is absolutely the fault of him whose merit it would have been if he had willed to continue.” (On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 32)

[1]. Augustine most certainly denies that those who are hard-hearted and persist in their blind resistance to the gospel have any grace or possibility in themselves of believing. This very belief of the Semi-Pelagians was summed up by their own master, Faustus of Riez: “truly impious is he who testifies that this mercy is not bestowed upon all, not imparted to all.” (Faustus, De gratia et libero arbitrio libri duo, book I, ch. 17)

When Pelagius insisted that all men have some possibility of avoiding sin, how does Augustine respond? “The reason why he attributes to the grace of God the capacity of not sinning is, that God is the Author of nature, in which, he declares, this capacity of avoiding sin is inseparably implanted. Whenever He wills a thing, no doubt He does it; and what He wills not, that He does not. Now, wherever there is this inseparable capacity, there cannot accrue any infirmity of the will; or rather, there cannot be both a presence of will and a failure in performance. This, then, being the case, how comes it to pass that to will is present, but how to perform that which is good is not present [Rom. 7:18]? Now, if the author of the work we are discussing spoke of that nature of man, which was in the beginning created faultless and perfect, in whatever sense his dictum be taken, that it has an inseparable capacity,— that is, so to say, one which cannot be lost — then that nature ought not to have been mentioned at all which could be corrupted, and which could require a physician to cure the eyes of the blind, and restore that capacity of seeing which had been lost through blindness. For I suppose a blind man would like to see, but is unable; but, whenever a man wishes to do a thing and cannot, there is present to him the will, but he has lost the capacity.” (On Nature and Grace, ch. 51); 

The comparison between spiritual and physical blindness entails more than merely the presence of an aversion to God, and the obstinate act of unbelief, but indeed some very deep-rooted inability, which cannot be removed by man’s own will. Who can be willingly blind in his heart, when indeed no man wishes even to be physically blinded? 

When Augustine speaks of the gifts Adam possessed in his first creation, and that help which he had without which he could not persevere (auxilium sine qua non), but yet which did not confer the actual will toward the act (auxilium quo), he also says: “If, however, this help had been wanting, either to angel or to man when they were first made, since their nature was not made such that without the divine help it could abide if it would, they certainly would not have fallen by their own fault, because the help would have been wanting without which they could not continue. At the present time, however, to those to whom such assistance is wanting, it is the penalty of sin; but to those to whom it is given, it is given of grace, not of debt; and by so much the more is given through Jesus Christ our Lord to those to whom it has pleased God to give it, that not only we have that help without which we cannot continue even if we will, but, moreover, we have so great and such a help as to will. Because by this grace of God there is caused in us, in the reception of good and in the persevering hold of it, not only to be able to do what we will, but even to will to do what we are able. But this was not the case in the first man; for the one of these things was in him, but the other was not.” (On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 32; emphasis mine)

Augustine expressly speaks of those to whom this sufficient grace is not present, and it is not present under the mode of being a punishment for sin. This passage was of such force against the Jesuits, that even Gabriel Vazquez was convicted to admit the following: “And if Pharaoh, that outstanding example of hardening, had this capacity to obey, it follows that he was never lacking in sufficient divine grace. Yet since in that same chapter 62 and other cited places Augustine so plainly denies sufficient divine grace to the hardened, I would not wish to confirm our opinion by his authority….I confess that I find the testimonies of Prosper and Fulgentius suspect, because they are most diligent and exact disciples of Augustine and seem to follow the opposing view, as is clear from the testimonies cited in the preceding chapter in the first class. In the passages now cited by us, they perhaps conceded only the grace of external signs and benefits — even external medicines for sin — while in others they denied the assistance of interior inspiration, which is now the matter under dispute.” (Commentaria Ac Disputationes In Primam Partem Summae Theologiae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, disp. 97, ch. 3). And again in chapter 6 of the same disputation, this Jesuit writes “Among those things which were adduced in chapter 1 for the prior opinion, I confess there are some more difficult ones — such as the testimonies of Augustine, with which I do not know how satisfaction can be given. Therefore it will be necessary to admit that Augustine held that opinion…The other things which we adduced from Augustine, distributed into two classes, in my judgment cannot be rightly explained. Wherefore I would not hesitate to say that Augustine and his disciples Prosper and Fulgentius held that opinion. What makes this very probable to me is that I see that Prosper and Fulgentius never excuse Augustine in this matter, though they defend him from many other calumnies and interpret his words in a good sense; and although what we cited in the first class could in some way be interpreted in a good sense, as we shall explain the words of the Council of Trent which we quoted there — yet because what was adduced in the second class admits no benign interpretation, I would not hesitate to say that Augustine held the same view in both.”

[2]. He teaches that grace infallibly accomplishes its intended effect, and that the reason why men do not believe, is because such grace has not been given to them. “What is the meaning of, ‘Every man that has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes unto me,’ except that there is none who hears from the Father, and learns, who comes not to me? For if every one who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes, certainly every one who does not come has not heard from the Father; for if he had heard and learned, he would come. For no one has heard and learned, and has not come; but every one, as the Truth declares, who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes…It is true that that grace is exceedingly secret, but who doubts that it is grace? This grace, therefore, which is hiddenly bestowed in human hearts by the Divine gift, is rejected by no hard heart, because it is given for the sake of first taking away the hardness of the heart. When, therefore, the Father is heard within, and teaches, so that a man comes to the Son, He takes away the heart of stone and gives a heart of flesh, as in the declaration of the prophet He has promised. Because He thus makes them children and vessels of mercy which He has prepared for glory.” (On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 13); And again in chapter 15, he says: “When, therefore, the gospel is preached, some believe, some believe not; but they who believe at the voice of the preacher from without, hear of the Father from within, and learn; while they who do not believe, hear outwardly, but inwardly do not hear nor learn — that is to say, to the former it is given to believe; to the latter it is not given…Therefore, to be drawn to Christ by the Father, and to hear and learn of the Father in order to come to Christ, is nothing else than to receive from the Father the gift by which to believe in Christ.”

In On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, book I, ch. 15, Augustine writes not only against the Pelagians—but also, as it were, against Molina and his followers: “Now as touching this kind of teaching, the Lord also says: ‘Every man that has heard, and has learned of the Father, comes unto me.’ Of the man, therefore, who has not come, it cannot be correctly said: Has heard and has learned that it is his duty to come to Him, but he is not willing to do what he has learned. It is indeed absolutely improper to apply such a statement to that method of teaching, whereby God teaches by grace. For if, as the Truth says, Every man that has learned comes, it follows, of course, that whoever does not come has not learned. But who can fail to see that a man's coming or not coming is by the determination of his will? This determination, however, may stand alone, if the man does not come; but if he does come, it cannot be without assistance; and such assistance, that he not only knows what it is he ought to do, but also actually does what he thus knows. And thus, when God teaches, it is not by the letter of the law, but by the grace of the Spirit. Moreover, He so teaches, that whatever a man learns, he not only sees with his perception, but also desires with his choice, and accomplishes in action. By this mode, therefore, of divine instruction, volition itself, and performance itself, are assisted, and not merely the natural capacity of willing and performing. For if nothing but this capacity of ours were assisted by this grace, the Lord would rather have said, Every man that has heard and has learned of the Father may possibly come unto me. This, however, is not what He said; but His words are these: Every man that has heard and has learned of the Father comes unto me. Now the possibility of coming Pelagius places in nature, or even — as we found him attempting to say some time ago — in grace (whatever that may mean according to him) — when he says, whereby this very capacity is assisted; whereas the actual coming lies in the will and act. It does not, however, follow that he who may come actually comes, unless he has also willed and acted for the coming. But every one who has learned of the Father not only has the possibility of coming, but comes; and in this result are already included the motion of the capacity, the affection of the will, and the effect of the action.”

[3]. Augustine and his followers consistently teach and indicate that the idea of a universal sufficient grace was a tenet of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. In his letter to Vitalis (Epistle 107), Augustine declares as a fundamental article of the Christian faith that “it [the grace of God] is not given to all human beings and that it is not only not given to those to whom it is given according to the merits of their actions but that it is also not given to those to whom it is given according to the merits of their wills, something that is seen especially in infants.” Indeed, so clear is all of this, that Prosper of Aquitane summarized the Semi-Pelagian heresy in such words as quite nearly are a replication of Arminius and Molina also:—"That every man sinned in Adam, and that no one is saved by his own works, but by the grace of God and by rebirth in Jesus Christ; and that nevertheless the salvation acquired through the mystery of the blood of Jesus Christ is presented to all men without excepting a single one, so that all who wish to receive the faith and baptism may be saved” (Prosper of Aquitaine, Epistle to Augustine, §3)

[4]. Augustine says that the grace of Christ infallibly accomplishes its intended effect in those in whom it operates, and that it overcomes the resistance of the will, since it makes it willing from being unwilling before. “But when men either come or return into the way of righteousness by means of rebuke, who is it that works salvation in their hearts but that God who gives the increase, whoever plants and waters, and whoever labours on the fields or shrubs — that God whom no man's will resists when He wills to give salvation? For so to will or not to will is in the power of Him who wills or wills not, as not to hinder the divine will nor overcome the divine power. For even concerning those who do what He wills not, He Himself does what He will.” (On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 14). And in that same chapter, he writes concerning Amisai: “Could he withstand the will of God, and not rather do the will of Him who wrought in his heart by His Spirit, with which he was clothed, to will, speak, and do thus?”

Does not the very example and life of the apostle Paul confirm all of this? Who was more unwilling and more thought to be incapable of salvation and a softening of the heart than Saul of Tarsus? And yet we must affirm that God so worked within him that he might begin to will well, when he previously willed nothing but evil and sin. 

II. Now the key text whereupon many seek to found this division of grace into efficacious and inefficacious is found in Augustine’s book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 34: “The helps themselves must be distinguished: one is the help without which something does not happen, and another is the help by which something does happen. For without food we cannot live, yet when food is present it does not follow that the person who wishes to die will live. Therefore the help of food is a 'without which it does not happen,' not one 'by which it happens,' so that we may live. But the beatitude which a man possesses, once it has been given, immediately he is blessed; it is therefore a help not only without which it does not happen, but also by which it does happen, for the sake of which it is given. Therefore this help both 'by which it happens' and 'without which it does not happen,' because if beatitude is given to a man, he is immediately blessed, and if it is never given, he will never be blessed; food, on the other hand, does not consequently make a man live, yet without it he cannot live. Therefore to the first man, who in the good in which he had been made upright had received the ability not to abandon that good, there was given a help of perseverance — not one by which he would persevere, but without which through free will he could not persevere. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God through God's grace, not only such a help of perseverance is given, but such that perseverance itself is bestowed on them — not only so that without this gift they cannot persevere, but also so that through this gift they cannot be otherwise than persevering.” The type of grace given to the saints is therefore which infallibly accomplishes its effect, and gives them not only the power, but the very willing and acting. 

However, it ought to be clear from this very passage that Augustine explicitly distinguishes these two graces by assigning the sufficient grace to Adam before sin, and the grace of Christ is that which works within us not only the power, but also the will and deed. Such a distinction is not of my own mind, but rather of his—for in the same treatise, he writes “Because such was the nature of the aid, that he could forsake it when he would, and that he could continue in it if he would; but not such that it could be brought about that he would. This first is the grace which was given to the first Adam; but more powerful than this is that in the second Adam. For the first is that whereby it is affected that a man may have righteousness if he will; the second, therefore, can do more than this, since by it it is even effected that he will, and will so much, and love with such ardour, that by the will of the Spirit he overcomes the will of the flesh, that lusts in opposition to it.” (On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 31)

III. All of these things considered, it is no wonder that many Jesuit writers have made rebukes against Augustine, as it were, or confessed their own confusion and misunderstanding of that holy man. We may see a few of their own testimonies here. 

[1]. In teaching that predestination is founded upon the foreseen use of free will, Molina admits that Augustine is not in favor of his cause—but rather than submitting himself to a far godlier and wiser theologian, the Jesuit instead rebels him, saying:—  “This view, however — both on account of its novelty at that time, and also because Augustine did not add that it was nevertheless not without foreknowledge of what would occur by the freedom of created will from the hypothesis that it would be placed in this or that order of things with these or those aids and occasions, and that such future use was taken into consideration in predestining and reprobating Angels and men (though Augustine did not deny this, he did not however express it) — at that time greatly troubled not a few of the faithful…I suspect that Augustine and St. Thomas (who followed in Augustine's footsteps) by their own intention aimed principally at only that first point which we gladly embrace along with the more common opinion of the Scholastics; and that they did not notice how much for removing that other harshness which they by no means intended, the addition they neither denied nor would have denied if consulted about it would have contributed — namely, that predestination and reprobation were nonetheless not without foreknowledge of the quality of the use of free will, with consideration of it taken in the manner explained and to be explained more fully in what follows. Meanwhile, however, while under that quasi-darkness St. Augustine did not attend to this — judging at first sight that it was connected with his opinion on predestination that God did not will all men universally to be saved but only the predestined.” (Luis de Molina, Concordia, Q. 23, art. 4 & 5, §6)

[2]. Bellarmine himself did not go as far as Molina did in this matter, and candidly expressed: “This theory is entirely alien to the opinion of St. Augustine and, in my judgment, even to the meaning of Holy Scripture.” (Robert Bellarmine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, book I, ch. 12). So perplexed was Suarez by the doctrine of congruent natural grace as explained by Gabriel Vazquez, that he candidly confessed: “the consequent is alien to the opinion of Augustine and can scarcely in reality be distinguished by us from the opinion of the Semi-Pelagians — though it may seem to differ in words.” (Francisco Suarez, De Divina Gratia, book I, ch. 17, §11)

[3]. The Semi-Pelagians taught along with the Jesuits and Arminians that divine grace is one and the same, but distinguished its relations—it is considered as sufficient or efficient with respect to the free choice of the will foreseen by God’s middle knowledge. Such universal grace as posited by the Jesuits was also envisioned by these false teachers of the ancient church, as we have already demonstrated. The 5th century Semi-Pelagian theologian Faustus of Riez said “You yourself, I say, confirm that without the merit of faith—that is, without the cooperation of the human will—grace profits nothing. And how then do you say that God has reserved everything to himself concerning the state of man, and has given nothing to man? Behold, even according to your own opinion, not even the mystery of regeneration itself can remain effective unless man adds the disposition of belief in accordance with the gift of blessing.” (Faustus of Riez, De gratia et libero arbitrio, book I, ch. 15; emphasis mine). Whether or not Faustus here accurately represents the Augustinians here is tangential to how he himself understands the efficacy of grace, namely as being dependent upon the human will; in the same treatise, Faustus said “everything is of grace—but it is offered and imparted to all for the salvation of all by the Creator and Redeemer” (book I, chapter 4)

[4]. As a note in passing, one may note how desperate these theologians are to insert their doctrine into not only Scripture, but also the orthodox fathers. Hence, one Jesuit tried to corrupt and mistranslate Prosper of Aquitaine's treatise On the Calling of the Gentiles in order that this sufficient internal grace might be found therein (see Antoine Arnauld, Apologie pour les saincts peres de l'Eglise, defenseurs de la grace de Jesus-Christ [Paris, 1651], book III, art. 3)

[5]. Seeing that the view of the ancient enemies of Augustine and the grace of God was so close to his own, the Jesuit scholastic theologian Juan de Ripalda (1594-1638), where he cites several passages from Prosper of Aquitaine that he thinks to be in his favor, either ignorant or deceiving his readers, considering that Prosper is here describing Semi-Pelagianism, not the true doctrine: “Again, the mind of Augustine and the truth of our doctrine are clearly gathered from the writings of his disciples. Prosper of Aquitaine was constant in asserting this, proclaiming the grace of God as universal for all human beings. Thus in Book II of On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 5: ‘Although this grace was formerly more sparing and more hidden, yet it has never denied itself in any age—one in power, diverse in measure, unchangeable in counsel, manifold in operation.’ And in chapter 29: ‘The manifold and ineffable goodness of God has always provided, and still provides, for the whole human race in such a way that no one who perishes has any excuse from the light of truth being denied to him, nor is it permitted to anyone to glory in his own righteousness.’ By these words he most clearly establishes that the grace of God is absent from no human being—not even from those who perish—such that they could claim any excuse from its denial.” (Juan de Ripalda, Adversus Baium et Baianos: Ad Disputationes De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 23, num. 84). Ripalda makes the same mistake again in section 87 of the same disputation, when he cites the following quote from one of Prosper’s poems: “That it calls all, invites all, passing over none; that it strives to bring a common salvation to all and to free the whole world from sin; but that each one obeys the one who calls by his own free choice, and by his own judgment extends his mind toward the offered light, which withdraws itself from no one.” (On the Ungrateful, ch. 10). Yet here, Prosper describes the error of the Pelagians that he sought to refute, not his own view which he defended and maintained after Augustine (see the text and footnotes in Migne ed., Patrologia Latina, 51:410)