Thus, for them, the purpose of original righteousness was to restrain the lower appetites in their natural propensity to rebel against reason and incline to material things, and war against the spiritual. In this regard, the Romanists have departed from the teaching of some of the earlier scholastics, who assert without any trouble that which is more in accord with the teaching of the Reformed churches, namely that the lower appetites were created with the intent purpose to be subject to reason and its proper exercise, even considered apart from grace. Thus Durandus: “That the act of the appetite would not be good unless it consisted in a mean is proved as follows. The goodness of anything that is regulated and measured consists in its being proportioned to its rule and measure. Now the act of the appetite is naturally apt to be regulated and measured by the act of reason.” (In sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum libri quatuor, book III, dist. 33, Q. 3; emphasis mine). Does not the light of nature itself evidence clearly enough that that which is the most noble and strongest in human nature ought naturally to take dominion? The soul is therefore the natural master of the body, and it caused man great shame after his fall into sin that his lower members rebelled against his reason. The sensitive appetite of man is not that of brute instinct as it occurs in non-rational animals, but is rather a reasoning soul which directs its view to sensible objects. Furthermore, the rebelliousness of sin, which is its formal nature as ἀνομία, has its seat rather in the mind and rational soul of man, rather than the material body. The flesh is said to lust against the spirit insofar as the spirit perceives carnal pleasure through the flesh. Thus says Soto: “this is all to say that man is conceived in sin because he is conceived as a son of Adam. But we freely confess what these assert, namely, guilt is not in the body but in the soul. Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is a quality produced by the flesh, but rather a liability inherent in human nature.” (On Nature and Grace, book I, ch. 8). Although Soto does not say here explicitly whether sin in its formal nature properly resides in the flesh or in the soul, I think the point itself is sufficiently clear. But much better is what Augustine says: “And for this reason, the cause of this carnal concupiscence is not in the soul alone, but much less is it in the flesh alone. For it arises from both: from the soul, indeed, because without it no pleasure is perceived; from the flesh, because without it carnal pleasure is not perceived….Therefore, when the Apostle says that the flesh lusts against the spirit, he undoubtedly means carnal pleasure, which the spirit has from the flesh and with the flesh, against that pleasure which it has alone. For alone—unless I am mistaken—the spirit has that desire, unmixed with bodily pleasure or the lust for carnal things, by which the soul desires and faints for the courts of the Lord [Ps. 84:2]….When, however, something that delights the soul according to the flesh opposes these and similar good desires in which the soul alone lusts, then the flesh is said to lust against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.” (On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book X, ch. 12); “For while there remains any remnant of the lust of the flesh, to be kept in check by the rein of continence, God is by no means loved with all one's soul. For the flesh does not lust without the soul; although it is the flesh which is said to lust, because the soul lusts carnally.” (On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness, ch. 8). Note here that Augustine places sin in the soul as its proper seat and subject, since it lusts carnally after created things, turning away from God.
The Papists do not assert that concupiscence really did exist in paradise, but that it would have been so in puris naturalibus—as can be seen from their analogy whereby they say that a man in pure nature is simply one who is unclothed, while in the state of sin he is naked after being previously clothed with original justice—the former is a negation, the latter a privation, and this is the only thing separating the two states. And in this they approach, albeit not fully arriving at, the teaching of the Pelegians, whom Augustine described as teaching “you wish to introduce into Paradise before sin the law of sin warring against the law of the mind.” (Against Julian, book V, ch. 7). Thus, Matthias Scheeben confesses: “In fact the Church Fathers generally understand the onset of concupiscence in this passage as a precursor of death and say that it is effected only because the soul lost a supernatural power with which God had graciously clothed it to ensure that the body (or the flesh), which in itself is animal and by its nature could be affected as in the case of the animals, would nevertheless experience no concupiscence. Augustine often emphasizes this with particular clarity, although on the other hand he more than all other Church Fathers considers freedom from concupiscence as a ‘natural endowment’ of the first human beings.” (Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics III, chapter 2, sect. 3, §155, n. 551; emphasis mine)
Here they depart once again from the teaching of Augustine, who taught not only that concupiscence did not exist in man before the fall (which our opponents grant), as he teaches constantly throughout book 14 of City of God, such as in chapter 23: “And certainly, had not culpable disobedience been visited with penal disobedience, the marriage of Paradise should have been ignorant of this struggle and rebellion, this quarrel between will and lust, that the will may be satisfied and lust restrained, but those members, like all the rest, should have obeyed the will”—but Augustine also says that it is contrary to nature, and a defilement of it. “To return to the present question, then, I say lust is natural, since every man is born with it; you, indeed, state this more fully, since you say the first man was created with it. I say lust must be overcome, and, to be overcome, must be opposed. You also say this, lest you hear in return what you say to me: 'You profess yourself an advocate of depravity when you deny lust must be overcome'; it certainly cannot be overcome unless there is combat against it. Since we both say lust is natural and conquerable, our dispute concerns whether we must overcome good or evil. Do you not see how absurdly you wish to expel this enemy, lust, yet do not wish to complete the discussion of its evil? Thus, if the Devil does not overcome you in the adversity of concupiscence, he will overcome you in the perversity of your opinion. Are you not as yet able to understand that we by virtue do not war against our nature, but our fault?” (Against Julian, book V, ch. 7; emphasis mine).
Similarly, several strong arguments are put forward against this Papist teaching by the Augustinian theologian William Estius (1542-1613), who although being in the church of Rome, yet pleads what we contend for on this specific question. He thus says: “ If rebellion of flesh against spirit is natural to man considered according to pure naturals; therefore no men in pure naturals could have obtained salvation or avoided gehenna; but all at least adults would have been destined to eternal damnation. For no one in whom such fight is, if he be destitute of supernatural gift, can long persist in innocence and abstain from mortal sin. For from that rebellion there is headlong inclination in man to vices, as even they confess who put it in pure naturals.” (In quatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria, II dist. 25, §6). The minor premise, namely that man in pure nature could not have been saved by his own powers, is confessed by Domingo de Soto in On Nature and Grace, book I, chapter 4. And again Estius correctly states, “Therefore if naturally there should be in man fight of inferior powers against right reason, and consequently against law of God; and through this naturally there should be in him inclination against his natural end, man will be in this respect worse than all others according to his natural things.”
Since God created man good and upright (Ecc. 7:29), it is completely inconceivable that he could have created man in such a state wherein the flesh naturally entices the soul and the mind towards sin. The motions of concupiscence hence cannot in any sense be natural to man. Even Romanists themselves will confess that the motions toward sin are themselves evil and a disease pertaining materially to the principle of original sin, although they will not confess with Paul and Augustine that it is itself sinful. One need only read his work Against Julian to see how often he states that it is impudent and insane to think of concupiscence as a natural good that would have existed in man before sin. And yet this is exactly what the Papists assert in their doctrine of pure nature, though they do not go as far as Julian did. Augustine says, “For what else is man's misery but his own disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he cannot?” (City of God, book XIV, ch. 15) Who therefore, can imagine, that such misery was natural to man were he created by God and not given the gift of original righteousness? For what could corporeal matter or the rational and animating soul do in man unless it had been so instituted by God who is the author of nature? “What are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good” (Enchiridion, ch. 11); “Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.” (On the Free Choice of the Will, ch. 13) Which same opinion is defended by Aquinas in ST, I-II, Q. 71, art. 2. Since concupiscence is a vice, it is contrary to nature. If however, it were not a vice, but was integral to man’s nature on account of his material condition, then it would not be unlawful to obey its desires and consent thereunto. This very thing is stated in Against Julian, book V, ch. 7.
Some of the Pelagians argue that since the animal and sensitive appetite exists in animals also created by God, it cannot be evil. However, this is because animals do not have the faculty or power of reasoning, to which such appetites can be subordinate. "This is therefore not evil in animals, because in them the flesh does not lust against the spirit: which evil in men must be healed by divine goodness, not praised by human vanity." (Augustine, Unfinished Work against Julian, 2.230). And he also states that the resistance of the flesh is not man according to nature, but according to vice: “There is a comparison, no doubt, between the two; but it is not by reason of nature, but through vice— not vice in the beast, but in nature. For so excellent is a man in comparison with a beast, that man's vice is beast's nature; still man's nature is never on this account changed into beast's nature. God, therefore, condemns man because of the fault wherewithal his nature is disgraced, and not because of his nature, which is not destroyed in consequence of its fault.” (On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, book II, ch. 46)
Concupiscence has its natural consequent shame. And this is the reason why Adam and Eve blushed after sinning when they realized their nakedness. This shame now exists in all men when it comes to the matter of sexual intercourse, and all societies (except perhaps, for some barbarians) blush at the topic and shield it in privacy. Such shame occurs in us as a result of the fall: “but when it must come to man's great function of the procreation of children the members which were expressly created for this purpose will not obey the direction of the will, but lust has to be waited for to set these members in motion, as if it had legal right over them, and sometimes it refuses to act when the mind wills, while often it acts against its will! Must not this bring the blush of shame over the freedom of the human will, that by its contempt of God, its own Commander, it has lost all proper command for itself over its own members?” (On Marriage and Concupiscence, book I, ch. 7) But on the idea of pure nature as fabricated by Rome, such shame could be as natural to man in that state as it was in fallen nature—the difference between those states being merely like that of a man naked who was previously clothed and a naked man who was never clothed to begin with. For this shame arises from the rebellion and disobedience of the flesh against the soul and reason to which it ought to submit; just as any master is embarrassed and ashamed on account of a slave which rebels against him and insults him. But it is impossible for man to be created with such necessity of shame and blushing. For why should he blush at it when it is nothing but his pure and natural condition on account of being material and created by God? And truly, my argument here is nothing but what Augustine says against the Pelagians: “Then, abashed at their action, since they moved no more at the bidding of his rational will, but at their own arbitrary choice as it were, instigated by lust, he devised the covering which should conceal such of them as he judged to be worthy of shame. For man, as the handiwork of God, deserved not confusion of face; nor were the members which it seemed fit to the Creator to form and appoint by any means designed to bring the blush to the creature.” (On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin, book II, ch. 39); “It follows that it was not possible to mention directly what God saw fit to make correctly, and the herald was ashamed to proclaim what the judge was not ashamed to make. How could this be true, unless by sinning we made unseemly what God by creation made seemly?” (Against Julian, book IV, ch. 16). It is therefore blasphemous and injurious to God to say that what he had created would of its own nature incline away from Him and turn to evil.
The consequences of this Papist error are exceedingly great, and destructive to the doctrine of original sin and its effects upon human nature and the posterity of Adam. For thus the difference between man before and after the fall is relegated only to the loss of certain supernatural gifts and endowments, then it follows from this that man has not truly and inwardly been defiled and contaminated by sin in all his faculties.
Thus, when these lower things rebel against reason and turn towards vice, they are contrary to the law of God, and therefore sinful—truly and properly, and not only metaphorically or “after a certain manner of speaking.” It is sin in unbelievers, and it remains a sin in believers, but its guilt is not imputed to them.
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