Every man who is anyway acquainted with the Protestant-Roman Catholic online dialogue scene is familiar with the classic "canon conundrum" argument against sola Scriptura. However, one many do not know is that this is not the way the Roman Catholic argument was historically formulated by their theologians. This older form of the argument has made a revival in the year of 2025 with figures such as Christian B. Wagner, Kevin Fernandez, and DoorDashThomist (the last of whom I have had the pleasure of getting to talk to personally about some of these topics). The argument for these men within the Church of Rome relates to how we understand the supernatural act of divine faith in the inspiration of Scripture, with respect to a mere moral certainty one might have concerning the apostolic authorship of the New Testament books or even that they are divine revelation. Since inspiration is a supernatural truth pertaining an order transcending natural reason, it can be grasped only by divine faith. However, someone has to reveal it to you that the Scriptures are inspired. But since Scripture itself does not give a list of inspired books, the argument goes that one must have recourse to the Roman Magisterium in order to perform the assent of divine faith. Otherwise, all you get is the motives of credibility which give you probable degrees of rational certitude, but not supernatural faith.
In this article, I wish to counteract this argument, as well as show that the Roman Catholic view leads to a vicious circle when it comes to giving an account of the first principle into which supernatural faith is ultimately resolved. They either have recourse to circular reasoning, or to an infinite regress. In answering several ways whereby these Papists have attempted to escape this circle, I will particularly be engaging with the literature of Thomism, as well as the polemicists of the Counter-Reformation and key RC theologians of the 19th-century.
In terms of the sources I have used as the foundation for defending the position of Reformed Orthodoxy, the primary texts have been The Reason of Faith by John Owen (contained in volume 4 of his collected works), and the Disputation on the Formal Object of Faith by the Aberdeen theologian Robert Baron, written in response to the Scottish Jesuit George Turnebull. Baron's work in particular is outstanding, and arguably impossible to be defeated.
Defining the Material and Formal Object of Faith
When considering that divine faith whereby we adhere to what God has revealed, it may be divided into two heads: (1) What that thing is or those things are which we believe; (2) That on account of which we believe it. The former is the material object of faith, and the latter is the formal object. For the former, we believe that God exists, that He is one in essence and three in person, that Jesus Christ is the Messiah and the Son of God, that He died for sinners and was bodily resurrected, etc. These are the material objects of faith, they are the things that we believe. In this sense, the material object answers the question, “What is it that you do believe?” Thus it is said of our Savior’s disciples after His resurrection, “and they believed the scripture, and the word which Jesus had said.” (John 2:22). And we may behold this also in the instance of the apostle Paul in his preaching to the Gentile nations: “Having therefore obtained help of God, I continue unto this day, witnessing both to small and great, saying none other things than those which the prophets and Moses did say should come: That Christ should suffer, and that he should be the first that should rise from the dead, and should shew light unto the people, and to the Gentiles.” (Acts 26:22-23). The material object is that which is believed on account of something else, and resolved into some other principle to ground it as regards its certainty and truthfulness with respect to us.
But if someone were to ask us, “Why or on account of what do you believe these things?”—the proper answer is that it is because they have been revealed by God. This is the formal reason and motive of supernatural faith in the Scriptures and articles of faith. The formal object of faith is that ultimate principle into which our faith is resolved, and on account of which we believe other things as having been revealed by God. This divine revelation is believed through and from itself, and not on account of something else.
The faith of which we are dealing with here is that which is divine, infallible, and supernatural, effectually produced by the illuminating work of the Holy Spirit upon the minds of men. It is perfectly possible for an unconverted person to give all sorts of scientific, philosophical, or historical reasons for the reliability and authority of the Scriptures, but this is not the same as the divine faith which is required of all who hear the word of God. Rather, faith is something supernatural in its principle and nature. When speaking of faith that is divine and infallible, this is said with respect not unto the subject which possesses it (as though a man himself must be infallible in order to possess an infallible faith), but rather because of the object into which it is resolved, as a property or adjunct. This faith is grounded in that God has revealed it. This is based on the principle that acts and habits are specified by their formal objects. Hence, it was common amongst the scholastics to deny that any created thing could enter into the formal character or object of faith, hope, or love—since upon that supposition, they would no longer be supernatural in essence.
So it was with the Samaritans, “So when the Samaritans were come unto him, they besought him that he would tarry with them: and he abode there two days. And many more believed because of his own word; And said unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying: for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world.” (John 4:40-22). And also what is said by the apostle of the believers in the Thessalonian church: “when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe.” (1 Thess. 2:13). This infallibility and unshakeableness of that faith we inquire into is had from its formal object, namely that it is revealed by God who neither deceives nor can be deceived (Deut. 32:4; 2 Sam. 7:28; Titus 1:2; 1 John 5:6). It is not possible for someone with genuine divine faith to believe that which is false and erroneous, but a man could believe that which is infallible with a faith that is but fallible and human. For example, he may believe it merely because of tradition, or because of the testimony of the Roman church, as is the case with the Papists. I do not intend to say here that all of the means, including the church’s testimony, whereby the Scriptures are received as the inspired Word ought to be rejected, but rather that the formal grounds of such a reception as occurs in regenerate persons is only, “Thus saith the Lord.” This alone is what made those prophets and apostles of old certain and firm in their faith, and hence Peter calls it a “more sure word of prophecy” (2 Peter 1:19), confirming their faith in a manner far surpassing what the witness of miracles ever did or could do for them, but also for us. And thus were the prophets certain that what they heard was revealed by God, as in the instance of Jeremiah, “Then I knew that this was the word of the Lord.” (Jeremiah 32:8) But this same degree of certainty is also given to all genuine believers in the act of faith, as Suàrez explains: “if the prophet himself did not have certainty about this, namely, that it is God who speaks, the faith of believers in the prophets' sayings could not be certain. But in the same way, the faith of believers could not be certain unless they themselves were equally certain that it is God who speaks, just as the prophets themselves could not be certain about revealed things and their truth unless they were certain that God testifies to them.” (Commentaria in secundam secundae divi Thomae, disp. III, sect. 12, §9)
The authority and truthfulness of God are not the immediate formal reason and motive of our faith per se. But rather it is God insofar as He has revealed and proposed these things to us. Another peculiar characteristic of the difference between these two objects of faith is that the material object is that which we believe on account of something else, while the formal object is believed on account of itself. The assent of faith is ultimately resolved into and rests upon this divine revelation through and on account of itself, and not because of any other revelation—otherwise we may justly ask of that other revelation, “Why do you believe this?”, and it will be an infinite regress. The material object of faith does not have anything in itself in which our faith can acquiesce into as a final and ultimate principle. It is peculiar only to the formal object of faith that it is believed on account of itself.
The formal object of faith contains both the certainty of faith and its manifestation. It contains its certainty because of the truthfulness of the God who reveals, and its manifestation because it has been revealed by the truthful God. For we believe not only that God is truthful, but that He has revealed such; and it is precisely this which is the motive for our believing.
We must also note that the rule of faith and the formal object of faith are not the same, and are distinguished from each other in the following ways:—
[1]. The rule of faith functions as an exemplar of faith, or that which faith ought to follow in the things that are believed and demand our assent. It is the principle according to which we believe, but the formal object of faith is not the same as this. Rather, it properly denotes that on account of which we believe.
[2]. The rule of faith limits and measures what is to be believed, determining the extension of the articles of faith, i.e. the material object of faith. On the other hand, the formal object is that which terminates and grounds the assent of faith.
[3]. The rule of faith, when used rightly, efficiently results in the knowledge that is necessary for an act of faith. It instructs our minds and proposes to us what we are to believe and act faith upon. However, the formal object effects the very act of faith itself, moving the intellect to assent to the articles of faith that are contained in divine revelation.
[4]. Our faith is resolved not into the rule of faith, but into the formal reason and object of faith. If it were to be accepted by us that the rule of faith is that into which we resolve our faith, then many absurdities would follow; for example, to answer one who asks “Why do you believe Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God?”, we would reply, “Because Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God, this is what we believe.” Such a proposition would be senseless. Rather, we say “because God has revealed this to us in His Word.”
Many amongst the Romanists are also free and willing to concede that the ultimate principle upon which we give the assent of faith to the truths of Scripture and to the revelation itself, is not merely the testimony of their magisterium, but that because God has revealed it.
Some argue against the definition here afforded for the grounds of divine faith and its formal object, on the pretense that nothing which is created can enter into the ultimate reason and motive of faith, but only the uncreated perfection of God by which He neither deceives nor can be deceived, i.e. His veracity as the First Truth. These authors distinguish between the eternal truth as it is in the Divine Mind, from the ad extra temporal revelation which we receive. The former is for them the true formal object of faith, and the latter is simply the reason applying that to us, mediating as a sort of bond between God revealing and what is revealed.
However, such assertions are absurd and vain conceits. The uncreated truth of God per se is not the formal object of faith, as can be made clear from the ensuing considerations. 1st, it pertains to the formal object of faith to manifest to us the truth of that thing which we assent to, and to give us infallible and certain faith concerning it. 2nd, It is required for the formal motive of faith that what is in the divine mind is made known to us by some external revelation. How can that which is not perceived by us in any way be the formal grounds of faith? Otherwise, we could believe all things God knows, if His uncreated truth and knowledge were to be strictly identified with revelation. 3rd, the fact that God Himself is truthful does not serve to ground the motive and reason of faith infallibly without some external sign or manifestation.
That this revelation and speech of God is the formal reason of believing can be proven first and foremost from Scripture itself, where it is given as the grounds of faith. “Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth: for the Lord hath spoken” (Isaiah 1:2); “Speak; for thy servant heareth” (1 Sam. 3:10); “Believe in the LORD your God, so shall ye be established; believe his prophets, so shall ye prosper.” (2 Chron. 20:20); Faith depends on two principles for its certitude and strength. First, we must remember that faith—unlike scientific knowledge which comes through logical reasoning and the inferring of conclusions from premises—is based on the testimony of someone else. In our case, we must know first, that the testifier is true, and secondly, that he has said this or that thing which we believe. Although there may be a trustworthy witness, we cannot believe anything on account of his authority and truthfulness unless he speaks, and brings forth some testimony. 3rd, If one were to ask us why we believe that there will be a final resurrection of the just and the unjust, it would be an inept response to say “Because God is the First Truth.” Rather, God who is the First Truth has revealed this to us. 4th, the certainty of faith depends on its formal object. But this cannot be simply the truthfulness and authority of God considered apart from external revelation. Otherwise, one may assuredly believe that God is truthful and cannot deceive, he may yet doubt whether God has revealed this or that—and faith will no longer be certain nor infallible.
Considering faith as one of the theological virtues infused into us, it is not repugnant for something that is created to come under its formal object. For example, the virtue of hope not only looks towards God as its object, who is uncreated, but also to the supreme enjoyment of Him as our chief end. Similarly, divine faith is founded not only upon the eternal truthfulness of God, but upon His testimony and revelation to us.
It is also to no purpose to say that the proposition “Thus saith the Lord” cannot be the formal object of faith, but rather only a material object, since it itself is believed on account of the authority of God, i.e. that He has indeed revealed this or that thing to be believed. For also the proposition “God is Truthful” is something that is revealed, and therefore it cannot be the formal object of faith, and we are left utterly empty and destitute as to what the motive of our believing properly is. The first and ultimate thing into which our faith is resolved must be self-evidencing, or else an infinite regress will have to be conceded.
In considering the differences between divine faith and between human faith (which theologians from the church of Rome also call “infused faith” and “acquired faith”), the Papists disagree amongst themselves, based on different understandings of the way in which the natural and supernatural orders relate to one another. According to Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition, the assent of faith is something which is not only modally supernaturally (insofar as it is efficaciously caused by God), but also entitatively supernatural, and therefore exceeds man’s natural powers and his reason. For Scotus, natural and supernatural acts can have the same formal object. The formal object of faith does not exceed acquired faith, which also ties into what we have seen from Durandus, who concedes that the testimony of the Church and its infallibility is that which faith ultimately rests upon for Romanists, thus making infused faith, i.e. that which is supernatural, resolve into that which is natural, i.e. acquired faith. According to their Thomist opponents, this would in effect destroy the absolute necessity of internal grace for divine faith, as well as its supernatural and infallible character.
The Papists wish to avoid there being multiple assent of faith, one to the material objects of faith, a second assent to the proposition that they are divinely revealed, and a third one into the authority of their Church whereby they know what divine revelation is. Rather, it is all one and the same act for them: “No, by a single act, I assent that God is three and one and that God revealed this, just as by one and the same act I believe God, believe in a God, and believe in God.” (John Capreolus, Commentary on the Sentences III, dist. 24, q. 1, art. 3, §2)
Suàrez taught against Scotus and Luis de Molina that the infused faith and acquired faith both have the same formal object and motive. He agrees with us that divine revelation is believed through and on account of itself, and it is that which our faith is ultimately resolved into. This is also admitted by John Capreolus in his Commentary on the Sentences III, dist. 24, q. 1, art. 3, §4, where he writes against Scotus: “And when it is asked in addition, ‘How do I assent to ‘God revealed this,’ etc. . . .,’ we must say that faith assents to it for its own sake and not on account of some other proposition, as though the assent to ‘God revealed this’ would be dependent upon such another proposition, for this is the first thing believed: God or the First Truth revealed whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture and in the Church’s teaching. And assent to this proposition is not efficiently [effective] caused by another preceding assent but, rather, by God moving the intellect internally through the habitus of faith to this assent. Nonetheless, this first assent of faith first requires the presentation of this complex expression through an interior or exterior locution either through the reading of Sacred Scripture or through preaching.”
Between the material and formal objects of faith, there is also some order of things that are believing, with dependence and credibility. The formal object is believed prior in nature to the belief in the material object. And two types of “priority” are intended here; (1) There is a causal priority in which one of the credible things is a cause which objectively moves to assent to something else which depends on that first credible thing. We believe the doctrines of Scripture, because of our faith in the proper proposition, “This has been revealed by God.” (2) There is a priority in which there exists some accordance with one credible thing depending on another as a sine qua non. For example, believing in the death of Christ is prior in this sense to believing in the resurrection of Christ. One could not believe in the resurrection without a prior faith in His death, but one could perchance believe in His death while denying the resurrection.
In the case at hand, the formal object is believed causally prior to the material object. For it is our belief that God has revealed thus and thus that causally moves us to believe in those things which He has revealed. The medium which moves the intellect to assent to something must be known prior to that thing to which assent is given on account of the medium.
It is also true that the formal object of faith is believed prior by nature than the material object. The divine authority of the rule of faith is believed in before we assent to those things which are believed on account of the authority of that rule. We have certitude about those things which are immediately and clearly revealed before we have certitude about those things which are contained in them implicitly or virtually, or gathered out of them by necessary consequence. From this it can be gathered that the certitude which we possess about that which is believed prior does not depend on that which is believed posterior. I ask: which is believed prior by nature: the divine authority and infallibility of the Church, or the divine authority of Scripture?
It is essential that there is some first principle of faith into which all other things are ultimately resolved. In every order of subordinated causes, there must be something first which is arrived at. It cannot be that the Roman teaching of the Church’s infallibility is that first principle of faith, since many other dogmas of theirs must be first believed upon and presupposed in order to conclude that they have the true Church established by Christ with His apostles. For Romanists, the “Church” which possesses such an infallibility is certainly not the laity, nor merely the doctors of theology, nor individual church fathers, but rather their bishops gathered together in a legitimate ecumenical council convened by the Roman Pontiff. Therefore, before we assent to the infallibility of the Church, we must also believe that Rome is the true Church of Christ, that it has received this divine assistance and infallibility, that Peter was installed by Christ as the universal Bishop of the Church in his successors, that the bishops of Rome are his legitimate successors, and that their ecumenical councils are free from error when defining matters of faith and morals. And furthermore, since the Papists confess that the infallibility of the Church is believed on account of the Word of God, written and unwritten, it is clear that the infallibility of the Church is not the first principle into which our faith acquiesces.
We say that the Word of God, the Holy Scripture, is the first principle of faith and theology, through which all articles of faith are believed. Scripture as it is the Word is the formal object of faith. Nor was this truth unknown to the ancient church, who in their controversies against heretics, made use of Scripture as the rule of faith and the supreme judge of controversies. Such was the case with Augustine, in his writings against the Donatist heretics, who claimed to be the true Church against the catholics. “But among us and the Donatists the question is, where is this body, that is, where is the Church? Therefore, what would we do? Seek it in our words or in the words of its head, our Lord Jesus Christ? I think that we ought rather seek it in his words who is truth and knows best his own body.” (Augustine,
And what Augustine says in chapter 19 of On the Unity of the Church is particularly noteworthy, where he distinguishes the motives of credibility and external evidences which prove him and his fellow orthodox believers to be the true Church in contrast to the Donatists, and what the genuine foundation of their faith was: “But they may not show whether they adhere to the Church unless from the canonical books of the divine Scriptures since we do not say that it should be believed of us that we are in the Church of Christ on this account that Optatus of Milevis or Ambrose of Milan or countless other bishops in communion with us commended that Church to which we adhere or that this Church was preached by the councils of our colleagues or that throughout the whole world, in the holy places that our communion frequents, so many miracles either of answered prayers or of healings are performed that the bodies of martyrs that lay hidden for so many years were revealed to Ambrose because they could hear many petitioners and a man blind for many years who was well known in the city of Milan received his sight at those bodies or since this one saw in a dream and that one heard in an ecstasy either that he should not go to Donatus’ sect or that he should abandon Donatus’ sect. Whatever such things happened in the catholic Church should therefore be approved of. Because they happen in the catholic Church, the Church is not therefore shown to be catholic, just because these things happen in it. The Lord Jesus himself, when he rose from the dead, offered his body to be seen by the eyes of his disciples and touched with their hands in case they nevertheless think they experienced some trick. He considered them more strengthened by the evidence of the law, the prophets, and the psalms, showing what was predicted earlier was fulfilled in him. So he commends his Church, saying that repentance and the forgiveness of sins is to be proclaimed to all nations beginning from Jerusalem. He asserted that this was written in the law, the prophets, and the psalms; we adhere to this commended by his own mouth. This is the evidence of our case, this the foundation, this the support.” (emphasis mine)
Without putting it into a formal syllogism, I express the argument as follows: That which is believed and ascertained on account of some other foundation is posterior to the foundation, because that which rests upon a prior principle is not the first principle. But the true Church, according to Augustine, is believed and ascertained on the basis of Scripture. Therefore, Scripture is that prior foundation, and is believed before the authority of the Church.
The Church also cannot prove itself to be true by virtue of its own testimony. For if the Papists say that Scripture’s testimony to its own divine truth and inspiration is insufficient for us to believe in it with a firm faith, then by a parity of reason in both cases, we can deny this in the case of the Church. Faith cannot rest upon the Church’s testimony unless it is first believed that the Church is divine and infallible, having been given the assistance of the Holy Spirit.
Motives of Credibility
There are various external evidences for the truth of the Christian religion which have been appointed by God, and have been set forth in Scripture, and are also known realities of the Church’s history, which manifest to us a strong confidence and belief concerning the fundamental articles of faith, especially concerning Christ and His apostles. That these twelve men, who were for the most part from lowly backgrounds, variably unacquainted with theology and spiritual matters, should yet preach such a faith which should within three centuries capture the whole of the Roman empire, does evidently show forth the truth and divine nature of the gospel of Christ. And thus are such created evidences, such as miracles and the fulfillment of prophecies, set forth in the Scripture as aids of faith, but not the infallible foundation thereof. “And they went forth, and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following.” (Mark 16:20); Christ said, “If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.” (John 10:37); “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin.” (15:22); “Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds.” (2 Cor. 12:12).
However, these motives of credibility are not the foundation or basis upon which we believe in the Scriptures or the articles of faith with that assent which is divine and infallible. And this is because such motives are of a natural order, and therefore cannot ground a supernatural faith. Thus, even if one were persuaded by such motives of the infallibility and divine origin of the Roman Church, this still would not help their cause, since it must be a supernatural principle from which such a faith is produced, not that which is within the power of natural reason. Even the very desire for an act of faith is produced only by the grace of God, and is not within our natural power (see canon 5 of the Second Council of Orange). These motives of credibility serve to persuade a man to believe in divine revelation with that faith which is infallible, but they are not of themselves such infallible faith. And hereby we see how greatly the Papists err when they assert that the motives of credibility are sufficient to persuade someone of the authority of their Church, and then move them towards believing in its infallibility, so that thereupon they also may believe in the divine authority of Scripture. For if this is the case, why not also can the Scriptures be assented unto by means of these external evidences, and from there without the testimony of the Church obtain divine faith thereupon?
There is nothing inconsistent with God’s wisdom and prudence in leading men to Himself, by beginning with less efficacious and fallible means, after which they begin to believe with divine faith. Such was the case with Thomas, who was persuaded of the truth of Christ’s bodily resurrection by means of the sensible proofs offered to him by the Lord, but at the same time believed it truly with infallible faith based upon His own divine testimony. “because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.” (John 20:29)
As already stated, the motives of credibility are insufficient to have divine faith in any supernatural truth, whether that is the infallibility of the Church, or the inspiration of the Bible.
Scriptural Testimony
Since both us and the Papists agree that Scripture is divinely inspired and a rule of faith, there is no trouble in appealing to it in order to resolve the present question. For, as will be shown, the Scriptures teach their own self-evidencing light and sufficiency to manifest their divine authority and inspiration upon the consciences of men. The Word of God is that light by which we see, and also a light which we see; and proves itself to us.
“And Moses commanded them, saying, At the end of every seven years, in the solemnity of the year of release, in the feast of tabernacles, When all Israel is come to appear before the Lord thy God in the place which he shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. Gather the people together, men and women, and children, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law: And that their children, which have not known any thing, may hear, and learn to fear the Lord your God, as long as ye live in the land whither ye go over Jordan to possess it.” (Deuteronomy 31:10-13). The reading of the Law is here declared to be a sufficient means for accomplishing the genuine faith and obedience of the Israelites, including the later generations in that nation "which have not known any thing", likely a reference to the immediate revelation given at Mount Sinai, as well as the miracles witnessed by them. And yet, although these children had no experience of such things, yet the law written by Moses was to be the foundation of their faith, so that they might fear God.
“The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord. Is not my word like as a fire? saith the Lord; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces? Therefore, behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that steal my words every one from his neighbour. Behold, I am against the prophets, saith the Lord, that use their tongues, and say, He saith.” (Jeremiah 23:28-31). Notice here that the prophet is addressing the question of how one may discern the true word of the God of Israel from the sayings of the false prophets who claim that their fables were divinely revealed. We therefore have two candidates here for the Word of God. And how is the true one discerned? Not by any external testimony, but by its internal power and majesty, analagous to how wheat intrinsically distinguishes itself from chaff.
“For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For he received from God the Father honour and glory, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. And this voice which came from heaven we heard, when we were with him in the holy mount. We have also a more sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts: Knowing this first, that no prophecy of the scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.” (2 Peter 1:16-21). Although the apostle Peter had received immediate revelation by God concerning the divinity of Christ (Matthew 16:16), and had witnessed His miracles, this is not what the apostle places the foundation of faith in. Rather, it is the sure word of prophecy of the inspired Word.
“Now to him that is of power to establish you according to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery, which was kept secret since the world began. But now is made manifest, and by the scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to all nations for the obedience of faith.” (Romans 16:25-26). No doubt, the "obedience of faith" that is spoken of here is not merely human faith or moral certainity. It is divine and supernatural faith infused by God. But what is the means used towards that end? What is the reason of faith here? It is divine revelation itself, as seen in verse 25. However, the way it is manifest is by Scripture. All of this is sufficient for the production of divine faith in the souls of men.
Patristic Testimony
When accounting his own witness of the vanity of the heathen philosophers and the lack of truth that he discovered in their writings, Justin Martyr relayed how different this was from the reading and hearing of the words of Scripture, the prophets, Christ, and the apostles. When speaking with aged Christian man, Justin records this saying of his: “There existed, long before this time, certain men more ancient than all those who are esteemed philosophers, both righteous and beloved by God, who spoke by the Divine Spirit, and foretold events which would take place, and which are now taking place. They are called prophets. These alone both saw and announced the truth to men, neither reverencing nor fearing any man, not influenced by a desire for glory, but speaking those things alone which they saw and which they heard, being filled with the Holy Spirit. Their writings are still extant, and he who has read them is very much helped in his knowledge of the beginning and end of things, and of those matters which the philosopher ought to know, provided he has believed them. For they did not use demonstration in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration, and worthy of belief; and those events which have happened, and those which are happening, compel you to assent to the utterances made by them, although, indeed, they were entitled to credit on account of the miracles which they performed.” (Dialogue with Trypho, ch. 7). Here, the divine revelation spoken by the prophets is called by him the “truth above all demonstration.” It seems reasonable to infer that this is also to be properly applied to Scripture in the mind of Justin, considering that he mentions explicitly the writings and treatises of the prophets, which form part of the Old Testament.
“If any one, moreover, consider the words of the prophets with all the zeal and reverence which they deserve, it is certain that, in the perusal and careful examination thus given them, he will feel his mind and senses touched by a divine breath, and will acknowledge that the words which he reads were no human utterances, but the language of God; and from his own emotions he will feel that these books were the composition of no human skill, nor of any mortal eloquence, but, so to speak, of a style that is divine. The splendour of Christ's advent, therefore, illuminating the law of Moses by the light of truth, has taken away that veil which had been placed over the letter (of the law), and has unsealed, for every one who believes upon Him, all the blessings which were concealed by the covering of the word.” (Origen, On First Principles, book IV, ch. 6)
“After that, O Lord, You, little by little, with most gentle and most merciful hand, drawing and calming my heart, persuaded taking into consideration what a multiplicity of things which I had never seen, nor was present when they were enacted, like so many of the things in secular history, and so many accounts of places and cities which I had not seen; so many of friends, so many of physicians, so many now of these men, now of those, which unless we should believe, we should do nothing at all in this life; lastly, with how unalterable an assurance I believed of what parents I was born, which it would have been impossible for me to know otherwise than by hearsay — taking into consideration all this, You persuade me that not they who believed Your books (which, with so great authority, You have established among nearly all nations), but those who believed them not were to be blamed; and that those men were not to be listened unto who should say to me, ‘How do you know that those Scriptures were imparted unto mankind by the Spirit of the one true and most true God?’ For it was the same thing that was most of all to be believed, since no wranglings of blasphemous questions, whereof I had read so many among the self-contradicting philosophers, could once wring the belief from me that You are — whatsoever You were, though what I knew not — or that the government of human affairs belongs to You.” (Augustine, Confessions, book 6, ch. 5)
"I would hear and understand, how ‘In the Beginning Thou madest the heaven and earth.’ Moses wrote this, wrote and departed, passed hence from Thee to Thee; nor is he now before me. For if he were, I would hold him and ask him, and beseech him by Thee to open these things unto me, and would lay the ears of my body to the sounds bursting out of his mouth. And should he speak Hebrew, in vain will it strike on my senses, nor would aught of it touch my mind; but if Latin, I should know what he said. But whence should I know, whether he spake truth? Yea, and if I knew this also, should I know it from him? Truly within me, within, in the chamber of my thoughts, Truth, neither Hebrew, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor barbarian, without organs of voice or tongue, or sound of syllables, would say, "It is truth," and I forthwith should say confidently to that man of Thine, "thou sayest truly." Whereas then I cannot enquire of him, Thee, Thee I beseech, O Truth, full of Whom he spake truth, Thee, my God, I beseech, forgive my sins; and Thou, who gavest him Thy servant to speak these things, give to me also to understand them." (Augustine, Confessions, book 11, ch. 3)
“For we have, as the source of teaching, the Lord, both by the prophets, the Gospel, and the blessed apostles, in various manners and at sundry times, Hebrews 1:1 leading from the beginning of knowledge to the end. But if one should suppose that another origin was required, then no longer truly could an origin be preserved. He, then, who of himself believes the Scripture and voice of the Lord, which by the Lord acts to the benefiting of men, is rightly [regarded] faithful. Certainly we use it as a criterion in the discovery of things. What is subjected to criticism is not believed till it is so subjected; so that what needs criticism cannot be a first principle. Therefore, as is reasonable, grasping by faith the indemonstrable first principle, and receiving in abundance, from the first principle itself, demonstrations in reference to the first principle, we are by the voice of the Lord trained up to the knowledge of the truth. For we may not give our adhesion to men on a bare statement by them, who might equally state the opposite. But if it is not enough merely to state the opinion, but if what is stated must be confirmed, we do not wait for the testimony of men, but we establish the matter that is in question by the voice of the Lord, which is the surest of all demonstrations, or rather is the only demonstration; in which knowledge those who have merely tasted the Scriptures are believers; while those who, having advanced further, and become correct expounders of the truth, are Gnostics. Since also, in what pertains to life, craftsmen are superior to ordinary people, and model what is beyond common notions; so, consequently, we also, giving a complete exhibition of the Scriptures from the Scriptures themselves, from faith persuade by demonstration.” (Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book VII, ch. 16)
That Scripture possesses such a fullness of divinity that it may evidence itself to our minds to be divine, by way of its own internal light, majesty, and power;—this truth has broken forth even among some Papist theologians, such as Gregory of Valencia: “For although it is written in simple words and almost entirely lacks the artifice and ornaments of rhetoric, nevertheless it so powerfully moves the mind of the reader that no other doctrine can compare with it. This is proof that its authority is entirely divine, not human. Human doctrine, without the art of words and the charms of eloquence, is not able to produce such movement of souls…The Maccabees, having experienced this power of Holy Scripture, although surrounded on all sides by enemies and pressed by great difficulties, nevertheless claimed to lack nothing, for (they said) ‘we have the holy books of consolation in our hands’ (1 Macc. 12). Indeed, the testimony of the Maccabees often seems to me of such a kind that even by hearing it alone—if a person is not entirely of corrupt mind—he could sense this saving and divine power of Holy Scripture, even without further experience.” (Gregory of Valencia, Commentariorum theologicorum tomi IIII, Vol. 3, disp. 1, q. 1 [Lyon: Horace Cardon, 1609], pg. 89).
The Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit
The true and saving knowledge of God and the salvation offered in the Gospel as set forth in Scripture is not merely one that comes through academic study and the reading of various tomes of books. For this is the manner in which one grows in the knowledge of any other science or art, such as logic, mathematics, the study of law and jurisprudence, geography, history, philology, etc. There are many learned men who are experts in the study of theology who are as yet utterly void of any saving grace or true faith. Such were the scribes and Pharisees: “thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.” (Matt. 11:25) Rather, it is the true and saving wisdom of God from above that we are concerned with. And this can only come through the internal and efficacious work of the Holy Spirit to remove the darkness and spiritual ignorance which naturally rests upon our souls because of sin, and illuminate our minds to behold divine revelation with true faith.
Abundant testimonies of Scripture can be brought forward in confirmation of this truth. I will cite them here, and then digress towards an exposition of certain key places which will aid our present purposes.
Speaking to the Pharisees and Jews, Christ said “And the Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape.” (John 5:37). Which is to say, although they had seen with clarity the miracles performed by Christ, and these external evidences of His divinity and status as the promised Messiah, they still did not believe in Him. And why did they not believe? Because they had not been inwardly taught of God, and enabled by Him to believe. For such faith is above the natural powers of human nature, and requires the efficacious operation of God. Similarly, “If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin. But now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father.” (John 15:24). Why did they persist in such obstinate unbelief? Christ answers us in verse 21, “because they know not him that sent me.”
But to those who did believe in Him, such as Peter, for instance, He said “Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.” (Matt. 16:17); “Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.” (13:9); “It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.” (John 6:45).
This is also taught by the apostle in 1 Cor. 12:3, “no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost.” And again in Phil. 1:29, “For unto you it is given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on him, but also to suffer for his sake”; “He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself” (1 John 5:10); “But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.” (1 Cor. 2:14)
A common error and misrepresentation of the Papists is to assert that Protestants and Reformed Christians believe in the divine authority and inspiration of the Scriptures on account of this internal illumination and testimony of the Holy Ghost, as though it were the formal reason of faith for us. And building on this shaky foundation, they assert that we have for the foundation of our faith something akin to an internal private revelation (similar to what is professed by the Anabaptists and Pentecostals in our day), whereby the individual becomes his own personal authority, having rejected the infallible testimony of their Church.
But this is an utter strawman, and a false conflation of that efficient cause whereby we believe, with that formal basis on account of which we believe in what God has revealed to us in the Scriptures;—or between the principle effective cause of the assent of faith, and the principle objective cause of the assent of faith. We say, that the internal testimony of the Spirit is not a formal object of faith, but rather the efficient cause which produces such faith within us. And that this is the common opinion of our divines need not require such proof, were it not for how often Romanists slander us. One such testimony will suffice for the present, as found in John Owen: “This work of the Spirit of God, as it is distinct from, so in order of nature it is antecedent unto all divine objective evidence of the Scriptures being the word of God, or the formal reason moving us to believe it; wherefore without it whatever arguments or motives are proposed unto us, we can- not believe the Scriptures to be the word of God in a due manner, and as it is in dui-y required of us…For it is not the reason why we believe the Scriptures, but the power whereby we are enabled so to do.” (The Works of John Owen, 4:55-56).
To the point at hand: we do not understand by this internal illumination some new and distinct private revelation from what is already set forth by the Scripture. Rather, it is an efficacious application of that revelation which already exists. Scripture has within it such internal divine majesty and light which is applied by the Spirit to produce the act of faith, although we certainly have no trouble granting that the testimony of the Church is an ordinary means whereby God proposes the Scriptures to hearers (Romans 10:14). That Scripture is the Word of God, I believe on account of itself, but this faithful belief is efficiently produced within me by the operation of the Spirit. This may be analogously compared to the manner in which we assent to the first principles of natural reason (such as the law of non-contradiction), which we believe on account of themselves without the need of some further rational demonstration, although the habit of the mind and intellect is necessary for producing such knowledge and assent.
The formal object of faith for Christians is not something internal and private, but external and publicly recognizable. Furthermore, the internal testimony of the Spirit is not believed per se and on account of itself, but rather is tried according to Scripture (1 John 4:1). But the formal object of faith is believed per se and on account of itself. Therefore, the internal testimony of the Spirit is not the formal object of faith.
That which shows the truth of the material object and makes our faith certain concerning it is the formal object of faith. This is based on the scholastic axiom that acts are specified by their objects. But the habit of faith itself which is produced in us by God cannot be such, otherwise faith would be the formal object of itself.
The ancient church also believed this doctrine concerning the internal light of grace in faith, and defended it against the Pelagians and semi-Pelagians, who thought either the faith was altogether in our power, or that grace merely aids faith so that it is more perfect and firm, while it can nonetheless retain apart from divine grace that true character of faith which is necessary for our salvation in Christ. For example, Cyril of Alexandria wrote “But God the Father will be conceived of as having implanted in us the knowledge of His Own Offspring not by a voice breaking forth from above, and resounding round the earth like thunder, but by the Divine Illumination shining forth as it were in us, to the understanding of the Divinely-inspired Scripture: but unto this again you will find the Son a co-Worker in us; for it is written of the holy Disciples, Then opened He their eyes, to the understanding, that is, the holy Scriptures.” (Commentary on John, book IV, ch. 1, on John 4:45; in PG 73:555-556). And earlier in the same part, Cyril said “then shewing that the Mystery concerning Himself was a God-taught good in men, and the knowledge of Him a work of the grace from above, He says that they cannot attain unto Him, save drawn by the teaching of the Father. But this is the plan of one whose only aim is to persuade them to consider, that they ought, weeping and sorrowing for those things wherein they had already grieved Him, to seek to be made free, and to be drawn unto salvation through faith in Him, through the Counsel of the Father, and the aid from above which lighteneth to them the way and maketh it smooth, which when they sinned, had become exceedingly rugged.” (PG 73:551-552). And finally from Augustine, whose opinion on this matter needs no citation. “Therefore, as these which we have in our face, and call lights, when they are both healthy and open, need the help of light from without — which being removed or not brought in, though they are sound and are open, yet they do not see — so our mind, which is the eye of the soul, unless it be irradiated by the light of truth, and wondrously shone upon by Him who enlightens and is not enlightened, will not be able to come to wisdom nor to righteousness…So also the Lord Christ distinguished between His faithful ones and His Jewish enemies, as between light and darkness: as between those whom He illuminated with the ray of faith, and those on whose closed eyes He shed His light. So, too, the sun shines on the face of the sighted and of the blind; both alike standing and facing the sun are shone upon in the flesh, but both are not enlightened in the eyesight. The one sees, the other sees not: the sun is present to both, but one is absent from the present sun…But how about the unbelievers? Is it not present to them? It is present also to them, but they have not eyes of the heart with which to see it.” (Tractate 35 on the Gospel of John)
This opinion was not only that of individual fathers, but also of the anti-Pelagian synods held in the 6th century. The Second Council of Orange (AD 529) had as one of its condemned heretical propositions the following view: “If anyone affirms that we can form any right opinion or make any right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life, as is expedient for us, or that we can be saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel through our natural powers without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who makes all men gladly assent to and believe in the truth, he is led astray by a heretical spirit, and does not understand the voice of God who says in the Gospel, ‘For apart from me you can do nothing’ [John 15:5], and the word of the Apostle, ‘Not that we are competent of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our competence is from God’ [2 Cor. 3:5].” (Second Council of Orange, Canon 7)
As to this necessity of internal grace for faith, and whether divine and human faith can have the same motive formally grounding them both, the Papists are divided amongst themselves. Some medievals like Peter Abelard approach at least towards Semi-Pelagianism in their teaching that the formal motive for believing is not something supernatural (that is, the authority of God revealing), but rather because of something accessible to natural reason. Abelard himself said “And it is not believed because God had said it, but rather, it is received because one is convinced that it is thus.” (PL 178:1050). This was opposed by many other theologians in his day, such Hugh of St. Victor (PL 176:217), Bernard of Clairvaux (PL 182:1061-1062), and William of Auxerre (In Sent., book III, tr. 3, ch. 1, q. 4). And so also in Bonaventure (Quaest. disp. de Trinitate, q. 1, art. 2).
The Papal Circle
A vicious circle in disputations has been summarily defined by logicians as when one reasons from the same, to the same, and in the same way. The consequent is proved and dependent upon the antecedent, and cannot be known apart from the antecedent; but the circle is made when that same consequent, dependent upon the antecedent, is again brought in to prove that same antecedent. Thought of in terms of syllogisms, it is when the same thing is functioning both as a premise and a conclusion. “Circular and reciprocal proof means proof by means of the conclusion, i.e. by converting one of the premises simply and inferring the premise which was assumed in the original syllogism.” (Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.5, 57b19-20). Since premises are more known and certain than the conclusion, the same thing would be both prior and posterior to itself, both more known and less known, which is a contradiction. This is in contrast to a regress, in which between a reciprocal cause and effect, the effect is used to prove and demonstrate the cause, because the effect is more known to us than the cause (Giacomo Zabarella, Opera Logica, quorum seriem, argumentum, & utilitatem versa pagina demonstrabit [1604], pg. 249). As it is summarized by Thomas: “To understand this it should be noted that a demonstration is circular when the conclusion and one of the premises (in converted form) of a syllogism are used to prove the other premise. For example, we might form the following syllogism: Every rational mortal animal is risible; Every man is a rational mortal animal: Therefore, every man is risible. Now, if the conclusion were to be used as one principle and the minor in converted form as the other, we would get: Every man is risible; Every rational mortal animal is a man: Therefore, every rational mortal animal is risible—which was the major of the first syllogism.” (Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Posterior Analytics, book I, ch. 8, n. 68)
We say that the Romanists cannot prove to us that they have a first principle of faith upon which they rest, and they are caught in a circle as follows: On account of the divine authority of the inspired Word of God which they assent to with divine faith, they believe the infallible authority of the Church’s testimony; and on the other side, they believe in the divine authority of the inspired Word of God, and say against us that do not have any firm or certain faith in Scripture apart from the Church. We see here that they meet the requirements laid down by philosophers and logicians for a circle: They proceed from the same to the same, in the same way.
There are about four responses to this argument of our divines which Papists have drawn against us, not realizing how they only dig themselves deeper into their own folly, and are unable to solve the problem.
I reply that the Papists do not seem to speak consistently in this regard. For while they profess openly that they think it to be only a necessary condition for faith in the revelation of God as to its proposal quoad nos, many of them also say it somehow does pertain to the formal object. And this they must do on their system in order that they have certain faith that the Scriptures truly are the inspired Word of God.
"We do not deny that the Word of God ministered through the Apostles and Prophets is the first foundation of our faith, but we add that besides the first foundation, another secondary foundation is required, that is, the testification of the Church." (Robert Bellarmine, De Verbo Dei, book III, ch. 10)
“Catholics, however, possess a faith that is completely certain and infallible, because they believe what they believe for this reason: God has revealed it, and they believe God has revealed it because they hear the Church declaring this—an authority which cannot err, since its testimonies from innumerable signs, miracles, and many other arguments (enumerated in the book On the Notes of the Church) “have been made exceedingly credible.” (Robert Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, book VI, ch. 3)
“One may believe that God has revealed this or that in three ways. First, on account of itself; and then it is the assent of theological faith, which is what we are treating here. Second, on account of the authority of the Church declaring it; and then it is not an assent of theological faith, but of another, lower order. Third, on account of the authority of a human being; and then it is an assent of human faith. The first assent is to be explained this way: I believe that God has revealed this, not because of something else, but immediately because of Himself. The second thus: I believe that God has revealed this because the Church says so. The third thus: I believe that God has revealed this because a human person says so. Therefore, the first assent is not further resolved but rests in the divine revelation itself, which is believed on account of itself. The second is resolved into the authority of the Church. The third into the authority of a human being.” (Martin Becanus, Summa theologiae scholasticae, Part II, tract. 1, ch. 1, Q. 1, §4)
Another admission of this kind is to be found in Cardinal Juan de Lugo, who states that the testimony of the Church pertains to the formal object of faith insofar as it is the voice of God speaking therein, according to the opinion of Papists: “Therefore, just as the testimony of the royal ambassador enters partially into the formal reason of human faith, so the human testimony of the Church enters partially into the formal reason of Christian faith. To say that the testimony of the royal ambassador is nothing but the application
of the king's testimony, and not part of the formal reason of assent, seems to be playing with words, since in fact one partially relies upon the authority of the messenger in order to believe that the king has promised his coming.” (Disputationes scholasticae et morales: Tractatus de Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 1, §5). For more on Lugo’s admission of the testimony of the Church entering into the formal motive of faith, the reader may consult John B. Thom, “The Formal Object of Faith: According to Principle Theologians from John Capreolus to the Salmanticenses and as Defined by the First Vatican Council,” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1965], pgs. 130-131. And similarly in the Franciscan author Miguel de Medina (1489-1578), in Christianae paraenesis sive de recta in Deum fide libri septem (Venice: Ziletti, 1564), bk. 5, ch. 11.
Therefore, we see from hence that the more honest writers amongst the Romanists are willing to admit that the testimony of their church is for them in some way the formal reason and motive for their faith. From this, their ability to escape our argument becomes more and more restrained and increasingly difficult for them. Hence it is that Scotus, Durandus, Cardinal Lugo, and those of similar opinions have a much more difficult time attempting to escape this circle (as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange acknowledges in On Divine Revelation: The Teaching of the Catholic Faith, trans. Dr. Matthew K. Minerd [Emmaus Academic, 2022], pg. 738).
The Thomists are those who wish to more strictly deny the testimony of the Church in any way pertaining to the formal object of faith, so as to prevent their falling into the argument we have set. They wish to regulate down to only a necessary condition of faith as the ministerial proposing of the formal object. See for example John of St. Thomas, in the commentary on the treatise on faith, Q. 1, disp. 1, art. 2, n. 6 - “The divine testimony is the formal reasoning for believing the content of the testimony, as well as for believing the testimony itself. Now, the Church is the instrument for infallibly proposing, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, believable things and herself, because on account of their universality these causes reflect on themselves, and we do not need to seek out another reason why we believe in the Church, who thus infallibly proposes, except because she herself says, indeed by the divine testimony, that God speaks thus.”
Papists believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures because it has been revealed by God. But that it has been revealed by God, they do not believe for itself, but because of the testimony of the Church. From first to last, it is the testimony of the Church which they ultimately resolve their faith into (as some Papists are willing to admit at least partially. See the Walenburch brothers, Tractatus generalis de controversiis fidei [Colonia Agrippina: apud Ioannem Wilhelmum Friessem, 1670], pgs. 171-172; of course, they elsewhere seek to affirm the common view that divine revelation is the principle of faith, but as we have seen, they cannot do so without contradiction). Where is that divine revelation on account of which they believe that the Scriptures are the Word of God and divinely authoritative for us? If it is the Scripture itself, with its divine authority being manifested through itself and its work upon the minds of men, then they have conceded our position. If it is a revelation outside of Scripture, the same question must be asked about that: how do we know that it has truly been divinely revealed, and ought to be trusted and believed in? If it is to be known from that external revelation (such as some unwritten tradition) through and of itself, why can the same thing not be affirmed of the Scriptures, which assuredly far excel all traditions in dignity and divine excellency? It cannot be known from the testimony of the Church, since the Papists and their polemicists deny in words (though not in deed) that it can be the formal object of faith. It cannot be known from another unwritten tradition, since we can then ask the same question about that, and we will land ourselves into an infinite regress.
The intellect tends towards the truth of its object, and gives assent only insofar as the object appears true to it. That which shows the truth in the object is the formal object of that assent, as Francisco Suàrez says (Commentaria in secundam secundae divi Thomae, disp. III, sect. 1, §7). The formal object of faith is that which renders the authority itself formally motivating and formally constitutes the testimony (see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, pg. 672), and whereby divine faith is distinguished from human faith. For these Romanists agree with us in this part against those like Molina, that divine and human faith cannot possess the same formal object. Although it is true that theologians and philosophers have troubled themselves with various divisions and significations of what a formal object properly is, in this present controversy, they nonetheless agree with this definition that has been provided. As the Jesuit Juan de Ripalda (1594-1648) states, “Yet this is certain for all: that the present controversy about the formal object of faith concerns that which moves the intellect to assent to the credibles and gives the theological species to acts of faith—just as divine goodness gives the species to acts of charity.” (De ente supernaturali
But according to the theology and teaching of the Papists, it is the testimony of the Church that supplies both of these functions—whereby we know that the Scriptures are inspired, and which books are divinely authoritative (and which ones are not). For them, it is the testimony of the Church whereby the truth and divinity of the Scriptures are discerned with divine faith. It is that whereby the Romanists answer the question, “Why do you believe this or that book of Scripture is canonical and inspired?” And without the Church, they say that no faith can be true and divine: “Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule,
If the testimony of the Church is what makes our faith in the inspiration of Scripture certain and infallible, then it is the formal object of faith; because acts are specified by their formal objects, and an infallible faith corresponds to an infallible object—just as in other forms of cognitive assent, the formal object of such assent is that which shows the truth in the object. Having rejected the self-evidencing power of Scripture as divine revelation, Perrone has substituted the Roman Church in its place, and thereby trapped himself in the Papal circle, which he pathetically attempts to respond to by saying “From our analysis, such an objection is rendered untenable, fully revealing the principle of the Church’s priority and prerogatives over the sacred writings, the possession the Church had of infallible authority, and the exercise of that authority independently of the Scriptures, which did not yet exist.” (Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, II:63). But this only concedes what we are proving against them, that the Church’s testimony is that first thing into which their faith is ultimately resolved. Indeed, Perrone here goes so far as to say it is known and believed independently of Scripture! I ask: is the infallibility of the Church, and its assistance by the Holy Spirit, something believed with divine faith or human faith? If divine faith, from whence is it known? If from Scripture, they once again fall into the circle. If from unwritten divine tradition, then how do we know that tradition is divine? If human faith, it can in no way serve to make us certain that this or that book of Scripture is inspired, and this other one is not so—for human faith cannot be more certain than divine faith.
“The light of faith, which is assumed to be infused, is not sufficient for the assent to any revealed truth, unless that truth is proposed by the Church. Therefore, the testimony of the Church determines the potentiality of that light, or of the infused habit: for example, if someone baptized comes to the use of reason, they will not be able to believe anything in particular unless it is proposed by the Church. Indeed, by the infused habit alone, one cannot distinguish between what is to be believed and what is not, between what is revealed and what is not revealed by God. Therefore, internal revelation is not the formal reason for believing, to which the ultimate resolution of faith is to be made.” (Domingo Báñez, Scholastica commentaria in secundam secundae ... S. Thomae, Q. 1, art. 1 [Altobellum Salicatium, 1587], pg. 30; emphasis mine). Once again, notice here that the Papists make the Church’s testimony that thing into which the light of faith, at least considered potentially, is determined and/or specified. The comments from John B. Thom’s dissertation are helpful regarding Báñez’s understanding of this controversy: “Banez answers that it is by the testimony of the Church as she is ruled by the Holy Spirit, that we believe in the holy Catholic Church as an article of faith. Our faith, then, is resolved in the Church only insofar as the Church distinguishes and explains those things that then are to be believed as revealed, by divine faith. We do not receive this distinction and explanation immediately from God (but from the Church); from God we receive infused faith, in the light of which our minds are inclined and determined to assent to what the Church proposes as revealed by God. Taking up this notion of the light of faith, Banez proposes the tenet that this light is not sufficient for the assent of faith to any revealed truth, unless that truth be first proposed by the Church. As a consequence the testimony of the Church can be said to determine the potentiality of the light of faith, or the infused habit.” (“The Formal Object of Faith: According to Principle Theologians from John Capreolus to the Salmanticenses and as Defined by the First Vatican Council,” pg. 98; emphasis mine).
Interestingly, Báñez also teaches that the testimony of the Church cannot be believed on account of itself, but is resolved into the internal illumination of the Spirit Scholastica commentaria in secundam secundae ... S. Thomae, Q. 1, art. 1 [Altobellum Salicatium, 1587], pg. 38). Now why, I ask, cannot the same thing be given to Scripture? Is the Church’s authority and infallibility to be thought more certain and firm than the inspired Word? If so, on what grounds?
The testimony of the Church for the Papists is not merely a necessary condition, as in the case wherein the proposition of a good object to the will by the intellect is a necessary condition in order for the will to be moved toward the good, although the formal motive moving the will is the good itself and not its proposal by the intellect thereunto. However, this does not parallel the manner in which Papists speak about the authority of the Church against the Reformed with regards to the manner in which we come to believe that the Scriptures are inspired by God. For we do not answer the question “Why am I moved towards the good?” by saying “Because my intellect has proposed it to my will,” but rather “because the thing itself is good and so moves me.” But the Papists do answer the question “Why do you believe that the Scriptures are inspired?” with “Because the Catholic Church testifies thereunto.” Therefore, the testimony of the Church is for them not just a necessary condition in the same way in which the proposal of the intellect to the will of its proper objects is a prerequisite, but is instead some ground for their faith.
Some may object that the answer to the question “Why do you believe?” can also be given not through the formal object only, but also through other rules of faith; especially given that the phrase “on account of which” can have different significations, which I concede. They thus endeavor by this means to guard against the Church and its testimony entering into the formal object of faith, knowing that it will ensnare them once again in this circle. I reply that though I perfectly admit the distinction between the rule of faith and the formal object of faith, this will not prove to be any way of escape to the Romanists. They still must answer “Why they believe Scripture is the revealed Word of God”? with insisting upon the testimony of their church, thus making it play the role of far more than just a rule of faith in their system. If there is no other certain, infallible, and objective reason for them for why they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God other than the testimony of the Church, then assuredly that it is their true formal object, though they may deny it as much as they wish.
The Romanists also bring forward the analogy of a king and his messenger, and the grounds whereon we believe the messenger’s reliability and trustworthiness, and also that of the king himself who has sent this messenger and authorized him to his duties. As it is paraphrased by Cardinal Juan de Lugo (1583-1660): “if a royal messenger brings a letter from the king, in which the king commands that the messenger be believed, then we believe the letter is the king’s because the messenger says so; and we believe the messenger because the king commands that he be believed.” (Disputationes scholasticae et morales: Tractatus de Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 1, §5). Yet this same cardinal himself refutes the use of this analogy in that same place. [1]. In this case, we do not assent and believe the letter to be the king’s precisely because the messenger tells us it is so, but because we recognize extrinsically of the messenger’s testimony that this letter bears the king’s hand and possesses the royal seal, i.e. it is self-evidencing in some way (just as we plead in reference to the Scriptures). If the only manner in which we could come to believe that the letter is from the king is from the testimony of the messenger, then it would in turn also be impossible to believe the messenger’s authority on account of the king’s authority. As Lugo says, “at most, one could believe it on account of the messenger’s private authority.” [2]. The Papists say in the case of this analogy that the acceptance of the king’s letter is based on the trustworthiness of the messenger, but the acceptance of the letter’s contents (which would be the material objects of faith, and the articles contained in that letter) are believed on account of the king’s authority, rather than that of the messenger that proposes this royal letter. However, behold how they shift this grounding of trust in the Church when they apply their analogy to the case in hand: “The Church proposes to us the Word of God. The Church’s trustworthiness is believable on the basis of her marks and divine signs.” (Charles René Billuart, Summa sancti Thomae, De Fide, diss. 1, article 2). In the case of the king and his messenger, what is that on account of which we believe in the trustworthiness of the messenger? Billuart says that we must “inquire into his credentials.” But this man does not explain what he means, nor give us any reasons in the case of the analogy he proposes as to what these credentials are, nor of the basis upon which they are reliable and authoritative. But let us apply this to the case of the Church, whose authority they say can be believed on the basis of divine signs. While I am not certain as to Billuart’s exact meaning here, it seems that he has in mind things such as the occurrence of miracles, or the marks of the church (which the Papists themselves do not agree upon with much certainty. Some would have it only to be that it is communion with the Roman Pontiff; others, such as Bellarmine, have devised as many as fifteen marks whereby the true church may be discerned!). It seems therefore that is primarily the motives of credibility whereupon the Papists wish to establish the grounds for their acceptance of the Church’s authority. However, I ask: are the motives of credibility (such as miracles, for example) sufficient for an act of true divine faith? They with us deny this, saying that a man may perceive supernatural miracles materially but without faith and the divine illumination of the mind, just as an animal may hear humans speaking without discerning any of the intelligible concepts that are conveyed through that speech. If the Church’s authority is accepted in this instance primarily because of the motives of credibility, that is insufficient for it to be an act of divine faith in their Magisterium, since it no longer has a supernatural foundation in God’s revelation. If they accept the Church’s authority because they say it is contained in divine revelation (appealing to various passages of Scripture which they twist for their own ends), then how do they know that it has been revealed by God? If they say that this divine revelation in Scripture is self-evidencing, then we have won them over. If they say that it is because the Church has identified it as divine revelation, then they are involved in a circle. And it is no better to say that the Church’s testimony itself is the voice of the Holy Spirit speaking, since we may easily ask them again: how do you know that it is the voice of God? If they say that also is self-evidencing, then they must further answer us as to why they deny such a power to the holy Scriptures—since they do indeed confess that these various marks and characters of divinity help to evidence that the Christian message is from God and has a divine origin; a confession of which we have from Franzelin (Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, pg. 654). But far better than that cardinal are what our Lord Himself pleads against the Pharisees: “for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.” (John 5:36). That is, the miracles which He accomplished proved His divine mission. And Franzelin not only says here that these divine signs are sufficient not only to know that this message comes from God, but also the fact that truly is revealed by God: “But indeed God in this life neither naturally nor supernaturally manifests Himself to us without created facts from which He is to be known, and thus even through such facts He exhibits Himself to be known as speaking or revealing; nor is the knowledge therefore any less of God Himself revealing. Whence also the motive or formal object alone and therefore first and ultimate, proximate and supreme, on account of which we believe the thing said by God, is the authority of God Himself revealing, not however those facts insofar as they are something created, through which God manifests Himself to us as revealing…Therefore when a word marked by the marks of divine speech is presented to a man, it from itself is cognizable not indeed evidently but certainly (as we shall explain shortly) as a word not of men; but, as it truly is, the word of God. It is therefore a sufficiently proposed object, not so as necessarily to determine the assent of the intellect, but so that the will moved and strengthened by grace, with pious affection of credulity and from the duty of infinite truth in obedience, may command a most firm assent; and thus the intellect likewise illuminated and strengthened by grace may most firmly assent to the truth that God is the one who has revealed this (e.g., the dogma of the Holy Trinity).” (Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, pgs. 655-656). But since all confess that the motives of credibility only suffice to give a moral certainty concerning the Scriptures rather than divine faith, this point is not something which I will insist much upon. [3]. We may turn the analogy back against them as follows, in order that it may be perfectly manifest what they resolve their faith into when all disputations and subtleties cease. Suppose the King Charles III of England were to send an ambassador of his to our country of America, and brought him with some commendatory letters that testifies to his reliability and trustworthiness in relaying the King’s mind and will. If one were to ask how we may know that these letters brought by the messenger, really are authored by the King and his very royal words, how would it thus be resolved? That they truly are the real words of the King is believed because the Messenger tells us so, whose trustworthiness is contained in the letters he brought. Thus it is the Messenger’s testimony and reliability which are adhered to first and foremost, not merely so that the letters of the King be proposed and applied to the recipients, but so that the recipients may trust and believe that these are indeed the King’s own words. [4]. The words of Suàrez also pertinent to this question, wherein he shows the circumstances in which the testimony of a teacher or messenger becomes not only a condition for applying and proposing what is to be believed, but a proper reason of believing: “if disciples believe some things from the sole testimony of the teacher, in those things, or with respect to that assent, he is related not only as a teacher, but also as a witness, and the reason of believing; thus therefore God is related in faith, not only as a teacher, but also as a witness to whom one must believe, and in this way we say he is the formal object.” (Disputation III, sect. 2, §8). As we have contended in so many words, this is precisely what the Papists fall into.
But let us take them at their word that the Church’s proposal for them is only a necessary condition. I ask: since the testimony of the Church is required as a condition for believing, but is not itself the formal motive of faithful assent, then is it still necessary that it be infallible? Cannot a fallible authority still function as a necessary condition in this case? In the case of a professor who teaches the principles of philosophy and agreed-upon axioms in logic (such as the law of non-contradiction, or that the whole is greater than the part), it is not the professor and his proposal of these first principles to the students which moves them to assent, but rather the truth of the principles themselves in their self-evident nature which is the foundation of the student’s acceptance of those principles. And this is all the case even if the professor has no guarantee of being unable to err in any capacity. And so it is in this case also. It is the authority of God revealing which is the foundation of faith, and not the testimony of the Church (as Papists will grant in words), therefore it is not required that we confess the Church’s infallibility in proposing revelation and the various articles of faith.
Since the certainty of our faith does depend on the Church intrinsically and essentially, and thus even if it were but fallible, our faith may still be certain and firm, which is precisely what the Papists deny against us—thus falling back upon the Church once again as the real foundation for their pretended faith, although they will rarely admit it as such. Similarly, we can consider the same thing in another way: The testimony of the Church with respect to our faith in the inspiration and divine authority of Scripture is either informative by way of ministerial authority (which we grant), or it is certificative and produces firm faith about the inspiration and divine authority of Scripture. If it is the former, this is granted by the Reformed, and the Papists have no grounds on this account to object that our faith is uncertain and doubtful since we do not believe in the infallibility of the Church. They may then put their polemics to rest. However, if they confess the latter point that the Church’s proposal is what makes our faith certain, then it is more than just a necessary condition for them, but something that shows the intellect the truth in the object, and moves it towards assent, i.e. the motive and reason of divine faith. See again, the words of Giovanni Perrone: “At the same time, however, we say that we have need of the Church’s testimony so that we may be made certain—certain in such a way that we can in no manner doubt—that these books, precisely these and no others, neither more nor fewer, are in their every part the work of God, written under the inspiration of God, containing the word of God. Hence the testimony of the Church is extrinsic to the sacred books and is given with respect to us, for the certain knowledge we must have in order to receive, believe, and venerate them as such.” (Giovanni Perrone, Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, Vol. II [Rome, 1853], pg. 64)
If the infallible testimony of the Church is a necessary condition for either the existence or certainty of divine faith in Scripture, then this infallibility must be known and believed prior to belief in Scripture. According to our adversaries, the testimony of the Church has no true force in faith unless it is infallible (other than that, it is for them merely high degrees of probability and religious assent, but not properly faith). Therefore if this testimony of the Church is an indispensable necessary condition for faith, then its infallibility must be first known by us before assenting to the divine authority of the Scriptures. According to this reasoning, the infallibility of the Church must be believed before the authority of Scripture; and the authority of Scripture must be believed before we believe anything that is revealed in the Word. Therefore, from the first to the last, the infallibility of the Church must be believed before we believe anything that is revealed in the Word of God. But if we were to ask the Romanists how they know with certain faith that the Church is infallible, they will answer, “because it is contained in the Scriptures”, or “because it is divine revelation, the agreed-upon formal object.” Thus, the infallibility of the Church is revealed in Scripture. But the infallibility of the Church must be believed prior to our belief in Scripture, since the former is the necessary condition for the latter. All of which is to say, the infallibility of the Church must be assented to prior to our assent to that thing which grounds and moves us to believe in the infallibility of the Church; the entirety of which is evidently absurd and contradictory.
Yet some of them, such as the Thomists, also are willing to concede with us that divine revelation is believed in and on account of itself, and is not resolved into some other revelation, otherwise we would have an infinite regress (see Cajetan, in his commentary on Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 1, art. 1, n. 11). Or as Cardinal Franzelin writes, “For the authority of God is known through itself and as an immediate object of adherence in the very supernatural speech of God, which presents itself to us as the speech of God. For this reason Cardinal de Lugo said that the authority of God is immediately cognizable in the very fact of revelation, which is enunciated by the proposition: ‘God has revealed this.’” (Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, pg. 652). Just as light is both something seen by us, but also that by which we can see colors in objects. Augustine testifies to this explicitly in his exposition of John 8: “The light shows both other things and also itself. Thou lightest a lamp, for instance, to look for your coat, and the burning lamp affords you light to find your coat; do you light the lamp to see itself when it burns? A burning lamp is indeed capable at the same time of exposing to view other things which the darkness covered, and also of showing itself to your eyes. So also the Lord Christ distinguished between His faithful ones and His Jewish enemies, as between light and darkness: as between those whom He illuminated with the ray of faith, and those on whose closed eyes He shed His light. So, too, the sun shines on the face of the sighted and of the blind; both alike standing and facing the sun are shone upon in the flesh, but both are not enlightened in the eyesight…Therefore the light bears witness to itself; it opens the sound eyes and is its own witness, that it may be known as the light…The witness of the light then is true, whether it be manifesting itself or other things; for without light you can not see light, and without light you can not see any other thing whatever that is not light. If light is capable of showing other things which are not lights, is it not capable of showing itself? Does not that discover itself, without which other things cannot be made manifest?” (Tractate 35 on the Gospel of John).
It is this group of Papists who approach nearest to the truth, but then have recourse once again to forcing their Church’s infallibility against us, and saying that we have no firm and certain faith without it, thus bringing them once again into our circle—as we have thoroughly proved above.
Lest this discourse in refutation of this objection run over its own course, the argument may be summarized as follows: That which renders faith infallible and certain is the formal object of faith. For Papists, the testimony of the Church renders faith infallible and certain. Ergo, the testimony of the Church is the formal object of faith. Since we now have a reasoning between Scripture and the Church in the same way, a circle is constituted.
The first premise is confirmed by the common agreement of theologians and scholastics regarding the nature of a formal object, as can be seen from Ripalda, Bañez, Aquinas, Suàrez, etc. And the last of these is particularly forward in asserting our premise, as also when he states the common view that if the testimony of the Church concerned as a congregation of men cannot be the ultimate resolution of faith, since such faith would be human rather than divine (Disp. I, sect. 10, §10). And from that I gather that the thing which distinguishes faith as divine in contrast to acquired human faith is that principle into which it is ultimately resolved. But for the Papists, this is the testimony of the Church, since they assert against us that no faith can be divine without it, and disregard the internal witness of the Spirit. Therefore, etc.
[2]. For those authors within Roman Catholicism that are willing to concede that the testimony of their pretended Magisterium is the formal motive of their faith, or at least some part of it, they have sought to use another tactic whereby they may escape. And this is to attempt to consider the Scriptures, particularly the Four Gospels, as merely historically reliable documents which testify to the miracles of Christ (which are sufficient to produce acquired faith, but not supernatural faith) and the establishment of the Church, and therefore show its binding authority. Thus, when the Scriptures are used to prove the infallibility of the Church’s testimony, they are not then regarded as the inspired Word of God, but at most as divine revelation based upon the motives of credibility.
I reply, that this response is in fact no response but rather an admission of defeat. For the Romanists will agree with us that faith which is not based upon the authority of God revealing, but merely on the motives of credibility, is not divine and supernatural faith, but rather that acquired faith which is within the power of natural reason. Neither in the case of infallibly believing in Scripture or the Church can the motives of credibility intervene, for it is divine faith with which we are concerned, which has a different formal object than acquired faith. Hence, whichever way they turn with this evasion, their faith is not divine, but uncertain and doubtful. If the infallibility of the Church is believed prior to faith in Scripture, and that only because of the motives of credibility, it is not sufficient for it to ground our faith in the divine authority and canonicity of the Scriptures. But in the same way, the Scriptures considered as merely historically reliable documents cannot prove that the Church has what the Romanists say it has. But let us assume for a moment that Scripture did truly teach such a thing. Nonetheless, since these documents are not being considered as inspired nor as divine revelation, it is no longer a supernatural object believed by supernatural faith.
[3]. Some Romanists will say that no circle occurs here, since the authority of Scripture is believed on account of the Church’s testimony, since the latter is something which is more known as to us (quoad nos), while the divine authority of the Church is believed on account of Scripture, as something prior by nature. Hence this is more of a regress than a circle.
I reply that, in both cases the knowledge in question is that which belongs to divine faith in revelation. The Papists believe with divine faith the inspiration and authority of Scripture on account of the Church’s testimony (indeed, as a ground, rather than a mere condition, as I proved above), and they believe in the testimony of the Church with divine faith on account of the inspired Scriptures.
Since these authors say that the infallible testimony of the Church is more known to us than the authority of Scripture, then I ask: before knowing the Scriptures, is the testimony of the Church believed in with infused divine faith or with merely acquired faith based on motives of credibility? It cannot be the former, since divine faith presupposes divine revelation as its formal motive, and assumes that the Word of God is known to us. If it is believed with merely acquired faith based on motives of credibility and certain marks of the church, then this faith is not firm and certain, and also not infallible, because acts are specified by their formal objects, and therefore in order for it to be certain and infallible faith, it must be based on divine revelation. Thus, this acquired faith could not be a foundation or preparatory act for believing in the authority of Scripture with divine faith. Although we may concede such certainty based on external evidences does ordinarily precede the assent of faith, it can in no way serve as its proper foundation.
[4]. Some say that divine revelation can indeed be known through itself on account of its divine signs and marks which impress themselves upon the minds of men. These Papists say that such an assent is certain, but not evident, and therefore may coexist with some doubt and imprudent fear about its truth and reliability (see Franzelin, Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura, pgs. 671-672). Therefore, the testimony of the Church is required for an act of divine faith so that it may be firm and certain that God has spoken thus. However, if the Church is in turn believed on account of motives of credibility, so that one may proceed to have certain faith concerning the inspiration of Scripture, it all falls back upon something which is contained under the natural order, such as these divine signs and marks which Franzelin speaks of. Nonetheless, his belief in the authority and infallibility of the Church cannot be divine faith on this account without being resolved into the formal object, which Thomists assert is the authority of God revealing. However, they then turn around and say that the only means whereby one may come to be certain that it has truly been revealed by God is through the Church. From first to last, they cannot give a consistent account of the ultimate thing into which their faith is resolved.
[5]. Our adversaries may also wish to say that the faith which we have concerning the canonical books of Scripture rests on unwritten tradition distinct from Scripture. But before such unwritten tradition can serve as a foundation for faith, we must know and believe prior that that tradition itself is true and divine. It cannot rest on itself, since the Papists say that Scripture by itself and its own testimony cannot serve to prove its divine inspiration, but that the testimony of the Church is required. By a parity of reason, neither can a tradition authenticate itself. It cannot rest on Scripture, since Scripture will not satisfy doubting about a tradition on whose authority the authority of Scripture itself depends. As long as doubts exist concerning unwritten tradition, within the opinion of the Papists, so also will the authority of Scripture be uncertain to us. Faith concerning tradition cannot rest upon another unwritten tradition, since the same question will be asked about the truth of that tradition, and then about the next one, and so on to an infinite regress. Neither can unwritten tradition rest on such rules as have been devised by Papists for discerning divine traditions from human ones (as Bellarmine has done in On the Word of God, book IV, ch. 9). For where are such rules found? If they are divine rules, then the same question can be raised about how we know they are true and divine. If they are simply human rules, they are not a proper foundation for divine faith. Once again, it is a semi-Pelagian error to say that grace is required only to make the act of faith more easy and prudent (in contrast to that which may be not cautious or rash), and to have the assent of faith depend upon some created motives which are accessible to our natural intellect. And finally, such tradition does not rest upon the testimony of the Church as a proper foundation, since the Romanists wish to plead that the testimony of the Church is not a formal motive of faith, but only a necessary condition for believing which applies and proposes divine revelation.
It is true that the manner in which we ascertain that certain books were written by the Apostles, specifically the ones whose names are given in their titles (as the Epistle to the Hebrews), is ascertained from the historic tradition and testimony of the Church, and not from Scripture. But Scripture is not to be accused of an imperfection on this account in functioning as a rule of faith. And this is because such knowledge is not indispensably necessary for having true faith in divine revelation. The various disputes surrounding, for example, who authored the epistle to the Hebrews, do not pertain to any article of faith. It is necessary for some, such as historians and theologians, who ought to be skilled in such matters. Even if God had in His providence given some divine and infallible canon of the Scriptures, and had therein set forth the answers to all disputes about the canonicity, and authorship of certain books, posterity generations later may still raise similar questions about this book the way Papists do against us: how we may know such a list truly is divine, and has been written by this or that writer, and they will not be able to satisfy such questions through this infallible and pretended canon in and of itself, but only through something external to it. Similarly, we also confess that it is one of the Church’s prerogatives to guard the Scriptures and preserve them, and reject all false human writings that pretend to be divine. Thus Augustine says against the Manicheans, who pestered him with this question concerning how one knows that the books of the New Testament were written by the apostles: “In a word, we know this in the same way that you know that the books whose authority you are so deluded as to prefer were written by Manichæus. For, suppose some one should raise a question on this point, and should contend, in arguing with you, that the books which you attribute to Manichæus are not of his authorship; your only reply would be, to ridicule the absurdity of thus gratuitously calling in question a matter confirmed by successive testimonies of such wide extent. As, then, it is certain that these books are the production of Manichæus, and as it is ridiculous in one born so many years after to start objections of his own, and so raise a discussion on the point; with equal certainty may we pronounce it absurd, or rather pitiable, in Manichæus or his followers to bring such objections against writings originally well authenticated, and carefully handed down from the times of the apostles to our own day through a constant succession of custodians.” (Contra Faustum, book 32, ch. 21). And that same Augustine also embraces the epistle to the Hebrews, being more persuaded by the Eastern Churches, than by Rome, which doubted its Pauline authorship. “Although the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews is doubted by some, nevertheless, as I find it sometimes thought by persons, who oppose our opinion touching the baptism of infants, to contain evidence in favour of their own views, we shall notice the pointed testimony it bears in our behalf; and I quote it the more confidently, because of the authority of the Eastern Churches, which expressly place it among the canonical Scriptures.” (On Merit and the Forgiveness of Sins, ch. 50; emphasis mine)
