A Brief Explanation of the Virtual Distinction in Thomistic Thought

 

Preliminary Note: This article is a compilation of some notes and outlines from my documents. It is thus not as well organized and formatted as some other articles may be!

“The virtual distinction is not an actual distinction, but an equivalence of distinction that obtains when one and the same thing is equivalent to many distinct things in act.” (Scholastic Renaissance)

Extrinsic virtual distinction: A thing which is simple in itself is equivalent to many in perfection or operation. The intellect conceives various aspects of the thing that is distinguished, without compromising its real unity. A single thing contains “more rationes or perfections in some being.” (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus Logica, Q. 2 art. 3). Human nature is identical with rationality and animality, and yet these two perfections are able to be distinctly conceived.

Intrinsic virtual distinction: The intrinsic capacity of a thing to receive without contradiction predicates that are contradictory to each other, prior to the operation of the intellect. Unlike the Scotist formal distinction, this type of virtual distinction does not exist ex natura rei. 

“In order for certain perfections or notions to be virtually distinct in God, it is not enough that they correspond to multiple notions or perfections in created things which are really or virtually distinct. Rather, it is necessary that these multiple aspects differ by genus and belong to different lines. Thus, because in created things essence and existence, intellect and intellection, will and volition do not differ by genus or belong to different lines—since they do not have different formal objects—they are not virtually distinct in God, but are only distinct by reason (distinctione rationis), based on their relation to creatures and the way we conceive divine things by analogy to created things.” (Jean Baptiste-Gonet, Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae [Paris: Sumptibus Antonius Bertier, 1669], pg. 50)

The virtual distinction has also been divided by the scholastics into major and minor. The major virtual distinction is with respect to the excluding and excluded, as how animality and rationality are virtually distinct in man, with the former being in potency to the latter. Obviously, this cannot be applied to God. The minor virtual distinction is of the nature of that which is explicit and implicit. 

In the doctors of Salamanca, a virtual distinction of divine perfections requires there to be correspondence to multiple lines belonging to different genera in creatures. Since nature and essence are not really distinguished in creatures by genus, they are therefore not virtually distinct in God.

Charles Billuart lists the following two foundations (fundamentum) for the virtual distinction (‘reason reasoned’):

1. Extra animam (outside the soul) - This foundation resides in the eminence of thing that “identifies in itself various perfections really distinct in the inferiors.”; for example, heat and dryness are both found in sunlight formally. This eminential complexity is the basis for a plurality of concepts. In God, it would be that the objective formal concepts of the attributes differ from each other. However this minor virtual distinction is potential and seeks to “impose” onto a human intellect.

2. Intra animam (inside the soul) - This is based on the finite nature of human reasoning, which is discursive, thus meaning that it must differentiate between concepts in the intellect, not being able to comprehend the one simple essence of God as it exists in itself. 

The distinction of reason reasoned: 

1. With perfect foundation - This occurs when the several concepts do not imply each other and can be separated. E.g., animality and rationality both exist in man, but there are brute animals which lack rationality, and intellectual creatures (such as angels, separate substances) which lack animality.

2. With imperfect foundation - When several concepts include each other in such a way that they cannot be separated. E.g., this type of distinction exists between being and the transcendentals, and among themselves.

None of this is to say that Thomists universally deny altogether any basis for the virtual distinction ex natura rei. Indeed, Gonet says quite explicitly that “Between the divine attributes and the essence, and among the attributes themselves, there exists a reasoned distinction with a foundation in reality; it is not merely a reasoning distinction, or from an extrinsic connotation of created things.” (Clypeus thomisticae Theologiae, pg. 80). Instead, the virtual distinction is founded on the finite nature of human intellects and the eminence of God’s simple essence: “Therefore, the reasoned distinction we conceive in divine attributes has a dual foundation: one from our part, namely the limitation of the created intellect and the mode of conceiving divine things by analogy to created things; the other from the part of God, namely the eminence of divine perfection, which although most simple in itself, corresponds to multiple things distinctly on the part of reality.” (Jean Baptiste-Gonet, Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae, disp. II, art. I, sect. 1 [Paris: Sumptibus Antonius Bertier, 1669], pg. 80)

The foundation ex natura rei is the divine essence in comparison to the deficiency of created intellects:

“The concepts expressed by these names correspond in God to different objective aspects. This diversity of aspect is not taken adequately from our intellect, but is founded on the eminence of divine perfection in comparison to the deficiency of our intellect, which is not able to conceive it under a single concept— and consequently, not to name it with one name.” (Pedro de Godoy, Disputationes theologicae in primam partem divi Thomae: Tomus Primus [Venice: Antonii Zatta, 1763], pg. 93)

The Predication and Classification of the Divine Attributes

Preliminary note: This article is a compilation of some outlines/notes from my documents and studies of the scholastic doctrine of God, within both the via Scoti and Thomistic traditions.  

“A divine attribute is commonly defined by theologians as: ‘A perfection that is absolutely simple, and can be absolutely and necessarily predicated of God, in the manner of an adjacent form.’” (Honoré Tournély, Praelectiones theologicae de Deo et divinis attributis [Paris: Nicolaum Pezzana, 1765], 1:202)

“An attribute is rightly defined as a certain absolute form or nature, constituted specifically and atomically, existing formally and necessarily in God, which follows from our way of conceiving the divine essence, in the manner of a passion, and as a property thereof. This is commonly taught by theologians, following Damascene in Book 1 of the Faith, Chapter 12.” (Jean Baptiste-Gonet, Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae [Paris: Sumptibus Antonius Bertier, 1669], pg. 74) 

Words are simply signs of concepts in the intellect. “As we know something, so we name it.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 13, art. 6). Therefore, we name God insofar as we know Him as He has revealed Himself to us. However, the divine Essence in itself is incomprehensible and indescribable. 

“Certainly, God is that which, when spoken of, cannot be expressed; when thought of, cannot be conceived; when defined, exceeds definition. He whom all do not know, they know to be fearful.” (Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 49)

“Therefore one should consider that, when names are imposed by us, who know God only from created things, they always fall short of representing divine things as far as the mode of signifying goes. For our names signify divine perfections through the mode in which they are participated in by created things. However, if we consider the reality being signified in the name, which is what the name is imposed for signifying, we find that some names are imposed for signifying principally the very perfection from God as exemplar, simply speaking, without being concerned with any mode in its own signification. We also find some names imposed for signifying a perfection received according to a sort of mode of participation. For example, all knowledge is from the divine knowledge as its exemplar, and every science is from the divine science; therefore the name “sensation” is imposed for signifying knowledge through that mode in which it is received materially, according to a power connected to an organ. But the name “knowledge” does not signify any mode of participation within its principal signification.” (Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences I, dist. 22, q. 1, art. 2)

“God Himself is not subject to definition. When we call Him good, wise, just, omnipotent, etc. we are calling him by the names which we may also give to creatures, but they do not represent the divine Essence in se. “Can God be named by us? We respond: we deny this with regard to an adequate name, but with regard to an inadequate name we concede this. For just like no concept of a finite mind can adequately represent God, so no spoken word (λόγος προφορικός) can adequately represent him.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Selectae Disputationes, 5:50)

There is a difference between what the name signifies and the mode of signification (Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 13, art. 3). In God, what the name signifies is perfection in itself, and the mode of signification refers to created things. So when we say that “God is Wise,” the meaning is that wisdom in its purity of definition belongs to God in all its fullness. When pure perfections are applied to God, this is with respect to the signification itself. However, when the mode of signification is under consideration, the attributes apply first to God in their signification, and then only secondarily in respect to creatures. 

“Every perfection that is in created things descends from God as from its exemplar, as from a principle that possesses in advance within itself, in a united way, the perfections of all things. Nevertheless no created thing can receive that perfection according to the mode in which it is in God. Whence, according to the mode of receiving, it falls short of perfectly representing the exemplar. And from this as well there is a certain gradation in created things, according to which certain things attain more, and more noble, perfections from God than do others, and they participate in them more fully. And due to this, in names there are two things to consider: the reality being signified, and the mode of the signifying. Therefore one should consider that, when names are imposed by us, who know God only from created things, they always fall short of representing divine things as far as the mode of signifying goes. For our names signify divine perfections through the mode in which they are participated in by created things. However, if we consider the reality being signified in the name, which is what the name is imposed for signifying, we find that some names are imposed for signifying principally the very perfection from God as exemplar, simply speaking, without being concerned with any mode in its own signification.” (Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences I, dist. 22, Q. 1, art. 2)

Impure perfections are attributed to God only in a causal sense that God is the source of them by way of efficient causality, but not in their essential meaning. The perfection of the effect is attributed to the cause thereof. 

The names we attribute to God are not all synonymous with each other: Even though they all refer to the same reality of the absolutely simple Divine Essence, they are in accordance with the different aspects through which the Divine Essence manifests in diverse effects ad extra. The attributes are considered by us in distinct names since they exist as really distinct perfections in creatures, but are one and the same in God, identical to His essence. 

Divine attributes are said to “flow” from the essence, not in the sense of a real temporal emanation (heretical), but in the sense that we presuppose the essence in its own formal concept before we think of the attributes. 

In creatures, perfections can exist in two distinct ways:

1. By their genus and proper formal distinction. This occurs when they refer to different formal objects; as mercy, justice, wisdom, goodness, etc. 

2. By the potentiality and limitation of the creature

In their internal intrinsic being, God’s attributes are neither really similar or dissimilar. This is because all the attributes are one and the same simple pure actuality. However, when these attributes are made explicit in our concepts, they are indeed dissimilar to each other. Dissimilarity is based on what one formal predicate does not explain, since it does not formally include it in its concept. 

A perfection can exist in a being in the following 3 ways:

1. Formally - When the being possesses the predicate according to his own concept and its proper definition. Thus animality and rationality exist in man.

2. Virtually - The capacity to produce the perfection exists in the subject. Thus we say that an effect is virtually contained in its efficient cause. E.g., a seed virtually contains the future plant.

3. Eminently - When a being has a greater perfection that “compensates” for the lack of a lesser perfection. Scholastic Renaissance gives the example of an Angel which lacks rationality (a perfection in man), but is nonetheless an intellectual being. Intuitive reasoning is superior to discursive reasoning. 

Gabriel Vasquez (1549-1604) taught that the essence and attributes could be abstracted from each other in the intellect in such a way that the former does not even implicitly include the latter, and vice versa. This is contrary to the position of most of the Thomist scholastics, who believed that the essence implicitly includes the attributes, and that each attribute implicitly includes the others. 

For Giles of Rome (I, dist. 6, q. 1), “attribute” simply means any of the perfections which we ascribe to God. Thus ‘subsistence’ would be listed under the divine attributes. However, Durandus takes the term “attribute” to refer more to incommunicable divine perfections like immutability, eternality, infinity, simplicity, etc. 

“A divine attribute is rightly described as a simply simple pure divine perfection under some certain inadequate notion of the pure act, conceivable outside the categorical line, as a total property flowing from the essence or nature immanently.” (Scholastic Renaissance)

God’s necessary acts of intellection and volition can also be called “attributes”, but not as personal perfections in God. 

Some divines have distinguished between intrinsic, extrinsic, and semi-extrinsic attributes in God. A “semi-extrinsic” attribute is composed of a divine perfection and extrinsic creatures (terminus), according to our way of conceiving it. The divine intrinsic attributes are diverse from each other in our explicit concepts, since it is impossible for the human intellect to simultaneously or adequately conceive infinite distinct formalities in God. 

With regard to perfections, we may differentiate between perfectionis simpliciter simples and perfectionis secundum quid. The former are those perfections whose concepts do not have limits, such as thinking or loving, while the latter type does imply a limitation. Under this framework, perfectionis simpliciter simples are found in God formally, while the perfectionis secundum quid are found in God virtually. For example, discursive reasoning does not exist in God formally, but does exist virtually in His power to create a creature which may perform that action. This classification finds strong similarity in the Reformed scholastic Jerome Zanchi (Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Divine Essence and Attributes [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006], pg. 217).

The attributes may also be classified into absolute and relative. The former are those that predicate a perfection of God without any relation of reason to creatures, while the latter imply some relation of the aforementioned type. “The properties of God are either absolute or relative. The absolute properties of God are such that they may be considered without the supposition of any thing else whatever, towards which their energy and efficacy should be exerted. His relative are such as, in their egress and exercise, respect some things in the creatures, though they naturally and eternally reside in God.” (The Works of John Owen, 12:93)

While many Protestant scholastics distinguished between God’s communicable and incommunicable attributes, this was not a universal teaching of the Reformed church. For example, Amandus Polanus (1561-1610) rejected this distinction and preferred to ally himself with more traditional scholastic methods. For him, we should differentiate between affirmative and negative predications; the via eminentiae and the via negativa (Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 3:220). 

A Glossary of Some Scholastic Distinctions

It is difficult to define the concepts of distinction and identity in and of themselves, since we always presuppose some notion of them in defining each of them respectively or any other concept within the science of metaphysics and logic. “Therefore, since distinction and identity, in such generality, are equivocal concepts, it will be sufficient to explain their meaning by way of names: The formality of distinction is explained as the negation or absence of identity; Conversely, identity is explained as the negation of distinction or otherness.” (Bartholomew Mastri, Cursus Philosophicus in Quinque Tomos Distributus: Tomus Primus [Venice, Nicolaum Pezzana, 1757], d. 1, q. 5, art. 2, pg. 94)

The following is a [somewhat] comprehensive list of scholastic distinctions, along with definitions from various schools: Scotist, Thomist, and Suarez:

[1]. The Real Distinction

1. Greater real distinction: This distinction applies to things separable from each other, as Peter and John, or the difference between body and soul.

2. Lesser real distinction: This separates a thing from its mode, such as the distinction between Peter and his state of being seated. Modes are minimal entities that cannot exist apart from their subject(s), but the subject may exist without them, hence grounding this type of modal distinction.

3. Minimal real distinction: A distinction between a thing and its formalities ex natura rei (diverse prior to the operation of the intellect). 

Virtual distinction: This distinction has been more fully discussed above, but we may summarize it again as follows: It is when a thing can be known by distinct acts and distinct formal qualities, as when the intellect notes the vegetative, sensitive, and rational parts of the human soul (though the nature of that distinction is also debated within scholastic psychology and the philosophy of mind). 

[2]. The Distinction of Reason

1. Greater distinction of reason: The human intellect may distinguish a single entity which is virtually multiple in different concepts, which do not include each other. E.g. the distinction between animality and rationality in man/

2. Minor distinction of reason: A thing may be distinguished in different concepts which do not explicitly include each other, but rather only in implicit act. E.g. we may distinguish truth, unity, and goodness under the single notion of transcendental being.

3. Minimal distinction of reason: The intellect distinguishes a single thing in different concepts/notions without real foundation, as when divine will is conceptually distinguished from volition. 

A simple way of thinking about the conceptual distinction is in the famous concepts of the distinction of the reason reasoning (rationis ratiocinantis) and the distinction of the reason reasoned (rationis ratiocinatae). The former is purely a product of the intellect, without foundation in reality; as when we distinguish between Tullius and Cicero (which are absolutely identical in reality). It arises merely from inadequate mental concepts of one and the same thing. “Although the same object is apprehended in each concept, the whole reality contained in the object is not adequately represented, nor is its entire essence or objective notion exhausted by either of them.” (Francisco Suarez)

The distinction of the reason reasoned has a foundation in re (“in the thing itself”). It is produced by the intellect, but has a foundation in reality. For example, when we distinguish God’s mercy from His justice. Its fundamentum is either the eminence of the object itself, or some other things which are really distinct. (Francisco Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae VII: On the Various Types of Distinctions, trans. Cyril Vollert, [Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1947], pg. 18). 

[3]. Inadequate distinction - This occurs between the reason of the whole and its parts; e.g. - the body and the hand, the whole man and the rational soul, etc.