Mar 11, 2024

Eutyches and the Double Consubstantiality of Christ

 

During the Home Synod of Constantinople, Eutyches was summoned multiple times to appear before the assembly of bishops. On one such instance, he was invited by John the Presbyter, and the two deacons Andrew and Athanasius. John the Presbyter provides testimony that Eutyches denied that Christ is “from two natures” as well as refusing to confess that Christ is consubstantial with us according to the flesh. His testimony is recorded in the minutes of the Home Synod, which were examined at the April 449 inquiry as well as in the first session of Chalcedon. His official statement is as follows:


“As for the assertion that our Lord Jesus Christ had come into being from two natures united hypostatically, he [Eutyches] said that he had neither learnt it in the expositions of the holy fathers nor, if such a statement were read to him by someone, would he accept it, since the divine scriptures, as he claimed, are better than the teaching of the fathers. While asserting this, he acknowledged as perfect God and perfect man the one who was born from the Virgin Mary but does not have flesh consubstantial with us. This is what he said in conversation with me.’ The most holy archbishop said: ‘Were you the only person to hear this, or did the deacon Andrew who was sent with you also hear it?’ The most devout presbyter and advocate John said: ‘When I was being told to convey these statements to your sacredness, the most devout deacon Andrew was also present.” (The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. 1, pg. 242, line 643)


John says that Eutyches made these statements during a private conversation with him (lines 644; 660). Andrew the deacon, who was present on the occasion, confirmed that this was true (lines 665; 667; 669). The deacon Athanasius claimed that he was not paying attention at the time (line 674). 


Two important things need to be noted about this particular conversation between John the Presbyter and Eutyches.


1) In the April 449 inquiry, there were suspicions that the minutes of Eutyches’ statements here had been falsified. John the Presbyter gave a paraphrase of his conversation with Eutyches that he had produced, which recorded things slightly differently from what was contained in the official minutes. What is most important for us to know for our present purposes is that John’s paraphrase did not contain Eutyches’ refusal to confess Christ’s double consubstantiality. John emphasized that his paraphrase did not vindicate Eutyches and swore that Eutyches had made the statements he accused him of making. Nonetheless, Andrew the deacon testified to John’s truthfulness (line 665).


2) Andrew the deacon’s account of this episode does differ slightly, by recording Eutyches as giving what appears to be an intentionally ambiguous answer as to Christ’s double consubstantiality. In both John’s and Andrew’s accounts, Eutyches ultimately refuses to say that Christ is consubstantial with us according to the flesh:


“Andrew the most devout deacon said: ‘Since God is seated among you and fear and trembling seize my soul, I cannot depart from the truth. A short time ago I was sent by my master the all-holy Archbishop Flavian and his holy synod to the most devout archimandrite Eutyches. As for the summons I confirm and acknowledge the testimony of the most devout presbyter and advocate John. As for the expression “consubstantial”, when the most devout presbyter and advocate John put a question to the most devout presbyter and archimandrite Eutyches as to whether he says that God the Word is consubstantial with the Father as regards the Godhead and consubstantial with us as regards the manhood, the archimandrite Eutyches said, “What does the creed say?” The lord John replied that the creed has only “consubstantial with the Father”, at which the archimandrite Eutyches countered, “So hold this yourself, since I too hold it.” This is all I know of the matter.” (The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. 1, pg. 246, line 667)


In the 7th session of the Home Synod, Eutyches was questioned by Flavian and the imperial patrician Florentius. Eutyches does reluctantly agree to confess the phrase "consubstantial with us", simply because his superiors and examiners were pressuring him to do so. The synod recognized that his confession did not appear to be genuine, but only because he was under compulsion to do so. For the sake of research, I have listed this full proceeding below.


(The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Vol. 1, pgs. 219-225) - Note: Some of the lines I edited out because they are from the minutes of Chalcedon and Ephesus II. What follows is only from the Home Synod of Constantinople (AD 448). 

487. Bishop Eusebius said: ‘Does he assent to what has just been read of the blessed Cyril and acknowledge that there has occurred a union of two natures in one person and one hypostasis, or does he not?’

488. The most holy archbishop said: ‘You have heard, presbyter Eutyches, what your accuser says. Say then whether you acknowledge a union from two natures.’

489. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Yes, from two natures.’

 490. Bishop Eusebius said: ‘Do you acknowledge, lord archimandrite, two natures after the incarnation, and do you say that Christ is consubstantial with us in respect of the flesh or not?’

498. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I did not come here to discuss, but I came to inform your sacredness of what I hold. What I hold has been recorded in this document. Give orders for it be read.’

499. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Read it yourself.’

500. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I am not able to.’

501. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Why? Is it really your exposition, or someone else’s? If it is yours, read it yourself.’

502. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘The declaration is mine, but the declaration of the holy fathers is the same.’

503. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Which fathers? Speak for yourself. Why do you need a document?’ 

505. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘This is what I believe: I worship the Father with the Son, the Son with the Father, and the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son; I acknowledge that his coming in the flesh was from the flesh of the Holy Virgin, and that he became man perfectly for our salvation. This I confess before the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and before your holiness.’

511. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Do you acknowledge that the same one Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, is consubstantial with his Father in respect of the Godhead and consubstantial with his mother in respect of the manhood?’

512. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘When I presented myself to your holiness, I said what I hold about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Do not examine me on anything else.’

513. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Do you now acknowledge “from two natures”?’

514. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Since I acknowledge my God and my Lord as Lord of heaven and earth, I have not till today allowed myself to inquire into his nature. But although up till now I have not described him as consubstantial with us, I now acknowledge it.’

515. The most holy archbishop said: ‘Do you not say that he is consubstantial with the Father in respect of the Godhead and the same consubstantial with us in respect of the manhood?’

516. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Till today I have not said that the body of our Lord and God is consubstantial with us, but I acknowledge that the Holy Virgin is consubstantial with us, and that our God was enfleshed from her.’

517. The most holy archbishop said: ‘So the Virgin from whom Christ the Lord was enfleshed is consubstantial with us?’

518. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I have said that the Virgin is consubstantial with us.’

519. The most God-beloved Bishop Basil said: ‘If his mother is consubstantial with us, so is he; for he was called son of man. If then his mother is consubstantial with us, then he too is consubstantial with us in respect of the flesh.’

520. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Since you now say so, I agree with it all.’

521. The most magnificent and glorious former prefect, former consul and patrician Florentius said: ‘Since the mother is consubstantial with us, then most certainly the son too is consubstantial with us.’

522. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Till today I did not say this. Because I acknowledge it to be the body of God – are you attending? –, I did not say that the body of God is the body of a man, but that the body is human and that the Lord was enfleshed from the Virgin. If one must say that he is from the Virgin and so consubstantial with us, then I say this also, my lord, with the reservation that he is the onlybegotten Son of God, Lord of heaven and earth, ruling and reigning with the Father, with whom he is also enthroned and glorified; for I do not say “consubstantial” in such a way as to deny that he is the Son of God. Before I did not say this of him; I am saying to you what, I think, I did not say originally. But now, since your sacredness has said it, I say it.’

523. The most holy archbishop said: ‘So you confess the true faith out of compulsion rather than conviction?’

524. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘For the time being, my lord, be satisfied with this. Up till this hour I was afraid to say this, since I acknowledge the Lord our God, and I did not allow myself to inquire into his nature. But since your sacredness enjoins it and teaches it, I say it.’

525. The most holy archbishop said: ‘We are not making an innovation, but the fathers defined this. And since our faith accords with the faith they defined, we wish everyone to be abide by it and no one to innovate.’

526. The most magnificent and glorious patrician Florentius said: ‘Do you say, or not, that our Lord who is from the Virgin is consubstantial [with us] and from two natures after the incarnation?’

527. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I acknowledge that our Lord came into being from two natures before the union; but after the union I acknowledge one nature.’

534. The holy synod said: ‘You must make a clear confession of faith and anathematize everything contrary to the doctrines that have been read.’

535. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I have said to your sacredness that I did not say this before; but now, since your sacredness teaches it, I say it and follow the fathers. But I have not found it clearly stated in the scriptures, nor did all the fathers say it. If I anathematize, woe is me, because I anathematize my fathers.’

536. The holy synod rose and exclaimed: ‘Anathema to him!’

537. After this the most holy archbishop said: ‘Let the holy synod say what is deserved by a defendant who neither confesses the orthodox faith clearly nor is prepared to accede to the doctrine of the present holy synod, but persists in his twisted and wicked perversity.’

538. Seleucus the most God-beloved bishop of Amaseia said: ‘He deserves to be deposed, but it depends solely on the mercy of your holiness.’

539. The most holy archbishop said: ‘If he were to acknowledge his fault and consent to anathematize his doctrine and to agree with us who follow the definitions of the holy fathers, then he would reasonably deserve forgiveness. But since he persists in his lawlessness, he will incur the penalties of the canons.’

540. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I say these things, since you have now ordered it, but I am not ready to anathematize. What I am saying, I am saying in accordance with the truth.’ 

541. The most magnificent and glorious former prefect, former consul and patrician Florentius said: ‘Do you affirm “two natures” and “consubstantial with us”. Speak!’

542. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘I have read in the blessed Cyril, in the holy fathers and in Saint Athanasius that they said “from two natures” before the union, but after the union and the incarnation they no longer affirmed two natures but one.'

543. The most magnificent and glorious former prefect, former consul and patrician Florentius said: ‘Do you acknowledge two natures after the union? Speak! If you do not, you will be deposed.’

544. Eutyches the presbyter said: ‘Have the writings of Saint Athanasius read. Then you will discover that he says nothing of the kind.’

545. The most God-beloved Bishop Basil said: ‘If you do not affirm two natures after the incarnation, you imply mixture and confusion.’ 

549. The most magnificent and glorious Florentius said: ‘He who does not say “from two natures” and “two natures” is not orthodox in his beliefs.’

550. All the holy synod rose and exclaimed: ‘Faith under compulsion is not faith. Many years to the emperors! To the orthodox emperors many years! Your faith is always victorious. He does not assent; why try to persuade him?’ 





















Feb 6, 2024

Brief Notes on the Christology of Emperor Justinian

 

The Mia-Physis Formula


“In confessing these things thus and also accepting, in addition to the other things about the orthodox faith taught by Cyril among the saints, his statement, “one incarnate nature of God the Word,” we confess that from the divine nature and the human nature resulted one Christ, not one nature, as certain individuals who take this expression in a wicked sense try to claim. The fact is that whenever this father himself said, “one incarnate nature of the Word,” he used the term “nature” instead of “hypostasis” in that case. And in the passages in which he uses this expression, for the most part he added [another term] in what comes next, sometimes “Son,” sometimes “Word” or “Only-Begotten,” which do not indicate nature but hypostasis or person. So then, when the hypostasis of the Word became incarnate, it did not result in one nature but in one composite Christ, the same one God and human being.” (Emperor Justinian, Edict on the Truth Faith, in Wesche, pg. 169)


Definition of “Nature”


“When they construct their one composite nature, they do not know, as was shown in the teachings of the fathers, and as we ourselves said earlier, that the term ‘nature’ refers to the universal reality; it indicates something indeterminate and is predicated of many hypostases. So, if, as they would have it, the two natures of divinity and humanity have become one composite nature, this means that something universal and indeterminate has been produced. We must ask them: to which universal, or to how many hypostases, would they say this nature refers?” (Emperor Justinian, A Letter to the Monks of Alexandria)


The Three Chapters Controversy


In his Edict on the True Faith (see Wesche, pgs. 185-190), Justinian provides his reasons for condemning the letter of Ibas of Edessa to Maris the Persian. For example, he accuses Ibas of teaching two prosopa in Christ


Justinian condemns the Nestorian writings of Theodoret, but also recognizes his repentance at Chalcedon:


“If anyone defends the writings of Theodoret which he expounded in support of the heretic Nestorius and against the orthodox faith, the first holy synod at Ephesus, and Cyril among the saints and his Twelve Chapters, in which impious writings the same Theodoret says that the union of God the Word with a particular human being was relational, about which he utters the blasphemy that Thomas touched the one who had arisen but worshiped the one who had raised him, and for this reason he calls the teachers of the church impious for confessing the hypostatic union of God the Word with the flesh, and furthermore denies that the holy, glorious, ever-virgin Mary is Theotokos. – Well then, if anyone praises the aforementioned writings of Theodoret, but does not anathematize them, let him be anathema. For it was because of these blasphemies that he was ousted from the episcopacy and afterward at the holy synod at Chalcedon was compelled to do all that was contrary to the aforesaid writings and to confess the orthodox faith.” (Edict on the True Faith)




Condemnation of Nestorianism


“Wherefore, we do not believe that the Divine Logos who performed the miracles is one [hypostasis or prosopon] and the Christ who endured the Passion another, but we confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same Divine Logos of God who was incarnate and became man, and both the miracles and the Passion are his which he voluntarily bore in the flesh. For a man did not give himself for us, but the Logos himself gave his own body for us so that our faith and hope might not be in a man, but that we might hold our faith in the Divine Logos himself.” (Emperor Justinian, “Edict on the Faith [AD 551]”; as found in On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian, trans. Kenneth P. Wesche [New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1991], pg. 165)


“If anyone confesses the number of the natures in our one Lord Jesus Christ, that is, the incarnate God the Word, without understanding that the difference between these natures, from which he was compounded, resides in contemplation, so that this difference is not destroyed on account of the union, but uses the number to refer to a division into independent things, let him be anathema.” (Emperor Justinian, Edict on the Truth Faith)


The Body-Soul Analogy


In response to the Monophysites who use the anthropological analogy to prove that there is only one nature in Christ, Justinian says the following:


“Now there are certain individuals who take a different approach in their attempt to establish that there is one nature of Christ’s divinity and humanity by adducing the example of a human being. They say that just as a human being is called one nature even though he is composed from elements that are different in nature (namely, soul and body), so too when it comes to Christ we ought to say that there is one nature, even though we say that he is from two natures (namely, divinity and humanity). In response to them we will say this: even if a human being is composed from different elements (namely, soul and body), he is nonetheless called one nature since this is what is predicated in common of all the hypostases or persons that fall under the same species. For even if it is most certainly true that each hypostasis or person, such as Peter or Paul, is distinguished from one another on account of their unique characteristics, they are nonetheless not distinct in nature since they are both human beings. And again, a human being is neither a soul apart from a body nor a body apart from a soul, but is fashioned from non-being into being from soul and body. And even if every creature has been composed of different elements, it is nonetheless said to have that one nature according to which it was created by God. Not so with Christ. For he does not display one nature or substance that is predicated in common of many hypostases or persons, as a human being does. (For if this were the case, many Christs would be found, of whom would be predicated what is common to the one nature; but it is impious to say this.) But Christ was not created from the beginning out of divinity and humanity in the same manner that a human being is created out of body and soul, such that this is what the nature of Christ is. Instead, the Word, who is God before the ages and of the same nature or substance as the Father and the creator of all things, in the last days hypostatically united human nature to himself and so became a human being without ceasing to be God. Christ is therefore one hypostasis or person and possesses in himself the whole of the divine and uncreated nature and the whole of the human and created nature……Now we say all these things not in ignorance of the fact that some of the holy fathers used the example of a human being for the mystery of Christ. But some of them did this to show that, just as what results from soul and body is one human being and not two human beings, so too Christ, compounded from divinity and humanity, is one and not divided into two Christs or two sons. Others, however, used the example of the human being to introduce one nature or substance of Christ’s divinity and humanity, which we have demonstrated to be foreign to piety.” (Edict on the Truth Faith)




Justinian uses the body-soul analogy differently in his Letter to the Monks of Alexandria than he does here in his Edict (AD 551), see Wesche pgs. 171-72, n. 9


The Two Births of Christ


“If anyone does not confess that God the Word, who was begotten from the Father before the ages and in a non-temporal manner, in the last days came down from the heavens and became incarnate from the holy and glorious Theotokos and ever-virgin Mary and became a human being and was born from her, and for this reason that there are two births of the same God the Word, one before the ages in an incorporeal manner and the other in the last days according to the flesh, let him be anathema.” (Emperor Justinian, Edict on the True Faith



Explaining Chalcedonian Christology


“By the preposition ‘in’ he [Cyril] teaches us to confess the two natures of divinity and humanity in which Christ is known.” (Emperor Justinian, Letter to the Monks of Alexandria


Jan 30, 2024

Samuel Rutherford on Efficacious Grace in Conversion

 



"God ordinarily contributes two causes to the work of conversion, one moral and one physical. These are outlined in the Examen, shortly after Rutherford asked whether God’s work of conversion is only moral, consisting merely in persuasion, invitation, promises and commands, or whether God’s work also consists in a real and physical predetermination of the will. Moral influences such as those outlined above are given by grace alone, in that the sinner does not deserve to be persuaded and invited by God, nor does the sinner have a right to hear the Gospel. In addition to this, Rutherford considered such graces to be ineffectual without a physical predetermination of the will. “It is hard to affirm,” he wrote in the Trial and Triumph of Faith, “that all who are prepared with these preparations of order are infallibly converted.” Nevertheless, such moral influences are part of God’s ordinary way of effecting the work of conversion, where moral influences are understood to act upon the mind and the will prior to God’s physical determination of the will. Whereas God’s moral influences are ineffectual and subjective, God’s physical acts regarding conversion are effectual and objective. The physical nature of converting grace may be understood in two ways. First, God’s converting grace is said to be physical, objective, and real, in that a new heart is actually given to the converted sinner and new powers are really granted to the will. Second, the physical nature of efficacious grace is emphasized by God physically predetermining certain acts associated with walking in obedience to God’s commands (Deut 8.6)........God’s efficacious grace, which predetermines physical acts of assent, belief, and will, provide the sufficient condition to which the good intentions of a converted saint may be joined." (Robert C. Sturdy, Freedom from Fatalism: Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661)'s Doctrine of Divine Providence [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021], pgs. 301-302)


Jan 4, 2024

Leontius of Jerusalem on Defining Hypostasis

 

One of the crucial neo-Chalcedonian theologians is the sixth-century writer Leontius of Jerusalem. He is known especially (along with Leontius of Byzantium) for formulating the doctrine of enhypostasis and explaining how the human nature of Christ exists in union with the single person of the Word. He is known for he is technicality and comprehensiveness in defining key ontological and metaphysical concepts and terms that were being used in the christological controversies of the 5th and 6th centuries, whether against the Nestorians, or the Monophysites who were at the time being led by Severus of Antioch. 

Kenneth Warren Wersche did his doctoral dissertation on the christology of Leontius of Jerusalem and how it relates to his soteriology. He has several sections on the concept of hypostasis which were quite helpful to me and which I thought I should quote and make a summary and analysis of in this article. I will be utilizing Aloys Grillmeier as well (Christ in Christian Tradition, Vol. 2, Pt. II, pgs. 276-282).

To begin with, we ought to hear from Leontius himself:

“Hypostasis also refers to when particular, different natures, together with their properties but not their prosopa, come together (τίνων συνελθουσον φύσεων διαφόρων ίδικων) in union in the same thing under one existence (ύφ’ έν στάσις). That is to say, there occurs a particular "standing together" (σΰοτασίς) which belongs to one single individual (ένδς µόνου άτοµου). It is also generally agreed that hypostasis refers to the coming together not of different natures, but of many particular properties (ιδιωµάτων µερικών) by themselves, from all of which is constituted one universal property in one particular subject, or in one single nature.” (Leontius of Jerusalem, Adversus Nestorianos, 2.1; in PG 86:1529) 

In that same passage, Leontius also writes that "[hypostasis is] that which shows the concrete individual thing (ὑποκείμενον ἄτομον τόδε τι) in its existence (πρὸς τῇ συστάσει) and as set off from all other things, whether of the same or of a different substance, by its specific mark (κατὰ τὸ ἰδικὸν γνωριστήριον); it is, as such, a detachment (ἀπόστασίς τις) and a limitation of unlimited being (διορισμὸς τῶν ἀδιορίστων οὐσιῶν) into the personal singularity of each one. This is why the Fathers considered, and called it, person (prosopon)." 

For Leontius’ doctrine, “one should note carefully that the term hypostasis itself is not the coming together of natures, or of properties, but it is itself that in which the στάσις or σύστασίς is observed. In other words, the hypostasis itself is not a union or a coming together, but it is that in which the union or coming together takes place.” (Kenneth Warren Wesche, “The Defense of Chalcedon in the 6th Century: The Doctrine of ‘Hypostasis’ and Deification in the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem,” [PhD diss., Fordham University, New York, 1986), pg. 52)

Wesche postulates that Leontius of Jerusalem is basically teaching that hypostasis is the ontological reality which is the ground or basis for the union of natures and/or respective properties. It is the underlying reality or “that in which the union takes place.” In this schema, there is a dependence of substance on hypostasis, which is why it is possibly for two natures to exist in a single hypostasis. 

A key emphasis here is that hypostasis is not the same thing as a “particular nature.” This would lead to Nestorianism and tritheism. 

According to Leontius of Jerusalem, the principle of hypostasis (rather than nature) is to exist in distinction and separation from other natures (Adversus Nestorianos, 2.7). This is why a Nestorian doctrine of two hypostases in Christ destroys any possibility of an incarnation and personal union, since two hypostases by definition “stand away from each other” and are thus opposed in that sense. No union is possible in such a situation.

Leontius distinguishes the hypostasis from that which constitutes it (natures and properties). He speaks of properties as belonging more properly to natures, but accruing to the hypostasis and being manifested in the hypostasis. 

One particularly interesting claim of Leontius is that natures and accidents do not exist as 'parts' of the hypostasis as such, only the particular properties (idiomata) do:

"Neither ousiai, nor accidents, nor the substantial properties belong to the substantial hypostasis as parts, but [only] things that are seen individually in a particular object (ἐν τῷδε τινι), whether from the ousia or around the ousia or even from elsewhere in and around [the hypostasis]." (Adversus Nestorianos, 1.6, in PG 86:1421)

To illustrate an instance of how Leontius' metaphysics play out, Johannes Zachhuber gives the following analogy:

"To say that Peter is a human being would then be no different from saying that Peter is healthy or tall or irascible. If this seems counterintuitive, it should be recalled that Leontius reconstructs insubsistence Christology in this precise sense. The eternal hypostasis of the Logos receives, in time, another nature into its own existence. This neither modifies divine nature nor, fundamentally, the divine hypostasis even though it completes its individual property." (Johannes Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappodocian Fathers to John of Damascus [Oxford University Press, 2020], pg. 265)

This of course leads to a huge concept in Leontius' view of hypostasis: the individual overarching property (idioma). The hypostasis has particular properties, but in order to be formally "one" hypostasis (which, I would argue, is for Leontius basically the same as being a hypostasis simpliciter, because he viewed the formal ratio of hypostasis as an individual subject separate and opposed to other hypostases and/or beings) it has to have this individual property. For example, in the case of the divine persons in the Holy Trinity, Leontius wrote: "These are several simple properties of the same hypostasis. From all of them, however, one composite property is conceptualized, of the fatherly or filial hypostasis." (Adversus Nestorianos, 1.20, in PG 86:1485)

It should be briefly noted in passing that Leontius is not teaching the same doctrine as Damian of Alexandria, who thought that the hypostasis is the particular property.


Dec 30, 2023

Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): The Sufferings of Christ's Soul during His Passion

 

[The following are extracts taken from Select Disputations, 2:164-172]


This passion of the soul of Christ consists in the penalty of loss and the penalty of suffering. The penalty of loss is the deprivation or loss of joy and delight, which the full vision and enjoyment of God and the plenitude of grace would have brought to Him, and this is through rejection from the face of God or abandonment (see Matthew 27, Luke 22, which we will discuss shortly). This includes the tasting and perception of divine wrath and light (the wrath is denoted by the cup in Matthew 26:39, 20:22, John 18:11, collated with Psalms 75:9, Habakkuk 2:16, Jeremiah 25:15, Isaiah 51:17), the subjection to the power of darkness, at least for vexation, not for servitude (Luke 22:53, collated with John 14:30, Genesis 3:16). Also, the curse, by which the full sentence of divine judgment for the sins of men was carried, and the sign and symbol of this was the ignominy of the cross (Galatians 3:13). The subject of this passion is Christ according to human nature, firstly and fundamentally in the higher or rational part of the soul, and secondly or by participation in the lower or sensitive part of the soul. He perceived God as wrathful, that is, He did not feel joy, which usually emanates from trust, but instead experienced pressure and vexation arising from God's wrath against our sins and consequently against Himself as the Bridegroom. The first and principal efficient cause is God, the most just judge, pursuing justice through His wrath, following Christ as the Bridegroom, not because He was worthy of any wrath, but on account of us and our sins, which He bore, being cursed. He withdrew His countenance, from which all joy was taken away, and He showed Himself stern. We deduce this necessary distinction from Galatians 3:13, Isaiah 53:4, Zechariah 13:7, collated with Matthew 3:17, Ephesians 1:6. The proximate impulsive cause is our sins, the next is the voluntary offering of Christ and the acceptance of our sin-bearing. The end and effect of this spiritual death are both the satisfaction and merit for us and the manifestation of glory, justice, truth, power, and divine mercy in our redemption. This is derived from commonplaces about the humiliation, passion, and satisfaction or merit of Christ, and analogically applied here. The proper, next, consequent, and effect of this spiritual death is horror, pain, distress, and perturbation, as mentioned in John 12:27, Luke 12:50, Matthew 26:39, Luke 22:24, Hebrews 5:7. We reject the Papists who argue that Christ felt no passion in the higher part of the soul in our place. See them refuted by Parker, book 3, n. 75. 76.

The adjuncts and peculiarities of this passion are, indeed, comparative. Firstly, that it was the greatest because it equated the entire misery that our sins deserved. Secondly, that it was most worthy and precious. Thirdly, that it was unique and most singular without example or likeness concerning the subject, causes, and effects. Fourthly, that it was the same as the punishments of the damned, the same, I say, essentially concerning its material aspect and as far as it proceeded from extrinsic causes, and the same analogically or by equivalence concerning its formal aspect in the ratio of compensatory and satisfactory punishment. Fifthly, however, it was different in its accidental or concomitant aspects and consequences, as they cannot satisfy these punishments by enduring them. 1. Regarding the material aspect and as far as it arises from intrinsic causes due to the defect and imperfection of the damned, such as despair, blasphemies, and a worm-like conscience, things absent from Christ's passion. 2. Regarding the formal aspect: it was different in terms of the circumstances of formal penalty, so-called. Thus, Christ's punishment could not and was not eternal; He was able to deliver Himself (Acts 2:24). He was not in hell, in the place and company of the damned and demons. Nor was it continuous and equally intense; His own arm supported and refreshed His soul intermittently, with moderation applied and intervals of granted relief internally, and externally with the confirmation of an angel, so that He could properly prepare for death, attend to the fulfillment of His duties through conversations, admonitions, responses, and the imposition of tasks; neither His mind nor senses were shattered, as stated in Luke 22:40, 41, 43. For He was the Son of God who suffered; thus, His intensive gravity and value arising from the dignity of His person not only compensates for the entire duration of the penalty but also breaks and removes it by the power with which He could overcome all punishment (1 Corinthians 15:57). In short, we outline the entire difference with these antitheses: It was holy, not sinful; pure punishment without guilt; glorious and not merely burdensome; He bore it in our name, not for Himself; not as the just, holy, blessed one, but as our sponsor and debtor, made sin for us, and a curse (2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:10) through transfer and imputation; voluntary, not coerced; out of obedience to the Father, not out of merit, or rather any demerit of His own; out of love for us, not out of compulsion from His own power, not only out of weakness; for struggle and vexation, not for victory and subjection; for satisfaction, not for perdition; through the fire of divine wrath burning and afflicting, not indeed consuming to the lack of the sense of divine sweetness, not to the removal of grace from the personal union emanating from the blessed vision, not to the dissolution of the union; for the suspension of the effect of joy, not for the overthrow of the principle and root; for the eclipse of act, not habit; for the eclipse of influx and reception on the part of the soul of Christ (due to the intervention of sin and divine wrath), not the efflux from the part of the Deity; partial, not total; temporal, not final or eternal; interrupted over intervals, not continuous; with moderation, not uniformly intense; and thus with the integrity of faith, trust, and hope, not with unbelief or despair.

This passion or death of Christ can be divided, according to its stages, into the non-passion and the passion: the former was a preliminary and preparatory phase, which His soul gradually experienced in the course of life, as I infer from Luke 12:56 and John 12:27. The latter is what He sustained at the end of His life, and it is either initiated or completed, either in the garden or on the cross. The initiation is described in Luke 22:40, 41, 42, 43, 44, along with Matthew 26:56, 45, Mark 14:33, 40, and Hebrews 5:7. It is called by Blessed Luke "agonia," from the Syriac interpreter "timor," with which the Arabic language also agrees. With this, the struggle of Christ in the face of the terrible judgment of an angry God and the supreme anguish of wrestling is indicated, to the extent that all His faculties temporarily left their functions to relieve His nature. As for the mode, causes, subject, and adjuncts of this agony, there is no need to repeat what we have covered in the superior doctrine and specifically apply it here, as this should be evident to anyone. We will only note the adjuncts, concomitants, and consequences by which Scripture presents the gravity of this agony before our eyes. These are four: 1. horror, 2. sweat like drops of blood, 3. sorrow unto death, arising from the contemplation of divine wrath and judgment, which the mind and memory of Christ were solely fixed upon at that time, so that, without sin regarding other objects, they rested, no differently than a clock can cease its movement after the hand of the craftsman, extrinsically moved, stops it; as Parker excellently explains and defends against the calumnies of the Papists in his work (Book 3, sections 102, 104, 105). To enhance understanding, we add that Christ's apprehension or understanding of divine justice and wrath or God as an angry and stern judge was distinct from His apprehension and understanding of God as a beloved father and deliverer. These two apprehensions do not conflict but only differ; they are distinct in their formal objects and diverse in their effects. The formal object of the former apprehension was God's punitive justice or God as a stern judge, while the object of the latter was the same God but as a beloved Father, gracious God, and faithful Liberator. From the former apprehension arose or was stirred up the affect of sadness or sorrow from the sense of present evil and the affect of fear from the expectation of future evil; from the latter apprehension, the affect of trust. These affects could coexist in Him, and neither displaced the other. Thus, in that paroxysm or agony, when sorrow and fear occupied Him, there was no lack of trust, for His mind was nonetheless fixed on His God as His own, and His will was projected onto Him. Regarding the objection that He did not elicit both apprehensions or intuitions of God as an angry judge and as a beloved Father and Liberator at the same time and in equal measure, nor consequently elicit acts of fear and trust simultaneously in that moment, I respond: while we attribute an immediate passion to Christ, we do not assert that, in Christ, any contrary or privative unbelief, doubt, distrust, let alone despair, from us should be admitted or posited.

Only this much remains to be addressed, that such a non-thought and non-actual trust or cessation of the act, while habitual faith and trust persist, has not yet been proven to be a sin in our Savior. How the Papists try to extricate themselves here can be seen in the commentary of Cornelius à Lapide on Matthew 26:37. II. His withdrawal from the disciples and His return to them, requested by them for assistance in prayer (Matthew 26:38, 40). III. Sweating blood (Luke 22:44). Some have denied this sweat, to the point of sacrilegiously expunging His words from the context, causing it to be absent in some copies, as testified by Jerome in his work Against Pelagians and Hilary in On the Trinity, chapter 10. Others diminish it and think it should be taken proverbially, such as Euthymius and Theophylactus; others attribute it to a miracle. Thus Hilary, who says it was against nature. 

And some Papists, including Thomas from Bede, Jansenius in Concordia Evangeliorum, chapter 137, and among our own, including Parker, claim it was supernatural. Platerus, a medical expert, adds his opinion in the third book of his practical treatise, chapter 5, page 673, stating that blood can sometimes infiltrate through the pores of the skin or spread beneath the skin, remain there, and produce a swelling, but it does not penetrate and transude through them, either through the anastomosis of skin veins or through diapedesis or rarefaction of the cuticle, because the division of the continuity of the skin itself is required for its emanation. Some leave it in the middle, such as Hofmeister in his commentary on Luke, and thus not a few from our own. Others acknowledge this natural sweat but attribute its cause either solely to the fervor of praying (Bilson on the Descent into Hell) or solely to the apprehension and fear of bodily death, as most Papist commentators, nearly all of them, including Lyranus, Maldonatus, Jansenius, Hofmeister, etc. And Polemicists in the question of the Descent into Hell, among whom Lavinus Lemnius in Book 1 of his work on natural miracles, chapter 12, makes a contribution. They make the cause of this sweat only a sensation of pain and disturbance of the sensitive part, not the rational part. Although many from the Papists hold this view, Lemnius disagrees with them clearly in the cited work. We, no less than the flow of blood and water from Christ's side, posit as natural, due to the immediate proximate cause; however, it is admirable and miraculous in nature, even supernatural if we consider the remote efficient causes and the end. We believe the proximate cause can be found in the affections and their movement, namely, in the affections of sorrow and fear that partly draw the Spirit and blood toward the heart from external parts, and partly in the affections of love, desire, ardor, and zeal (Luke 22:44), which impel the Spirit and blood from the heart toward the external parts of the body. Hence, it happened that the blood, like a whirlpool agitated and thus attenuated, erupted along with the serous fluid from the veins through the skin. Philosophers and physicians attest to the possibility of such a phenomenon, especially if the texture of the body and skin is rarer, as advised by Aristotle and Sennertus (Book 2, Part 3, Section 2, Chapter 8). Experience supports this reasoning. It is established that sudden intense disturbances can cause people to suddenly die or develop gray hair (Scaliger Exercitation 3.12). Lemnius, in his work on natural miracles, Book 2, Chapter 7, says that from consternation and the imagination of sorrow, blood can move to and fro and burst forth.

Through illness and bodily conditions, blood has been shed from fingers, breasts, eyes, ears, etc. (Schenck, Observations, Volume 2, Book 4, No. 257, 266, 268). Indeed, it is reported that the head and chest of a certain individual, three days before death, released blood (Ibid, Book 6, No. 138). Platerus, in his practical treatise, Book 3, Chapter 5, mentions a boy with hydrophobia whose pores over most of his body were marked with blood. Aristotle, in Book 3 of his Parts of Animals, Chapter 5, and Book 3 of his History of Animals, Chapter 19, Theophrastus in his book on Sweats, Galen in On the Utility of Respiration, and Mercurialis in his book on Skin Diseases, Book 3, Chapter 1, testify to having observed blood sometimes being shed from the extremities of veins that terminate in the skin. Fernelius, in Book 6 of his Diseases of Parts, Chapter 4, states that he observed blood occasionally flowing from the extremities of veins that end in the skin. Sennertus, in his Institutions, Book 2, Part 3, Section 10, Chapter 11, reports, citing Benivenius, that a pound of blood flowed through the skin, where the lower part of the liver lies, each month, even though no hole or scar appeared on the skin. This is particularly related to the blood that Aristobulus expelled suddenly due to sorrow over the crime of fratricide (Josephus, The Jewish War, Book 1, Chapter 3), and that which usually bursts forth from the lips of George Castriota during battle, due to the ardor of fighting, as reported by Scultetus in his treatise on Prayer, Chapter 19. An example of someone drenched in blood-sweat was heard in Paris after receiving a death sentence, as reported by Maldonatus in his commentary on Matthew 26, where he agrees with us that this sweat was natural. Why he expressed it in this way, so as to make it appear as if the sweat was only supernatural, as the learned Parker acknowledges (Book 3, No. 110, 112), I confess I have not yet seen. Beza, in his notes, calls this sweat evidence of human weakness; therefore, it was natural. Nevertheless, it remains and is very well defended that this initial death or agony was spiritual in the soul, and the immediate cause of this sweat in Christ was supernatural—namely, the apprehension and fear not only of bodily death (as wrongly asserted by Maldonatus) but rather of the sins He had taken upon Himself and the wrath and severe divine judgment He bore for that reason, although, rightly stated, it is said to be natural due to the proximate cause just explained. Problem: Can it be properly said that Christ, as a priest, was sanctified and prepared for an imminent sacrifice by this sweat? No, according to Parker, Book 3, No. 112.


Dec 12, 2023

Scholastic Definitions of Subsistence (Thomism vs. Scotism)


When studying the one person and two natures of our Lord Jesus Christ, defining terms is very important and crucial for our understanding and defense of the orthodox faith. One such term is that of "subsistence", which is used in contexts of discussing the Trinity and the person of Christ.

One question that is often asked is this: what is it that prevents the human nature of Christ from being a separate person (Nestorianism)? Islamic debater Jake Brancatella asked this sort of question in his debate with Samuel Green. Since Christ assumed both a human body and a rational soul, aren't these sufficient conditions for being a human person? This is a good question and I am glad Jake brought it up. As far as I can tell, Mr. Green seemed unable to provide any sort of adequate response to Jake's argument. This should tell us a lot about the lamentable lack of classical theological education in seminaries today. This is why the retrieval of Reformed Scholasticism is a great blessing to Christ's church. 

In this article I wish to provide a brief answer to this question, but proceed to elaborate on it more by examining how Thomism, Scotism, and Reformed Scholasticism typically understood the nature of what subsistence (or 'personhood') is. 

The answer to Jake's question is that Christ's human nature (hereafter "CHN") is not a person because it is enhypostasis, meaning that it is sustained by and subsists in the divine person of the Logos. In order for it to be a separate person, it would need to have its own incommunicable subsistence apart from the Logos. It does not have this, and could not have this, otherwise there would be no real Incarnation (Cyril of Alexandria talked about how Nestorianism basically leads to viewing the Incarnation of Christ as being the same as when God dwelt in the prophets and was connected to them by a union of mere good-will or grace).

One question that some have posited as dividing Thomists and Scotists (e.g., Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay [Oxford University Press, 2016], pgs. 68-70) is whether or not that which prevents CHN from being a person is a negative privation (which is alleged to be the Scotist position) or some sort of positive ontological entity (Thomist view). 

Is subsistence a negative privation or positive entity?

Thomists generally spoke of subsistence as a positive entity which functions in the role of terminating a nature, similar to how a point terminates a line:

"In addition to this, the fact that the term "hypostasis" or "person" and similarly the proper names of natures with pronouns, such as "this man," "this ox," and likewise demonstrative pronouns personally, like "I," "you," "he," are all acknowledged to formally signify substance, and not negation or accident or something extraneous, further supports these points. If we all confess this, why, when investigating the purpose of the signified thing, do we deviate from the common confession? And if it is permissible to say that personality is formally negation, why not stand in a sentiment that is so much more probable and in accordance with the common confession?.......It [subsistence] is the term of nature. This is proven by the fact that the nature of a person is the nature to be terminated, and personifying is terminating nature. For we explain the human nature in Christ to be personified by the Word because it is terminated by His person; and conversely, the Word personifies that nature because it terminates it.......And this is not a fabrication but has testimony from the terms of quantity: a point is so terminus of a line that there is no cause of it."" (Cardinal Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologiae, Part III, Q. 4, art. 2, §8, 10)

"[Subsistence] completes [the nature] and renders it subsistent per se through the perseity of independence from a sustainer....it constitutes the suppositum,  as incommunicable to another." (Jean Baptiste Gonet, Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, tr. 11, disp. 8, a. 3, §2)

"[Personhood] is not a mode, but a real entity, really distinct from nature." (Jean Baptiste Gonet, Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, tr. 11, disp. 8, art. 6, §1)

"Every non-subsisting thing, as such, is less perfect than the subsisting or perfectible by subsistence, as is evident in a separated soul and any other part, which is less perfect than a subsisting thing, being incomplete and perfectible. However, a subsisting thing is perfect, whole, and complete, from which the non-subsisting part lacks something. Therefore, the non-subsisting thing will rather express the negation of that perfection, whereas the subsisting thing adds not only the negation but also some positive perfection beyond the nature of the non-subsisting.......[Subsistence] adds to nature a terminus or substantial formality, which excludes the mode of inherence and the mode of communicable part, and thus renders the nature terminated and incommunicable to any further terminus, just as a point terminates a line by a positive addition and termination." (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus: Philosophia Naturalis, p. 1, q. 7, a. 1)

Another distinctive of the Thomist position is that they view subsistence as logically prior to esse (Richard Cross, Christology and Metaphysics in the Seventeenth Century [Oxford University Press, 2022], pg. 38)

Scotus, on the other hand, believed that subsistence was simply a negative privation. According to him, in order a human nature to be its own distinct person, there must be, as Dr. Richard Cross puts it, "an absence of hypostatic dependence." For example, Scotus wrote the following:

"And so this negation, not of actual dependence but aptitudinal, this sort does complete the idea of ‘person’ in intellectual nature and of ‘supposit’ in created nature." (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, III, d.1, p. 1, q.1, n. 46)

It ought to be noted that the idea of CHN not being a person because it does not have its own hypostasis is found very explicitly in Aquinas' own writings (De Unione, art. 2, ad. 10).


Dec 9, 2023

Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676): Disputations on the Doctrine of Justification

 

[The following is taken from the Select Disputations, 5:277-339]


Before I approach the Problems, I define both the "what" and the "how" of justification—what it consists of, what its meritorious cause is, and what its distinction is.

As for the first point:

Justification is a judicial sentence of the supreme Judge, which includes, or formally states, these two judgments: the condemnation of the guilt and punishment of sins, that is, the remission of sins or absolution from sin; and the judgment of the right to eternal life. Thus, these two moments in the act of justification are to be considered, both of which are about its essence or formal nature. They occur simultaneously in time but not in nature, nor in ignorance.

The meritorious cause is the obedience of Christ imputed to us. This can be considered either closely or materially, or proximately or formally. In the former consideration, Christ is our surety, mediator, and sponsor, who, with respect to his obedience, is as if the subject that is, and the principle that is. Thus, obedience is the principle by which. In this obedience, something can again be distinguished as material, namely, the obedience itself in fulfilling the debt; and something as formal, namely, satisfaction or merit. The former is said in relation to God, to whose justice it satisfies; the latter in relation to us, for whom he has obtained or acquired justice. Now, there was a twofold debt to be paid by us to God: one absolute, universal, and perfect obedience, namely, obedience to be rendered to God according to the law; the other hypothetical, particular, and accidental, inasmuch as, by hypothesis and due to the intervention of sin, man is obligated to endure compensation by suffering. Regarding this, see 1st part, select disp., title "On the right and justice of God." Christ took both of these debts upon himself and paid them for us as our Sponsor.

In the latter consideration, imputation occurs, which some theologians call the form of justification (properly speaking, it is the formal principle of it, or the form of the impulsive cause of justification; about which, more later). Just as the obedience of Christ is the material, for we are not justified by the obedience or righteousness of Christ unless imputed and by that imputation—without divine imputation, it would not be ours. Therefore, that marvelous and divine exchange should be observed here, as mentioned in 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Romans 5:19, by which our debt is imputed to Christ, who did not contract it, and, in turn, the payment of Christ is imputed to us, which we did not provide.

However, just as our debt is twofold, so is the twofold righteousness or obedience of Christ as the sponsor, the twofold payment, the twofold imputation, and, as a result of it, the twofold effect: freedom or immunity from the guilt and punishment of sin, and the right to eternal life.

III. Justification is distinguished into that which is from the prior and that which is from the posterior. The former is properly the declaration or demonstration of justification from the prior, as the cause from the effect. Again, justification from the posterior or demonstration is twofold: either before God and in the court of divine law or conscience, or before humans, in the civil court. Both of these distinctions have been sufficiently and thoroughly elucidated by our commentators on James 2 and Romans 4. Additionally, there is another distinction initiated by some more recent scholars, into active and passive, or external and internal. The former is universal, extending to all the saved, in one instance, first made in paradise, after the sad fall was given and the mediator was promised; preceding all calling, regeneration, and faith; indeed, preceding the existence of all the justified, except for the prototypes. This justification is actually the same as the promise of grace and the remission of sins through Christ, or with the pronouncement of the sentence of absolution. The latter is particular, made as many times as the number of the saved, and subsequent to the calling and faith of each individual.

I. Problem: Are the terms "imputing" and "justifying" synonymous? Answer: By no means, as is evident from an induction of scriptural passages.

II. Problem: Does the term "imputing" denote a gracious estimation? Answer: No, it is never used in this sense in the Hebrew word "chashab" and the Greek word "logizo" in the scriptures. Nor is this meaning supported by Greek and Latin writers. Arminius wrongly attributed this hypothesis to his error regarding the imputation of faith and the non-imputation of the righteousness of Christ.

III. Problem: Is imputation justification, or its form? Or does justification formally consist in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ? Answer: No, because according to all theologians, the righteousness of Christ imputed (which is the same as the imputation of the righteousness of Christ) is the cause of justification, by which and for which the sinner is justified.

However, an objection is raised, widely asserted by our theologians, that the mode of justification is through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and not through the proper fulfillment of the law or inherent righteousness. Response: That statement refers to the antecedent and cause of justification, not to its form or essence. Thus, in response to the question of how Gentiles and Christians know God, it is answered that the former know through natural revelation, and the latter through supernatural revelation.

Where a distinct mode of knowledge designates the specific cause of each, just as the knowledge of the faithful is not formally divine supernatural revelation, nor vice versa, but knowledge occurs through revelation as its proper cause. And so in other cases, where the phrase consists in it, it is and happens in that manner, etc., are not to be taken as formal but as causal. The sons of logic should consult here for improper predication.

It is objected that imputation and justification go hand in hand. Response: It is so, but it does not follow that one is formally the other, or that the conceptualization of one is the formal representation of the other. Just as effective calling and union with Christ are inseparable from justification, and justification from sanctification: which, however, should not be confused but distinguished as cause and effect, or at least as antecedent and consequent.

IV. Problem: Is it accurately and properly said that the parts of justification are two, the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and that justification consists in these two? Response:

Conclusion: The phrase "to consist in both" could be tolerated or excused: in remission, as in the formal part or prior moment of its form; and in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, as in the proximate cause. For it admits latitude in something. Although such a phrase is not without ambiguity or confusion.

Conclusion: I do not see how it can be said that there are two parts, or members, or moments of the act of justifying, as long as we speak acroamatically and logically. For neither is the efficient or antecedent cause a part of the thing, nor vice versa. Because a part enters into the essence of the thing, if it is essential; or at least into its integrity, if it is integral; or its form, if it is formal. But now the imputation of the righteousness of Christ precedes, indeed, and causes justification, because God justifies us on account of it. Also, add that the active imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which some theologians seem to understand here, is no more the justification itself formally so called than the passive imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Just as active righteousness, with regard to the reason of causality, corresponds to passive righteousness, and vice versa; so, in the judgment of eternal life because of the active righteousness of Christ, corresponds to the judgment of damnation or remission of sins. And just as in that twofold act the imputation of the righteousness of Christ constitutes the meritorious cause of justification, but not its form or formal act, so in that twofold act of remission or absolution and the adjudication of life, justification itself formally consists. 

Not as parts or members of one integral act, remission with imputation, whether active or passive righteousness, nor the imputation of righteousness, whether active or passive, or both, with the remission of sins or adjudication, or even with the adjudication of life. Therefore, it is properly a regard of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the remission of sins, as the antecedent to the consequent, and as the cause to the effect. Where such a regard and order of one to the other exists, there is no coordination or co-ordination. Just as in the act of saving faith, the assent general and the special and fiducial assent are subsumed and coordinated, and in these two moments, the proper and true essence of faith is constituted; not, however, in the general assent, which is the first moment or member of faith, and in some efficient or prevenient grace, whether it be God's or Christ's meritorious cause.


V. Problem: Does the decree of justification make any part or moment in justification itself? Response: No, for the calling, regeneration, justification, adoption, or sanctification should not be confused with the decree; internal action with the external emanation; eternal with the temporal; or the decree or will of God with execution and accomplishment, which can be exemplified by the decree of creation or the decree of salvation, which are distinct from creation and salvation themselves.


VI. Problem: Should justification be considered an instantaneous, individual, at once total and perfect action, without succession and without a gradation of intensity, and thus distinguished from sanctification? Response: Generally, according to our theologians, we think that it should be understood distinctly depending on the various meanings of the term.

Conclusion: Justification, when indicating the universal, external, and active, is performed all at once.

Conclusion: Justification, when indicating the particular, internal, personally applied, or passively non-sensory and from the prior, is performed all at once in one moment for the initial implantation of faith.

Conclusion: Justification, as it denotes the sensory and direct application from the prior, is often repeated.

Conclusion: Justification, as it denotes the sensory demonstration and declaration from the posterior, is often repeated and admits of degrees.

VII. Problem: Whether, if justification is truly instantaneous, total, and perfect, should it be said that future sins are also forgiven consequently? Response: The hypothesis is presupposed against the successive remission of the Catholics, which they make through consecutive steps or parts progressing according to the progression of the parts of human satisfaction. However, preserving the distinction between the instantaneous justification and the sensory or sensible application of the same, which is often found and renewed, and progresses successively, admitting more or less. See this distinction in Ursinus, Perkins, and other interpreters of the Lord's Prayer, on the 5th petition. As for the consequence drawn from this, regarding the remission of future sins, we affirm with the distinction applied: we deny with regard to the latter. For the sense and evident demonstration of such remission necessarily follows not only sins already committed but also renewed actual repentance and faith. Practical considerations, signs, and indications in treatises on the practice of repentance, faith, and conscience aim at the latter part of this distinction. Although the assertion under the first part of the distinction may seem paradoxical or harsh to some, it must necessarily be established and defended, as we do not wish to deviate from the foundations of the doctrine of grace, the Covenant, regeneration, justification, faith, and baptism. Amesius in his work "The Marrow of Theology," chapter 27, sections 23-24, indicated this assertion. In the year 1634, I defended the same in "Thersites Heautontimorumenos." Later, in 1646, the distinguished theologian André Rivet in his "Discussion of Grotian Dialogues," section 13, chapter 6, seemed to deny that sins are forgiven before they are committed. However, this must be understood concerning that sensory forgiveness or condonation, not the true active or even passive forgiveness implanted in the first instant of faith through regeneration.

Problem: Is faith commanded by the Decalogue? Response: Affirmative. Because it is a theological virtue, and every theological virtue is commanded by the Decalogue. The catechisms and interpreters of the Decalogue, both from our side and the Catholic side, commonly agree on this. Among others, and above all, Peter Baro Stepanus, a theologian from Cambridge, extensively supports this opinion in his works published in London in the year 1580. Testimonies from Melanchthon, Calvin, Martyr, Viret, Bullinger, Beza, Borrhaus, Noëllus, Hemmingius, Urbanus Rhegius, and Kneustub are cited in support of this. Although generally agreeing with him, I strongly disapprove of his own interpretation, which he clearly reveals on page 107, asserting that the first and right affection of the will, by which one begins to love God demonstrated to oneself from the understanding, desiring to be led by it, is of the nature of faith, not its effect. On page 129, where he describes the process of justifying faith, he presents it as follows:

1) Liberation from the error of the mind and the celestial knowledge of Truth in it.

2) Desire of the will toward the known good and hatred of evil.

3) In the same will, hope and confidence in the known and loved good to be obtained.

4) Sending possession of Christ, or his apprehension, and application to us.

5) Christ dwelling in us.

6) Testimony of the Holy Spirit concerning Christ dwelling in us.

7) Charity, or love, toward God whom we already honor as Father, whence good works.

8) Hope and confidence as a crown: these render the spirits more certain.

9) Hence the perseverance of the elect, fortified by which they strive steadfastly toward eternal life.

However, this theologian, having fostered opinions akin to Semi-Pelagianism and having begun to spread them there, and these opinions being censured at Lambeth by other theologians (see the published articles called Lambeth Articles, edited by D. Thyssius under the care of Professor Harderovicius), abandoned his extraordinary theology profession and the University of Cambridge. Today, Socinians disagree on this question, imposing ambiguous play on the less cautious, substituting the gospel for the law, the covenant of works for the covenant of grace, and works or evangelical obedience (as they call it) for justifying faith. Remonstrants, in their Confession chapter 12, enumerate certain special acts or virtues under the First Commandment but omit faith. In their catechism, they also omit knowledge and other spiritual virtues. By this counsel, they themselves declare and one who knows about these things may think.

Objection: There is no mention of Christ in the Decalogue, who, nevertheless, must be received by faith as the only Mediator. Response: Special truths, which are the object of faith, are not referred to in the precept of the Decalogue, just as attributes and works of God, the Trinity, creation in the image of God, the fall, eternal life, resurrection, the person of Christ, and his office, etc., are not mentioned. However, in the general category of duties prescribed for us to obey, both toward God and toward our neighbor, the worship of God, both natural (consisting of faith, hope, and charity) and instituted, is commanded. The material and formal objects of these virtues are not explicitly explained. Therefore, when in the first commandment we are prohibited from having other gods and adhering to them, conversely, we are commanded to adhere to one God alone, and to bear faith, hope, and charity toward Him alone: faith, indeed, for the first truth, and hope and charity for the first goodness. Thus, it is evident that divine faith is prescribed to me; it naturally follows that everything divinely revealed, whether it be a common or special precept, promise, common or special commination, or any common or special prediction, is to be believed with certain faith. Therefore, such an explanation is made through the first and most evident consequence and subsumption. Everything credible from God, who is the first truth, proposed and revealed by divine faith, is to be believed. But the Gospel or the evangelical promise of salvation through Christ is such credible matter: Therefore. 

And thus, it has features regarding Baptism, the Lord's Supper, Antichrist, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the Apostles, the calling of the Gentiles, the conversion of the Jews, the state of the Church before the second coming of Christ, and other prophecies and predictions in the New Testament; all of which are not explained by the law of the Decalogue, yet they are prescribed to be believed in general, under which all singular things revealed or to be revealed by God are included. I believe this response is sufficient. Others add that the covenant of grace and redemption through Christ are typified in the preamble of the Decalogue. However, the Socinian objection returns: Faith in Christ, the Lord's Supper, etc., are not commanded by any precept of the law; consequently, Christ is the new legislator who brought new laws, new evangelical precepts. Besides this solution, Baro has another one on page 39. Furthermore, the objection says that the law of the Messiah is most frequently mentioned, and His sacrifice is a perpetual foreshadowing and representation in ablutions and sacrifices. However, this response does not address the proposed question and objection. He had already said, and rightly proved, on page 37 that faith in Christ is commanded by the first precept of the Decalogue. Against this assertion and proof, he presents an objection that is now refuted. It cannot be solved by a response about the ceremonial law because it differs from the moral law, not only in terms of law, as it is moral, but also because it is typic, that is, it contains the Gospel. See question 19 of our Catechism and common places of Maccovius. Concerning its material aspect, the actions prescribed there are properly called the law. However, concerning its formal aspect, the mystic meaning and sealing of those actions, it is properly called the Gospel or the promise.

II. Objection: The law only commands us to love God and people, but not to believe. Response: Baro seemingly responds to this objection on page 42, stating, "But, indeed, if you only consider the words, but if you explore the sense of the words, as interpreters do, you will find that love is commanded by the law in which faith is included. Indeed, it is said positively that faith is included, although not formally, when love is mentioned, according to the rules of common scholasticism. Nothing is loved unless it is known, and we only love as much as we know. However, it is said that love is the summit of the law, not faith, in Matthew 22, Romans 13, Galatians 5, because love is greater than faith (1 Corinthians 13:13), because faith is effective through love (Galatians 5:6), because it is perfected by it, meaning that it is shown to be true and living through love (James 2:18, 22, 26), and finally, because the state of man here, through grace, and in heaven, through the glory united to his living God by the act of charity, the ultimate act, is fulfilled and specified: according to the common rule - the last act specifies. See our Exercise on Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica I-II, question on the subject and formal act of beatitude in the second part, question.

Therefore, it follows that faith is fulfilled and perfected by charity, and consequently, charity can be called its form or its ultimate and specifying act. Response: No. For it is one thing for faith to be fulfilled or perfected, and indeed formally formed by charity, and another for the state of a faithful person here, through faith, and in heaven, through the intuitive presence of the living God, to be fulfilled and ultimately perfected by charity. We concede the former, but we deny the latter. For faith and charity are distinct virtues in form and species, as inferred from 1 Corinthians 13:13, Galatians 5:6, etc.

III. Objection: Contrary to which one sins by not believing or infidelity, from which faith in the God-Redeemer or in Christ is prescribed. But against the Gospel, one sins by unbelief. Therefore, faith is not prescribed by the law, and the Gospel is a new law. Response: The objection presented with this reasoning, before the arising or exposing of Socinian controversies, was left sufficiently secure in its place, as is usually done, by some, even if not admitted, at least not effectively repulsed. Phrases such as the new law, the evangelical law, evangelical obedience, evangelical precepts, Christ's precepts, as they are now used, due to the heterodox errors that they hide, should be avoided or used only with an added explanation and caution. I therefore distinguish the term "Gospel" and "evangelical preaching," which is sometimes broadly understood as the entire saving doctrine preached under the New Testament; sometimes strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace, which is specifically and perpetually distinguished from the law of commandments; sometimes very strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace after the manifestation of Christ. If the Gospel is taken in the second and third meanings, it is asked: Does it prescribe any precepts, either old or new? Response: No. Or at least, is that one commandment strictly or very strictly understood, "Believe in the Gospel," or "Believe in Christ," prescribed? Response: No. Therefore, you might ask: Is only this prescribed by the law, specifically by its first commandment? Response: Yes. For the duty of faith, or believing everything revealed by God, is prescribed by the law alone. But the object of this faith, or the things to be believed, namely, those special ones, which are the promises of the Gospel, or Christ the Savior, or salvation through Christ, are revealed and presented by the Gospel alone, not by the law, whether commanding or promising. Therefore, the law has faith as its immediate and direct object among other duties and prescribed acts of man, and the Gospel, strictly speaking, has faith that is believed, or things to be believed, or the very truths of faith, or those credenda, which are the promises of the covenant of grace, or the Evangelical ones.

Regarding the difficulty in the objection presented, the consequence of the major premise is denied, and the reason for the denial becomes clear in the instances mentioned. One sins against God, against creation, and all other benefits of God, against the grace extended, against our repeated promise to God, against Baptism, against partaking in the Lord's Supper, against brethren, against any neighbor, against God's chastisements, against parental admonitions, against the sermons of ministers. Yet, those are not prescribing laws. Therefore, you see the need for a distinction here: either against the motive or reason moving, or against the object against which the sin is committed (as in Psalm 51:6, Luke 15:18, 1 Corinthians 5:13), or against the law of God revealed by God, whether naturally or supernaturally, internally or externally, commonly or specifically. In the second and third ways, we deny that one sins against the Gospel; in the first way, we concede. For as long as it contains those outstanding promises of the covenant of grace, it is itself the most excellent motive by which and for which we should be led away from all sin and encouraged toward all virtue (even faith, hope, etc.).


However, you might insist: One who sins through unbelief, given that he sins against the first commandment of the Decalogue, seems nevertheless to sin against the Gospel, which presents such outstanding truths. Response: Indirectly, and as it goes against those excellent motives stimulating us to our due duty, I concede; directly and against the object prescribing or ruling, or against the law and norm prescribing, I deny. For one thing is a gratuitous promise that, in its kind and aspect, moves and stimulates me, and another is a prescriptive law that obliges me.


Problem: Is faith an act, a passing action, or a habit, a disposition inherent and enduring? Response: Both are proven later. 1. Because in Hebrews 5:14, it is expressly called a habit. 2. Because from its acts, whether elicited or commanded, it is the principle by which it is distinguished (Galatians 5:6, Ephesians 3:7, 12). 3. Because the new creation, and all its parts, are something habitual and enduring; therefore, faith is also. The antecedent is proven from John 3:7,6, where the spirit is said to be, and Ephesians 2:10, where workmanship is, and Ephesians 4:24, together with Colossians 3:10, where the image of God is, and 2 Peter 1, where divine nature is. 4. 4. Because it is said to be clothed with the whole new man and to become a partaker of the faithful man. (Ephesians 4:23-24, 2 Peter 1:4). Therefore, it is an adjunct and something habitual. 5. Because it is said to exist, remain, and dwell in believers (2 Timothy 1:7, Colossians 1:4) and not to fail (Luke 22:32). 6. Because believers are denominated from it in concrete, just as others are denominated righteous, courageous, temperate, liberal, etc. (See also analogous arguments in the works of philosophers like Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, where he proves virtue to be a habit.) 7. Because it is said to abide in unbelievers while other parts of the new creature grow, fulfill, perfect, and abound (Philippians 1:6, 9, Colossians 1:6).

Problem: Is it an infused habit or an acquired one? Response: It is an infused habit, and this is proven by all those arguments by which the efficacious grace of regeneration is established in the first moment of conversion, simultaneously refuting the pretense of free will as a forerunner, or preparatory disposition, or synergy, as discussed in Part 2, section "On Regeneration." However, with respect to those who are regenerated in infancy and are continuously brought up in faith from tender age, faith might, in some sense, be called a habit gradually acquired, formally so named, with its beginning, however, being infused and impressed through the initial regeneration. While some might call this principle faith, many prefer to label it an analogue of faith, a non-formal faith, such as the seed and root of faith or the spirit of faith. This can be conceived as a kind of spiritual power or a disposition of the spiritual being from which, through successive spiritual acts, progressively elicited and more and more completed, a habit is eventually born. For more on this, see the discussion on regeneration.

Problem: Is it one simple habit, or is it composed or aggregated from several? Response: This question can be understood in three ways: whether historical, justifying, and miraculous faith are three distinct habits and three distinct faiths; whether general and special assent are two habits or one; whether general faith in the intellect and trust in the will, along with special assent in the intellect, both direct and reflex, are formally justifying faith or habits of faith. If they are, then whether faith, in this sense, is a simple or composite habit. The first question is determined negatively by our theologians, removing one of the objections raised by the Papists. Some who seem to address this are Pareus and Ames, against Bellarmine, and in Part 2, section "On Miracles." As for the second, it is responded that the double assent does not make two habits distinct in species and form or a composite habit any more than historical knowledge and assent, two distinct general faiths, or knowing with practical application, two practical sciences, or each concept of a genus joined with the concept of a difference alters the species of a thing.

As for the third question, its various parts and contents should be distinctly unfolded as follows: a) Whether trust or faith or hope (as Ames distinguishes against Bellarmine) is formally justifying faith, or whether it is a proper principle and instrumental act through which we first apprehend and unite ourselves to Christ and are thereby justified. b) Consequently, whether justifying faith, in its proper form, exists solely in the will. c) Whether all those acts enumerated by Ames in his "Medulla" (Book 1, Chapter 3) and "Ego" (in Part 2, section "On the Practice of Faith") are formally part of the essence of faith. d) If they are not, then who among them is the formal and proper instrument, and what is the formal effect of justification? e) How they should be ordered and which one precedes or follows another. There are mainly three opinions: The first belongs to those who attribute the subject and formal act of justifying faith to the mind, such as Zanchius, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Gomarus, Maccovius, and Dan. Dyke in his commentaries on the Epistle to Philemon. The second is held by few who assign it solely to the will, notably Ames. The third, more common, requires, apart from the general assent of the mind, an additional special application in faith and trust of the will. Many Reformed theologians, especially those who opposed the Papacy, adhere to this view. Their aim is to demonstrate that in a truly converted and faithful person, there can and should be a special application, certainty, and trust. They argue against the Papists, asserting that a general assent to scriptural truth, combined with mere moral certainty or perpetual doubt about God's grace and one's own salvation, is insufficient. On this matter, we believe none of our theologians disagree. However, the current question, according to the logical distinction without regard to Papist doubts, does not concern the requisites and distinctions conjoined in the state of a truly faithful and converted person, nor the required act of the will for eliciting the assent of special and applying faith. Instead, it focuses on the formal nature of faith, precisely what it consists of, and whether the trust of the will is the essence or form of faith, or a necessary adjunct akin to docility, susceptibility, intellect, and will, which are essential concomitants of man. It also addresses the question of whether the assenting and certitude of the mind, or the trust of the will, precedes in the order of nature. I do not think many have contemplated this specific aspect, no more than the controversy between Thomists and Scotists regarding the subject and formal act of beatitude, as we observed in a specific discussion in Part 2, section "On Beatific Vision," on this issue earlier.

Therefore, having set forth the indubitable and commonly accepted orthodox hypotheses, partly opposing Socinianism and partly Roman Catholicism, we now present an examination of the arguments regarding the trust of the will in private colleges, as the occasion compels us. The hypotheses are as follows:

The distinction of justifying faith from hope, charity, obedience, fidelity, repentance, or reformation in a strict sense.

Regarding the necessary requisites for salvation, piety in practice, and solid consolation, emphasizing not only faith, general assent, and general certainty but also special and applicative certainty and a special and firm trust of the heart. Thus, these cannot be more separated from each other than animality from rationality in a human, or susceptibility, intellect, and will from rationality, or these from each other.

The sophism, which Bellarmine posits and is followed by the Remonstrants in their Apology against justification, involves the instrumental effect of faith, as if it inferred this absurdity: the object comes posteriorly to the act revolving around the object, or the effect is prior to its instrumental cause. This is well resolved in Part 2, Section "On the Practice of Faith."

Let us now address the arguments that have been brought forward regarding the subject of justifying faith, the will, and its formal act, namely trust.

Argument from the definition of faith: Since faith is the acquiescence of the heart (that is, the will) in God as the author of life and eternal salvation, or in this manner: faith is the virtue by which, adhering to God's fidelity, we strive towards Him so that we may obtain what He proposes to us. We respond that justifying faith does not consist in the mere acquiescence of the will in God as our Father and the author of life and salvation. It should have been proven that it is formally the acquiescence of the will and not of the mind, by which we assent to and receive that special truth proposed and attested to within us by the Holy Spirit, in this manner: God is your God, Christ is your Savior. As for the proofs from the cited texts, we say the following:

Concerning Isaiah 10:29, it is not taught there that an elicited act of properly accepted faith is to be elicited, but rather an act of trust, which accompanies or follows the act of faith, certain assent, and the will's concurrence with the preceding wing of hope; and this is indicated when it is added "in faith," that is, through faith or through the act of faith elicited.

As for Ephesians 3:12, when we are said to have confidence or trust through faith (see Beza's notes there), we say that trust is an act through faith and after the special and applying faith; however, the act of special and applying faith is not an act through and after trust.

Regarding Psalm 37:5 and Jeremiah 17:7, we say that nothing else is preached there than the act, duty, necessity, and fruit of trust, which we concede.

Indeed, neither can nor should a person be a servant of God without trust any more than without faith. However, it does not follow that one is the other, or that the elicited and formal act of one is the act of the other, or that the act of one precedes the act of the other. Thus, in Psalm 32:11, Philippians 3:1, and 4:4, compared with Romans 5:2, 2 Corinthians 6:10, and 1 Peter 1:8, spiritual joy is commended or called the joy of faith. However, it does not follow that justifying faith formally consists in joyous hearing. We will address John 1:12 and 3:33 shortly.


Argument: Receiving is an act solely of the will, not of the mind. Yet, the act of justifying faith is described as receiving in John 1:12. Therefore, Response: An objection might arise whether it is necessarily proven from these texts that receiving is an act elicited, formal, and of the will, and not of faith, as distinguished from trust. Yet, trust is attributed to faith metonymically, being antecedent and consequent. Setting aside the lesser issue for now, we deny the major. The reason is that reception in the Scriptures is also attributed to the mind, such as knowledge and assent. In Proverbs 1:5, 4:2, and 9:9, "to know" is called "to receive" - "laqach." Thus, wisdom is attributed to those who receive it as an act of reception. In Greek and Latin philosophy, commonly used terms include perception, conception, apprehension, comprehension, etc. For wisdom, concerning the teacher, is called doctrine, tradition, etc., while concerning the learner, it is called learning, lesson, acceptance, λήψις.

III. Argument: Election is an act solely of the will, not of the mind. Believing is choosing or election. Therefore, Response: Though the minor premise may be debated, for the sake of brevity, we now deny the major. The reason is that just as commanding and pursuing are attributed to the will, so judging, directing, and sharing are attributed to the practical intellect. Thus, in Greek philosophy, habits and acts of the mind, not the will, are attributed to knowledge, judgment, and opinion. The entire doctrine of counsel, an act of the mind and practical judgment, shows that election concerning various proposed means primarily takes place there. Refer to the Scholastics on 1.2, question 13, article 1.

Example: Since faith tends towards the good that is offered to us, and to tend towards the good is of the will, not the intellect. Response: It is of both: For the practical intellect tends towards the same good through judgment and direction, and the will in its own way, that is, through command and pursuit. Thus, wisdom, universally recognized as a habit of the intellect, not the will, has as its proper object good.

Regarding this, let Aristotelian and Scholastic Ethicists consult 22. qu. 47, art. 1, qu. 48, art. 1, and qu. 52, art. 2.


Example 2: Because tending towards the good is the act of election and thus of the entire person (John 6:35). Yet, this in no way agrees with the act of the intellect. Response: It might be objected that if it is the act of the entire person, it cannot be solely attributed to the will. Faith is the act of the entire person; therefore, distinguish: To know, to believe, to trust, to hope, to rejoice, to love are acts of the entire person, as the principle and subject "what"; and they are nevertheless of the intellect or will as the principle and subject "by which" or formal. To believe or to attribute trust solely to the will should not be exclusively to the entire person or exclusively to the act of either; since the one necessarily and essentially has the other as a consequent, concomitant, and conjoined, while the other necessarily and essentially presupposes it, and their dependence on each other is essential.


IV. Argument: Because salvific knowledge is not given in anyone without it being found in those to be saved, diverse, unless consequently, depending on the act of the will, i.e., trust. Response: If by knowledge, knowledge, assent, and general faith in the truths of faith are understood: Deny the antecedent. But if it is faith or special and applicative assent, which has as its object that truth - Christ is your Savior; God is your God - deny the antecedent. And this is truly "τὸ χριστιανὴν," whether trust and acquiescence of the will precedes that salvific knowledge and certain assent or whether it follows and accompanies it. We affirm the former; deny the latter. No argument or medium appears here to prove the opposite. It is, therefore, a bare repetition of the antithesis and a request for what is in question.

V. Argument: That truly Christian faith, which takes place in the intellect, always relies on divine testimony as divine (John 3:33). But it cannot be received unless from a pious disposition of the will towards God. Response: It is only established that some act and affection of the will precedes faith or assent, both general and special. However, it is not thereby established that special and justifying faith is formally an act of the will, no more than it follows that general faith (which the author himself, along with all our scholars and Scholastics, places in the intellect) is an act of the will because the act of commanding the will to elicit assent precedes it. Consult the Scholastics on 22. qu. 2, art. 1, and 1.2. qu. 9, art. 1.

VI. Because to believe in God is to believe to adhere to God, rely on God, acquiesce in God as in our life and salvation, who is all-sufficient (Deuteronomy 30:20), therefore, faith is true and proper trust. Response: If in the antecedent proposition "to believe" is taken properly and formally as relying on God and acquiescing in God, the antecedent is denied. However, if it is taken improperly, metonymically, and effectively, the antecedent is granted, and the consequence is denied. Thus, when the Word of God is said to be our life, it does not follow that the Word or faith is formally life itself. Likewise, James 1 is called the visitation of widows causally, not formally. And so, death is said to be the separation of the soul from the body, etc. Consult Rhetoricians on Metonymy and Logicians on improper predication.

The additions prove nothing.

It is about the choice and apprehension of a sufficient means, in which a certain and absolute persuasion of a future good is founded, as people are said to have trust in wisdom, power, friends, and wealth (Psalm 78:22). Response: First, it presupposes that the election and apprehension are not solely the proper domain of trust and will and cannot be attributed in any way to the intellect, which has been proven otherwise above. Second, it tacitly seems to attribute to dissenters that they assume all persuasion, assent, and certainty, or certain knowledge, to be about future good. However, they unanimously teach that faith properly concerns and deals with the present reality it apprehends.

It is. The true nature of solid faith is explained with phrases like "lean not on your own understanding" (Proverbs 3:5), "trust in the name of the Lord" (Isaiah 50:10), "trust in the Lord and do good" (Psalm 37:3), "on God rests my salvation and my glory; my mighty rock, my refuge is God" (Psalm 62:7), "everyone who believes in him will not be put to shame" (Romans 10:11). Therefore, faith is formally trust, and consequently, it is in the will alone. Response: The antecedent is denied concerning the cited Old Testament passages. These passages do not explain the nature or essence and formal act of faith, but either trust or hope, which are adjuncts to faith.

VI. We concede, however, that those are acts and motions of the will. Let us not light a torch at noon; let the passages in the original text be examined now. And if anyone cannot swim without a cork, let them see these stolen phrases explained from the sources of languages by the great among theologians and philologists, Fr. Gomarus, in his Diatribe on Faith, subject to commentaries on the epistle to the Hebrews; with which, if time allows, compare Matthew Mart's Onomasticon on the words "fides" and "fiducia." Regarding the phrase "for he who believes," Rom. 10:11, it does not necessarily signify the formal act of trust and will any more than the Hebrew word constructed with a preposition, also used of Moses and other prophets (2 Chronicles 20:20), where in Greek it is ΜΙΣΕΥΣΕΝΤΕ & ΠΟΠΥΡΥ, and of God's miracles (Psalm 78:32) where in Greek it is interpreted as ἐκ ἐπίστευσαν ἐν τοῖς θαυμασίοις αυτό. And concerning God's precepts, Psalm 111:6.

Then, the given particle "in" can sometimes signify trust; hence, it will be proved that this sense is proper, not metonymic. But if metonymic, how will it be proven that the formal nature of faith is trust, and consequently, that faith is in the will alone, as in its immediate subject?

Third, it could be said that the particles "in" and "with" admit various explanations, some of which may well suit this phrase "in" or "with." Indeed, the consequence of trust and acquiescence of the will could be deduced from those particles. However, we do not wish to insist on this exception unnecessarily, lest we seem to have compiled this abundance idly; the statements made thus far should suffice.

VII. What consists of union with God is not an assent given to the truth about God. But faith consists of union with God. Therefore, the major consequence is proved: Because an assent given to the truth about God can in no way bring about union with God.

Proof of the minor: Because faith is the first act of our life, by which we live to God in Christ. Response: It is said improperly or absurdly and falsely that faith consists in union with God, that is, that it formally is union with God. Union is neither the form nor the difference of faith; in fact, it is not even the genus. Union differs from faith in the whole predicate, as it is a relation, and this is an action or quality. Hence, in both definitions of faith presented by the opponent, it is defined by trust and acquiescence, not by being united. Theologians commonly and most accurately, including the opponent himself, teach that faith is the instrumental cause of our union and communion with God through Christ, and consequently, of justification and adoption. Therefore, what precedes union as an instrumental cause in the order of nature cannot be formally union.

If one wishes to speak causally to the contrary, we do not object that union with God consists in faith. Consider how the Apostle speaks about life in Galatians 2:20, "Christ lives in me, and I live through faith." Behold the meritorious and instrumental cause of life, distinct from its effect, that is, from life itself, which cannot therefore be said to be formally and properly union with God or our life by which we live to God in Christ. It must always be considered that our theologians warn that justifying faith is not considered absolutely, in itself, as a virtue or good work, but relatively, organically, and by means of another, namely, the gratuitous divine ordinance and Christ's righteousness, which faith receives. Thus, this whole argument collapses. An exception may also be made, ambiguously saying, "an assent given to the truth about God." If it means general assent, no orthodox person immediately attributes union to it; but if it refers to special and applicative assent, union is deservedly attributed to it as an instrument divinely ordained for this purpose. If one wishes to reform the argument and propose it in this way: "Through that by which, as its proper principle and instrument, we are united to God, and live to Him and in Him, that is formally justifying faith." But by an act of the will, trust, as its principle, etc. Therefore, deny the minor. Trust is an addition and consequent special and applicative effect.

VIII. The surrender by which one gave oneself to God in Christ, as a sufficient and faithful Savior, is made by the consent of the will alone, and in no way by the assent of the intellect. Therefore, faith is in the will alone. Response: Deny the consequence. This cannot be established by any reasoning unless one says that surrender is formally identical to believing or justifying faith. However, the opponent cannot say this, nor does he. Rather, he says the opposite with these words: "Even the believer, after the sense of misery and all kinds of liberation within himself and in others, has a need to surrender to God." Hence, I turn this argument back onto him: "What is formally and formally necessary for the act of justifying faith, that act is not the act of faith itself. Or, what is required as a condition in the one believing, that is not the very formal act of the believer or faith. But surrender or the act of surrender is required as a condition antecedent in the one believing. Therefore, this argument is sufficiently weakened. Moreover, about that surrender, what it is, and what order it has, whether in antecedence or in concomitance or consequence, is not something to be discussed here. For given that any necessary condition for the one believing is that it is formally an act of the will, it cannot be inferred in any way that it is formally believing or the act of justifying faith; rather, the opposite follows, that it is not. Just as sorrow for sins, despair of salvation in oneself and one's works, the desire for grace are necessary for the one believing (as shown in the outline and method of the practice of faith and repentance in the second part of theological disputations titled "On Regeneration and the Practice of Faith"), and these are in the will; however, none of these has called forth formal and formed acts of faith, either direct or reflex.

IX. Argument: It seems to be directed toward humans, that is, based on the hypothesis and concessions of those who posit faith in the intellect. However, they necessarily admit that there is some movement of the will in offering that assent, just as in human faith, it is said to be voluntary to grant faith to someone. Response: The entire argument is granted, and above, we have stated that this is the common doctrine of the Scholastics regarding faith or assent in its general sense. The same should be affirmed about faith or special assent. But the opponent continues:

If, however, faith depends on the will, it is necessary that the primary principle of faith is in the will. Response: Let this be granted or conceded. But does it follow from this that faith, both general and special, is formally trust and an act of the will? Certainly not. For that act of command by which the will moves the intellect is not formally or properly trust, that is, security in dangers, as trust is usually defined. Furthermore, this argument is turned against the opponent in the following way: "That of which the primary principle is in the will and which depends on the will in this respect is not formally an act of the will. But the primary principle of faith is in the will, etc. Therefore, the major consequence is evident. Because the principle is not what is principiated. The opponent's argument is similar to this: "That of which the primary principle is in external sense and imagination and which depends on them in this respect is formally an act of sense and imagination, or is only in sense, etc. But in physical knowledge, for example, the primary principle is in sense and imagination, etc. Therefore, physical knowledge is formally only in sense and imagination and, consequently, in no way in the intellect." Thirdly, the opponent counters his own argument by saying that doubt opposes faith, hesitation, error, and disbelief. But doubt, error, deception, whether in general or in special faith, is in the intellect. Therefore, faith is also in the intellect. This is how theology, which the opponent elsewhere placed in the will, is convincingly shown to be in the intellect based on his own propositions, as it is defined by him as doctrine, and terms such as wisdom, knowledge, prudence, etc., are considered judgments in the intellect. And thus, all the arguments, if they are to be called arguments, at least as presented by the opponent as arguments or in place of arguments, do not appear to have other premises with which the conclusion and thesis that faith is formally trust and an act of the will have been repeatedly asserted and refuted.

We conclude so far that we see no reason why there should be an exclusive emphasis on the will against the intellect, and why the more common opinion should not be left in its place. This common opinion speaks in a popular and exoteric manner without the application of a meticulous distinction between reason and the formal act of faith or believing, and between the necessary adjunct, the essential constitutive of faith, and the essential consequential. Meanwhile, we suggest to scholars engaging in these discussions that it seems necessary to follow sources that exclusively attribute justifying faith to the will, subject, and proximate principle:

Phrases and terms like "adhere to God," "choose," "acquiesce," etc., are used confusingly and should have been first unfolded from Scripture and good authors. They should be distinctively applied to the cited texts, as is done with faith, trust, joy, hope, charity, etc. Without this, there is a risk that faith, hope, charity, obedience, faithfulness, and their formal and elicited acts may become confused.

The acts of the will, by which the intellect is moved to produce its acts as a formal and eliciting principle, need to be distinguished from the formal and elicited acts of the intellect itself. Therefore, what is formally the intellect, attributed to the will, is called its act, to believe with certainty, and is given the status of a formal, eliciting, and immediate or proximate principle, when it is only an effective motivating or imperative principle and a mediate or proximate one.

Throughout the preliminary considerations, the entire course of this disputation, and in all arguments and solutions, the opponent does not insinuate or observe with sufficient accuracy and clarity—at least in a way that any reader could perceive—the distinction between the general faith common to hypocrites and the unregenerate, if considered materially and objectively, and the faith or certain special assent proper to the truly regenerate and salvifically converted. Consequently, the Papal controversy about only general faith, without special assent, trust, hope, joy, charity, and all the axioms and associated elements, is not distinguished from the problematic and Logical-Theological controversy that revolves among orthodox theologians. If these theses are distinguished from each other, and their respective arguments, exceptions, etc., are clearly and methodically assigned, and if they are presented concisely (as the opponent is adept at logically and sharply pressing and, as it were, punctuating his adversaries with great subtlety and skill), there is no doubt that much light and clarity will be brought to the discussion.

The opponent does not employ or seem to acknowledge the distinction between the act of Apopopias or special and justifying faith in a direct or simple sense and in a reflexive sense. However, this distinction is useful in explaining the nature of faith and in solving the sophism that states, "What all are bound to believe is true; But that Christ died for you, etc." This sophism, frequented by Perkins, Gomarus, and other orthodox theologians, merits recognition.

The saving faith is not accurately reduced to its proper category, and in that proximate genus (divine faith), or close genus (faith), or remote genus (intellectual habit), which is distinct from science—a knowledge through a cause—is not designated. The same is said about the kind and definition of trust. Hence, during the course of the discussion, faith and trust, along with their properties and attributes, are confused.

In many matters, as well as in this subject, because faith and trust are necessarily connected, they are treated as the same thing or one is substituted for the other.

Let us now proceed to the objections that I seem to have noted against the arguments of the opposing opinion.

I. Objection: Commonly, to believe signifies an act of the intellect giving assent to the testimony presented. But since, consequently, the will tends to be moved and extends itself to embrace the proven good, faith also appropriately designates this act of the will. This understanding is necessarily implied in this context.

Response: We concede that trust is a consequence of faith, and we turn the argument back against the opponent. Faith is not formally an act of the will, nor is trust formally faith. Through faith, or a certain persuasion and assent about a good, the will consequently moves and extends itself to embrace the good.

If the acquiescence and trust of the will in the good are formally faith because it follows, why is joy and mental tranquility not also faith? Since where there is faith and persuasion about the good, there the will tends to move toward joy, hope, mental tranquility, and security.

We acknowledge that the term "faith" is sometimes used (improperly, by metonymy) to denote trust. However, in this matter, in Scripture, when dealing with divine faith in general or justifying faith in particular, it is not necessarily to be understood in this way. This can be shown through an induction of relevant passages, if the paper allowed for it.

II. Objection: Special assent, by which we establish that God is our God in Christ, is not the first act of faith but an act emanating from faith. For there is no internal certainty in another person regarding this truth, nor is there a truer apprehension of it before you have singularly applied yourself to God by faith.

Response:

The entire objection is granted. In the simple or direct act of faith, Christ is first received and applied individually before it can be conclusively affirmed that Christ died, God is God to you, and your sins are forgiven. This can be compared to Gomarus in very learned discussions on the death of Christ and in the treatise on faith in his comments on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Then, this argument could be turned against trust in the following way: Trust and acquiescence in our God, as God through Christ, is not the first act of faith but an act emanating from faith. For there can be no greater trust and acquiescence of the heart in God as yours unless you have first believed and known with certainty through divine faith, that is, you have believed and known individually that God is yours through Christ. Nothing is willed singularly (especially God as our God) unless it has been believed and known, and this is the knowledge of faith.

III. Exception: Although in Scripture, sometimes the assent to the truth, which is about God and Christ (John 1:50), is held as true faith, there is always included a special trust. Thus, in all passages where the discourse is about saving faith, which presupposes trust in the Messiah, etc., or is designated through that assent as its effect, it is explicitly mentioned as an effect through its cause (John 11:25-27).

Response: Firstly, if the assent is understood in a general sense, we deny that it includes special trust. If the special assent is understood simply as the first direct assent (a different statement should be made about the reflexive act of faith), we concede that trust is concluded as a consequence or concomitant, but not as the antecedent and presupposed. However, however it is understood to be included, the argument can be turned as follows: What is included in faith is not formally faith or the formal essence of faith. But trust is included in faith. Therefore,

Secondly, if sometimes metonymically the word "faith" signifies trust, and sometimes (indeed, almost always, as evident from an inspection of the passages) properly signifies assent, why should we more firmly establish that faith is formally trust based on the force of the former usage in those specific texts, rather than establish that faith is formally special assent based on the force of the latter usage in many more texts? What phraseology, what analogy of Scripture, what rationale, what usage of the term "faith," "pistis," "pisteuo," among philosophers, orators, historians, poets, or Greeks, compels us to this conclusion?

IV. Exception: It is objected that trust is said to be the fruit of faith, but that is true of trust as it receives God in the future and is a firm hope. However, as it receives God in Christ, offering Himself in the present, it is faith itself. Hence, titles arise in Scripture that attribute to faith qualities such as παρρησία, πληροφορία, υπόςασις. Response: Elsewhere, the opponent distinguishes trust in faith and hope. With this distinction admitted, the opponent must still prove that this trust and acquiescence of the heart or will in God is formally justifying faith, through which, as an instrument divinely ordained, we are united to our God through Christ. And it must be proven that such trust is naturally prior to every act of faith, assent, persuasion, and special and applying certainty. Please define trust and acquiescence as security in dangers or evil or as the enjoyment of God as God for the present. Thus, it should be demonstrated with at least one argument that trust can and should be conceived and held by believers antecedently to all certainty, assent, persuasion, and special and applying divine faith, and antecedently to spiritual and salvific union with God through Christ as our God. So far, I have not seen such an argument. Indeed, against the correct proposition of the controversy, without elaborate argumentation, it is clear that divine and firm trust and acquiescence are not in God as ours unless it is established and believed singularly and with divine faith in this special truth presented to me that God through Christ is my God. That the act of special apprehension and certainty is in the mind, no one, I think, will deny. Refer to Part 2, Select Discourses on the Practice of Faith. This can also be easily observed in the comparison of human trust or acquiescence in a supporter or friend who presents themselves as wholly yours in the present, with human faith and persuasion about that supporter or friend, considering them as wholly yours.

Regarding the citation of the Greek terms παρρησία, πληροφορία, etc., by the opponent, along with the cited Scripture texts, Gomarus explained them in the aforementioned treatise in such a way that I believe no difficulty remains. Therefore, I leave it to our diligent scholars to pursue further.


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