Jacob Arminius and the Heidelberg Catechism

 

By the end of the 16th century, the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism were viewed as binding and authoritative. This is especially true with the former of these two documents. Even Remonstrant historian Gerard Brandt knew this (Brandt, The History of the Reformation and Other Ecclesiastical Transactions in and about the Low Countries: From the Beginning of the Eighth Century, down to the Famous, Synod of Dort, 1:405-406). Many Reformed synods confirmed this, such as those as Antwerp (1566), Wesel (1568), and Middelburg (1581).

Where does Jacob Arminius play into all of this? It might come as a surprise to some that Arminius viewed himself as Reformed, and, during the Leiden controversy on predestination (which eventually led to the Synod of Dort), claimed that the Heidelberg Catechism and the Belgic Confession were on his side of the question of whether or not foreseen faith is the grounds or cause of God's eternal decree to save the elect. For example, he once said this:

"If it be decided, that [my opinions] are contrary to the Confession, then I have been engaged in teaching something in opposition to a document, 'against which never to propound any doctrine,' was the faithful promise which I made, when I signed it with my own hand: if, therefore, I be found thus criminal, I ought to be visited with punishment." (Arminius, Declaration of Sentiments, in The Works of James Arminius 1:609)

Arminius appealed to questions 20 and 54, of the Heidelberg Catechism, to support his view on predestination and election. Here is the statements from the Catechism:

Question 20: Are all men then, as they perished in Adam, saved by Christ? 

Answer: No; only those who are ingrafted into Him,1 and receive all His benefits, by a true faith

Question 54: What do you believe concerning the holy and catholic church of Christ? 

Answer: I believe that the Son of God, from the beginning of the world to its end gathers, defends, and preserves to himself, by his Spirit and word, out of the whole human race, a church, chosen to everlasting life, agreeing in true faith; and that I am, and forever shall remain, a living member thereof.

Regarding question 20, Arminius interpreted this as meaning that the eternal decree of God considered the elect as believers, and on that basis, predestined them to eternal salvation. However, Arminius did this against the majority Reformed interpretation of his day. Add to this that Zacharias Ursinus (whose famous commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism has been a standard text in Reformed Orthodoxy) also interpreted the catechism as teaching unconditional election. It gets more interesting when we see that Arminius was familiar with Ursinus' commentary and possessed copies of it in his library (The Auction Catalogue of the Library of J. Arminius [facsimile edition with an introduction by C. O. Bangs; Utrecht: HES, 1985], pg. 4). A similar conclusion applies with respect to question 54.

Rational Spontaneity or Compounded Indifference? - A Brief Refutation of the Jesuit/Arminian View of Free Choice

 

It has been noted by many prominent scholars of post-Reformation theology, such as Richard A. Muller and David S. Sytsma, that the Synod of Dort and Thomism were similar in their views on necessity and free choice, while the Jesuits, Socinians, and Remonstrants (the Dutch Arminians of the 17th century) were connected to each other and had similar sentiments concerning the same issue.  

Part of the debate was how to define free choice and what properly was its subject. The basic two options were rational spontaneity (also called "rational willingness") or an absolute indifference. The former is the Reformed view, the latter is the Jesuit/Arminian view. In this article, I seek to outline what the question is, and explain why I embrace the Reformed view and reject the Jesuit view. 

The Jesuits commonly define free will as "a free potency, by which someone can act or not act, act this or that, all things requisite for acting being posited." (Rodrigo de Arriaga and Francisco de Oviedo). These "requisites" would be things such as the divine decree and the practical judgment of the intellect. This position thus leads to the idea that the human will is independent of the divine will of God and also of the intellect. 

It should be noted that we do not altogether reject the notion of indifference with respect to the will, only that it should be understood in a divided sense. In order to understand this, we should bear in mind the distinction between potency (the term "volition" might also be used here to express the same idea in terms of the will) and act. Prior to the practical judgment of the intellect, it is true that the will is indifferent, in that it has both freedom of contradiction and freedom of contrariety. The point at which we depart with the Arminians and Jesuits concerns the point in time when the will is actualized to choose a particular object. They thus view the will as indifferent not only in a divided sense (which we grant), but also in a compounded sense. However, this would mean that the will is completely independent of God's decree (which we vehemently reject) and that the will could act against the judgment of the intellect. As Richard Muller summarizes, "Once the will is operative, it cannot be indifferent." (Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought [Baker Academic, Grand Rapids, MI: 2017], pg. 244).

“A human being has simultaneously a potency to opposites, not however a potency of simultaneity, with respect to opposite acts.” (Johannes Hoornbeeck, Socinianismus Confutatus, 2.3, cited in Muller, 244)

We reject the Jesuit definition for a number of reasons:

[1]. The Jesuits implicitly teach that the will is independent of God, which is expressly denied by Scripture, which says that God works in us "both to will and to work for His good pleasure." (Philippians 2:13)

[2]. Man is not the only being with free choice. God is freely good, and yet He is at the same time good by necessity. This shows that necessity and free will are not incompatible with each other. Who would attribute indifference to God?

[3]. The will must follow the practical judgment of the intellect, otherwise it would no longer be a rational appetite. 

Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) on Free Choice and Necessity

 

Voetius' Definition of Free Will: "the faculty that can out of itself and according to a mode of acting that fits its nature, choose and not choose this or that, by virtue of the power of its internal, elective and vital command" (Andreas Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, pg. 440)

Here, Voetius combines freedom of contradiction (to will p or not will p) and freedom of contrariety (to will p or q) in his definition of freedom. Thus, indifference was essential for Voetius in defining the faculty of free choice. 

Two Types of Indifference

1) Indifference regarding the means that will be used for the particular (at least, apparent [insert footnote from Turretin on will seeking objects as an apparent good]) end.

2) Indifference of volition (multiple potencies) prior to the determination of the practical judgment of the intellect. 

Voetius says that these two types of indifference constitute the essence of human freedom. He defends this with a syllogism:

P1: The essential structure of freedom is that by which the will has a mastery of the act that is maximally appropriate to a creature.

P2: These two indifferences grant to the will such a mastery of the act that is maximally appropriate to a creature.

C: These two indifferences constitute the essential structure of freedom. 

(taken from Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 159)

Three Types of Hypothetical Necessity (Basic Formula: If p, then q)

1) Necessity arising from the divine decree: In order to explain this type of necessity, Voetius appeals to Philippians 2:13; "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Voetius puts forth a relationship or parallel between the way God wills contingent acts and the way that rational humans will contingent acts. God (independently) wills B, thereby removing indifferent to A or C (in the sense that Voetius understands it, namely the composite sense). In a similar manner, the human wills B (dependent on God), removing the indifference to A or C. Thus, the terminus ad quem is the same with the divine decrees and human contingent acts (secondary causes), though the origins are different (Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, pg. 245) However, we must note that this does not mean that the divine cause and the human cause combine as a tertium quid, because the decrees are the divine essence, and as such cannot be subject to any change, since God and His decrees are immutable (Mal. 3:6; James 1:27; Isaiah 14:24-27; 46:10; Proverbs 19:21). The will of God is nothing itself than the essence itself willing (insert citation from Turretin here). 

2) Necessity arising from physical premotion: Voetius defines physical premotion as “the force (virtus) applied by God to awaken a creature that is capable of a second act." This plays into why Muller rightly caricatures the Reformed Orthodox view of free choice as "dependent freedom."  By "second act", Voetius seems to be referring to volition and a concrete act that takes place in time (Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 165). He also expressing this idea by speaking of a divine action "virtually passing over to us." Yet another important distinction is added by Voetius, which is that the virtus applied by God to awaken a man towards actuality in act and volition tends towards the same decreed effect which the man would have done if this physical premotion did not exist in the first place. 

3) Necessity arising from the practical judgment of the intellect: This kind of necessity not only concerns the potency, but also the act. Several objects are presented before the intellect, and the intellect determines not only the volition towards x, but also the act itself.

Appendix: Defining the Composite and Divided Senses of Propositions

"Composite sense is taken from the composite modal, and divided sense from the divided modal. And these consist in this: that in the composite sense the simultaneous presence and the union of two forms in one subject is signified; whereas in the divided sense is meant the union, or fitting, of two forms in a subject, not at the same time, but successively, or where one excludes the other; for this is divisive. Whence it is never valid to go from a divided to a composite modal proposition, or from the divided sense to the composite, just as it is not valid to go from fitting successively to fitting simultaneously. And therefore the composite sense is properly signified by a composite modal proposition, where the mode is predicated of the whole saying. For it signifies that the form of the predicate and of the subject under this mode are joined and come together at the same time. And the divided sense is signified by a divided modal proposition, where the mode only affects the copula. Thus it denotes that this mode fits the subject, and not that it fits the form of the predicate and subject at the same time. This is an example, if you said, That a black thing is white is possible, That a sitting person stands is possible. In the composite sense this signifies that the joining together of sitting and standing is possible. But if you said. A person sitting possibly stands, or can stand, this signifies in the divided sense that the power to stand fits the subject sitting, and not the power to stand at the same time as the sitting. Therefore when in the subject and predicate forms are introduced that are opposed—because for instance one form does not exclude the subject’s potency to receive the other, and excludes only co-existence and being present together with it—then in the divided sense this potency remains as long as the first form is present in the subject; for that form either takes away the potency nor gives it. And so when I say, The will moved efficaciously is able not to act in the divided sense, I do not signify that separate from efficacious motion the will is able not to act; but that while the efficacious motion is present in the subject there remains the potency to its opposite, and not the potency to join the opposite with the form, efficacious motion. Thus the divided sense places in the subject a potency to its opposites successively combined; the composite sense denotes a potency to opposites simultaneously combined." (John of St. Thomas, Outlines of Formal Logic, trans. Francis C. Wade [Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1955], pgs. 88-89)

Reformed Soteriology and Monothelitism: A Response to Robin Phillips and Eastern Orthodox Apologists

 

Eastern Orthodox writer and apologist Robin Phillips has written an article in which he claims that Calvinism resurrects the old seventh-century heresies of Monoenergism and Monothelitism. This same claim has also been made by Jay Dyer (source). 

Philips seems to make two errors here. The first is that he misunderstands the Dyothelite position (which, in this article, I will arguing for a clarifying through John of Damascus), and he also misunderstands and blunders when it comes to the historic view of Reformed Orthodoxy regarding the human will and its relationship to the divine decrees.

First, we have to ask: is Christ's human will subjected to the divine will? The answer is yes. Mr. Philips says that "Once you say that Christ’s human will was subordinated to, and irresistibly moved by, the divine will, then you have essentially embraced a version of Monothelitism". However, this was what was stated by the orthodox fathers in and shortly after the 7th century. A prime example of this may be found in the writings of John of Damascus, as well as in the acts of Constantinople III:

“But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, since He possesses different natures, His natural wills, that is, His volitional faculties belonging to Him as God and as Man are also different. But since the subsistence is one, and He Who exercises the will is one, the object of the will, that is, the gnomic will , is also one, His human will evidently following His divine will, and willing that which the divine will willed it to will.” (John Damascene, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book II, Ch. 22)

“Christ, then, energizes according to both His natures and either nature energizes in Him in communion with the other, the Word performing through the authority and power of its divinity all the actions proper to the Word, i.e. all acts of supremacy and sovereignty, and the body performing all the actions proper to the body, in obedience to the will of the Word that is united to it, and of whom it has become a distinct part. For He was not moved of Himself to the natural passions, nor again did He in that way recoil from the things of pain, and pray for release from them, or suffer what befell from without, but He was moved in conformity with His nature, the Word willing and allowing Him œconomically to suffer that, and to do the things proper to Him, that the truth might be confirmed by the works of nature.” (Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 3.15)

“He, therefore, assumed flesh animated with the spirit of reason and mind, a spirit that holds sway over the flesh but is itself under the dominion of the divinity of the Word. So, then, He had by nature, both as God and as man, the power of will. But His human will was obedient and subordinate to His divine will, not being guided by its own inclination, but willing those things which the divine will willed. For it was with the permission of the divine will that He suffered by nature what was proper to Him. For when He prayed that He might escape death, it was with His divine will naturally willing and permitting it that He did so pray and agonize and fear, and again when His divine will willed that His human will should choose death, the passion became voluntary to Him. For it was not as God only, but also as man, that He voluntarily surrendered Himself to death. And thus He bestowed on us also courage in the face of death.” (John Damascene, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, 3.18)

"Defining all this we likewise declare that in him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers. And these two natural wills are not contrary the one to the other (God forbid!) as the impious heretics assert, but his human will follows and that not as resisting and reluctant, but rather as subject to his divine and omnipotent will. For it was right that the flesh should be moved but subject to the divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius." (The Acts of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, Session XVIII, Definition of Faith)

Eastern Orthodox blogger Perry Robinson also used similar language of Christ's human will as being aligned towards the divine will of the Trinity and overcoming the human instinct/volition (Mr. Robinson specifically made this comment in reference to Christ's suffering in the Garden of Gethsemane). This was in a livestream (2:02:00) with Sam Shamoun and Qai from the Orthodox Shahada channel on YouTube. I wonder if Philips will accuse Perry of espousing Monothelitism as well? He would have to do so if he is consistent with the claims he has written in this article.

Returning to the issue, this view of Damascene and the orthodox Reformed concerning the human will of Christ as being in some sense subject the divine will is not to be confused with how the way in which the Monothelites construed it, namely that the human will was merely a passive instrument of the Logos in such a way as to deny that Christ has any human energeia or operation. We need to bear in mind the useful distinction made by Aquinas:

“Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as God, which appears from what He says (Matthew 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will....The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. 3, Q. 18, Art. 5, underlining mine)

This important clarification is not done so as to posit multiple human wills, because then Christ would have three wills. Rather it is a distinction that was rightly taught by Aquinas in order to understanding the relationship between Christ's divine will and His human will. The subject of willing is one, not two. It is one and the same Christ who works in both of His natures. This is why it is important to distinguish between operation and the mode of operation.

This is also why the language of Christ's human nature as an "instrument" (οργανον) of the Logos is not to be rejected altogether:

“For what happened of old was a shadow of this; and what the Savior did on His coming, this Aaron shadowed out according to the Law. As then Aaron was the same and did not change by putting on the high-priestly dress , but remaining the same was only robed, so that, had any one seen him offering, and had said, 'Lo, Aaron has this day become high-priest,' he had not implied that he then had been born man, for man he was even before he became high-priest, but that he had been made high-priest in his ministry, on putting on the garments made and prepared for the high-priesthood; in the same way it is possible in the Lord's instance also to understand aright, that He did not become other than Himself on taking the flesh, but, being the same as before, He was robed in it; and the expressions 'He became' and 'He was made,' must not be understood as if the Word, considered as the Word , were made, but that the Word, being Framer of all, afterwards was made High Priest, by putting on a body which was originate and made, and such as He can offer for us.” (Athanasius, Second Discourse Against the Arians, 8)

“And thus His divinity communicates its own glories to the body while it remains itself without part in the sufferings of the flesh. For His flesh did not suffer through His divinity in the same way that His divinity energized through the flesh. For the flesh acted as the instrument of His divinity.” (John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book III, Ch. 15)

Now, what is the alleged connection that the EOs make between Monothelitism and Reformed soteriology? Mr. Philips answers: "You may be wondering what any of this has to do with Calvinism. I confess it took us a long time to connect the dots because of how deeply Calvinist heresies were ingrained into our thinking. However, while we were still attending our Calvinist church, my wife and I started thinking about the soteriological implications of the Sixth Ecumenical Council. We began to realize that the Monergism of Calvinism seemed to be driven by many of the same concerns that animated the ancient Monoenergists, for both tended to treat the divine and the human as if they are two sides in a zero-sum transaction. Soteriological Monergism, no less than the heresy of Monoenergism, sees the divine and the human competing for the same space, and both want to give the divine all the pieces of the pie....What was lacking for both Theodore of Pharan and Calvinism is the assertion of synergy between the human and divine will which seems to have been the understanding behind the verdict of the Sixth Ecumenical Council...To be consistent Calvinism must deny that the human will possesses such self-determining powers. Thus, Christ’s obedience to the Father to the point of death becomes either a kind of fake dramatization or something attributed to His divine nature only."

Robin Philips claims that Reformed soteriology attempts to "give the divine all the pieces of the pie." This is a misunderstanding of the Reformed position. Strictly speaking, monergistic language is generally spoken of specifically in reference to the work of regeneration, and not of salvation as a whole. And even with respect to regeneration, this is spoken in such a way to mean simply that God is the sole efficient cause or agent of regeneration, and not that the human will plays no role at all in salvation. This is contrary to what Reformed historically teaches. Two examples will suffice for the time being:

"The second kind of spiritual actions or things, concern the kingdom of God; as repentance, faith, the conversion of a sinner, new obedience, and such like: in which we likewise in part join with the Church of Rome and say, that in the first conversion of a sinner, man's freewill concurs with God's grace, as a fellow or coworker in some sort. For in the conversion of a sinner three things are required: the word, God's spirit, and man's will: for man's will is not passive in all and every respect, but hath an action in the first conversion and change of the soul. When any man is converted, this work of God is not done by compulsion, but he is converted willingly: and at the very time when he is converted, by God's grace he wills his conversion. To this end said Augustine, He which made thee without thee, will not save thee without thee. Again, that is certain, that our will is required in this, that we may do any good thing well: but we have it not from our own power but God works to will in us." (William Perkins, A Reformed Catholic, in The Works of William Perkins, 7:14)

"When God regenerates men he so cleanses and renews them that they understand for themselves what they do and also why they desire and choose those things, after they have once received a heart of flesh for their heart of stone. So then, after they are once regenerated they becomes workers together with God, and of their own accord they bend themselves to holiness and purity of life." (Peter Martyr Vermigli, Predestination and Justification: Two Theological Loci, pgs. 28-29)

It would also be proper here to briefly comment on how the Reformed have historically understood the relationship between the divine decrees and the nature of the human will.

First of all, though the divine decrees do result in the certainty, infallibility, and futurition of the thing decreed, this does not take away the liberty and contingency of second causes. This is articulated very clearly in chapters 3 and 5 of the Westminster Confession, and was the unanimous teaching of virtually Reformed theologians up until Jonathan Edwards (who may fairly be called the architect of modern-day compatibilism), who broke with the prior Reformed tradition. God decrees not only the event, but also preserves the nature of secondary causes in such a way that they operate according to most proximate causes. Free things act freely, and contingent things act freely. Such is the case with the human will.

To illustrate this, we may defer to God's foreknowledge. God has knowledge of possible events that do not actually take place in time, but this does not remove them from the possibility or potency to exist. For example, during His betrayal, Christ said that it was possible for Him to summon legions of angels to save Him from death (Matthew 26:53). This never happened, nor was it decreed, however it was still possible for it to happen. Therefore, just as the possibility of an event is not excluded by divine foreknowledge, neither is the liberty and contingency or man's will done away with because of the divine decree.

On the subject of free choice and predestination, there is a lot more we could get into, which I will save for another time. For more reading on this issue, I highly recommend Dr. Richard Muller's outstanding work Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought.

John Calvin and the Ecumenical Creeds: The 1537 Disputation with Pierre Caroli

 

Eastern Orthodox writer and scholar Cyril Jenkins published an article at the Ancient Faith website in which he discussed the issue of Calvin's view of the Athanasian Creed, as recorded in his 1537 disputation with Pierre Caroli. Apparently, Calvin refused to sign the creed when Caroli asked him to do so. 

This episode in the life of the Genevan reformer has generated a lot of controversy, much of which started in Calvin's own lifetime and continues till this day. It is constantly spread around by opponents of the Reformed faith in order to smear Calvin's image. In this article, I wish to investigate and provide an introductory overview of the history of this situation and problem. 

Background

Pierre Caroli was initially very accepting of the doctrines of the Reformation. According to some, his conflict with Calvin initially began with the former's view of prayers for the dead. After this, Caroli had a more rooted animosity towards Calvin. 

At one point, Caroli made an accusation of Arianism and Sabellianism against Calvin (and possibly his other colleagues), because of the Genevan Confession's lack of "technical language" in explaining the Trinity. Around this time, Calvin wrote a letter to Kaspar Megander (1495-1545), an influential theologian in Bern. He described Caroli as the "rabid fury of the little ass" and as a slanderous individual. Calvin urged Megander to deal with the situation with Caroli immediately, and not wait around the civil magistrates to do so. The Genevan ministers met in Lausanne on May 14 and presented their Trinitarian theology and were vindicated. However, Caroli continued his accusations. Eventually, a synod was held in Bern to deal with the controversy, which had caused Calvin and his fellow Reformer, Guillaume Farel, much anxiety and stress.

The primary reason why Calvin, in this specific situation mind you, refused to sign the Creeds, was because he did not want to cave into the demands of Pierre Caroli and give him the upper hand, so to speak, or make people think of it as an absolutely necessary action. 

However, in order to properly understand as to why Calvin chose to do this, it is important for us to see what Calvin himself said two years later (1539) in a letter to Guillaume Farel:

"He boasted, moreover, that at first he had a most just cause of complaint against us, that he did not immediately rush forward to accuse us, but required in a friendly way, that we should subscribe the three creeds; that we not only declined doing so, but disparaged with much scornful derision those three symbols, which by the perpetual confession of good men have always been held as of established authority in the Church. Thereupon they excepted, that he had not on that account any sufficient ground why he should fall away to the Papists. Then, having rebuked him very severely, they admonished him to repentance. When called upon, I replied to his objections, and in the first place, most assuredly did not spare to declare the whole business as it stood from the very commencement. There was some little difficulty in clearing ourselves as to the symbols; for it was certainly somewhat discreditable that we should have rejected those documents, which, since they have been received by the approving judgment of the whole Church, ought to be considered as beyond controversy. Although, therefore, it would have been easy for us to palliate that also, by replying we did not reject these symbols, far less disapprove them, but that we had only refused our subscription, in order that Caroli might not thereby find occasion of triumph in his attacks upon our ministry, there would still have remained somewhat of suspicion in regard to us. That circumstance especially procured him favour, because a little before that, Claude, who it was clear had been often condemned by all the Churches, had been received again into the office of the ministry. Therefore, although I shewed that he had done that from malice, I could not take away from him every pretext for attacking us. It was my duty to give satisfaction on the score of battologies. But by no means have I admitted that there was here any useless battology, or mere contending about words. I confessed, however, that I would not have spoken unless I had been forced by his wickedness to do so." (John Calvin, "Letter 40" to Farel)

Nonetheless, Caroli also recognized that Calvin's theology was not a variance with the teaching of the three ancient creeds (B.B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, pg. 208). Calvin repeatedly cited Athanasius in his writings, especially in his famous disputes against the impious heretic Michael Servetus (Anthony N.S. Lane, John Calvin: Student of the Church Fathers [T&T Clark: Edinburgh, 1999], pgs. 77-80). 

Amandus Polanus: Comparison of Election and Reprobation

 

And thus having declared the dissenting arguments of it, I come to the comparison, especially such as belong to the equality or inequality of reprobation and election.

Reprobation is equal to election, -

1. in the efficient causes. For God is author of both, Gods good pleasure or freewill is the motive cause of both.

2. In the matter. For both is the decree of God.

3. In the ends: for both are for the glory of God and salvation of the elect.

4. In the common subject, which is mankind, in as much as it was to be corrupted & thrown into eternal death by their own default. As then election is the decree of delivering such as are given to Christ by mercy out of the common destruction: so Reprobation is the decree to leave such as are not given to Christ in that common destruction by justice. Therefore as election found not men worthy but made them so, so reprobation cast none into eternal death, but by just judgement leaves them that are plunged into it by their own sin and fault in it. For as God decreed not to choose any that was just already, but the sinner to be made just by grace, so likewise he did not decree to reprobate the just, but the sinner to be justly condemned for sin.

5. In the adjuncts both were from eternal: both are firm and immutable: both not to be altered, whether you respect Gods counsel, or the persons themselves elected or reprobated. So that neither the counsel of God can possibly be made frustrate, nor the elect become reprobates, nor the reprobates elect.

The inequality or unlikeness of reprobation and election, appears in these.

1. In the form. For as election is a decree of pitying and delivering out of the universal ruin, and taking into salvation: so reprobation is a decree of not pitying but relinquishing in the common mass, and of not vouchsafing of salvation.

2. In the effects. For inward calling, faith, justification, glorification, good works, and eternal salvation, are the effects of election: but debarring from the grace of inward calling and faith, and justification, glorification, good works, and the blessing of salvation, and sins, and the punishments of the same, are not the effects of reprobation.

3. In the proper subjects. For election is of such as shall be saved, reprobation of them that are to be condemned.

4. In the ensuing adjuncts. For though sin bee not the cause of reprobation, yet it is of damnation: for no man is condemned but for sin: but the good works of the godly, as they are not the cause of election so neither of salvation, but only the way that God hath prepared for the godly to walk in. Eph. 2.10. We are his workmanship framed in Christ Jesus to good works, which God hath prepared that we should walk in them: Now as the way is not the cause of the mark, so are not good works the cause of salvation.

(Amandus Polanus, A Treatise on God's Eternal Predestination, Wherein both this excellent doctrine is briefly and sincerely delivered, and many hard places of Scripture are opened and maintained against the corrupt expositions of Bellarmine and other adversaries [University of Cambridge: John Legat, 1599], pgs. 201-203)