This article contains my thoughts and insights on Richard Feldman's academic paper Internalism Defended (view the paper here). This paper relates to the study of epistemology, particularly regarding how one obtains epistemic justification for their beliefs. This is not necessarily an orderly outline but rather things I noticed throughout the essay.
Main Points of the Essay:
1) The first part of the paper gives a brief overview of the different ways in which internalism has been defined (not necessarily different definitions) :
a - Internalism essentially is saying that everything needed for one's justification for their belief is cognitively accessible to that particular individual.
b - Epistemic justification is grounded in what is internal to our minds
c - Properties that can give us this justification are easily accessed by the person
2) " 'Accessibilism' holds that the epistemic justification of a person's belief is determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access." (pg. 2)
Among "accessibilism", there is another subcategory of internalism:
Mentalism: a person's beliefs are justified only by the things that are internal to the person's mental life.
3) The implications [theses] of internalist thought:
A Defense of Internalism
Right here, it would seem to say that Bob's justification is not "feeling the heat" but rather the forecast was his main justification, but then him feeling the heat further increased the certainty of his belief thus increasing the justification as well [in the process].
- Objections Answered
Feldman makes a distinction between two types of objections to internalism:
Objection Type #1 - These sorts of objections tend to focus on "internal states that justify beliefs" (pg. 5) and arguing that there are certain situations in which internal "states" of justification need not be there.
Objection Type #2 - These objections relate to how internal justifiers, the nature thereof, and their relationship to the beliefs to which they are to provide epistemic justification, mostly proposing that internalism has problems when it comes to trying to make any sort of definite assertions in regards to the connections between the above-mentioned components.
Answers to Objection Type #1 :
The general answer here is that one could apply this same standard to any sort of "prima facie plausible internalist view" (this is particularly relating to the things said about this particular objection by Alvin Plantiga).
This then gets into a discussion of the meaning of "impulsion evidence". Plantinga holds that there are 3 evidentalist views as to what constitutes evidence:
1- All evidence is propositional (evidence consists only of other beliefs [possibly already justified beliefs?])
2- All evidence is propositional or sensory (evidence consists only of beliefs or sensory states)
3- All evidence propositional, sensory, or impulsional (evidence can also include a sense of confidence or emotional conviction)
#3 is discussed more thoroughly. It seems that a negative version of this argument (i.e. we deny things that feel "wierd" or "obviously false" [sometimes before investigating it more thoroughly, however] would apply here as well.
b - Epistemic justification is grounded in what is internal to our minds
c - Properties that can give us this justification are easily accessed by the person
2) " 'Accessibilism' holds that the epistemic justification of a person's belief is determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access." (pg. 2)
Among "accessibilism", there is another subcategory of internalism:
Mentalism: a person's beliefs are justified only by the things that are internal to the person's mental life.
3) The implications [theses] of internalist thought:
A Defense of Internalism
Right here, it would seem to say that Bob's justification is not "feeling the heat" but rather the forecast was his main justification, but then him feeling the heat further increased the certainty of his belief thus increasing the justification as well [in the process].
- Objections Answered
Feldman makes a distinction between two types of objections to internalism:
Objection Type #1 - These sorts of objections tend to focus on "internal states that justify beliefs" (pg. 5) and arguing that there are certain situations in which internal "states" of justification need not be there.
Objection Type #2 - These objections relate to how internal justifiers, the nature thereof, and their relationship to the beliefs to which they are to provide epistemic justification, mostly proposing that internalism has problems when it comes to trying to make any sort of definite assertions in regards to the connections between the above-mentioned components.
Answers to Objection Type #1 :
The general answer here is that one could apply this same standard to any sort of "prima facie plausible internalist view" (this is particularly relating to the things said about this particular objection by Alvin Plantiga).
This then gets into a discussion of the meaning of "impulsion evidence". Plantinga holds that there are 3 evidentalist views as to what constitutes evidence:
1- All evidence is propositional (evidence consists only of other beliefs [possibly already justified beliefs?])
2- All evidence is propositional or sensory (evidence consists only of beliefs or sensory states)
3- All evidence propositional, sensory, or impulsional (evidence can also include a sense of confidence or emotional conviction)
#3 is discussed more thoroughly. It seems that a negative version of this argument (i.e. we deny things that feel "wierd" or "obviously false" [sometimes before investigating it more thoroughly, however] would apply here as well.
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