The Council of Ephesus (431 AD) and the Papacy

 

The Convocation of the Council

Emperor Theodosius II was the one who convened the council at Ephesus. More than that, the Emperor's synodal letter to all of the metropolitans forbid any new decisions to be made by anyone whatsoever (Mansi 4:1111-1116)

The Presidency of the Council

The council was presided over by St. Cyril of Alexandria. The obvious argument from the Romanists is that Cyril acted as Celestine's legate, which I think is true in one sense and false in another sense. Allow me to explain:

[1]. It is unquestionable that Arcadius, Projectus, and Philip (a presbyter) were Celestine's (main) legates at Ephesus. This is made clear in the synod's letter to Pope Celestine:

" For there were sitting with us the most reverend bishops Arcadius and Projectus, and with them the most holy presbyter Philip, all of whom were sent by your holiness, who gave to us your presence and filled the place of the Apostolic See (τῆς ἀποστολικῆς καθέδρας)" (The Letter of the Synod to Pope Celestine)

Furthermore, in the list of the bishop's signatures (Mansi 4:1303), Arcadius and Projectus are the only ones termed "legates". 

[2]. "Now, in considering this question, it is to be observed that in the absence of the Bishop of the First See in rank at a Council which had to investigate charges against the Bishop of the Second See in rank, the office of President would naturally fall to the Bishop of Alexandria." (Denny, Papalism, pg. 141)

[3.] The letter of the council of Ephesus to Theodosius II seems to say that Cyril was representing Alexandria at the council. 

[4]. Cyril's relationship to Celestine at this council is similar to how Flavian of Philippi presided in the place of Rufus of Thessalonica (Mansi 2:1224).

At the same time, many sources say Cyril acted in Celestine's place and thus my final conclusion would be that Cyril was representing both Rome and Alexandria at the Council of Ephesus based off of the available data. 

The Council's Overall Attitude

[1]. The fact that the council still examined Nestorius (even inviting him to take his seat amongst the other bishops at one point) in despite of the fact that Celestine's ten-day chance given to Nestorius to repent had expired, shows that they did not view Pope Celestine as being the final authority in the controversy. 

[2]. At the council, Cyril's second letter to Nestorius was examined, and only after it had been examined to see if it agreed with the creed of Nicaea, was it approved:

"The Nicene Creed, and the letter of Cyril, in all things agree and harmonise" (https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf214.x.ii.html)

This is in spite of the fact that Pope Celestine had already approved of the letter, as can be seen by his correspondence with St. Cyril. 

[3]. Charles Hefele (a Roman Catholic church historian) describes in detail the examination of Nestorius at the council:

"In  order,  however,  to  submit  the  doctrinal  point  in  question to  a  thorough  investigation,  and  in  the  light  of  patristic testimony,  at  the  suggestion  of  Flavian,  Bishop  of  Philippi,  a number  of  passages  from  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  of  the Church  were  now  read,  in  which  the  ancient  faith  respecting the  union  of  the  Godhead  and  manhood  in  Christ  was  expressed." (A History of the Councils of the Church, Vol. 3, pg. 48)

The fact that such a thorough investigation took place even though Celestine had already given his judgment on the matter shows once again that the bishops of Ephesus didn't view Roman bishop as the final arbiter in controversies and schisms. 

"Compelled" by Celestine?

Erick Ybarra cites the following passage from the decree of the council against Nestorius as proof that they recognized Celestine as having ultimate papal authority and power:

"As, in addition to other things, the impious Nestorius has not obeyed our citation, and did not receive the holy bishops who were sent by us to him, we were compelled to examine his ungodly doctrines. We discovered that he had held and published impious doctrines in his letters and treatises, as well as in discourses which he delivered in this city, and which have been testified to. Compelled thereto by the canons and by the letter (ἀναγκαίως κατεπειχθέντες ἀπό τε τῶν κανόνων, καὶ ἐκ τὴς ἐπιστολῆς, κ.τ.λ.) of our most holy father and fellow-servant Cœlestine, the Roman bishop, we have come, with many tears, to this sorrowful sentence against him, namely, that our Lord Jesus Christ, whom he has blasphemed, decrees by the holy Synod that Nestorius be excluded from the episcopal dignity, and from all priestly communion.” (Decree of the Council Against Nestorius)

The argument is obvious: the decree says they were compelled by Celestine's letter shows that they viewed it as the final arbiter. 

Not quite. At least, not when we recognize these facts:

[1]. The "canons" (which is likely a reference canon 74 of the Apostolic Canons) and Celestine's letter are mentioned in the same sentence/breath, which is more significant than many might realize at first glance. This seems to imply that they are on equal footing since both of them "compel" (some have suggested translating the Greek word κατεπειχθέντες as meaning "to urge" or "to press hard". I personally think the translation here does not affect the overall meaning) the bishops to make their final decision/judgment, which is obviously in conflict with what Roman Catholicism teaches today about the authority of the pope of Rome. 

[2]. The title "holy father" is also applied to Cyril and others (Mansi 6:1055; 7:265; 493), though whether or not Roman Catholic apologists would use this as their main argument is debatable. 

St. Gregory of Nyssa's Solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity [Part 2]

 

(notes on Dr. Beau Branson's PhD dissertation The Logical Problem of the Trinity)

[2.] Unity of Action Argument (UAA) 

We now come to St. Gregory's main argument in defense of Trinitarian theology. A good summary of this argument would be as found in Lewis Ayres' book on Trinitarianism in church history:

"Natures and their intrinsic powers are known by the operations of those powers, and the divine operation is always observed to be one. Therefore the divine power and nature is indivisibly one." (Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology [Oxford University Press, 2004], pg. 348)

"There is one God because there is only one token power and there is only one token action (energeia) shared among the Triad." (Branson)

We should start, as Dr. Branson does, by noting Gregory's semantics for "is God". He views "God" (theos) as signifying the divine energeia or operation:

"Since, then, as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our appellations from the several operations that are known to us, and as we recognize as one of these that operation of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it, beholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His power of contemplation into those things which are not visible, we suppose that Godhead, or θεότης, is so called from θέα, or beholding, and that He who is our θεατής or beholder, by customary use and by the instruction of the Scriptures, is called θεός, or God" (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)

"Thus, on Gregory’s actual view, “God” is not a kind-term like “man” or “horse,” but an agent noun like “philosopher” or “rhetorician.'" (Branson)

Gregory provides an analogy of three rhetoricians ("orators") performing the same action. Yet, we still speak of three "orators" rather than one. So the problem is not yet completely solved. Gregory responds:

"But in the case of the Divine nature we do not similarly learn that the Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit; but every operation which extends from God to the Creation, and is named according to our variable conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided with regard to the number of those who fulfil it, because the action of each concerning anything is not separate and peculiar, but whatever comes to pass, in reference either to the acts of His providence for us, or to the government and constitution of the universe, comes to pass by the action of the Three, yet what does come to pass is not three things." (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)

"Gregory’s answer is that, unlike the case with men, the energeiai of the Trinity are not divided. This does not mean that, somehow, necessary metaphysical truths simply work differently for the Trinity, so that when we are talking about God we will have a theory of energeiai types (universals) as indivisible monads, but when talking about men we will switch over to a collective theory of energeia types. Nor does it mean that theological language is somehow different, so that when we speak about God our words follow a different set of rules. It is rather that in the case of men there are factors which actually do individuate the token actions, but in the case of the Trinity, while the hypostases are individuated by the idiomata of paternity, filiation and spiration, there simply are no idiomata that could individuate their token energeiai." (Branson)

Gregory provides this example: each of us have been given life by the Triune God, and yet we receive one life, not three distinct lives. He strengthens his theology of what is called synergy (in God), by appealing to a biblical operation: the salvation of man. The Father is called the Savior of all men, and yet that does not mean that the Son is not the Savior (same goes for the Holy Spirit). 

"The assumption that: 'for any hypostases, x and y, if x ≠ y, and if x does token energeia e of type e*, then y does not do e'. would entail that, if the Father saves me, either the Son and the Holy Spirit do not save me at all, or that, if either of them do, then I am being saved multiple times in multiple token acts of salvation – neither of which seems consistent with what the Bible says or how the Bible says it." (Branson)

One might allege that Gregory is employing a special pleading fallacy and does not elsewhere teach the idea that energeia individuate ousiai. However, Michael Rene Barnes in his study on this subject (The Power of God: Dynamis in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology) has shown otherwise. Here are two examples of Gregory's metaphysics of energeia as seen in Ad Xenodorum and Ad Eustathium:

"For we say that energeia is the natural (φυσικός) power (dynamis) and movement of each ousia without which a nature (φύσις) neither exists nor is known. For intelligence is [the energeia] of intellectual beings, sensation of sensate beings—by which the same lay hold of things outside them and are subject to things outside  them—flight of that which flies, swimming of that which swims, crawling of that which crawls, walking of that which walks, sprouting of that which sprouts. To speak comprehensively, the idioma significant (σημαντικὸν) of  each nature we call its natural energeia; of which only that which does not exist is deprived. For that which participates in a certain ousia will also participate naturally and completely in the  power (dynamis) manifesting it. For .the true Logos presides over the natural limits of ousiai." (Ad Xenodorum, in Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters [trans. Annas Silvas], pgs. 246-247)

"If, on the other hand, we understand that the energeia of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is one, differing or varying in nothing, the oneness of their nature must needs be inferred from the identity of their energeia." (Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium)

"when Gregory speak of natures being individuated by energeiai, he means that it is the energeia type, or as he sometimes puts it, the “form” (εἶδος) of energeiai that individuates ousiai" (Branson)

St. Gregory of Nyssa's Solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity [Part 1]

 

(This article series is for the most part simply my notes taken from my study of Dr. Beau Branson's PhD dissertation The Logical Problem of the Trinity, where he gives an analysis to how Gregory of Nyssa works at solving this very problem in his letter Ad Ablabium). 

In the 4th century, a bishop named Ablabius wrote to the great church father St. Gregory of Nyssa, asking about how the Trinity is secure against the charge of polytheism. Gregory of Nyssa wrote a very interesting and well-thought response to this question in a treatise now known as "On Not Three Gods". In this article series, I will be examining this treatise and how it provides a solution to the modern problem in the philosophy of religion/analytic theology known as the "Logical Problem of the Trinity" (LPT). 

St. Gregory of Nyssa

The Structure of the Letter

The question of Ablabius is this: why is it forbidden to say that there are "three gods" when there are three persons (or hypostases) with the same nature (ousia) (in the process of appealing to Peter, James, and John, who though sharing humanity as their same nature, yet are referred to as "three men")?

Gregory first provides a solution, which as he says, does not actually answer the problem at all, and then provides two of his own arguments to explore the issue further (the first of which functions differently than the second). Beau Branson has distinguished them into the "Unity of Nature Argument" (UNA) and the "Unity of Action Argument" (UAA). 

St. Gregory of Nyssa's Argumentation

[1]. Unity of Nature Argument - Gregory begins by noting that common everyday language of men can be misleading in certain circumstances (such as when discussing God's nature). Here is the crux of this argument from Gregory himself:

"Now, we first claim that it is a certain misuse of convention to name men, who are not distinguished by nature, in the plural according to the very name of the nature, and to say that there are many ’ men, which is like saying that there are many human natures." (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)

Gregory supports this point by noting that when we address someone, we call them by their proper name (e.g., Peter, James, or John) not by their nature ("man" or "human") since that would result in confusion. Everyone would be thinking that they are the one being addressed, thus this is a clear proof that "nature" (ousia), strictly speaking, is indivisible. 

It is necessary to briefly discuss Gregory's view on defining ousia and hypostasis. The patristic scholar Richard Cross argued convincingly that Gregory (as well as Basil) uses ousia synonymously with the word physis ("nature"). 

Gregory also uses a semantic of collective nouns on a number of occasions in Ad Ablabium. Here is an example of this:

"And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality... [λέγεται . . . μοναχῶς . . . ἐν πλήθει νοεῖται]" (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)

Gregory is saying things similar to the well-known Greek grammarians of his time, Apollonius Dyscolus and Dionysius Thrax. 

"There are some words that imply quantity, even though they are singular in form. . . [ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καί τινα ἔστι δι’ ἑνικοῦ χαρακτῆρος πλῆθος ἐμφαίνοντα] " (Apollonius Dyscolus)

It is crucial to note these two passages from St. Basil the Great, which provide an obvious background to Gregory's thinking concerning ousia and hypostasis:

"ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the particular. Every one of us both shares in existence by the common term of essence (ousia) and by his own properties is such an one and such an one. In the same manner, in the matter in question, the term ousia is common, like goodness, or Godhead, or any similar attribute; while hypostasis is contemplated in the special property of Fatherhood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify" (Basil, Letter 214)

"The distinction between ousia and hupostasis is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith. We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding the particular to the common. The Godhead is common; the fatherhood particular. We must therefore combine the two and say, I believe in God the Father. The like course must be pursued in the confession of the Son; we must combine the particular with the common and say I believe in God the Son, so in the case of the Holy Ghost we must make our utterance conform to the appellation and say in God the Holy Ghost." (Basil, Letter 236)

Gregory obviously followed Basil in this regard, especially in Ad Petrum. There, he hashes out clearly the meaning of ousia and hypostasis. 

"In other words, what it seems to me that Gregory is doing is leaving points 1 and 3 of this perhaps then-common picture in place, and merely rejecting 2 – the collective theory of universals – and replacing it, as Cross has argued, with a theory of an in re universal that is monadic (not divisible into “parts”) and which is “wholly present” in each of its particulars. Then he simply draws the obvious conclusion that all nouns signifying natures (including “man”) are always to be used in the singular (just as “army” would be in the example above). Read in this light, Gregory’s argument seems to make much more sense. In the first sentence below, he finishes making his metaphysical point about whether universals are indivisible monads or divisible collections. In the second sentence, he goes on to point out the linguistic fact that there are collective nouns such that, semantically they indicate a collection of individuals, but their correct syntactic form is nevertheless singular." (Beau Branson)

St. Gregory views "is God" as signifying an activity or operation (energeiai).

"For now, though, we’ve seen that for Gregory “God” is not a kind term, but an agent noun. Thus, although Gregory can and does enter into debates that assume “God” is a kind term like “man,” his actual view is that it is more like “rhetorician” or “shoemaker” " (Beau Branson)

It is likely that Gregory changed his view on this at some point in his life. Before he wrote Ad Ablabium, Gregory wrote Ad Graecos, where he said quite clearly that "God" does signify the divine ousia, however even there Gregory modifies his meaning as Branson explains:

"So, even here, although he goes along with the idea that “God” signifies the ousia, he allows that it does so only by way of signifying that ousia’s “natural idioma” – the energeia of “beholding” – and in turn the energeia itself “signifies” the ousia. Now, whatever the nature of this “signification” going on between an energeia and an ousia (presumably something like the way in which smoke – naturally – “means” fire), it seems clear that, even in Ad Graecos, Gregory takes it that the primary signification of “God” is actually the energeia of “beholding." (Beau Branson)

This idea is seen prior to Gregory in earlier fathers of the church:

"But to the Father of all, who is unbegotten there is no name given. For by whatever name He be called, He has as His elder the person who gives Him the name. But these words Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but appellations derived from His good deeds and functions" (Justin Martyr, Second Apology, Chapter 6)

We should note that many of the presuppositions of the UNA are not accepted by Gregory himself. This is shown quite clearly by the fact that Gregory does not end with the UNA, showing that he doesn't view it as the ultimate answer to Ablabius' question. 

"Gregory argues, even if “God” did not signify an energeia (beholding), it still could not denote the divine essence (as his opponents claim), because the divine essence is “above all names,” and “God” is a name." (Beau Branson)

What then is the role of the UNA in Gregory's argument? It essentially functions as a back-up argument, so that even if Gregory were wrong about "Godhead" being a signification of the energeiai, then his main point, that there is only one God, is still maintained, since there is obviously only one divine nature.

The Role of UNA in St. Gregory's Argument (Branson, pg. 150)

One last concept helpful to understand here is that of the idiomata. 

"Gregory takes the idiomata to be what individuates the hypostases" (Branson)

"But note also the role of idiomata here. We are told that each of us individuals “participates in existence by the common logos of the ousia,” i.e., we exist only in virtue of instantiating our essence or nature. Thus, on Basil’s view, and Gregory would certainly follow him here, there cannot be any hypostasis that does not have an ousia or nature." (Branson)

We should also discuss Gregory's letter to his brother Peter (hereafter Ad Petrum) where he discusses in more detail the distinction between ousia and hypostasis. This letter is also given the attribution of Letter 38 of Basil. There are a few things to note on this letter:

[1]. Much of the letter's discussion is reminiscent of the Stoic discussions about common and proper nouns, which as we will see, is the background for Gregory's way of defining ousia and hypostasis.  "the Stoics defined proper nouns by way of idiomata. For the Stoics, a common noun “signifies” a common quality, and a proper noun “indicates,” not, as we might expect, an individual, but a peculiar quality (ἰδία ποιότης)." (Branson) 

"There is some scholarly debate as to whether the Stoic idiomata are simple, non-shareable qualities (like Socrateity), or whether they are only unique combinations of in-principle shareable qualities (like the combination of whiteness, snub-nosedness, and so forth, that is only exhibited by Socrates, even though any of these qualities taken by itself might be exhibited by other individuals). (Sorabji, for example, maintains the stronger view, that for the Stoics each distinguishing mark is unique to the individual.) I will not enter into the details of that debate here. I only want to note that there is a case to be made that the Stoics take this stronger view of idiomata. And to the extent that Gregory’s discussion seems influenced by the Stoics, or by the grammarians (particularly Apollonius, in my opinion), we might reasonably conjecture that he would hold this stronger view."

"What is important for our purposes is that idiomata are part of the Stoic criterion of individuation for particulars." (Branson)

[2]. "where individuals differ in their individual definitions, Gregory speaks of their differing with respect to idiomata, which seem to be either qualities or bundles of qualities that individuate an individual" (Branson) 

"In Ad Petrum, Gregory says quite explicitly that the idiomata of the Trinity are neither shareable nor even compossible (i.e., not constantiable), so that the relation between hypostases and idiomata is neither one-to-many nor many-to-one, but one-to-one. This seems similar to Stoicism. For the Stoics, for an idioma to be shared by two material substrata would simply be for numerically one qualified individual to subsist in two different material substrata at the same time, i.e., to be bi-located – which they regarded as absurd. Conversely, for two distinct idiomata to be instantiated in the same material substratum would just be for two distinct qualified individuals to be co-located – also an absurdity in the Stoics’ view. This might be taken as good evidence that Gregory has in mind the stronger view of idiomata after all." (Branson)

Two Views on How Hypostases are Individuated

1) " An idioma is an element of a bundle, and each idioma in the bundle is, by itself, sufficient to individuate a hypostasis." (Branson)

2) "An idioma is an element of a bundle, but only the bundle as a whole is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. (Idiomata themselves, individually, are actually in-principle shareable qualities.)"

However, the argument which Gregory puts the most amount of emphasis on in his defense of Trinitarian theology is the Unity of Action Argument (UAA), which is what we will now our turn our attention to in the next article in the series. 

Did Luther View Himself as the Protestant Pope?

 

Today on Facebook, RC apologist Dave Armstrong sent me this quote from Martin Luther:

“I need not have any title and name to praise highly the word, office, and work which I have from God and which you blind blasphemers defile and persecute beyond measure. I trust my praise will overcome your defiling, just as my justice will overcome your injustice. It does not matter if, with your blasphemy, you are on top for the moment. Therefore, I now let you know that from now on I shall no longer do you the honor of allowing you - or even an angel from heaven - to judge my teaching or to examine it. For there has been enough foolish humility now for the third time at Worms, and it has not helped. Instead, I shall let myself be heard and, as St. Peter teaches, give an explanation and defense of my teaching to all the world - I Pet. 3:15. I shall not have it judged by any man, not even by any angel.For since I am certain of it, I shall be your judge and even the angels' judge through this teaching (as St. Paul says [I Cor. 6:3 ]) so that whoever does not accept my teaching may not be saved - for it is God's and not mine. Therefore, my judgment is also not mine but God's.”  (Luther’s Works, 39:248-249)

I responded by noting the following things:

[1]. The historical context of Luther’s statements here take place in his argumentation against indulgences. He did not necessarily think he was the infallible judge on every matter of doctrine. For example, he believed in Mary’s perpetual virginity, but did not think that those who denied it were not true Christians (LW 54:340).

[2]. This is taken out of context in the literary aspect as well. Here is what Luther said later towards the end of the same document quoted by Mr. Armstrong:

"If someone said to me at this point, “Previously you have rejected the pope; will you now also reject bishops and the spiritual estate? Is everything to be turned around?” my answer would be: Judge for yourself and decide whether I turn things around by preferring divine word and order, or whether they turn things around by preferring their order and destroying God’s. " (LW 39:279).

Penal Substitution in the Early Church Fathers

 

The Eastern Heterodox are known for their rejection of the biblical doctrine of Christ's substitutionary atonement on behalf of His people (the elect of God). However, in this case, they are conflict with the teaching of the ancient fathers of the church.

#1 - Clement of Rome

"On account of the love He bore us, Jesus Christ our Lord gave His blood for us by the will of God; His flesh for our flesh, and His soul for our souls." (Clement's Letter to the Corinthians, Chapter 49)

#2 - Eusebius of Caesarea

"This Sacrifice was the Christ of God, from far distant times foretold as coming to men, to be sacrificed like a sheep for the whole human race...He then that was alone of those who ever existed, the Word of God, before all worlds, and High Priest of every creature that has mind and reason, separated One of like passions with us, as a sheep or lamb from the human flock, branded on Him all our sins, and fastened on Him as well the curse that was adjudged by Moses' law, as Moses foretells: "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." This He suffered "being made a curse for us; and making himself sin for our sakes." And then "He made him sin for our sakes who knew no sin,"and laid on Him all the punishments due to us for our sins, bonds, insults, contumelies, scourging, and shameful blows, and the crowning trophy of the Cross. And after all this when He had offered such a wondrous offering and choice victim to the Father, and sacrificed for the salvation of us all, He delivered a memorial to us to offer to God continually instead of a sacrifice." (The Proof of the Gospel, Book 1, Chapter 10)

#3 - Saint Athanasius

"And thus taking from our bodies one of like nature, because all were under penalty of the corruption of death He gave it over to death in the stead of all, and offered it to the Father — doing this, moreover, of His loving-kindness, to the end that, firstly, all being held to have died in Him, the law involving the ruin of men might be undone (inasmuch as its power was fully spent in the Lord's body, and had no longer holding-ground against men, his peers), and that, secondly, whereas men had turned toward corruption, He might turn them again toward incorruption, and quicken them from death by the appropriation of His body and by the grace of the Resurrection, banishing death from them like straw from the fire." (On the Incarnation of the Word, section 8)

"For He did not die as being Himself liable to death: He suffered for us, and bore in Himself the wrath that was the penalty of our transgression, even as Isaiah says, Himself bore our weaknesses." (Letter to Marcellinus)

Writing about Athanasius' theology, Thomas G. Weinandy says the following:

"Moreover, Jesus must die on the cross in order to bear the curse of sin, for, as Paul stated, quoting Deuteronomy 21.23, 'cursed is he that hangs on a tree' (see 25.2)." (Thomas G. Weinandy, Athanasius: A Theological Introduction, pg. 39)

#4 - St. Augustine

"Death is the effect of the curse; and all sin is cursed, whether it means the action which merits punishment, or the punishment which follows. Christ, though guiltless, took our punishment, that He might cancel our guilt, and do away with our punishment….Exemption from Adam’s curse implies exemption from his death. But as Christ endured death as man, and for man; so also, Son of God as He was, ever living in His own righteousness, but dying for our offenses, He submitted as man, and for man, to bear the curse which accompanies death. And as He died in the flesh which He took in bearing our punishment, so also, while ever blessed in His own righteousness, He was cursed for our offenses, in the death which He suffered in bearing our punishment" (Reply to Faustus the Manichaean, Book 14)

#5 - Ambrose of Milan

"And so then, Jesus took flesh that He might destroy the curse of sinful flesh, and He became for us a curse that a blessing might overwhelm a curse, uprightness might overwhelm sin, forgiveness might overwhelm the sentence, and life might overwhelm death. He also took up death that the sentence might be fulfilled and satisfaction might be given for the judgment, the curse placed on sinful flesh even to death. Therefore, nothing was done contrary to God’s sentence when the terms of that sentence were fulfilled, for the curse was unto death but grace is after death." (Flight from the World, in Fathers of the Church, vol. 65, pgs. 314-315)

#6 - Gregory the Great

"For the rust of sin could not be cleared away, but by the fire of torment, He then came without sin, Who should submit Himself voluntarily to torment, that the chastisements due to our wickedness might justly loose the parties thereto obnoxious, in that they had unjustly kept Him, Who was free of them.  Thus it was both without cause, and not without cause, that He was afflicted, Who had indeed no crimes in Himself, but Who cleansed with His blood the stain of our guilt." (Morals on the Book of Job, Book 3.26-27)

#7 - Macrina the Younger

In this case we have what one might amusingly call a "church mother", since she was the older sister of St. Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory wrote about her life. On her deathbed, she said these words:

"You redeemed us from the curse and from sin, having become both on our behalf. You have crushed the heads of the serpent who had seized man in his jaws because of the abyss of our disobedience. You have opened up for us a path to the resurrection, having broken down the gates of hell and reduced to impotence the one who had power over death." (Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of St. Macrina)

Ambrosiaster's Doctrine of Justification

 

When discussing justification in church history, one of the most often-discussed writers is the Latin exegete Ambrosiaster, who wrote a commentary on the Pauline Epistles. His views on justification have been receiving attention once again due to the controversy surrounding Anthony Rogers' livestream on "Sola Fide in the Fathers", causing Sam Shamoun (who has in the last year abandoned the true Gospel of Christ for the false gospel of Romanism) to bring on William Albrecht and Perry Robinson (who I will engage with more in this article). 

My main point is that while Ambrosiaster's doctrine of justification is not exactly the same as the traditional Reformed Protestant doctrine, it is close to it a number of areas.

Here are the main passages brought forward where Ambrosiaster speaks of "faith alone":

1) "For the mercy of God had been given for this reason, that they should cease from the works of the law, as I have often said, because God, taking pity on our weaknesses, decreed that the human race would be saved by faith alone, along with the natural law" (Commentary on Rom. 1:11, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture: New Testament, 6:23)

2) "God has decreed that a person who believes in Christ can be saved without works. By faith alone he receives the forgiveness of sins" (Commentary on 1 Cor. 1:4b, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 7:6)

3) "For if the law is given not for the righteous but for the unrighteous, whoever does not sin is a friend of the law. For him faith alone is the way by which he is made perfect. For others mere avoidance of evil will not gain them any advantage with God unless they also believe in God, so that they may be righteous on both counts. For the one righteousness is temporal; the other is eternal" (Commentary on Rom. 2:12, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 6:65)

4) "They are justified freely because they have not done anything nor given anything in return, but by faith alone they have been made holy by the gift of God" (Commentary on Rom. 3:24, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 6:101)

5) "Paul tells those who live under the law that they have no reason to boast basing themselves on the law and claiming to be of the race of Abraham, seeing that no one is justified before God except by faith" (Commentary on Rom. 3:27, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 6:103)

6) "How then can the Jews think that they have been justified by the works of the law in the same way as Abraham, when they see that Abraham was not justified by the works of the law but by faith alone? Therefore there is no need of the law when the ungodly is justified before God by faith alone" (Commentary on Rom. 4:5, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 6:112)

7) "righteousness apart from works: Paul backs this up by the example of the prophet David, who says that those are blessed of whom God has decreed that, without work or any keeping of the law, they are justified before God by faith alone" (Commentary on Rom. 4:8, in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 6:113)

Quotes numbers #3 and #7 show that Ambrosiaster understands "works of the law" as having a broader scope than merely circumcision and ceremonial laws, but also to the "moral" law as well, contrary to the claims of Roman Catholic apologists and proponents of the New Perspective on Paul. Notice in particular Ambrosiaster excludes "any keeping of the law" from the grounds of man's justification before God (quote #7). 

Someone will likely point out that Ambrosiaster says we're "made holy" in quote #4. However, it is possible that he is contradicting himself here, since elsewhere he says things like this:

"This he says, that without the works of the law, to an impious person (that is, a Gentile) believing in Christ, his faith is imputed for righteousness, as it was to Abraham" (Commentary on Romans 4:5, PL 17:82-83)

In fairness, one can show that Ambrosiaster thought of faith as the basis for justification rather than the instrument whereby receive the imputed righteousness of Christ. Yet he still says in the quote above, that faith is "imputed for righteousness" ("for" implying that faith itself is not the "righteousness" here spoken of). 

Here is what Gerald Bray, in an essay on Ambrosiaster's interpretation of Romans, says concerning his doctrine of justification by faith:

"On the great theological theme of justification by faith, Ambrosiastr is clearer and more detailed than any patristic writer...He states quite clearly that righteousness belongs to God alone, and that it is revealed in the gospel by God's gift of justifying faith to man..Ambrosiaster did not have to face the complex issues surrounding justification by faith alone that confronted Martin Luther, but there can be no doubt that the two men are on the same wavelength...Ambrosiaster is as clear as can be that faith is not only incompatible with works, it is also the only basis for our salvation." (Gerald Bray, "Ambrosiaster", in Reading Romans Through the Centuries: From the Early Church to Karl Barth, pgs. 25, 29)

"Ambrosiaster’s understanding of justification shows that the doctrine of sola fide did not disappear after first-century NT Christianity." (Dongsun Cho, "Ambrosiaster on Justification by Faith Alone in His Commentaries on the Pauline Epistles", Westminster Theological Journal, volume 74 (2012), pg. 290)

Notes on Systematic Theology - The Immutability of God

 

The attribute of God's immutability simply means that God does not change in any way whatsoever. 

Scripture teaches this doctrine clearly in a number of places:

- Malachi 3:6

- Psalm 102:26

- James 1:17

- Isaiah 46:10

Reason also supports this biblical teaching. Anything that changes, will change either for better or for worse. Thus, if God changes, he is either becoming greater (and hence He is not a perfect being), or for the worse (then this would diminish His attributes in some way and He would be God).

"Whatever therefore dies, both from better to worse, and from worse to better, is not God; because neither can supreme goodness proceed to better, nor true eternity to worse" (Augustine, Tractate 23 on the Gospel of John)

Further Clarifications

"Creation did not produce a change in God, but in creatures; not a physical change and properly so called (which supposes its material), but hyperphysical by which the creature passes from nonexistence to existence. An agent said to be changed (which in itself becomes different from what it was before), but which becomes different (not in itself but only relatively and in order to another thing) cannot be said to be changed. Now when God became the Creator, he was not changed in himself (for nothing new happened to him, for from eternity he had the efficacious will of creating the world in time), but only in order to the creature (because a new relation took place with it). And as to the act of creation being transient not immanent, it is not so much in God as from him." (Francis Turretin)

"Repentance is attributed to God after the manner of men (anthropopathos) but must be understood after the manner of God (theoprepos): not with respect to his counsel, but to the event; not in reference to his will, but to the thing willed; not to affection and internal grief, but to the effect and external work because he does what a penitent man usually does. If repentance concerning the creation of man (which he could not undo) is ascribed to God (Gen. 6:6, 7*), it must be understood not pathetically (pathetikos), but energetically (energetikos). Although he could not by a non-creation undo what he had done, yet by a destruction he could produce change." (Francis Turretin)

Answering Modern Objections

Bruce Ware has argued for the idea that there is relational mutability in God (while still claiming to retain God's ontological immutability). 

“God cannot change for the better or the worse, but he can change in some sense nonetheless. He changes from anger to mercy, from blessing to cursing, from rejection to acceptance. Each of these changes is real in God, though no such change affects in the slightest the unchangeable supremacy of his intrinsic nature.” (Bruce Ware)

James Dolezal answers this idea of Ware in his book on the attributes of God:

"it is incoherent to say that God is ontologically immutable while denying that He is absolutely immutable, unless one believes there are changes in God that are not alterations of actuality or being (which is de facto ontological). But then these changes would not be the alteration of anything real, and therefore any cogent intelligibility of Ware’s point collapses. If the mutable relations do really exist in God, as Ware clearly intends, then it turns out that there is in fact ontological mutability in God. This is because relational and accidental states of being are no less ontological—that is, existentially actual—than one’s nature or essence. Every state of being, whether essential or nonessential, is an ontological state" (James E. Dolezal, All That Is In God, pgs. 25-26)

What about those texts that talk about God "repenting", "regretting", and "changing His mind" (an example of this would be Genesis 6:6-7)?

"How then shall we interpret Genesis 6? The text contrasts God’s “heart” to man’s “heart” after the fall of Adam (Genesis 3). Man’s heart, once good, has changed into a mass of corruption that continually produces evil (6:5). God’s repentance communicates that his heart is “highly displeased” with human sin, as the word grieved indicates (v. 6), for its “evil” violates the goodness of his creation and his image in man (1:26–28, 31). Consequently, the Creator of the pristine world is the Destroyer of the sinful world. In this sense, we may say that God “repented” or turned from universal blessing to cursing in order to express his hatred of sin." (Joel Beeke)

Alleged Early Testimonies to the Bodily Assumption of Mary

 

William Albrecht is perhaps one of the leading Roman Catholic Mariologists around at the moment. He and Fr. Christian Kaapes have together written a book on the subject (titled Mary Among the Evangelists). 

Albrecht has provided us with a few documents and sources which he sees as proof that the doctrine of Mary's bodily assumption was the universal ancient faith of the Christian church. Here, I tackle a few of these.

#1 - Jacob of Serug

"On this day Adam rejoices and Eve his wife, because their daughter rests in the place where they are gathered. On this day the righteous Noah and Abraham rejoice that their daughter has visited them in their dwelling-place. On this day Jacob, the honourable old man, rejoices that the daughter who sprouted from his root has called him to life. She wove a beautiful crown and set it on her sublime head on which valuable pearls were laid. The name of Christ the King who was crucified on Golgotha, grants life and sheds forth mercy on the one who invokes Him. And also on me a sinner who is not capable of praising her, the Mother of mercy, who brought You forth in the flesh. O Son of God, by her prayers make your peace to dwell in heaven, in the depths, and among all the counsels of her sons. Make wars to cease, and remove trials and plagues; bestow calm and tranquillity on seafarers. Heal the infirm, cure the sick, fill the hungry; be a Father to orphans whom death has left destitute. In your pity, drive out devils who harass mankind, and exalt your Church to the four quarters of the globe, that it may sing your praise. Watch over priests and purify ministers; be a guardian of old age and youth. O Bridegroom Christ, to you be praise from every mouth, and on us be mercy at all times. Amen, Amen." (Homily on the Dormition of the Mother God)

However, the 1950s doctrine of the bodily assumption is not contained here. Jacob of Serug never says that Mary's body and soul were assumed into heaven, only the latter. 

"In all likelihood then Jacob composed this homily in the late fifth century, as the homily’s prologue indicates, and certainly before his death in 521. The homily describes the events of the Virgin’s death, burial, and entry into heaven in a unique and highly poetic account, but there is no question of Mary’s bodily Assumption in its narrative. Despite the wishful thinking of some modern interpreters, there is no indication of her bodily presence in heaven, and only the translation of her soul is described." (Stephen J. Shoemaker, The Ancient Traditions of the Virgin Mary's Dormition and Assumption [Oxford: 2002], pg. 64) 

#2 - Timothy of Jerusalem

"Therefore the Virgin is immortal to this day, seeing that he who had dwelt in her transported her to the regions of her assumption" (Homily on Simeon and Anna, PG 86:245-247)

Albrecht attributes AD 400 as the dating of this document. This is incorrect, as Shoemaker notes:

"Jugie argued (La Mort, 70–6) that a homily In Simeonem et Annam attributed to a certain ‘Timothy of Jerusalem’ witnessed to a tradition about the end of the Virgin’s life, and more specifically, her immortality, from the end of the 4th or the beginning of the 5th cent. He dated the text by this otherwise unknown author to this period based on the absence of any mention of Mary’s Jerusalem tomb (a legend that he incorrectly believed began to take shape only around 550; for more on this, see the following chapter), the absence of any anti-Nestorian polemic, and the use of parthenos instead of theotokos. Bernard Capelle, however, has convincingly shown that the homily was composed sometime between the 6th and 8th centuries (Bernard Capelle, ‘Les Homélies liturgique de prétendu Timothée de Jérusalem’, Ephemerides liturgicae, 63 (1949), 5–26). Jugie, however, was unconvinced: see his L’Immaculée Conception dans l’Écriture sainte et dans la tradition orientale, Collectio Edita Cura Academiae Marianae Internationalis, Textus et Disquisitiones, Bibliotheca Immaculatae Conceptionis, 3 (Rome: Academia Mariana/Officium Libri Catholici, 1952), 74–5 n. 3. According to my knowledge, there is, as of yet, no critical edition of this text, but a critical edition of the relevant passage may be found in Othone Faller, SJ, De priorum saeculorum silentio circa Assumptionem b. Mariae virginis, Analecta Gregoriana, Series Facultatis Theologicae, 36 (Rome: Gregorian University, 1946), 27." (Stephen Shoemaker, Ancient Traditions of the Virgin Mary's Dormition and Assumption [Oxford: 2002], pg. 15n21)

This homily thus is about 2 centuries later than Albrecht's dating to it. 

Notes on Systematic Theology - The Unity and Constitution of Man

 

In the universe there are two main realms: the physical (or material) and the spiritual. Animals belong in the physical realm. However, man is different from this and hence a unique creature. The human creature partakes of both the spiritual realm and the physical realm, since he has both a body and a soul. 

Here are some of the terms used in sacred Scripture when talking about the constituent elements of man:

1) "Soul" (Hebrew: נֶפֶשׁ Greek: ψυχή). This word has a variety of different meanings. It can refer to a person's life (Exodus 21:23; Judges 16:16; Matthew 2:20) or to the thing which survives after death (Matthew 10:28)

2) "Spirit" (Hebrew: רוּחַ). The most basic meaning of this word in Scripture is "wind". It also refers at times to the inner man with his feelings and strength (e.g. Genesis 26:35). 

3) "Heart" (Hebrew: לֵב or לְבַב). This word carries the idea of man's inner person, along with his moral condition before God, his emotions, and his thoughts (Proverbs 4:23; Mark 7:21). 

4) "Reins" (Hebrew: כִּלְיָה). This often can mean man's moral disposition(s) - Psalm 7:9; 26:2; Jeremiah 11:20; 17:10)

Trichotomy, Dichotomy or Monism?

There are three main anthropological views within Christian theology. Michael Horton provides the following chart to illustrate these different perspectives:

Trichotomy (also known as the "tripartite" view) says that humans are composed of a body, soul, and a spirit as well.

Dichotomy says that humans are composed of a body and a soul.

Monism teaches that humans are material organisms only and they deny the existence (and thus immortality) of the soul. 

Several reasons can be offered for why the dichotomist view is the one most in line with biblical teaching:

1) "Soul" and "Spirit" are used interchangeably in a number of places: Genesis 41:8; Psalm 42:6; Matthew 20:28; 27:50; Hebrews 12:23.

2) "Body" and "Soul" are spoken of as the basic and complete constitution of man: Matthew 10:28; 1 Corinthians 5:1; 3 John 2.

The Origin of the Soul

There are two main views in Christian theology as to the origin of the soul:

1) Creationism - This teaches that at the conception of each child, God creates it soul ex nihilo (similar to his creation of the universe out of nothing). This was the view of Aristotle, St. Ambrose, and Thomas Aquinas (who viewed Traducianism as a heresy). Augustine was hesitant and did not take a definite view either way on the matter of the soul's origin. 

2) Traducianism - This view teaches that the soul is passed from the parents to the embryo by natural generation (also called "propagation"), rather than it being created by God. In other words, the human soul is generated by the parents just as the human body is generated. One of the first main theologians to hold to this view was Tertullian. 

Personally, I think creationism is the better view based on the following texts of Scripture: Numbers 16:22; Ecclesiastes 12:7; Isaiah 57:16; Zechariah 12:1.

At the same time, I might be willing to go with Augustine in suspending my judgment based on the words of Ecclesiastes 11:5. 

Athanasius also believed in the creationist view of the soul and denied traducianism:

"For God, being good and loving to mankind, and caring for the souls made by Him." (Against the Heathen, section 38)

The Faculties of the Soul

The "heart" is the command center of human activity (Proverbs 4:23).

Biblically speaking, we can divide the soul's actions into three categories:

- Mental (Psalm 77:6; Isaiah 29:24; 1 Corinthians 2:11)

-Emotional (Job 7:11; Mark 8:12; Luke 1:47)

-Volitional (Exodus 35:21; Ezra 1:5; Matthew 26:41)

How should we categorize the faculties of the human soul? There are two main views among Reformed theologians:

1) Mind (conscience being a subset of the mind), Emotions, and Will. This view was held by men such as John Flavel.

2) Understanding and Will (the emotions being a subset under the category of the "will"). Augustine, John Calvin, Edward Reynolds, Jonathan Edwards, and Herman Bavinck hold to this view to name a few examples of its proponents. 

Understanding the faculties of the soul is especially important for understanding our doctrines of sin and the salvation of man. 

I personally would hold to a sort of in-between view: I would say that the will and emotions are not included each other completely, but they undoubtedly influence one another. This can be seen simply from the general experience of human beings in the world today (and throughout history). 

An important aspect of the faculty of the mind is man's conscience. This is one of the gifts of God that he uses to restrain most men from sin (e.g. Rom. 2:14-15). 

"The conscience is man's judgment concerning himself and his deeds, to the extent he is subject to God‟s judgment." (Wilhelmus a' Brakel, The Christian's Reasonable Service, 1:317).

There are three elements of the conscience of man: knowledge, witness, and acknowledgement. 

Conscience can be seared and destroyed to the point of no return (Romans 1:24; 1 Timothy 4:2). 

Did Nicaea Receive Papal Confirmation?

 

The Council of Nicaea is perhaps the greatest of all of the ecumenical councils. Everyone (Romanists, Protestants, as well as the Eastern "Orthodox") all agree on the authority of Nicaea in 325 AD. However, it is also an argument against the papacy when one recognizes the council's relationship to Pope Sylvester, who was the bishop of Rome at that time period. 

Generally, it is acknowledged that Nicaea did not receive papal confirmation. Many church historians confirm this reality:

"Only in the seventh and eighth centuries did the legend arise that Sylvester, bishop of Rome, was responsible, although there may have been extensive discussions between the emperor and the principal bishops over the matter....That Ossius alone signed before the papal legates at Nicaea was due to his special position as imperial counsel as well as the fact that he was a bishop, the legates being only priests. As Dvornik admits, it cannot be proved conclusively that Senatorial procedure was followed point by point at Nicaea, but it was followed by local councils before Nicaea and at the subsequent six general councils." (Leo Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology [Michael Glazier Inc., 1987], pgs. 56-57)

Often a letter attributed to Hosius of Cordova is appealed to (and two Roman priests) where they allegedly request Sylvester to approval the council of Nicaea. However, it is known that this letter was a forgery and inauthentic. The Roman Catholic historian Charles Hefele (though he argues for the papacy) admits this fact (A History of the Councils of the Church, vol. 1, pg. 44).

Other sources tell us that the president over the council was either Constantine or Hosius (not Pope Sylvester):

"Of the great Hosius , who answers to his name, that confessor of a happy old age, it is superfluous for me to speak, for I suppose it is known unto all men that they caused him also to be banished; for he is not an obscure person, but of all men the most illustrious, and more than this. When was there a Council held, in which he did not take the lead , and by right counsel convince every one?" (Athanasius, Apologia de Fuga, section 5)

Furthermore, Mansi gives us two lists of the bishops' signatures to the Nicene creed. And Hosius' name is first in both of these lists (Mansi 2:692 and Mansi 2:697)

Pope Vigilius and Papal Infallibility

Pope Vigilius

During the mid-6th century, the Monophysite controversy was coming to a close after many decades of argument and disputes between four major theological groups (Monophysites, Dyophysites, Cyrillian Chalcedonians, and the Origenists). 

The Emperor Justinian I was a key figure in helping resolve this major controversy. He issued in an edict in the year 544 condemning the Three Chapters (Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus, and Ibas of Edessa) in an attempt to appease the Dyophysites. He demanded that the church would submit to this decision. One person who would not submit to the condemnation of the Three Chapters was the bishop of Rome, Pope Vigilius. Justinian proceeded to kidnap Vigilius, take him to Constantinople, and ended coercing him into producing the Judicatum, a condemnation of the Three Chapters from Vigilius. However, he ended up withdrawing later on. Leo Donald Davis, in his work on the history of the councils, gives a description of this situation:

"On the basis of this information, the pope drew up his decision — the Judicatum — which he sent to the Patriarch Menas in April, 548. Vigilius thereby condemned the Three Chapters but with reservations, keeping intact the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon. His action brought a storm of protest from the West, even less tempered than before, since the powerful Monophysite-sympathizing empress Theodora had died in June of the same year. His own papal entourage opposed him; protests poured in from Italy, Dalmatia, Illyria, Africa, even from Gaul. To recoup his authority, the pope reprimanded and suspended members of his entourage, including his own nephew, the deacon Rusticus who broke with him publicly at Christmas Mass in 549. Matters began to move beyond mere protest. In Illyria, the bishops in synod deposed a metropolitan who accepted the Judicatum; Aurelian of Arles, vicar apostolic for Gaul, sent one of his priests to investigate the situation at Constantinople; the priest returned strongly opposed to acceptance of the imperial edict against the Three Chapters. More forcefully, Reparatus of Carthage presided over a council of African bishops who excommunicated the pope himself, until he would withdraw the Judicatum. In the face of such opposition, the emperor allowed the pope to retract his Judicatum and explain to the West the need for a council to examine the reasoning of the East on the subject." (Fr. Leo Donald Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology, pgs. 236-237)

The fact that an African synod excommunicated a pope is evidence in and of itself against the Vatican I doctrine of the papacy in church history, but there is a lot more to this particular episode in history. 

Vigilius then withdrew the Judicatum, and he (and Justinian) agreed that council needed to take place to resolve these issues. Later on, Vigilius issued the first Constitutum. There, he rejected certain Nestorian-sounding passages from Theodore of Mopsuestia and  Theodoret of Cyrus, but said nonetheless that their destiny/status in the church should be left up to God since both of them had already died. The more significant thing in the first Constitutum would be his resolved refusal to condemn the letter of Ibas, appealing to the council of Chalcedon in the process. At the end of the first Constitutum, Vigilius says the following:

"But if in the name of anyone with ecclesiastical dignity and rank there has been, or will have been, done, said and written, by whomsoever and wheresoever it so transpire, anything in breach of what we have here declared and enacted concerning these Three Chapters, this we totally annul with the authority of the apostolic see over which by the grace of God we preside" (Fr. Richard Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553, Vol. 2, pg. 211)

This sounds like ex cathedra language. It sounds as if the this document is irreformable (though he later on did write a second Constitutum), by saying that "anything written against what has been declared here is annulled by the authority of the Apostolic See" (paraphrase). 

After Constantinople II, Vigilius issued a second Constitutum, in which he declared the following things:

1) A full condemnation of the three chapters

2) A maintaining of the orthodoxy of Chalcedon by asserting that letter to Mari the Persian (which was read at the council) was not actually from Ibas but rather from someone else. 

A general loophole for Romanists would be to say that the first Constitutum was not irreformable, and in sense it was, but it in another sense it was not. It was by virtue of the fact that it was reformed eventually, after the Council of Constantinople II. But it was not in the sense that Vigilius clearly said that anything in breach of the first Constitutum is annulled by the authority of the apostolic see. An interesting question for RC apologists to ponder would be this: What was the status of the first Constitutum before Vigilius the second Constitutum? Was it reformable or not at that point in time?