John of St. Thomas (1589-1644): Do Forms Reduce to Prime Matter in Substantial Generation?

 

(The following is taken from John Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [Lyon: Laurentius Arnaud, Petrus Borde, Johannes, and Petrus Arnaud, 1678], pgs. 592-598)

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Article VI - Whether in substantial generation there is a resolution of every form down to prime matter.

To reduce prime matter to prime matter is the same as to remove every form, both substantial and accidental, when generation occurs. We inquire whether every form, both substantial and accidental, is taken away from matter when something new is introduced, in other words, whether the same accidents that were in the corrupted thing remain in the generated thing. However, we are not currently discussing the resolution of every substantial form, but we assume that matter is entirely stripped of substantial form when generation occurs because in a composite there are not multiple substantial forms, as we will show in question 1 of On the Soul. Therefore, when one substantial form is excluded so that another may be introduced, all preceding substantial forms are stripped away.

Therefore, the difficulty lies in the resolution of every accidental form. On the one hand, it seems that not all accidents can be corrupted, but they should remain at the moment of generation. This is because, at that instant, there should be dispositions that make the matter disposed and determined for this form rather than another. Otherwise, the matter would remain indifferent and undetermined for such a form. Similarly, the accidents that act as the generating agent's power should remain at that instant, as the generating agent is not conjoined with them. In that instant, generation must proceed from something that acts effectively, not from the generator, since, as we suppose, it is not there. Nor is it from the power of the generator, the heavens, or any other agent left behind because this power would be subject to change and exist in the thing that is corrupted. Therefore, if all accidents cease at that instant, that power also ceases. Moreover, there is a special consideration for some accidents that cannot be entirely separated from matter, such as quantity, which follows matter itself. Just as quality follows the form and through quantity, matter is divided and made divisible. It is assumed that at the moment of generation, undivided matter separated from other matter is postulated, having quantity by which this division takes place. This is especially relevant in humans, in whom quantity cannot be attributed except to matter alone since the form is spiritual. Therefore, the quantity of matter is not eliminated when a human is produced, and consequently, it seems that other accidents that are subject to the substance through quantity are not removed. Finally, there is the difficulty regarding certain accidents that do not appear to belong to the generated thing unless they remain in the matter itself. For instance, we observe the same scar, the same black color, the same marks, etc., in a corpse. Sometimes, the heat remains within the viscera of a dead animal, which cannot be generated by its corrupting agent, especially when it is suffocated with water, as water cannot generate heat. Similarly, if an animal is lifted up, the new motion cannot be generated in the corpse because the corpse cannot produce it. Such a generative principle is absent, as the generator does not possess impulsive force since it is not living. Therefore, these accidents are not separated from the matter itself, nor are similar accidents produced, as there is no cause from which they could originate. 

John of St. Thomas (Poinsot)

On the other hand, two well-known principles in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas contradict this view. First, accidents are subject to the whole, and when the whole perishes, accidents also perish. Second, matter receives a substantial form before receiving an accidental form. Therefore, when the substantial form is removed, all previously received accidents are also removed. Otherwise, some accidents would remain immediately received in the matter before the substantial form.

Hence, this difficulty mainly depends on another one to be discussed later: question 9, namely, whether the subject of accidents is only matter or the composite itself. Those who hold that matter is the immediate subject of accidents consequently argue that it is not necessary to dissolve all accidents in the introduction of the substantial form. This view is advocated by Francisco Suárez in Disputation 14, Metaphysics, Section 3. He cites many ancient philosophers and refers to the position of the University of Coimbra in Book 1, De Generatione, Chapter 4, Question 18, Article 1, especially by prominent figures like Gabriel, Ockham, and Gregory. It might also seem that Murcia shares this view in Disputation 1, De Generatione, Question 5, and others among more recent philosophers.

Nevertheless, the view of Saint Thomas Aquinas is that in substantial generation, accidents should be resolved, so that nothing that existed in the corrupt is left in the generated, but rather newly produced. This is clear from Saint Thomas himself in his First Part, Question 76, where he says, "It is impossible for any accidental disposition to fall in between the body and the soul or between any substantial form and its matter." He supports this argument immediately afterward. The same doctrine can be found in Book 1 of De Generatione, Lecture 10, where he says, "The accident of the same species does not remain, but what was there before is corrupted by the accidental corruption of the subject, and a similar accident, following the form, arrives anew." A similar sentiment can be found in questions concerning spiritual creatures, Article 3, Reply to Objection 1, and in questions concerning the soul, Article 9, Reply to Objection 5. Thomists, including Cajetan, Soncin, Capreolus, Báñez, and others, generally follow this view. They are cited and followed by the University of Coimbra in Book 1, De Generatione, Chapter 4, Question 18, Article 2, the Carmelites in Book 1, De Generatione, Disputation 3, Question 6, Fonseca in his Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 28, Question 20, Section 2.

The foundation for this view is twofold, as discussed above. The first point, that the entire composite and not just matter is the subject of accidents, should be demonstrated by us later, in question 9.

The second principle, as presented by Saint Thomas earlier, is that while matter is receptive of both substantial and accidental forms, it receives them in a certain order. This order arises because these forms are hierarchically related, with one essentially presupposing the other. For example, the vegetative level presupposes the sensitive, and the act of the intellect presupposes the potentiality of the intellect. Similarly, the accidental being presupposes substantial being, naturally coordinating with it and depending on it. Substantial being, however, is conferred by the substantial form.

To fully grasp this, we must distinguish between accidents that are properly passions and those that are common. If they are proper accidents, it is certain that they do not adhere to matter or unite with it except through the form because they do not suit matter unless they emanate from the form. They do not emanate from the form unless they are united to matter because they do not emanate from it unless it has existence. The form, when it is in matter, has existence because it either depends on it or is created in it. Therefore, it is prior for a form to exist in matter and give it existence than for accidents emanating from it to remain in matter. Consequently, when heat is produced in fire, it cannot be the same as what was in the wood when it was being prepared for the fire because the heat emanates from the introduced form of fire.

However, if the accidents are common or can be called common because although they emanate from the form, they emanate according to a common grade, not according to the ultimate difference, as quantity emanates from the degree of the body, which is common to all elements, whether simple or mixed. The same reasoning applies to these accidents as to the proper ones because, as St. Thomas Aquinas points out in Part 1, Question 78, Article 6, just as different degrees of the same form are given, so each genus or degree of form has its own proper accidents. Therefore, if these accidents emanate as mentioned and follow this line of reasoning, they necessarily presuppose the form in matter, so they emanate from it, rather than being placed in matter before the substantial form to which the immediate order of matter pertains because matter is the potentiality for the substantial form and, therefore, immediately pertains to the substantial act. Thus, if dispositions that are required by their nature and that determine matter are not received in it before the form, much less can accidents that are not essentially connected with matter be received. Moreover, the relationship of matter to the substantial form is immediate and essential before it regards the accidental form. Matter is the potentiality for the substantial form, and its immediate corresponding act should be the substantial act. It is named and constituted as potentiality by its order to the act. Therefore, before the accidental, it should consider the substantial form as its primary intention, but it also pertains to the execution because what essentially and primarily determines the relationship is more quickly reached in execution than what is secondary since essence is constituted in execution and not only in intention, unlike what is secondary. Furthermore, since the accident depends on the substance in existing because the substance exists on its own, while the accident is non-existent and adherent, what comes first in the order of existence is also the first in the order of execution, not just in the order of intention. Execution regards the existence of the existent. If the substantial form gives substantial being to matter and consequently gives being in the order and line of existence, which is prior in adhering, then, in this order of execution, the substantial form must precede the accidental form. Therefore, because the accident depends on the substance in the order of existence, it strongly resembles dependence on the efficient cause, insofar as the efficient cause presupposes existence so that the effect depends on it. Thus, with His immediate efficiency, God can supply the actual dependence of the accident on the sustaining substance because in this regard, the efficient can do the same as the sustainer. Therefore, once the substantial form is removed, matter cannot retain accidents. Hence, accidents do not pass numerically from the corrupt to the generated because they do not immediately exist in matter.

You might argue that it suffices for supporting accidents to have partiality, which matter possesses. Therefore, you may say that even though it assigns a primary and essential order to the substantial form, matter is still sufficient to support accidents, especially those that emanate from it, like quantity or common accidents.

Secondly, the fact that accidents do not necessarily corrupt even though the form changes to a substantial one is because something else that equally sustains such an accident in existence is substituted in its place. This is why we said above that prime matter does not perish when a new form arrives, even though its existence changes, because something else equally gives existence to matter.

In response to the first point, it is argued that it is not sufficient for matter to have partial existence to support accidents. Firstly, because matter does not possess partial existence; rather, it receives existence solely from the form. This is because the form provides substantial existence and, therefore, the primary existence that underlies everything else. Otherwise, it would not be substantial. Consequently, matter does not presuppose something prior in itself. Secondly, even if it had partial existence, it still could not support accidents unless it depended on the whole or composite as if it were existing for something else. Thus, matter alone is the principle that sustains accidents as the "that." However, if the principle "that" is removed or destroyed without being replaced by another that fulfills all its functions, then the principle "that" neither acts nor receives. It is false that quantity emanates solely from matter since it emanates from the degree of corporeality provided by the form. We observe that quantities vary according to different forms. If the same quantity always inhered in matter, then accidents would be more closely and intensely united to the matter than the substantial form, which varies. However, matter essentially refers to the substantial form before referring to the accidental form.

Regarding the second point, it is said that an equivalent is not substituted for the accident because a different subject cannot contain the same accident numerically. This is because one natural cause does not entirely contain the effects of another, even in terms of complete individuation. Only the first cause can completely contain and supply everything due to the complete subordination of the secondary cause to the first cause in every aspect of being, as we discussed in Question 12 of Physics and will address in the following question. By this reasoning, God, as the sustainer of the accident outside the subject, preserves it numerically the same. However, with matter, when different forms are substituted, the same accident is preserved numerically because each form is inadequately regarded by matter and is capable of preserving it. On the other hand, the accident does not regard multiple subjects but is adequately sustained by one, thereby being individuated.

Regarding the first point about dispositions that determine matter and the efficiency of generation in the last instant, we will address this in the following article as it involves a specific difficulty.

In response to the second point, it is stated that quantity does not necessarily follow matter in a clinging and emanating manner. Instead, it follows matter as it exists under a form and acquires the degree of corporeality bestowed upon it by that form. Quantity is considered an essential accident of matter, just as quality is an accident of form. This is due to both similarity and generality.

Firstly, quantity is attributed to matter due to its similarity with matter's passive nature. In a similar manner, quantity is inherently non-active.

Secondly, it is attributed to matter due to its generality. Quantity is as general to matter as the degree of corporeality. No form of matter is found without corporeality, and none without quantity.

Regarding the statement that matter is individuated by quantity and should be assumed as individuated at the moment of generation, it is responded that matter is not individuated by substantial quantity but by its inherent incommunicability. Quantity contributes to multiplication and division, not so much to the concept of individuation as to its differentiation. Quantities divide and multiply, but it is the substance or matter itself, not the quantity, that determines diverse substantial individuation. This will be explained more fully in the next question when discussing the principle of individuation.

Hence, the quantity that individuates and is individuated by matter is sufficient if it possesses, at the moment of generation, priority in terms of formal cause over the form, dispositional cause over disposition, and material cause over matter. However, it is not necessary for this quantity to be coeval with matter and perpetually inherent in it. This will be further clarified later. This does not pose a specific difficulty in the case of humans because although their form is essentially spiritual, it is formative and virtually corporeal, as it provides the degree of corporeality that gives rise to quantity, just as it does with other corporeal accidents. Therefore, the entirety resulting from this, which is simply corporeal (i.e., a human being), is capable of quantity as "that." The principle for receiving quantity as "that" is matter itself, as it serves as the substrate for the form and provides the degree of corporeality.

In response to the second point, it is stated that the accidents that remain in the generated entity are not the same in number as those in the corrupted entity but are similar, as explicitly taught by St. Thomas in his work on generation (1. de gener. lect. 10). Some forms have such a symbolic relationship and affinity that they tend to seek similar accidents, especially at the beginning of their generation when they have not yet achieved their full perfection. During this early stage, transmutation is relatively easy, such as the transformation from an embryo to an animal or from an animal to a cadaver. As these are vital forms, they tend to progress towards another form, and this prompts them to seek similarity in their accidents.

Sometimes, the generating agent produces an accident similar to what was present in the corrupted entity due to the necessity of the matter from which the generation occurs. It should be noted that forms, when generated anew or during processes like augmentation or nutrition, may not possess their proper accidents or intrinsic passions as part of their inherent nature but may acquire many common accidents as a result of the determination of the matter into which the form is introduced. Common accidents do not emanate directly from the form but are provided by the generating agent according to the suitability of the matter and the circumstances. For example, when a living being is killed by water, fire, or iron, and the form of a cadaver is generated, whether by those agents or by celestial causes as the primary agent, common accidents are produced. These common accidents are determined by the resistance or demand of the matter. Hence, when a dead animal's form is introduced, a certain amount of heat can still be produced. Although the form of a cadaver is introduced by the cold agent, this agent, while primarily producing cold, can also acquire qualities of warmth when it acts against the resistance of the matter. Similarly, sometimes such heat is generated through antiperistasis, or the surrounding action of the opposite quality, as introduced by the form of the cadaver itself, acting as a direct cause. The concept of antiperistasis will be explained further in question 5.

By the same reasoning, we observe that the nutritive faculty sometimes generates food with additional qualities and alien properties due to the influence of the matter, which imparts its own qualities to the nutrition. Likewise, animals are sometimes generated with different qualities, even though the seed is good, because of the mixture with the blood, which is the matter. Thus, the agent or generator must not only be considered in terms of its inherent power or modification due to resistance and reaction but also in terms of the power it derives from external sources, such as celestial influences and other surrounding circumstances. All of these factors determine or provide the power to generate certain common accidents in accordance with the demands of the matter in which it operates.

Therefore, the generating agent or agent is not solely defined by its intrinsic power but also by its relation to the matter, circumstances, and other surrounding influences. It can generate similar qualities, scars, impulses, and other such common accidents not by its inherent force but by continuing the impulses in the body of the deceased, as the impressed power from the agent on the dying animal, which is being corrupted, does not encounter a resistance contrary to its extinction. Instead, it determines the agent undergoing corruption and imparts to it the power to continue a similar impulse in the cadaver.

It should be noted that the senses do not perceive any change in this process, as their function does not involve indicating changes in individual things resulting from the mere corruption of the subject, where a similar accident of the same species is substituted, but rather in cases where an alteration or mutation occurs in the accident without the substitution of a similar one.

But you might still object with reference to Thomas Aquinas, who, in "Contra Gentiles," chapter 18, states: "The matter of a human being, after his death, which was subject to such a form, remains with the same dimensions it had, so as to be individual matter. Therefore, the matter is not stripped of every accident, at least not of quantity, by which it is marked and determined, so as to be this individual matter. This is confirmed because the antecedent dispositions have nothing contrary to cause their corruption by subsequent ones, as they are of the same nature with them; therefore, they persist. Nor can it be said that they are defined by the definition of the subject, for it is quite the opposite, as the ultimate disposition, when joined to the generated form, is not corrupted by its destruction, but rather is generated then. A disposition beneath the ultimate one is compatible with the subject undergoing corruption. Therefore, they do not terminate solely due to the subject's definition but rather due to the contrary. However, this does not apply because the ultimate disposition is not contrary to the preceding one; it is of the same species, for example, heat as an eighth with heat as a seventh."

Response: What St. Thomas means is that the matter remains with the same dimensions fundamentally, insofar as matter is the root of those dimensions, not formally. This is because the same quantity does not remain, nor does the same form. Nevertheless, there is an order in matter to the same form, that is, to the soul, for its restoration through resurrection, so it remains the same dimension fundamentally.

St. Thomas confirms this by saying in the same text that corporeity is twofold: one is substantial corporeity, which is the nature of the body as belonging to the genus of substance, and this is nothing other than the form itself. The other is accidental corporeity, which is the species of quantity, which is the body. St. Thomas continues: "Although the corporeity of the human body ceases to exist when it corrupts, it does not prevent the same human, numerically, from rising again because the same corporeity remains, with the same form of a human being." Therefore, St. Thomas understands that the quantitative dimension does not remain the same in the matter of a human, but the same order to the human form remains. Consequently, it will have the same dimensions because it will have the same corporeity.

We will explain other passages from St. Thomas in question 7 and 9 of the Third Part in the following article.

Regarding your second point, dispositions that precede are not directly corrupted by the ultimate disposition as if they were contrary to it, but indirectly. This is because they introduce an incompatible form to the preceding one, and consequently, the subject of such preceding dispositions is destroyed. Thus, these dispositions terminate to define the subject in which they existed, but it is not incongruous for something to be indirectly and accidentally corrupted by its like, with the foundation on which it relied being destroyed.

John of St. Thomas (1589-1644): Predicamental Being and Accidents

 

(The following is taken from John Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [Lyon: Laurentius Arnaud, Petrus Borde, Johannes, and Petrus Arnaud, 1678], pgs. 189-198)

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QUESTION XIV. - On Predicamental Being and Division into the Ten Categories.

ARTICLE I. - What is a predicament, and what is required for something to be in a predicament?

A PREDICAMENT is nothing else than a series or coordination of superior and inferior predicables starting from one supreme genus, which is predicated of every inferior one, down to the individual, which is subject to every superior. And because this coordination is done through superior and inferior predicables of greater and lesser universality, those predicables are called "degrees" because they are like steps on which we ascend and descend within the predicables themselves. For example, in the predicament of substance, the supreme genus is substance, then body, then living, then animal, then man, then Peter, and so on. In each predicament, we will arrange things towards the end of that predicament, as indicated.

And since the distinction of predicaments was introduced for the purpose of presenting orders and classes of different natures to which everything that partakes of a certain nature could be reduced, it is therefore necessary, first of all, to exclude from every predicament beings of reason because they do not possess a true nature or true existence, but rather a fictitious one. Hence, they do not belong to a true predicament but to a fictitious one. Therefore, according to Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae, I, Q. 7, Art. 7), only things outside the mind are said to come into the predicaments.

However, among real beings, it is necessary for some to belong to this line and gradation of predicaments directly, some to the side and, as it were, reductively. This is because not all things participate in the concept of being or the genus in the same way. In order to distinguish which beings are entirely separated from the predicament, which are placed in the straight line, which are placed reductively, and which are placed to the side, five conditions are enumerated that are required for something to be in the predicament. Although others may enumerate more conditions, all can be reduced to these.

The first condition is that it must be being per se and not by accident. The second is that it must be a complete being. The third is that it must be a finite being. The fourth is that it must be a complete being. The fifth is that it must be univocal.

Regarding the first condition, it is said that being per se must be present to exclude being by accident. The latter is excluded from the predicament because it does not signify one nature but multiple natures. Therefore, it does not constitute a thing with a single genus and difference but with multiple ones. This is the nature of being by accident. It is not placed in the predicament per se but through those natures, and each one is placed in a distinct predicament if they belong to different natures or in the same predicament if they are of the same nature but with different modes and multiplied natures. This is not being placed per se but with a single position.

Based on this condition, I believe that concrete accidental entities must be excluded from the predicament because they are not taken merely as formal but as a composite composed of both the subject and the accident. For example, in the case of color, it signifies not only the form of color but also the subject it inheres in. This means that it signifies the formal aspect only. However, concerning the substance, when we say, "The white thing is colored," we refer to the quidditative formal aspect that is implied in them. Thus, even though concrete accidents are not taken as total entities, they do not contradict the notion of genus and species, and consequently, the series of predicaments. Some may find difficulty in this mode of signification because they signify by way of an accident, not by way of quiddity. But this does not matter because, although they signify by way of an accident concerning the subject, concerning the very form of the accident and the essential predicables, there can be predication, as when we say, "The white thing is colored." This involves the formal aspect that is inherent in them.

The second condition required for the concept of predicamental being is that it must be a complete being. This refers to those entities placed in the straight line of the predicament, not reductively or to the side. We call something a complete being when it is signified as constituted and, in a sense, as a whole. This condition also applies to accidents since they can be seen as a complete entity within the genus of accidents, although relative to substance, they are incomplete.

The third condition is that predicamental being must be finite. This condition excludes the infinite simply and in the whole genus of being, as in the case of God, who is not infinite in any determinate genus. For example, infinite quantity or infinite quality would be excluded by this condition. The reason is that the infinite in a determinate genus is only infinite accidentally. From the perspective of essence, it consists in actuality and potentiality, which are the terms that define essence. These terms constitute essence when considered in their act; it is potentiality that gives rise to genus, and it is act that gives rise to difference. Therefore, it retains coordination and the series of superior and inferior predicables, such as genus and difference, which are placed in both the genus and the predicament.

However, infinite in substance or in the genus of being involves pure actuality, as it pertains only to the absence of the terms of essence. Thus, if it is in act, it is infinite actuality, which excludes all potentiality. When potentiality is excluded, the genus, which is a potentiality for differences, is also excluded. Therefore, pure actuality excludes all coordination of determinable and determining degrees, of being capable and being actual, which constitutes the gradation and the predicamental series, as will be explained further in the following questions.

The fourth condition is that predicamental being must be uncompounded. This condition excludes not only complex accidental beings and those that are beings by accident (which is excluded by the first condition) but also complex essential beings, such as definitions. For example, the complex expression "rational animal" is excluded. The reason is that these complex expressions correspond to two concepts that explain one and the same nature. The nature that is intrinsically placed in the predicament is the defined thing itself, which is the species. Therefore, if the species or the defined thing is intrinsically placed in the predicament, and the complex expression explaining the defined thing is also intrinsically placed in that predicament, the same thing would be placed in the predicament twice: once by its own nature and again by the nature contained in its complex definition. Sometimes authors do not have a single-word term to signify a particular thing, and they use a complex term to signify it. However, when they do so, it is because the thing signified is intrinsically simple. It cannot be argued that only the definition is placed in the predicament, not the defined thing itself, which is the specific nature. This would imply that the predicaments are merely formal intentions, namely, the intentions of definitions, which would be placed in the predicament, while the defined things themselves, which are real, would not be.

The fifth condition is that predicamental beings must be univocal. Equivocal terms do not signify one nature but multiple ones, and therefore, they do not denote a single possible thing in the predicament. Analogical terms are excluded because they do not have one contractible ratio, as is the case with genus through differences, nor are they constituted as a species derived from a genus that contracts to individuals. By excluding genus, species, and difference, the coordination of the predicament, which is based on these, is also excluded.

ARTICLE II. - Is Being Univocal or Analogous to the Ten Predicaments?

This controversy has been well-known between the schools of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Scotus believes that being is univocal with respect to the ten predicaments, and consequently according to his opinion, being signifies a concept that is one object distinct from its inferiors, which it is predicated of, and is contractible to them. However, Scotus also claims in certain passages that being is equivocal or analogous to the ten predicaments because, in his view, it does not have a sufficient univocation to be a genus or one of the five predicables. He always denies that being has the univocation of genus because, according to his explicit interpretation of Aristotle, he excludes it from being since it does not represent the essence of a thing. He often cites the explicit authority of Aristotle in Metaphysics (e.g., text 10 of book 3 and text 2 of book 4) to support this claim. 

For the present discussion, we only need to address two questions. First, we must determine whether being is analogous or univocal with respect to the ten predicaments. Second, assuming that it is analogous, we must consider what kind of analogy it is. We will address the second question in subsequent articles and focus on the first question here. We will not delve into the analogy of being with God and creatures since it is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it can be resolved easily based on the resolution of the current question.

Scotus believes that being is indeed univocal with respect to the predicaments, but not as a genus. By univocal, he means that the concept of being is so precisely one that its unity is sufficient for contradiction, whether affirming or denying it in the same context. He explicitly states this in his Sentences (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 36). However, he also asserts in other places that being is equivocal or analogous to the ten predicaments because it does not have sufficient univocation to be a genus or any of the five predicables. Scotus dismisses the notion of being as a genus from his system, primarily due to Aristotle's explicit assertion in Metaphysics that being is not a genus but transcends it (Metaphysics 3.2, 1003a16).

Scotus's foundation for this position relies mainly on the principle that many philosophers, including some outside his school, admit: the concept of being and any analogous proportionality concept are precisely one and distinct from their analogates with the same precision. Scotus argues that if being had the precision of unity necessary for contradiction, it must contract to the things below it by addition, which determines and divides the superior concept. Therefore, nothing prevents being from being a univocal concept since the entire inequality or diversity in it arises from the different contracting differences, not from the superior concept itself, which is precisely one. Similarly, when we consider a concept like animal, the whole inequality in it arises from the differences contracting it, not from the superior concept, which is precisely one.

Scotus's position hinges on the idea that the concept of being cannot immediately represent multiple things in actuality or include them in the concept itself, as such inclusion would mean that multiple things are included within the concept explicitly. Therefore, being is necessarily univocal in his view, as its precise unity results from the fact that it includes in potency, not explicitly, everything that can be included in it.

Nevertheless, for the resolution, I first say: Common being with respect to the ten predicaments cannot have a univocal concept, whether it is taken as the complete concept of the knower or as abstracted from the complete and incomplete. This conclusion is undeniably the position of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and I am surprised that some authors want to deny it in the sense of Saint Thomas. Thus, he affirms in his work (Sententiarum I, dist. 2, quaest. 1, articulus 3, ad 2), where he states: "It is divided differently: equivocal, univocal, and analogous. Equivocal in terms of the things signified, univocal in terms of differences, but analogous in different modes. Therefore, since being is predicated analogically of the ten genera, it is divided in various ways." So, Saint Thomas expresses it very explicitly.

Furthermore, in the same work, in Distinction 25, Question 1, Article 2, and in his statement to Annibal, he sets forth the general rule that if things do not belong to the same most general genus, nothing can be said of them univocally. Now, being belongs to what is above the most general genera, namely, the ten predicaments. Similarly, in Distinction 19, Question 5, Article 2, he proves that being, and other transcendentals, are analogically predicated of the inferiors. In Question 1, Article 1, he proves that being cannot be contracted by addition (such as the contraction of univocity through differences) but through various modes that explain it. The idea that its concept is not entirely precise with respect to the inferior predicaments is derived from what he teaches in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially in Book 8, where he states, "It solves the above and so on," and it is clear that because the ten predicaments do not have being added to them in the way species have differences added to genera, what is essential, being, does not expect anything added to it to be this or that, that is, substance, quantity, quality, etc. Here, he clearly excludes the notion that being can be contracted by addition, and thus he assumes it is not univocal and that it does not include multiple things potentially. Therefore, it is not actually separated from them, even though it does not explicitly explain them.

Moreover, in Metaphysics 4, Lecture 1, he explicitly teaches that being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident and the other predicaments. You can also see this in Metaphysics 3, Lecture 5. It cannot be said that when Aristotle and Saint Thomas say that being is not predicated univocally, but only analogically, they are not speaking about being absolutely but being per se, which is the first being. This first being, they claim, is the only one that applies to accidents denominatively and attributively because, for example, accidents are said to be being because they participate in being. However, this claim doesn't hold because if being is taken there as substance, it would not deny being a genus, at least with respect to substances themselves. It could be a genus for substances even if it denies being as a genus generally.

In response to these arguments, some people say that the differential reasons are not being but a mode of being. Now, let's suppose that this differential reason is a mode of being. Then, this mode is either something in the nature of things or nothing. If it is nothing, then it makes things differ by nothing, which means there is no difference. If it is something beyond nothing, then it is being because, in this most general sense of being, being refers to anything other than nothing.

Some from the school of Scotus, like P. Merinero in his discussion on Univocity (Disputation 2, Question 1, and the following questions), distinguish between two considerations of being: "ens quid" and "ens quale." They say that "ens quid" refers to being as contractible and potential towards lower entities, while "ens quale" refers to being as actual and determining, or contracting, which is the differentia itself. They claim that "ens quid" is not included in the contracting differences because it would lead to an infinite regress. If the ultimate differences included "ens quid," they would share something in common and yet differ from each other, which would require another differentia to differentiate them, and this process would continue infinitely. Therefore, this process must terminate in something that does not include "ens quid" but is still "ens quale," i.e., a differentia.

However, this response is neither true nor does it resolve the difficulty. It's not true because "ens quale," or the mode of difference, either includes "ens quid" or it does not. If it does not, then it is nothing because "ens quid" is what is opposed to nothingness. If "ens quale" also opposes nothingness, then "ens quale" and "ens quid" share the concept of being something rather than nothing, i.e., having true and proper existence. This leads to an inquiry into how "ens quid" is intrinsically included in both "ens quale" and "ens quid." If "ens quale" includes "ens quid," it means that "ens quid" is intrinsically included in the intrinsic modes and ultimate differences since those are "ens quale." Therefore, "ens quid" cannot be entirely separated from them, even though it is not explicitly explained. If it were separated, we could perfectly understand it without them, just as an animal can be perfectly understood without being rational, even if it potentially includes it. If "ens quale" includes "ens quid," then "ens quid" is intrinsically and essentially included in those intrinsic modes and ultimate differences, as they are "ens quale."

Moreover, the idea that these intrinsic modes are distinct from each other due to added differences doesn't resolve the issue. If these modes are differentiated by some added mode or difference, we would need to inquire how they are in agreement and how they differ from each other based on this new mode, leading to an infinite regress. On the other hand, if it is claimed that these differences or modes entirely differ within the nature of "ens quale" and are not due to anything added, then why wouldn't the same reasoning apply to "ens quid," which shares commonality within the nature of "ens quid," yet the modes are primarily different? If adding some difference distinguishes the modes, then the question arises about how this new difference is in agreement and how it differs from other differences added in another way, and the infinite regress continues. If it is argued that these intrinsic modes entirely differ within the concept of "ens quale" and are not due to anything added, this doesn't address the problem because "ens quid" can also be argued to differ primarily within the concept of "ens quid." Therefore, the solution seems to admit that "ens" actually includes these modes but does not explain them, which aligns with our assertion and negates the univocity of the concept of being.

In response to this, some of Scotus' disciples, like M. Cabrero, concede that being is a genus and that Aristotle's claim (Metaphysics 3, Lecture 10) that being is not a genus applies to common complete being. However, they argue that this doesn't imply that the ten predicaments are genera distinct from the first genus of being. They only consider these distinctions as forms of denomination and intrinsic reality, not as distinct genera. But this argument doesn't hold since it undermines the entire structure of the ten predicaments. If the highest genus is only considered relative, then any lower genera would also be considered relative. This would result in an infinite number of higher-level predicaments, rendering the system incoherent.

The conclusion is that the concept of being cannot be perfectly separated from the modes that contract it, and it does not have a simple unity in itself. This conclusion aligns with the position of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who argued that being is not a genus because it is included in the intrinsic differences, contrary to the nature of a genus.

Regarding the arguments made from the beginning:

In the concept of being, several aspects are not explicitly represented or expressed as distinct, but they are present in a confused manner and under the proportion of having existence. This means that these aspects are implicitly conceived, but what is implicit in potentiality is not the same as what is implicit in actuality. Something implicit in potentiality denotes something determinate in itself, but it can be determined to multiple things by adding the determinable aspects, as in the case of "animal" concerning the rational and irrational. On the other hand, something implicit in confused actuality signifies everything without specific determination, as when we see a multitude from afar in a confused manner. To not represent in actuality is different from not including in actuality, and this distinction is essential.

It is argued that if these lower aspects of being are not part of the common concept of being, they can still be perfectly represented. The response is that these various aspects, when explicit, are not part of the concept of being as such. However, when implicit, they are part of the concept of being in common. In fact, being in common is nothing other than what pertains to the essence of being under confusion and without any specific determination, except for the proportion of having existence. This distinguishes it from the concept of "animal" and other univocal concepts, which not only include but also explain a specific degree that can be further determined by lower contracting differences. This is because a specific degree or aspect explicitly expressed cannot be contracted except by the addition of a higher degree or aspect. Conversely, an analogous concept does not determine any specific aspect explicitly but confounds them in a proportional relation, so contraction and distinction occur not by addition but by explication of the confusion, as explained in the preceding question.

As for the objections raised:

It is suggested that the same concept or notion can simultaneously represent something doubtful and certain, obscure and clear. This is considered in the context of faith where something may be clearly attested as credible under the aspect of credibility but remain obscure as the object of faith. It is also noted that sight can verify something seen from afar, such as an animal, but remain uncertain whether it's a horse or a cow, especially in the case of negative doubt. The response acknowledges that a single act can address multiple things under different aspects and may not equally clarify all of them. For example, a single act can fully certify one aspect while not providing the same certainty for another. The argument, therefore, does not support the notion of the univocity of transcendent concepts per se.

It is claimed that in predications like "substance is being" and "man is being," the predicate "being" does not attribute analogous particular analogates to the subject. The response reiterates that in such predications, "substance is being" signifies that substance has existence, but it does not attribute multiple, distinct aspects to it explicitly. It signifies existence under a proportional unity and confusion, and this is what is predicated there. The sense is that "man has existence," signifying that it has what pertains to the essence of existence under confusion. However, it does not explicitly signify substance, quantity, quality, etc., and it doesn't determine them in a specific and distinct manner.

Lastly, it is argued that being can be a medium in demonstration since it has demonstrable attributes and does not signify different aspects as if they were distinct. The response agrees that being can serve as a medium in demonstration since it possesses demonstrable attributes and signifies them in a proportional unity and some level of confusion. This is sufficient for knowledge and, consequently, for demonstration. Additionally, it can have transcendent and analogous attributes connected to the proportional relation it signifies, as mentioned in the previous article.

ARTICLE III. - How is Being Analogous?

Some hold that the analogy of being is neither a matter of proportion nor of a third thing, which they call transcendence, as discussed by Magister Cabrero in Disputation 4, Question 3, Doubt 3. Others believe that being, concerning substance or accident, only shares a common term and is like an analogous proportion. For example, they liken it to "healthy" concerning medicine and urine, as in the work of P. Vazquez in Volume 2, Part 1, Disputation 121, Chapter 2. However, these discussions are generally about all analogies, which they believe are only based on a common term. We are not addressing these viewpoints in this context, as we have addressed them previously. The others understand that there exists a proper analogy of proportionality, and this is more accurate.

Hence, there is only one conclusion: The analogy of being to the ten predicaments is not sufficiently explained by stating that it is transcendence. Instead, it must be said that it is the analogy of proper formal proportionality, although it virtually includes the analogy of attribution or proportion. The first part of the conclusion is evident because transcendence is not a species of analogy; it is the subject of analogy. Analogically, what is transcendent is denominatively analogous, just as "animal" is denominatively a genus. This is clear because transcendence is something real found in all things, whereas analogy, like univocity and equivocity, is a second intention. It pertains to the mode of predicability and universality and involves abstraction in the intellect. Therefore, to say that transcendence is a species of analogy is like saying that "animal" is a species of universality or predicable. It is necessary to assign the formal reason for analogy, which is found in being and the transcendent things, as it is in the subject.

The second part of the conclusion is clear because being and transcendence are intrinsically found in all things and not through extrinsic denomination. Otherwise, transcendence would not be what it is. Hence, St. Thomas Aquinas frequently teaches that accidents have their own existence and essence, truly and distinct from substance, as evident in the Fourth Distinction, Question 12, Article 1, Question 1, Article 1, Question 3, Reply to the Fifth, and in the Fourth Book Against the Gentiles, Chapter 14, Reply to the Ninth Reason, where he states that accidents are a certain form superadded to substance and caused by the principles of substance. Therefore, their existence is added above the existence of substance and depends on it. Similarly, he teaches that the quiddity of an accident is a reality that seeks existence through inherence. None of this could be the case unless accidents existed intrinsically and were beings in terms of their quiddity. When St. Thomas states in First Part, Question 55, Article 4, Reply to the First Objection, that accidents and non-subsistent forms do not have existence, he means that they do not have existence in themselves as they have existence when posited, not that they don't have existence at all.

Lastly, St. Thomas clearly teaches in the First Distinction, Question 19, Article 5, Article 2, Reply to the First Objection, that the analogy of proportionality, which is the analogy of proper proportionality, pertains to being and transcendent things. It is necessary that they have existence in each of those about which they are predicated. This can also be gathered from Question 7, De Potentia, Article 7. The reason is evident because the analogy of proportionality is distinguished from the analogy of attribution in that the latter is through denomination from one form that is intrinsically in one principal thing and denominatively in others. The former is with regard to forms intrinsically existing in each analogous thing but not concurring in one thing absolutely, only proportionally. Accidents are intrinsically beings because they truly exist apart from nothingness and truly adhere, producing real effects, such as being quantitative, colored, hot, etc. Therefore, being is said to belong to the analogy of proper proportionality.

The third part is proven by what we mentioned earlier, that philosophers and St. Thomas often compare the analogy of being, analogous to the Holy, to "animal" and "medicine," which are analogous attributively, as in the Fourth Book of the Metaphysics, Lecture 1, and the Eleventh Lecture of the Metaphysics, Question 2, Article 11. However, this is not because it is solely this kind of analogy. In the First Book of Ethics, Lecture 7, St. Thomas clearly attributes the analogy of proper proportionality to the Good. The same reasoning applies to being, but it does have intrinsic existence. Therefore, it is not formally called being by attribution, but it possesses being. Hence, it could be called "being" by attribution if it did not possess intrinsic being. As St. Thomas states in the Fourth Book of the Metaphysics, Lecture 4, being is said as "healthy" is with respect to substance and accident, not by the attribution of an efficient or final cause but by a material one, insofar as an accident inheres in a substance, as in a subject. Therefore, it is deduced that being must intrinsically possess existence, namely through inherence, not through extrinsic attribution to a cause or an extrinsic effect.

You state that the proportion of an accident to its existence or substance is a ratio, not a real proportion; therefore, it is insufficient to establish a real analogy and intrinsic suitability. The antecedent is argued as follows: Proportion is a relation, and that relation is a matter of reason because it does not exist between real extremes, as nothing is distinct from its existence. Therefore, it is a matter of reason. Additionally, the proportionality between an accident and substance is not signified by the term "being," nor does it suffice to constitute analogy even if it is exercised. For instance, proportionality can be exercised between two species falling under the same genus without signifying "being." Just as one species relates to its genus, so does another, and yet it does not eliminate univocity; thus, it doesn't do so in the case of "being."

Response: First of all, in the sense of St. Thomas distinguishing existence from essence in reality, it does not apply to this instance because here the extremes are found in which a real relation is exercised. However, beyond this point, we say that analogy is formally a second intention, and as such, it is not a real relation but a matter of reason, just as the intention of genus or species is. Yet, it has its basis in proportionality, not as a relation per se, but as a matter of suitability and proportional similarity among many, whether in real beings or matters of reason. This is similar to how the intention of a genus is founded on the suitability of generic similarity, whether in real beings or matters of reason.

Regarding the second part of your argument, our response is that the proportionality itself should not be taken to signify an act but to be exercised in analogical terms, just as equality or unity is not signified in univocal terms. Concerning the exercise of proportionality among species falling under the same genus, we mentioned in the previous question that this kind of proportionality relies on absolute and perfect suitability, and, as such, it does not solely rely on proportionality. In analogical terms, the entire unity or suitability is derived from proportionality itself, and no other greater unity is presupposed. This is the distinction between proportionality found in analogical terms and that in univocal terms. 

ARTICLE IV. - Is an Accident Univocal with Regard to the Nine Categories?

There are authors who hold the affirmative position, especially if an accident is considered as a predicamental complete accident, not as abstracted from the complete and the incomplete. They consider an accident as a real accident intrinsically denominating. For, with respect to an extrinsically and intrinsically denominating thing, there is no univocal concept. Therefore, when speaking in this manner about a complete accident, many authors, even outside the Scotist school, believe it to be univocal with respect to those predicaments which are intrinsically denominating forms.

The foundation for this is that such an accident is not included in differences, but it behaves like a complete substance, which is indeed a genus, for it does not include differences. However, as it abstracts from the complete and the incomplete, it does not constitute a genus. Why then would a complete accident not be univocal, especially when not one accident, for instance, quantity, participates in the nature of an accident more than another, such as quality? The entire diversity of these accidents arises from their specific differences in which the complete accident is not included. Furthermore, it is not easy to determine the analogy of a complete accident, for it is not transcendent since it is not included in differences, nor is it an attribution or metaphor since all accidents are not denominating intrinsically but only accidentally. It is also not proportional in its proper sense since, in the opinion of these authors, it does not suffice to make something analogous, as it can also be found in univocal terms. On the contrary, there is the general rule of St. Thomas in Distinction 25, Question 1, Article 2: "Whatever does not agree in the most general genus cannot be said univocally of them. But the nine genera of accidents are the most general genera, being diverse predicaments; therefore, nothing can be said univocally of them, and consequently not of accidents."

I say, therefore, firstly, that an accident, as abstracted from the complete and the incomplete, is not univocal but analogous. This is commonly agreed upon by authors because the same reasoning applies to a common accident that is both complete and incomplete. Likewise, for a substance, even though they are abstracted differently, they are intrinsically denominating and transcend all things and modes. For these accidental differences are also accidents, albeit incomplete, as they are something existent and not substantial. Therefore, they are accidental. From this, it follows that there is not one but several ratios, as they are included in differences, completely abstracted from them and perfectly abstracted from them, for a ratio that is once included does not abstract from them since there are no other differences of such differences from which it could abstract, leaving them behind. Therefore, if it abstracts from differences, it abstracts from all, and only the common ratio remains in relation to the lower, not in relation to the differences, if it abstracts from them. So, for the common ratio to apply to them, it does not abstract from them, and this is to include them in act and to be one reason, not absolutely one.

Secondly, I say that a complete accident is also analogous to the nine genera even if they all consist of intrinsic denominating forms. This conclusion is based on what we discussed in the second article about a complete being. Although it is not included under the concept of completeness, the differences themselves must be included under it for it to be complete because it is only through them that completeness is achieved. An accident can only become complete by a mode that distinguishes it from the incomplete. However, this mode is either inherence itself, as in the case of substance making a substance complete, or the accident being in concrete, or the accident becoming predicamental. Here, the differences that make the accident complete pertain to the essence and form of the accident itself. Therefore, a complete accident is not rendered univocal by this process, particularly when a different accident, for example, quantity, has the essence of an accident just as another accident, such as quality, does. The entire diversity arises from the specific differences inherent in the nature of accidents. These differences do not include the complete accident, and thus, a complete accident is not rendered univocal through them.

The first point does not make a complete accident univocal because inherence does not lead to an accident being complete. Inherence is not oriented toward constituting a whole in itself, as in the case of substance, which is a complete whole within itself. Inherence is the proper form informing the subject. Thus, when an accident is conceived as inhering precisely, it is not abstracted or removed from the inclusion of the differences, as they are still inherent. In fact, through the differences themselves, completeness is achieved, and thus, a complete accident is rendered complete in essence and the nature of the form, not through inherence as such.

Thirdly, the third point is also inadequate because a predicamental complete accident is either understood to become predicamental through a second intention of ordering it to the predicate or through some first intention that makes it capable of such a second intention, which is found in the predicate. The first option does not complete a real accident because the second intention is something of reason, nor can it be suitable unless the first intention, which makes it a thing capable of being placed in the predicate, is presupposed. The second option is unassignable in terms of what makes complete accidents according to the modes by which each predicable is constituted and a predicamental accident is rendered, for there is no real mode common to the nine predicaments by which an accident, as such, can be rendered complete and distinct from the differences.

Therefore, it must be said that a complete accident is not a single concept superior to the nine predicaments, but it is immediately rendered a complete accident through the very modes that constitute the predicaments. If it is actually complete, it actually includes them and thus does not have a simple unity required for univocation. Instead, it takes on the diversity of the differences and modes themselves. For this reason, St. Thomas says in Metaphysics 5, Lecture 9, that those things into which being is divided first are the predicaments because they are distinguished according to various modes of predication. Hence, the division into ten predicaments is immediate, and the first is that of being. However, a complete accident does not require any complement separate from the ten predicaments.

Furthermore, this avoids the argument, for if a complete accident were univocal with the nine genera, then the genus would be univocal with those genera. Consequently, the nine genera would not be alternative; for everything univocal is equally divided into genus, species, and the other five predicables. As D. Thomas says in Cont. Gent. 32, "Everything that is predicated univocally of several things is either a genus, a species, a difference, a property, or an accident. But accident, in general, is not a species, much less a difference or a property in relation to its inferiors; therefore, it will be a genus if it is univocal."

Some deny this consequence and say that an accident is not a genus because it is divided unequally according to its essence. However, this does not destroy the genus; rather, it affirms the analogy. An accident is analogical because it is divided unequally according to its essence. But if inequality arises only from the differences themselves, it is also found in the genus whose differences are unequal.

Others say that an accident is not a genus because it does not signify quiddity but the being of the accident, which is in the substance, or if it signifies quiddity, it does not signify a distinct degree but what is included in whatever it is found. But this contradicts univocation because it includes everything, does not specify a distinct degree, and is not complete as a predicament. Thus, if it is included in whatever, why would it not be called a generic concept if it is univocal? For it is univocal and signifies quidditatively, just as quality is an accident quidditatively and not substantially. In this sense, it does not specify a distinct degree, which is why a complete accident is not considered complete if it is included in whatever, unless it is not included in differences. But if it is not included in differences, why would it not be called a generic concept since it is univocal, signifies quidditatively, and is predicable quidditatively?

Regarding the objections raised from the beginning:

Response to the first objection: The distinction between complete substance and accident is established because in substance, we assign something of one concept, namely, a predicate by which it is completed, namely, being a complete or total substance, as in "what it is." However, in the case of an accident, since it is a form, there is nothing assignable by which it could be completed except those predicamental modes by which it is measured against substance. Such a mode constitutes a determinate predicate if it is determinate. However, when taken in a confused and indeterminate manner as a predicamental accident, if the term "predicamental" refers to the second intention, then it is not a real completion of the accident but presupposes it. If it refers to the very complete nature of the accident, then it signifies all the predicamental modes in a confused manner because it is completed not by anything other than those modes. Thus, it includes differences and is analogical.

Regarding the statement that quantity is equally an accident with quality: Even though they share the nature of being accidents equally in terms of inherence, they do not share it equally in terms of arranging and measuring themselves with respect to substance. In this aspect, they are initially distinct and have an unequal relationship. However, the mode of inherence is not constitutive of the quiddity itself but pertains to the manner of existence as communicable. Just as substance makes substance incommunicable, equality in inherence does not make equality absolutely in the quiddity of the accident.

Response to the second objection: It equally applies to the accident as it is abstracted from complete and incomplete, which all acknowledge to be analogical. Therefore, we say that it is analogical in the case of proper proportionality because it is present in all analogates through intrinsic form. As for the possibility of finding a comparison of proportionality in univocals, it has been answered before that such a comparison is found not as the sole source of their unity but as that which presupposes and falls upon it. However, when it is found as the sole source, such that there is no other unity apart from proportionality, then it constitutes analogy, and thus it is not found in univocals.

ARTICLE V. - Whether the division into the ten predicaments is adequate?

This division into the ten predicaments is very ancient and famous, widely accepted by authorities over the centuries, and it is beyond question. However, many find it not so easy to provide a rationale for this division.

St. Thomas Aquinas, in his lectures on Metaphysics (Book V, Lecture 9) and Physics (Book III, Lecture 5), establishes its adequacy in the following way: Whatever can be predicated of a subject, or of the primary substance, can only be predicated in three ways. First, as pertaining to its essence, secondly, as inhering in it but not pertaining to its essence, and thirdly, as a predicate taken from something extrinsic, from which it derives its denomination.

If predicated in the first way, it constitutes a predicament of substance. If in the second way, the predicate that inheres is either absolute or relative and orders itself to another term. If it is an absolute form inhering, it either pertains to matter or to form, as a form is, whether spiritual or corporeal. If it pertains to matter, it is quantity, for this extends over material parts. If it pertains to form, it is quality, which has the function of qualifying and determining the mode of the form. If, however, it is a relative form, it is relation.

But if the predication happens in the third way, i.e., by taking its denomination from something extrinsic on which it depends, then it belongs to the six remaining predicaments. These are: substance, quantity, quality, relation, habit, and time.

Regarding denominations that depend on something extrinsic, it can either be a cause or a measure. The extrinsic cause cannot be material or formal since these constitute or denote intrinsically. Therefore, causalities of this kind do not constitute a special predicament as they are more oriented towards perfecting and completing matter and form through information and reception within them rather than perfecting or altering other things, as the causality of an efficient cause. Modes, on the other hand, do not constitute a special predicament when they merely indicate something complementing another thing because they are reducible to the thing whose modes they are. However, they do constitute a special predicament when they imply a specific commensuration to a substance and not just a complement or condition of its being.

As for the final cause, it only has metaphorical causality, and in the actual, it coincides with the causality of the efficient cause.

Hence, it remains that the extrinsic efficient cause that provides denomination is either denominating the subject, which is being changed (passion), or it is the cause from which an effect emanates, and it is action.

If the denomination comes from an extrinsic measure, this measure is either of place or of time. If it's a measure of place, it measures according to the absolute aspect of being in a place, concerning a diverse distance, and thus, it is "where." If it measures in terms of the order of parts in a place, it is "situation." But if it is a measure of time, it constitutes the predicament "when." There are no other extrinsic measures.

In this reasoning regarding the classification of the predicaments, some find difficulty, especially in two aspects. Firstly, because it is said that quantity follows matter and quality follows form. If this is understood as inhering in, then both inhere in the composite, as stated in the doctrine of St. Thomas in his books on generation. If it refers to emanation, quantity does not emanate solely from matter but from the composite, which is the body. The body, indeed, possesses three dimensions, but this doesn't merely indicate matter alone but matter informed by the form of corporeality.

Secondly, it appears that St. Thomas assigns the last six predicaments to extrinsic denomination, which we will show is false when discussing them. In particular, there is no doubt that passion is an intrinsic change. Nor can it be said that these are intrinsic modes that, nevertheless, depend on something extrinsic to which they are related. Otherwise, even relation would be considered an accident of extrinsic denomination because it depends on an extrinsic term.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned rationale is not hindered by these concerns. For the proposition that quantity follows matter and quality follows form is a common saying among philosophers and does not rely on emanation or inherence solely in matter but on the idea that quantity is the primary disposition of matter because division and indivision are considered with regard to quantity. This is evident from St. Thomas' statements in his works, such as his fourth distinction in De Potentia and questions on potentiality and actuality.

Regarding the second objection, St. Thomas does not establish the last six predicaments as based solely on extrinsic denomination, as seen in the examples of being known or being seen. These do not signify merely an inhering predicate. Instead, these denominations intrinsically posit something within the subject, although depending on something extrinsic, not just terminating or originating the denomination. Thus, these denominations are sometimes said to be derived from something extrinsic, not formally but derivatively. The denomination of these intrinsic modes indeed depends on something extrinsic.

John of St. Thomas (1589-1644) - The Three Operations of the Intellect

 

(The following is taken from John Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [Lyon: Laurentius Arnaud, Petrus Borde, Johannes, and Petrus Arnaud, 1678], pgs. 884-887)

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In our intellect, there are three intellectual operations, which are simple apprehension, enunciation, or judgment, and discourse. This is attested by experience in us and has often been explained in summaries. Distinguished scholars, such as St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 58, art. 5), affirm this. It is also derived from Aristotle's text in "De Anima" (Book 3, Text 21, Lecture 11). In this text, Aristotle teaches that there are two operations of the intellect, namely simple apprehension and composition. Aristotle does not call it enunciation but composition, encompassing even discourse under this term, which consists of a certain composition, not in an enunciative but in a deductive way, connecting concepts.

Now, regarding these operations, some doubts arise. First, we must inquire about the origin of why these operations in humans are distinct. The answer is that it arises from the imperfection of our intellect because we proceed from imperfection to perfection, and from potentiality to act. This is taken from St. Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae (I, q. 58, art. 5), where he teaches: "Our intellect proceeds from potentiality to act and from imperfection to perfection. Therefore, when it cognizes or sees something, it does not immediately grasp everything that can pertain to it. It needs to pass to something else and compose with it to know if it pertains to it. The intellect of the angels, on the other hand, is perfect in the intellectual order and, therefore, immediately penetrates anything that pertains to it because it does not use discourse but comprehension. Thus, there is one simple mode of operation in angels, which is so virtuous that it is equivalent to our discursive thinking and multiple acts."

Angels, being completely separated from the body and corporeal communication, also have perfect intellects. They do not need to successively acquire knowledge because they use comprehension instead of discourse. They immediately grasp everything that is in the object.

However, you might argue that, concerning things that do not naturally pertain to any being but pertain morally or supernaturally, an angel may need composition and acquire them successively. Furthermore, with regard to negative propositions or divisions, when an angel negates something, like saying "a stone is not an angel," which is not contained in the species of a stone, and an angel wishes to know both extremes, they might need to connect two different species through a composition of concepts and not elicit a single act but two acts, one for each extreme.

However, it will not be said that composition or discourse is due to the presence of multiple species converging into a single act in an inadequate manner. Rather, it arises from the plurality of acts formed from different species and by comparing them, not by a simple usage of both species in forming a single act. However, if an Angel does not wish to see each negated extreme distinctly and explicitly within themselves but rather sees the negation of something through the negated form and recognizes its contradiction in the concept of truth as false, then it is enough to see the affirmation itself. This is because once the affirmation is posited, the negation of it is known as false. And with some nature known, it is known that there is nothing else beyond it. In this way, that negation is touched upon as if in a confused or oblique manner. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 58, art. 4, reply to objection 2.

Secondly, you'll inquire into what constitutes the simplicity of apprehension and composition. For, on the one hand, many complex things pertain to the first operation. For example, definitions pertain to the first operation. As St. Thomas Aquinas says in De Anima (Lecture 11, Book 3) and in Summa Theologiae (I, q. 17, art. 3, and I, q. 58, art. 4). On the other hand, composition itself does not exclude simplicity. A proposition is formed from several concepts in a unified and indivisible concept. Because that simple concept is a quality, as we have said in summaries, article 2. Therefore, simplicity does not contradict composition.

The response is that simple apprehension or composition is not determined by its inherent simplicity or composition in the being of quality or entity. Nor is it due to simplicity or composition in the object's entity itself. However, composition primarily pertains to some artificial construction that is formed within cognition from multiple pieces of knowledge. Conversely, simple knowledge excludes this. The reason is that what the intellect primarily aims for through composition and division is to attain truth through artifice or construction. It cannot do this by comprehension as an Angel does in a single intuition. Therefore, that which is said to pertain to the first operation is what is understood without that artificially composed construction but is an extreme or a part in the order of attaining truth. Hence, it is not resolvable into another part, and this pertains to the first operation.

On the contrary, whatever has the nature of a whole that can be artificially constructed and resolved is said to pertain to composition. If all of this is representable in a single quality and entity in several coordinated things, it is considered a composition. This happens accidentally in relation to the artful construction of truth. Thus, it is not called a simple or compound operation in terms of the simplicity or comparison of concepts as if they were physical or entity-based. Instead, it pertains to the artificial one, proceeding from one to another while preserving the unity of the construct, which may even generate a single image entity-wise. However, it must at least presuppose multiple acts and concepts from which this image arises and is formed by comparing one to another. This is different from an Angel who does not gather truth from multiple sources but shines with intellectual simplicity, as mentioned by St. Dionysius in "De Divinis Nominibus" (Chapter 7).

As for the objection concerning the simple operation that composes a definition or a complex term, the response is that it is not a composition perfectly consummated. It is not a composition in the sense of a whole and term being compounded together. Rather, it is an imperfect composition because only a part is composed, not the whole. For instance, when a limb or a head is formed, these parts are constructed from other parts, such as the arm being formed from the hand and the forearm, consisting of bones, flesh, nerves, and so on. Nevertheless, these parts do not yet compose the whole in a simple manner; they only compose a compound part. Therefore, the essence of a whole is not fully realized there, and the generation and formation of composition only exist in the complete whole. However, in artificial things, especially in constructs of reason that are mostly formed by arrangement and relation, it is easy for something that is a part to change into a whole and vice versa. This is also true for real artificial constructs; a house that is a part of another structure can be separated and become a whole, and vice versa. In fact, water, which is initially a whole, can become a part by mixing with other water and can become a whole again by being separated from it. So, as long as something is considered as a part, even if it is complex and composed, it pertains to the first operation because the construction or formation doesn't simply compose the whole or manifest the truth but only part of it, and it only forms one end of this constitution. However, when something is considered as a whole, it pertains to the comparison and division. Nevertheless, the truth is found only in declarative sentences, as discussed in the Summa Theologica, question 5. Thirdly, you inquire whether the second operation is the same as judgment or whether there is a distinction between two types of composition, one in the form of enunciation and the other in the form of judgment. The response is that judgment is sometimes used more broadly to denote any differentiation between one thing and another, just as external senses distinguish between white and black, bitter and sweet. This is why St. Thomas Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae (II-II, q. 68, art. 3) that the proper operation of the senses is judgment concerning their proper objects. We discussed this further in Summae, question 5, article 2. At other times, judgment is taken more strictly to mean assent or dissent regarding a truth or falsity, which occurs through affirming or denying. In this sense, judgment is either made through the comparison and relation of extremes or presupposes it and falls under assent or dissent. Therefore, this kind of judgment is not found in animals because they lack the capability of comparison. In Angels, judgment occurs in a more eminent way since they comprehend and judge without the need for comparison. In us, because affirmation or negation concerns connected extremes, or truth, not a simple thing, it pertains to the second operation.

The difficulty lies in two aspects. First, whether judgment is an act distinct from the apprehension or representation of enunciation, or whether it is the same as the formation of enunciation and judgment. Second, assuming it is a distinct act, whether it is a simple act or a composite act. To the first question, the response is that there is undoubtedly a distinction between enunciation as apprehended or represented and judgment, which is the mental assent or dissent to a particular determination. This is evident from the fact that sometimes we apprehend an enunciation or composition and suspend judgment, as when we say, "Are the stars in pairs or not?" An enunciation, in this case, is formed, making a proposition about the predicate and the subject, but judgment is withheld because the truth is not yet fully known. If the truth is evident, judgment cannot be suspended, as the intellect, when evident premises are given, is compelled to assent to the conclusion, as we often discuss in the question 24 of Logic. Therefore, when the intellect is not compelled, it can suspend judgment while still forming and representing enunciation, as it forms the entire basis upon which judgment can later affirm or deny. Hence, enunciation as represented and apprehended is distinct from judgment. As for the second question, assuming that judgment is a distinct act, the question arises whether it is a simple or composite act. In response, it is argued that the act of judgment is not a perfectly composite act since it does not compose a whole and its parts. For instance, when we form a limb such as an arm or a head, these parts are composed of other parts like hands, forearms, bones, flesh, nerves, and so on. Yet, these parts do not completely compose a whole in a simple manner; they only form a compound part. Therefore, the essence of a whole is not fully realized there. However, in the case of artificial constructs, especially those of reason that are formed through arrangement and relation, it is easy for something that is a part to change into a whole and vice versa. This is also true for real artificial constructs; a house that is part of another structure can be separated and become a whole, and vice versa. In this way, as long as something is taken as a part, even if it is complex and composed, it pertains to the first operation because the construction or formation does not simply compose the whole or manifest the truth but only part of it, forming only one end of this constitution. However, when something is considered as a whole, it pertains to the comparison and division. Nevertheless, the truth is found only in declarative sentences, as discussed in the Summa Theologica, question 5.

Regarding the second point, some argue that judgment is a composite act. This is affirmed by Pat. Suarez, who claims that judgment is not distinct from composition and comparison of the united extremes. Just as we cannot apprehend a proposition in a simple act, especially in negative propositions, we also cannot judge in a simple act.

However, it is responded that judgment does not require formal composition but, rather, presupposes it. This is because judgment does not form the composition and union of extremes but compares the composed enunciation to what exists in reality with determination and the adherence of the intellect. A simple comparative act is sufficient for this purpose because it does not involve uniting or combining elements but considers the conformity or non-conformity to reality in a simple comparison. This comparison presupposes the union of extremes, and that conformity or comparison to what exists in reality is taken not as a specific act but as a determination that causes the intellect to adhere to the proposition as true or conforming to reality.

As for the objection that this judgment, which is distinguished from the formation of enunciation, pertains to the third operation, it is responded that judgment is not discourse because it is not a process of inference but rather pertains to the second operation. In the second operation, there is a comparison or relation of the composed enunciation to what exists in reality, along with the adherence of the intellect. The second operation deals with truth or falsity, which is not immediately evident from the simple and naked enunciation, and thus, it is in a state of imperfection. To manifest this truth, which cannot be immediately known, there is a need for inquiry and discourse, which through their proofs, make the truth evident, and order and determine the intellect to know whether something is so or not in reality. This is done through a conclusive comparison and relation, which is judgment. Therefore, the second operation, in an imperfect state, is oriented towards discourse, and discourse leads back to the second operation in a perfect and complete state, where the intellect rests in assent to the truth.

Regarding the fourth point, it is inquired whether distinct concepts are formed through these three operations. It is clarified that it is explicitly taught by Saint Thomas Aquinas in several places that there are distinct concepts formed in the first and second operations. In the first operation, the nature or essence of a thing, or the thing itself in itself, is represented. In the second operation, the truth that is not sufficiently explained by the first operation is represented, as it shows how a thing corresponds or does not correspond to something else. Thus, in the second operation, there is a concept formed which is different from the concept formed in the first operation.

However, it does not appear that discourse gives rise to a separate concept. For when we think, there is not yet a fully formed word, as Augustine teaches according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, the concept is formed both in the first and second operations, as they involve representing distinct objects. In the first operation, it is the nature or the thing in itself, and in the second operation, it is the truth which is not fully unfolded in the first operation.

It is not sufficient to claim that several concepts from the first operation, when coordinated among themselves, are sufficient for the second operation. This is refuted because coordination based on succession alone is not enough. Instead, there should be a coordination based on proportion and suitability through predication. Sometimes, a simple concept can follow another one, differing from it and not suited to it. Therefore, in order to see this suitability or unsuitability and the proportion of one concept to another, some special knowledge and penetration of one extreme to another is required. Coordination through succession in concepts is not enough; there needs to be coordination regarding the suitability and proportion between concepts.

However, whether that concept of the second operation is one in terms of being, yet respects the coordination of those simple concepts in the sense that several inadequate objects are coordinated as one, though suppositively multiple concepts are presupposed in the first operation, from which their coordination and collation result in the concept of the second operation, we discussed in the Summularum, and we will touch on it in the following article. It is sufficient to note that Saint Thomas Aquinas in 1st part, question 85, article 5, response 1, states that the composition and division of the intellect is due to a certain difference or comparison. When several things can be understood under one reason of comparison, or difference, or unity, by one species or one knowledge, or one concept, as will be discussed in the following article, then it does not contradict that this comparison or difference that constitutes composition or division can be terminated by one concept, although formed and gathered from many that precede in the simple or first operation so that the second, formed comparatively from them, is far from the condition of an angel who, though he comprehends a composite thing, does not do so in a compositional or comparative manner, nor is he formed from presupposed and compared many, but apprehends the whole in one act and comprehension. In us, however, just as a mixed thing is made up of non-existing but preceding, altering, and corrupting mixtures, so from preceding compared concepts, one results, which is called composite objectively and by reason of what is presupposed.

Regarding discourse, since it does not consist of a single proposition but rather involves several propositions that do not make or compose a third one but infer, it seems that it does not produce a distinct word from the propositions. Instead, it deals with them in different ways and relations, either as inferential or inferred. Therefore, as discourse involves a transition from one proposition to another, it must include the second operation to produce that which pertains to a proposition, and regarding what is motion or inference, it requires the third operation, which pertains to considering that word or concept as modified. Thus, when it is said that it is a distinct operation, it means that it has a distinct modality but not a distinct reality from what is represented by the propositions themselves. However, when moving from simple apprehension to the composed representation, a distinct object becomes apparent in representing the essence or truth. Therefore, discourse, according to causality (i.e., inference), presupposes discourse according to succession (i.e., multiple succeeding propositions), as Saint Thomas Aquinas mentions in 1st part, question 14, article 7. Yet, it does not result in one proposition from several propositions.