The article was well-written, and had a classic 17th-century polemical tone, something I am quite fond of! Indeed, for whatever reason, the writers of this piece refer to me throughout as "the Dutchman", and also accuse me of engaging in what they have crudely referred to as "polemical masturbation" (page 32) for having said in August 2025 that Robert Bellarmine is suffering the torments of hell---a position I still hold unabashedly, since that man was one who spent his whole life writing against the true reformation of the Church and the restoration of the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ. Undoubtedly, they would say that John Calvin is in hell, and yet would expect us to say nothing similar against them? But, such things are not my present focus.
The paper also had some responses to Sean Luke from Anglican Aesthetics, and Gavin Ortlund, and what they have said about the topic of sola Scriptura. However, I will be dealing exclusively with what is written in response to me. The part at the end of the paper in answer to the blessed divine Richard Baxter is up to someone like "Inquisitor" (@WesternCatholik on X) to respond to, since he has espoused that position before, as far as I know.
I do not presently have time to respond to every single point the paper raised, but I will limit focus specifically to the question of the Papal Circle, since that indeed is the majority of their argumentation as well. I must also apologize in advance that the response is not as structured in nature as their original paper, particularly in the first section or two.
Page 23: “In solemn accordance with the great divine, it is indeed true that divine faith is specified formally by the authority of God revealing; yet it is also necessary, on the part of the believer, that there be a sufficiently certain and divinely guaranteed means of knowing what God has revealed. For if the object be not certainly proposed as revealed by God, the intellect cannot adhere under the formal motive of God revealing, yea, merely under some inferior and fallible motive. In other words, in order that an act be truly divine faith, it requisites merely not that God be the formal motive, yea, that the object be proposed with infallible certainty as revealed by God. The Catholic, therefore, promulgates no such argument to the effect that the Holy Church replaces God as the motive of faith; she denies such an accusation with vitriolic certainty. Instead, the guardian of the despositum fidei, by her infallibility, guarantees that this proposition X is indeed revealed by the Almighty; hence the intellect can adhere to X under the formal motive of God revealing. For our guardian the church, professes not to produce divine faith as principal cause, never, nay, she eradicates all reasonable doubt as to the object, thereby rendering possible an assent which is formally divine.” These men have been accurate insofar as they correctly assert that the formal motive of faith is not simply the truthfulness of God as such, but insofar as He reveals. They also assert that there must be some certain and divinely guaranteed means of knowing what is revealed. But here again is where they fall into the trap. For I ask: is that act of faith whereby we assent to something under the aspect of being divinely revealed (as distinct from the content) an act of divine faith, or is it not? If it is, then what is its formal ground, i.e. what is it that causally moves the intellect to assent to the fact that God has revealed? I will talk later about how a formal object is to be properly defined. If they say that the Church is only a ministerial authority which may propose the object, then who among us has ever disagreed with this? What caused them to quarrel with me upon such a pretense?
Page 23: “If the means by which one knows that X is revealed be indeed fallible, revisable, or merely probable (irrespective of its probabilistic degree), then the intellect cannot exclude the possibility of a lonely thought to the tune of “Perhaps this is not, in fact, revealed by God.” But if that possibility remains positively admissible, then the assent mustn’t truly be absolute, irrevocable, or infallible.” They must not ignore the fact that the uncertainty of an individual Protestant’s faith in Scripture does not necessarily mean that the faith of Protestants, based on what they see as our “fundamental principles” is invalid, but rather that the individual may be slow and weak in believing. An infallible object of faith does not mean that the subject who elicits faith is himself infallible.
The quote from Charles Coppens on page 34 illustrates the problem (which they repeat again from Daniel Lyons on pg 35): “We are, therefore, for natural reasons, certain that Christ is God. Consequently, we are naturally certain of Christ's truthfulness. Now Jesus, God and Man, declared that He founded a Church on the unfailing Rock of Peter and his successors ; that is, Christ affirmed that He founded an infallible Church which cannot err in dogmatic declarations. But among her dogmatic declarations is this concerning the Holy Scriptures—which hitherto we have viewed merely as genuine documents—that they are the inspired Word of God. She declares the Bible to contain, not merely the Word of God—the Penny Catechism contains that—but the inspired Word of God. Thus we argue from the Scriptures as genuine to the infallible Church, and from the infallible Church to the Scriptures, as inspired. Call that a circle, if you like, but not a vicious circle.”
Note here that this Jesuit makes a leap which may go unnoticed by readers that do not pay careful attention. They assert that the natural rational assent to the deity of Christ and His authority as a divine legate is prior in this order they have constructed to one’s belief in the authority of the Roman church, founded upon Petrine succession (which again is known by them primarily from Scripture, as they allege) and that it is infallible in its dogmatic declarations (among which is the declaration concerning the inspiration of Scripture). Now, is this act of trust in the authority of the Church one of divine faith or one of human faith? It cannot be the former, since its foundation is not inspired Scripture, but simply a set of historically reliable documents providing what they claim is an attestation to the infallible authority of the Church.
However, the Church must be believed with divine faith before it can serve the role with respect to the assent to biblical inspiration that Papists claim it serves. Such a thing as this is confessed by these words from Gregory of Valencia: “If he is asked once more how he knows that the proposition of the Church is infallible, let him likewise say that he does not clearly know it, but believes it with infallible faith on account of the revelation of Scripture, which bears witness to the Church; and he does not believe that revelation on account of some further revelation, but on account of itself, although for this very act the proposition of the Church is needed as a requisite condition.” (Commentariorum theologicorum tomi IIII, Vol. 3, disp. 1, q. 1, §10 [Lyon: Horace Cardon, 1609], pg. 37)
Coppens says that “Now to prove infallibility from the Scriptures as inspired would certainly be a vicious circle.” When the assent to the authority of the Church is given on the basis of Scripture, what, I ask, is that formality under which Scripture is then regarded? Is it inspired, or is it not? Is it the Word of God, or is it merely a trustworthy historical document like Herodotus (which is a blasphemous comparison indeed, given Herodotus’ infamy for historical falsification)? If the former, they cannot know this without the Church, which they seek to prove from Scripture. If the latter, it is not a suitable foundation for divine faith, not merely as a dispositional cause, but as a cause on account of which one believes, which seems to be what Coppens is saying here.
On pg 40, the analogy these learned men provide of the act of sight in relation to light and visible objects actually works against them. They write, “The act of sight is specified by its formal object, namely colour as visible under light. It is not the eye, nor the medium, nor any condition that specifies vision as vision, but plainly the object as formally presented; namely, that which is seen as visible. The eye is the power; light is a necessary condition; the coloured object is that which specifies the act. Now, light is a sine qua non for vision. Bereft of which, the object cannot be seen. Yet no one sober would profess that light is the formal object of sight. Why? Because light determines not what is seen, but only renders the seeing possible. The specification of the act is received from the object—this colour, this shape—not from the condition that enables its manifestation.”
Setting down their analogy and its correspondence to our present dispute, we may outline it as follows:
The problem of course is that the Church does determine what is to be believed. Just 2 pages earlier, they state that the Church is “that whereby the intellect comes to know that a thing is revealed.” And again on page 13, “whereby it is affirmed that the Church, though divinely constituted to propose revelation in all her fecundity, functions as the means by which revelation is known.” They affirm here that light does not determine what is seen, but only renders seeing possible. Yet the Church for them does more than this: it proposes revelation, and guarantees its certainty. It specifies the material objects to be believed as divinely revealed, while light, as a mere sine qua non, does not perform any role analogous to this. In fact, see the following passage from the Salmanticenses: “The reason is perspicuous, because just as nothing can become known to the visual power except through light — since light is its formal reason under which it operates — so nothing can become known to us through the obscure assent of infused faith except by the motive of divine revelation, which is the formal reason under which this virtue operates…For just as bodily light, being the formal reason under which the visual power operates, is itself visible without needing another in order to be seen, so since divine revelation is the formal reason under which infused faith operates, it must be credible through itself and exercise this function (once it is believed), because with respect to this act it performs the function both of the objective means (objectum quo) and of the object (objectum quod).” (Cursus theologicus, treatise XVII, Q. 1, disp. 1, dub. 5, §2). So here, it seems that Salamanca views light as a formal motive with respect to the operation of the visual power. See again dub. 3, section 2:
Furthermore, I ask: what is the reason why the act of sight recognizes an object as visible? Is it not that it is because light has shown it to be visible? It is true that light is that by which a thing is seen, yet it is also that which we see, as Augustine confirms in his Tractates on John.
“The Church is the means of arriving at certitude” as they say in their explanation of Bellarmine on page 41. But I ask again: is the Church the grounds of certitude? If they would reply in the affirmative insofar as it pertains to the order of knowing (medium cognoscendi), then we can turn this against them with respect to the light analogy: is light a means/ground of certitude in the act of sight with respect to objects under the formal aspect of visibility?
Medium Cognoscendi vs Ratio Credendi
Regarding the distinction the authors constantly make between the order of believing and the order of knowing (ordo cognitionis), a couple things may be said.
First of all, it is generally agreed upon that “to believe” is simply to think with assent. This is distinct from simple apprehension, the first operation of the intellect whereby a simple quiddity is formed of the thing in question. But at present, the Papist through the authority of the Church does not only apprehend the divinely revealed books of Scripture, but also assents to the Church’s testimony that they are divinely revealed. This kind of assent upon authority is nothing other than faith itself. As Franzelin explains on pages 602-603: “We can know truth not only insofar as it manifests itself in itself through internal reasons — immediately or mediately — to our intellect, but also from an external reason: insofar as we are made certain that it is known as true by some other intellect. Thus anyone, even one ignorant of astronomical science, can know a future eclipse of the sun, insofar as he is made certain that it will be known by astronomers from fixed and (physically) immutable laws. The astronomer's cognition is a cognition of truth in itself from the perceived causes, and is therefore science from internal reasons. The cognition of the uneducated man rests solely upon the foreknown science and veracity of astronomers. Although the astronomer's science can be said to be connected with the future eclipse as prior with posterior, this foreknown connection does not cause the uneducated man to understand the truth (that there will be an eclipse at such an hour) in itself — why it is so and how it is so. Rather, for his intellect, the authority of the astronomers is the external reason for knowing the existence of the object about which they testify. This mode of cognition is not properly called science and the intelligence of truth, because it does not read from within — as the Scholastics are accustomed to say — but it is faith: because one trusting in the science and veracity of another gives assent to a truth, which assent itself is signified by the word to believe. Insofar as the formal object is regarded, we believe someone (credimus alicui); insofar as it is an assent toward the material object, we believe something (credimus aliquid). Encompassing both, we are said to believe in someone (credere in aliquem); but this is properly said only in relation to the First Truth who is God, insofar as through faith we tend toward God as the supreme truth and ultimate end — whence also in the Creed we believe in God (credimus in Deum), and we believe the holy Church (credimus sanctam Ecclesiam). (Cf. St. Thomas, 2.2. q.1, a.9, ad 5. See concerning this entire manner of distinguishing: Gregory of Nazianzus, Or.31 (al.37), n.6; Rufinus, In Symbol. n.36; St. Augustine, In Io. tract.29; serm.18, c.2; Theologians in 3, dist.23; on St. Thomas, 2.2. q.2, a.2.).”
Note here that what we are dealing with is “the external reason for knowing the existence of the object about which they testify.” If the Church fulfills such a criterion as this on a Roman view, then what we have is the order of assent, not simply the order of knowing. The rest of the material in this paper is generally aimed at showing that classical Roman Catholic authors assert the former in some way or another. The very notion of exercising authority with respect to rendering the believer’s faith in certain Scripture also seems to imply far more than the order of cognition. It is not merely thinking, but thinking with assent with which we are presently concerned. Can something that “is a matter of causing such articles to be believed with the most absolute certainty, under pain of becoming unfaithful to God Himself and thus subject to His wrath and to the eternal loss of the soul” (Perrone, Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, II:118) truly have no causal place at all in the ratio credendi?
Pg 42: “Still, however, in total dismay of our Dutch adversary, the act of believing remains formally ordered to the divine locution itself, not to the Church as such.” Once again, the Papists do say that the Church is a form of divine locution, and its proclamations are called the proclamations of God in a strict sense, rather than a mere broad sense of being the minister of the Word of God, and displaying its matter or content, but rather as an authoritative divine proclamation in and of itself. As Scheeben puts it: “Instead, along the lines of the Apostle’s saying, “faith through hearing,” the Church’s proposal also has influence on and importance for faith because she, being the living proclamation of God’s word, carried out in His name, with His authority, and in His power, causes God Himself to speak to us, and consequently the divine motive of faith confronts us through her and in her and exercises its influence on us. In other words: the Church acts with regard to the faith not merely somehow as the minister of the matter of God’s word [supplying or displaying the matter of the word] but rather as ministra Dei loquentis or as the organ and plenipotentiary envoy of God Himself who speaks, who precisely through her presents His word to us in a lively manner corresponding to its dignity and validity.” (Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics 1.2, ch. 6, §43, n. 765). And again from Perrone: “For the magisterium of the Church is, by its very nature, something altogether different from any purely human ministry. In her case it is nothing less than proposing dogmatic teaching in the name of God—not in a broad or loose sense, but in the strictest sense and with the full force of the term: as acting in God’s stead, as sent expressly by God for this purpose, with God’s own sanction. It is a matter of inducing men to hold as truths revealed by God—truths substantial and infallible by their very nature, the first source of all truth—doctrines which, being for the most part above human understanding, surpass every human capacity, and in which even the slightest error would be fatal. It is a matter of causing such articles to be believed with the most absolute certainty, under pain of becoming unfaithful to God Himself and thus subject to His wrath and to the eternal loss of the soul.” (Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, II:118). The authors themselves acknowledge again on page 44 that “God speaks through the Church” when it comes to our dispute.
This would seem to dispel the manner in which they use the Salmanticenses, namely by saying that the Church pertains to the formal motive only on the side of the faculty of faith, and not on the side of the object (the latter of which is what truly corresponds to the formal object sub quo). However, if the Church is itself a divine proclamation (which the Papists do assert), and thus an object which is believed, then we are still stuck in the same problem. Indeed, that it is God revealing through the Church that is the ground of their faith, and that without relation to the habit or faculty, is clear from a passage from Salamanca which was already quoted above, but this time with emphasis: “And the reason is the same in all cases; because just as light, for example, taken in the manner of a formal character sub qua, constitutes color in the character of attainable only by the visual power — and therefore does not presuppose or include its light, but rather founds it by way of a measure — so the obscure revelation of the First Truth proposed and modified through an infallible rule, such as the Church, constitutes of itself and without relation to any habit the divinely revealed object in the character of the credible determinately through infused faith, and through it as an extrinsic form and measure originates infused faith.” (Cursus Theologicus, treatise XVII, Q. 1, disp. 1, dub. 3, 2)
I believe some insight may also be gained by harkening to what the Ordo Essendi writes around pages 41-42, in their examination of Bellarmine and Perrone: “Even Rev. Perrone, whose language is pressed most forcefully, explicitly states that the testimony of the Church is “extrinsic to the sacred books… so that we may have the certain knowledge necessary to accept them.” That is, it concerns the ordo cognitionis, dispositive in se, and not the ordo credendi. And the certitude Perrone invokes—that Catholics be certain 'in such a way that we can in no manner doubt'—in no way concerns the formal specification of the act, but the certitudo applicationis, which is the certainty with which the formal motive is known to apply to this particular object. The Church's infallible testimony, therefore, secures this certainty of application without thereby becoming the ratio formalis of the act itself. The distinction between certitudo applicationis and certitudo formalis is not an evasion of triviality; for it is the precise differentiation between knowing infallibly that almighty God has spoken and adhering formally because He has spoken. Rev. Perrone concerns himself with the former; the formal motive of faith is the latter. The Dutchman reads such passages as though they spoke of the latter, when in fact they are concerned with the former.”
It seems then, that this certainty that Perrone and other Romanist writers speak, is urged by them to pertain strictly to the order of cognition, and not the reason of assent or belief. However, let us see if this is an accurate description or not by considering the nature of certitude.
Certainty may be aptly and broadly defined as the determination of the intellect to a given object, with the firm adherence of the intellect to a knowable object. It involves a firm assent (Bernard Wueller, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, pg. 21). Now in considering the act of divine faith, Henri Grenier lists (Thomistic Philosophy, pg. 341) four cases of certitude that are involved:---
The speculative certitude of the intellect, which passes judgment upon the credibility of the truth proposed, judging it to not be absurd, and that the testimony of the one proposing is worthy of belief;
Practical certitude of the intellect, judging that assent would be a good.
Subjective certitude of the will (moved by grace), making the intellect to adhere to the truth
The certitude of the intellect, assenting to the truth proposed, caused not by the evidence of the truth proposed, but rather by the will in its subjective certitude. It is an extrinsic certitude, not an intrinsic one.
When Perrone says that the certainty that the Church provides is one which “excludes all doubt”, I plead: is not this a reference to that firm assent of the intellect to something as having been divinely revealed? Now Perrone does appear to assert that the Church is a cause of formal certitude in some sense, insofar as “It is a matter of causing such articles to be believed with the most absolute certainty, under pain of becoming unfaithful to God Himself and thus subject to His wrath and to the eternal loss of the soul.” (Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, II:118). Now, if the Church is that cause and ground for the firm assent of the intellect, can it really be maintained any longer with sobriety that such things refer only to the order of cognition, rather than the reason for assenting? In the analogy of light these Papists provided, is light itself a cause of certainty, and the firm assent of the intellect to the fact of revelation?
When the Ordo Essendi therefore speaks of this certainty of application, behold how they attempt to separate it from the order of assent, which certainty broadly considered implies: “the certitudo applicationis, which is the certainty with which the formal motive is known to apply to this particular object. The Church's infallible testimony, therefore, secures this certainty of application without thereby becoming the ratio formalis of the act itself. The distinction between certitudo applicationis and certitudo formalis is not an evasion of triviality; for it is the precise differentiation between knowing infallibly that almighty God has spoken and adhering formally because He has spoken.” Note in the middle that they do not use the word “believing God has spoken” but rather “knowing God has spoken”---just as they do at the beginning, wherein they do not say that the “formal motive is believed to apply to this particular object”, but rather that it is “known to apply.” This is indeed appears to be a tricky evasion on their part, and an obfuscation about what the meaning of certainty is
King-Messenger Analogy
Pg 43: “If one believes the message because of the messenger, one has only human faith; but if one believes it because of the king, having been assured by the messenger that it is indeed from the king, the act terminates in the king’s authority.” Notice how quickly the Papists enjoy glossing over that middle act of assent, namely— “having been assured by the messenger that it is indeed from the king” is not the same in nature as the act whereby “one believes the message.” They again confuse the content and the fact of divine revelation. The latter is the point of dispute, not the former. It is fine for one to say that the act terminates in the authority of God (king) as regards the content of revelation. What we are concerned with at present is how one knows with firm assent (divine faith) that the letter is indeed truly from the king. A similar confusion from these Romanists can also be seen on page 57 when they write: “From this it follows that the Reformed—or better yet, the Dutchman’s—charge of circularity rests upon a fundamental category error. They, for some reason, construe the Catholic position as though the Church and God functioned within the same genus of causality (almost by force at this point)—as though the Church’s testimony were the reason why almighty God is believed, and His authority the reason why the Church is believed, thereby forming the vicious circle treated in prima pars.” For my own part, I do not assert that Papists believe what God has revealed because the Church declares it, but rather that they believe that God has revealed it because the Church declares it. These are not the same questions, and Romanists constantly conflate them together in order to extricate themselves from the difficulty.
We see the same confusion in the following portion from the same paragraph: “Therefore the messenger, upon the clarification of his royal mandate, assures the subject that said fiat truly does proceed from the pen of the ruler. But the reason to believe the message, confounded by the Dutchman’s objection, is simply the authority of the king, of which the legate constitutes nothing.” Again, we are not debating about the reason for believing the message, but rather about believing that the message comes from the king—they admit here that the assurance of this relies upon the messenger, whose credentials are in turn his “royal mandate.” Is the royal mandate that whereby the messenger is established as credible and authentic in proposing the object to be assented to, namely the letter of the king? So be it. Thus, I ask again: how does one know that this mandate that confirms the king’s authority is royal? How does he know that it has not been forged by the messenger himself, or some other non-authentic party, and that it truly is from the king’s own hand? This is precisely what Lugo pointed out in a specific quote which the Ordo Essendi never addressed: “Therefore, just as the testimony of the royal ambassador enters partially into the formal reason of human faith, so the human testimony of the Church enters partially into the formal reason of Christian faith. To say that the testimony of the royal ambassador is nothing but the application
of the king's testimony, and not part of the formal reason of assent, seems to be playing with words, since in fact one partially relies upon the authority of the messenger in order to believe that the king has promised his coming.” (Disputationes scholasticae et morales: Tractatus de Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 1, §5).
Let us proceed to how they further clarify their approach on pg 44: “The herald does not function as the reason why the decree is binding; he functions as the means by which the decree is made known. Nor does the authority of the king depend upon the herald’s testimony; rather, the herald’s authority derives from the king. The causal structure is therefore not circular but hierarchical, where the principal authority is above, and the instrumental mediation below.”
No sophisticated Protestant divine that I know of has ever dared to assert that the authority of God (king) is in anyway dependent upon that of the Church (herald/messenger). The whole dispute revolves around the authority of divine revelation considered quoad nos. They also understate things when they assert that the herald “is the means by which the decree is made known”; he is not only this according to them, but also that whereby we are assured that it truly is the king’s letter.
They also note around the middle of page 44 concerning the dilemma about whether the Church’s authority is believed with divine or human faith. This is important precisely because it is insufficient to assert that the Church may serve as an infallible guardian and proposer for revelation once it is established by various divine signs and motives of credibility. On the contrary, it is unable to do this unless it is first believed with divine faith, precisely because even our opponents will at least admit that it is the mechanism without which divine faith cannot occur. Here is Scheeben again: “Nevertheless, in order for the visible activity of the Church in her public teaching to influence faith in an appropriate way, the invisible authenticity and authority present in that activity in its supernatural divine character must be known by way of divine faith in much same way as the divine origin of the external word of God in general, and consequently must be included as part of the material object of faith along with the formal object as a condition for it. It must be known by way of faith, first, because as an altogether invisible ordinance of God it cannot be the object of direct perception or insight, and again, because it too is directly and formally affirmed in every act of Catholic faith as the rule thereof.” (Handbook of Catholic Dogmatics 1.2, ch. 6, §43, n. 776)
Defining Formal Object Sub Quo
On page 48, the authors present the following definition of a formal object sub quo: “on the principled definition of a formal object from first principles. A formal object is not simply what a cognitive act pertains. It is that under which the act is specified—or more distinctly—the precise ratio or aspect under which the intellect adheres to its material object, and which gives the act its determinate species. Two acts may indeed concern the same material thing but differ in species because they adhere to it under diverse formalities. I behold a man as an animal; I know him as a rational being; I love him as my neighbour; I believe something concerning him depending upon his testimony—these are specifically distinct acts directed at the same material subject, distinguished solely by their formal ratios. The formal object is therefore that which constitutes the act in its species from within, not adjoined from without.”
However, this definition is missing something, namely the causal or motivating function of formal objects with respect to cognitive assent. It is precisely this “moving” and “causing” function of the formal object that causes such difficulties for Romanists in their attempts to escape the argument. That this is indeed the formal object’s function is clear from a number of Thomist sources. The intellect tends towards the truth of its object, and gives assent only insofar as the object appears true to it. That which shows the truth in the object is the formal object of that assent, as Francisco Suà rez says (Commentaria in secundam secundae divi Thomae, disp. III, sect. 1, §7). Something similar, although not necessarily identical we may admit, can be seen from Garrigou-Lagrange, the formal object of faith is that which renders the authority itself formally motivating and formally constitutes the testimony (Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, On Divine Revelation, Vol. 1, pg. 672), and whereby divine faith is distinguished from human faith.
This definition of a formal object is also agreed to by Dr. William Marshner, a prominent contemporary Thomist and translator of Cajetan, but also translating the work "De ultima resolutione actus fidei" by T. Zielinski, in which he writes: "The formal ratio sub qua, therefore, is the objective light under which the formal object quod is manifested (shown as true) to the faculty or habit, or, under which it is made to be attainable by the faculty or habit, and through which the faculty is moved to attain it....This is the ratio through which an object is manifested to a faculty or constituted as an object proportionate to and attainable by that faculty, and through which the faculty is causally moved to attain that object." (https://marshner.christendom.edu/?p=1721). And again in a later paragraph: “Now for any cognitive act, it is not hard to see the crucial importance of this formal ratio sub qua, which is identically the objective medium sub quo of cognition. Remember that this formal ratio does two duties. It does an objectival duty, whereby it constitutes an act’s formal object quod as attainable by that act and as specificative of that act. But then it also does a causal duty, whereby it moves the faculty to attain its formal object quod. Therefore, this “formal ratio sub qua” formally causes a true and certain judgment in our minds regarding any truth — so much so that, take it away, and the whole certitude of our knowing collapses, but, supply it, and we are able to elicit an act of knowing. And the more sure and firm is this formal ratio sub qua, the more firm is our knowing what we know. Hence, this formal ratio sub qua is the foundation and formal cause of the certitude of our every cognition.” The language at the end is also quite interesting, in which Zielinski asserts that the formal object plays the role “causes a true and certain judgment in our minds”, without which “the whole certitude of our knowing collapses.” This is strikingly similar to the language from Giovanni Perrone that I cited concerning the Church, which the Ordo Essendi men tried so desperately to separate from a true and proper formal motive—or more broadly speaking, from the order of the reason for assent (ratio credendi).
The last part there is particularly key: it is not only specificative in nature (though that is obviously part of it), but also that “through which the faculty is causally moved to attain that object.” See the definition provided by Juan de Ripalda, which I quoted in my original writing. “Yet this is certain for all: that the present controversy about the formal object of faith concerns that which moves the intellect to assent to the credibles and gives the theological species to acts of faith—just as divine goodness gives the species to acts of charity.” (De ente supernaturali, vol. 7, disp. II, §1, n. 3 [Vivès, 1873], pg. 9). He does not say only that the formal object is what gives the species, but also that it is “that which moves the intellect to assent.”
Now, in our dispute, the object in question is the proposition that “the Scriptures are inspired by God”, and we are inquiring as to what causally moves the Roman intellect to assent to the truth of that statement. Is it Scripture itself? No, otherwise they would be Protestant. Is it the Church? This is what is implicated by the rest of their teachings, but they dare not say this since it traps them in the circle. Is it the authority of God revealing? Presumably they would say yes, but the problem is then: how do I know that this truly is God revealing, and not a mere counterfeit?
We may do this again from the Salmanticenses. They also distinguish two senses of “formal object”, i.e. (1) on the part of the object; (2) on the part of the intellectual habit. Ultimately, those men resolve the doubt by saying that the formal object sub qua (which our dispute is about) refers to that medium or motive under which the intellect assent to the truth of the object (Cursus theologicus, treatise XVII, Q. 1, disp. 1, dub. 2, §1, [Paris: J. Albanel, 1879], 11:24-25), just as the formal ratio of scientific knowledge is that by which its object is constituted as knowable. A key point of Salamanca in this section is that absolutely speaking formale objectum sub quo is first and foremost considered with the object, not the habit. Indeed, they say: “But whatever holds itself on the side of the power, as a formality indistinct from the habit, is not of this kind. Therefore in no way can the name or the essence of the formal character sub qua properly and absolutely speaking belong to it. The major and the consequence stand; the minor is supported: both because any formality intrinsic to the habit is not altogether absolute, but essentially relative to the object as its term or principle, from which it draws its species. Therefore it does not constitute the object in the character of an object, but entirely presupposes it constituted — otherwise it would not so much draw its species from the object as impart it to the object. And also, because even if in a cognitive habit there is given the illuminative formality of the object just explained, this formality must nonetheless derive its specific character from the same extrinsic principle from which the other effective formality of the same habit derives it; otherwise they would differ from each other really and specifically. But this latter formality of the habit presupposes the object integrally constituted in the character of an object, and draws its species from it so constituted. Therefore so also does the former.”
Salamanca again asserts shortly thereafter of the formal object sub quo in the objective sense (with which they are primarily concerned, as they explicitly state twice in that same section): “something upon which it may ultimately rest, and because of which it may extend firm assent to divinely revealed truths.” I again implore the reader to focus on what the state of the question is: we are inquiring after that upon which the intellect may rest in the assent to the fact of revelation, and because of which it may extend firm assent concerning the fact of revelation, i.e. that such and such books are the Word of God. Let us not shift the goalposts. The specificative function of the formal object is indeed important, but the causal function of moving the intellect to assent is also essential, and indeed, arguably more important to our present discussion. That chief means whereby the Papists not only know, but also believe that something has been revealed, is because the Church has declared it; as we may see from Francisco Marin Sola: “And the habit itself of faith inclines the mind to assent to the things proposed because God has so revealed. But we believe that this or that has been revealed, or revealed in this or that sense, because the Church so teaches.” (The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, pg. 301)
Perrone Quote
In the passage I originally quoted from Perrone (Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, Vol. II [Rome, 1853], pgs. 58-60, 64), there is one portion which the Ordo Essendi omitted from their response, which is the following: “It was therefore necessary that the Church—which, as has been said, was held by all the faithful to be infallible in its teaching—should make it certain, by its testimony, to each one who received them that such a book contained the truths preached by the Church, that it was indeed the work of the author to whom it was attributed, and finally that it was of divine dictation, that is, that the author was divinely inspired.”
On pgs 41-42, the authors say that Perrone is speaking only of the ordo cognitionis and not the order of believing, since he speaks of the Church’s role as “providing the certain knowledge necessary to accept them” and establishing certainty “in such a way that we can in no manner doubt.”
Here is the full quote from Perrone as cited in my original treatise: “If, then, faith in the divine mission of the Apostles—that is, of the teaching Church—is the first condition and first step in the process, without which it would have been useless to propose the object of preaching, as anyone can readily see, then once this was fully established and every doubt removed, the rest flowed naturally from it. For once it was proved that the man who presented himself to the peoples with a new doctrine had been sent by God for that purpose, and proved in a manner rendering his claim evidently credible, it followed that these peoples were bound to place unlimited trust in that divine envoy, and to believe by faith whatever was announced to them as coming from God…All this took place and was accomplished many years before any of the books of the New Testament were written; and therefore both the existence and the prerogatives of the Church, as well as all the other truths that constitute the sacred deposit of faith, are entirely independent of Scripture…When these books appeared, far from diminishing the previous authority of the Church in preaching to the peoples the truths it had received, this authority was more necessary than ever to give its sanction to these same books as they were published from time to time. For although these books were divine in themselves and contained divine teaching, this was not evident to those who received them. It was therefore necessary that the Church—which, as has been said, was held by all the faithful to be infallible in its teaching—should make it certain, by its testimony, to each one who received them that such a book contained the truths preached by the Church, that it was indeed the work of the author to whom it was attributed, and finally that it was of divine dictation, that is, that the author was divinely inspired…At the same time, however, we say that we need the testimony of the Church so that we may be made certain—certain to the point that we can have no doubt whatsoever—that these books, and no others, neither more nor less, are in every part the work of God, written under the inspiration of God, containing the word of God. Hence the testimony of the Church is extrinsic to the sacred books; it is given with respect to us, so that we may have the certain knowledge necessary to accept them, believe them, and venerate them as such.” (Perrone, Il protestantesimo e la regola di fede, Vol. II [Rome, 1853], pgs. 58-60, 64).
The highlighted portions here show that Perrone appears to have more of the ratio credendi in mind here, not simply the order of cognition. Recall the light analogy once again. Does light “give it sanction” to those visible objects which are seen? Obviously not. Does it bind a man to assent and recognize the objects which are seen, as the Church does for the objects of faith? We again answer in the negative–thus showing yet again how the authors’ analogy does not prove their case.
On pg 61, the authors state “The Church's infallibility is therefore not assented to by divine faith as a prior condition that then grounds the divine faith in Holy writ, as though the two were serially dependent in the manner the Dutchman supposes. Rather, both the Church's divinely assisted authority and the divine inspiration of Holy writ are simultaneously the material objects of one single act of divine faith, whose sole formal motive is Deus revelans. The iudicium credibilitatis disposes the intellect toward this single act without itself constituting it.There is no serial circle— prior faith in the Church grounding posterior faith in Scripture—because both are co-believed in a single act under the one formal motive.”
However, let’s apply this to the case of Perrone. He elsewhere also expresses the priority of the Church over Scripture in the act of divine faith as follows: “For since the Church, as we have shown, is prior and prescribes to all the books of the New Testament, how could their divine authority and origin have been demonstrated to the first faithful of Christ from testimonies drawn from those same books? Therefore, this must have become known to them from elsewhere—namely, from the motives of credibility, by which the truth of the Christian religion itself is established, with which the Church is identified. Now, once the truth and divine authority of the Catholic Church have first been securely established by those motives of belief, it is then from that same authority that we discern which books—whether of the Old Testament, which she learned from Christ, or of the New Testament, which she approved—are to be held as canonical and divine. In this process, as is evident, there can be no begging of the question nor any vicious circle.” (Giovanni Perrone, Praelectiones Theologicae, IX:72; emphasis mine).Again, note the language here carefully. Is the discernment Perrone mentions here “thinking with assent”, involving the affirmation (not mere perception) that such books are the Word of God? If so, then we are no longer merely in the ordo cognitionis, but rather in the question about the reasons for believing.
Furthermore, let us also behold what these men say on page 71: “Thus, there is indeed a gap—and it cannot be crossed by reason alone. The passage, however, is made possible by the concurrence of two elements: (1) Motives of Credibility (Dispositive Cause) and (2) Interior Grace (Elevating Cause). The former affords credence to the Church, by her visible marks, miracles, sanctity, and historical continuity, renders revelation credible. Wherefore the production is not faith properly so called, yea, a judgment of credibility (iudicium credibilitatis), namely: “It is reasonable to believe that God has spoken.” That, however, remains still within the order of reason. The latter concerns at this point, the invention of a new consideration, grace. For the almighty moves the intellect and will interiorly, in such a manner in accord with its nature, so not to add any new external evidence, rather now, by animate inclination of the intellect to assent under a new formal motive. Thus the intellect now assents, as we persistently maintain, solely on the basis of “God, who cannot deceive, has revealed,” and never because “the Church is credible.”
Note here that the question then becomes as to what causally moves the intellect to assent to the proposition “God, who cannot deceive, has revealed.” Will they say that it moves of itself, and without need of any further medium in the order of believing? This they cannot do, since they confess that the testimony of the Church is necessary in order that one may know what those books are which are divine revelation and inspired. Indeed, for the Papists, the formal object of faith, that which is believed as the reason for believing all other things, is not simply the authority of God revealing, but insofar as this is modified by Scripture, tradition, and the Church: “‘The formal object of faith with respect to us is no longer the First Truth, period; but the First Truth is so far as it is manifested in ... the teaching of the Church.’ Not solely the First Truth; not even the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition; but the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition but as understood and interpreted by the Church.” (Francisco Marin Sola, The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma, trans. Antonio T. Piñon [Santo Tomas University Press, 1988], pg. 299). I am once again that such writers as these stricter Thomists will seek to deny the language used by Durandus and Lugo. The point is that there is an inconsistency present.
The medium which objectively moves the intellect to assent to something is in some manner pre-known by the intellect, because the intellect is not moved except through knowledge, as Suarez correctly states. Since the formal object of faith moves and draws the intellect to assent to the material object, it must necessarily be pre-known by the intellect, or first perceived by the light of faith, before the material object. Therefore I first believe that God has revealed this, before I believe this is true, because God has revealed it—or divine revelation is the formal reason on account of which I believe this is true. Before one can believe upon the authority of God revealing as a formal motive moving them to the assent of faith, they must know what it is that God has revealed—but this, according to the Papists, is done only through the Church; and indeed, as we have demonstrated from their own sources, the Church is not only the means whereby they know which books are inspired, but also
Durandus Quote
The authors’ analysis of the Durandus quote is also completely flawed, and indeed departs from the way in which most other Thomists have understood Durandus in their responses to him. To say that Durandus is only considering a linear ordering of credible objects rather than the ratio credendi, the proper order of believing with regard to the ultimate resolution of faith, is to misread his own words. But see furthermore how Salamanca explains him when arguing against his reading:
Salmanticenses: “Durandus (in 3, dist. 24, quaest. 1, art. 1) must also be refuted, where he teaches that the first complex object of belief — which is the reason for believing other things and into which the resolution of all things to be believed ultimately terminates — is the infallible authority of the Church approving Sacred Scripture, that is, being guided by the Holy Spirit. This opinion, I say, is refuted first because the act of faith must be ultimately resolved into its per se moving principles. But the principle that per se moves to the act of faith is not that the Church is guided by the Holy Spirit, but the First Truth revealing obscurely — because we believe the Holy Spirit to govern the Church precisely because the First Truth has revealed this truth; otherwise this assent would not be one of theological faith, since it would not rest on divine testimony. Also because the faith of angels was of the same essential species as ours, yet it was in no way grounded on the proposition expressing the Church's direction, nor did it resolve its own acts into it as into the first object of belief. Second, because although the authority of the Church is the rule of what is to be believed with respect to us, that the Church is directed by the Holy Spirit is not the first object of belief with respect to us. The first object of belief with respect to us is rather that the First Truth has revealed the articles which we receive in the obedience of faith, as will be established below.” (Cursus theologicus, treatise XVII, Q. 1, disp. 1, dub. 5, §2)
Notice here that the ordering in which Durandus taught his view, according to Salamanca, is “the first complex object of belief, which is the reason for believing other things and into which the resolution of all things to be believed ultimately terminates.” It is thus clear that we are dealing with the ratio credendi here, not the medium cognoscendi, since he centers his discussion verbatim around “the reason for believing.” To think that is simply a linear discussion of credible objects and nothing more is quite frankly to do violence to Durandus. Hence the commonality of his position with Lugo and Franzelin is also seen, as we may see from Garrigou-Lagrange’s witness: “God’s authority is self-evidently known from the apprehension of the terms [of the given proposition], and the fact of revelation is known, at least obscurely, from miracles, which in a certain sense, are the voice of God. And this twofold knowledge, which of itself can be merely natural, would always de facto bring about supernatural faith in believers on account of God’s supernatural help. Thus, the Church’s proposing [of revelation], confirmed by miracles, according to Cardinal de Lugo, pertains to the formal motive of faith, and in this respect, he returned to Durandus’s doctrine. In the nineteenth century, Cardinal Franzelin followed de Lugo against Suarez.” (On Divine Revelation, Vol. 1, pg. 815 of the Internet Archive version).
The reason why the circle would occur for Durandus is when we inquire into the reason why one believes that “the Church is ruled by the Holy Spirit.” This is the ultimate resolution of faith for him, as a “reason for believing other things”, not merely “the first in an ordered series of material objects of belief”, as the authors try to water him down on page 49.
On pg 52, their citation of Durandus saying that a doctrine may be judged to be true based upon motives of credibility does not refute my point; because it is conceded by all that motives of credibility are not the resolution of divine faith with respect to either the authority of the Church or the authority of Scripture.
Franzelin Quote
On page 690, Franzelin writes: “If the testimony of the Church is understood with infallibility already supposed under the assistance of the Holy Spirit; certainly such authority of the Church cannot be either the necessary motive or the necessary condition for every act of faith. For this mode of infallibility and this assistance of the Holy Spirit cannot be known from internal reasons, but only believed through an act of faith on account of the authority of God revealing it.” This point is quite remarkable indeed, and once again confirms what I earlier said, namely that a Church’s authority established only upon motives of credibility cannot serve as the ground, motive, or condition for every act of faith unless it is first supposed that the Church is already accepted as having the infallible assistance of the Spirit based upon the authority of God revealing. In order for the Church to apply the object to be believed, as Papists assert, they must first tell us whence they gather the act of faith in the Church’s infallibility and perpetual divine assistance.
The Ordo Essendi also concludes near the bottom of page 59: “We may conclude therefore, the text of our blessed Franzelin–Tractatus de Divina Traditione et Scriptura–holds that the Church is indeed necessary, even infallibly so, for the proposition of revealed truth; yet she is never the formal reason why that truth is believed—as maintained by us staunchly.” However, it is not entirely clear to me that Franzelin so strictly presses the absolute necessity of the Church for faith. For example, on page 691: “For without doubt, with this infallibility of the Church not yet known to men, other articles of faith can be sufficiently proposed so that they can and are bound to believe them with divine faith. Nor is there reason why acts of divine faith should be denied to those who, without their own fault, nurtured in some sect, while they invincibly ignorant of this infallibility of the Church, nevertheless have other revealed truths sufficiently proposed through things and facts which, from the Church unknown to them and they themselves unaware, are derived to them. For such men, as long as they do not sin gravely against faith, and bear a ready disposition to believe any revelation whatsoever and therefore also the true Church, when it will be sufficiently proposed, and to follow it practically, are only materially heretics, but in disposition and habit are truly faithful.”
Jeremiah 23:28-31
On pg 55, they begin their rebuttal to me by saying “the contrast between wheat and chaff is, in its original context, a contrast between the true prophet’s word and the false prophet’s fabricated dream, and not a supposed contrast between Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition, which is a category entirely foreign to the pre-exilic prophetic context. For the Prophet opposes the true word of God—likened unto wheat—unto the lying dream—likened unto chaff—thereby establishing a formal antithesis betwixt verity and deceit, namely between utterances which, though professing to proceed from the Lord, stand in contradiction one unto another, and thereby betray their falsehood.” But I never claimed that the contrast Jeremiah was speaking of, being inspired by the Holy Ghost, was between Scripture and tradition. Indeed, such a false strawman as this is what these Papists build their house of sand upon in their desperation to escape the argumentative force of the Word of God, which is indeed so powerful in its efficacy as to convict the consciences of men.
Now first, that “wood” and “chaff” is a reference to that intrinsic efficacy and effects of these two revelations—one which is truly of God, and the other which only pretends to be so, at the mouth of lying false prophets—is evident from the usage of such terms elsewhere by the prophet. Consider the following texts from Jeremiah: “Wherefore thus saith the LORD God of hosts, Because ye speak this word, behold, I will make my words in thy mouth fire, and this people wood, and it shall devour them” (5:14); “Then I said, I will not make mention of him, nor speak any more in his name. But his word was in mine heart as a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary with forbearing, and I could not stay.” (20:9). It seems to be that these Papists have missed the point of the passage altogether, and my original writing concerning it. The point is that the Word of God, by its intrinsic divine power and manifest, manifests itself to be from the true God of Israel, and that such a thing as this was utterly lacking in the false prophecies of Jeremiah’s day.
Since I am focusing primarily on epistemological and Scriptural issues, and not on the patristic data, I will pass over that for the time being. I suppose it is only fair, considering that these men did not desire to address what I provided from Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata at all.
We may also consider how the Lord Jesus Christ Himself judged of this controversy, as to what that ultimate principle and means is whereby men are brought to true and divine faith. Consider these words from the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus: “ Then he said, I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldest send him to my father's house: For I have five brethren; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come into this place of torment. Abraham saith unto him, They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent. And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.” (Luke 16:27-31). The damned man in hell thought that a man rising from the dead, a marvelous motive of credibility indeed, would be sufficient to persuade man to such faith and devotion toward God, and all else that he might avoid the torments of everlasting damnation. But Abraham, who was in heaven, thought otherwise. For him, it is “Moses and the prophets” which are the appointed mens whereby men are brought to faith. It is here expressly rated to be of greater weight and efficacy toward faith than miracles such as the resurrection of the dead.
