The Civil Government's Authority Around the Church (Circa Sacra)

 

Every era of church history has some sort of doctrinal controversy which attaches itself to it, and earns a place in the collective consciousness of Christendom. We think of the 4th century controversies over Arianism and the Trinity, the 5th-7th century debates on Christology and the hypostatic union, and the Reformation-era debates on justification, liturgy, sacraments, Scripture and tradition, and the list goes on (it is a long one, too!). It seems that the one facing our generation is that of "Christian nationalism", a term which has come into popular usage in the past 5-10 years, particularly through the prodding of the media and groups of evangelicals which have bought into them (examples include Christianity Today, Russell Moore, Kristen du Mez, Michael Bird, Aimee Byrd, Tim Alberta, Samuel Perry, Andrew Whitehead, etc.) Most recently, a documentary was released titled God and Country. It was directed by Rob Reiner, a Jewish atheist. In this film, Moore, du Mez, and Jemar Tisby appear alongside militant atheist Andrew Seidel and progressive "Christians" to attack the perceived threat of Christian nationalism. Having watched this film myself, there is absolutely zero reckoning had with the evidence I present here, or any study of early American history and the beliefs of the Founding Fathers. This anecdotal story shows just how much this controversy has swept throughout the American church. Countless instances of slander have taken place. The phrase "Christian nationalism" has been around for some time, but one man in particular has helped bring into the forefront of the debate. 

In the fall of 2022, Dr. Stephen Wolfe, a Reformed believer with expertise in political philosophy, released his controversial work The Case for Christian Nationalism. Notably, it was published by Canon Press in Moscow, Idaho (those circles are practically known for nothing other than the angry reactions received from those on the outside!). This set off a storm of controversy in the Reformed world, and within evangelicalism at large. Whole books have been written in response to Wolfe. He and a few others figures have "linked arms" in this common cause for moving the goalposts, and broadening the Overton Window a bit. Such men include Joel Webbon, Andrew Isker, Doug Wilson, William Wolfe, Dusty Deevers, Timon Cline (an excellent writer at the American Reformer website), and many more. They have quite an active presence on Twitter/X. 

The purpose of this article is not to review Wolfe's book or provide an analysis of the Moscow Mood. I have issued comments against Doug Wilson's theology on my Facebook page, and don't have much interest in diving deeper into it at this stage. I will say this concerning Wolfe: Though I disagree with some of his conclusions, his overall method is sound and ought to be reckoned with more. Wolfe quotes the Reformed Scholastics and Puritans extensively in his book. For that, I commend him. I am also not here to give commentary on current political events or the Trump administration (though I am aware of the connections folks have made been Jan. 6 and Christian Nationalism). I am here to provide an explanation and defense of the Westminster Confession's teaching on the duties of the civil magistrate with regard to the matters of religion and the Church. 

I will state clearly here that I do not call myself a Christian Nationalist. I think the term is anachronistic, misleading, and causes unnecessary confusion which poses a distraction from discussing what is really important: a working outline of the relationship between church and state. I will be arguing from Scripture and the Reformed tradition.

A Summary of the Confessional Teaching

Given this article's scholastic nature, I will be using lots of distinctions and terminology. My aim to be as precise as possible, but in a way that is clear and compelling. I think it proper to begin by quoting two Reformed confessions and a treatise by the English divines of the Westminster Assembly:

“And their office is not only to have regard unto and watch for the welfare of the civil state, but also that they protect the sacred ministry, and thus may remove and prevent all idolatry and false worship; that the kingdom of antichrist may be thus destroyed and the kingdom of Christ promoted. They must, therefore, countenance the preaching of the word of the gospel everywhere, that God may be honored and worshipped by every one, as He commands in His Word. Moreover, it is the bounden duty of every one, of what state, quality, or condition soever he may be, to subject himself to the magistrates; to pay tribute, to show due honor and respect to them, and to obey them in all things which are not repugnant to the Word of God; to supplicate for them in their prayers, that God may rule and guide them in all their ways, and that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. Wherefore we detest the error of the Anabaptists and other seditious people, and in general all those who reject the higher powers and magistrates, and would subvert justice, introduce a community of goods, and confound that decency and good order which God hath established among men.” (The Belgic Confession, Article 36)

“Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the Word and sacraments; or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; yet he has authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administrated, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he has power to call synods, to be present at them and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God.” (The Westminster Confession of Faith [1646], ch. 23, sect. 3)

“Objective or objectively ecclesiastical, as being exercised about objects ecclesiastical, but politically, not ecclesiastically. His proper power is about [circa], not in religious matters [in sacra]. He may politically, outwardly exercise his power about objects or matters spiritual, but he may not spiritually, inwardly, formally act any power in the Church… in a word, his whole power about church offices and religion is merely, properly and formally civil or political.” (Jus Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici [London, 1646], pg. 77)

I should note in passing that I am well aware of the 1788 American revisions to chapter 23 of the Westminster Confession. I personally do not accept these revisions, and choose to be faithful to the original views of the Puritans and Reformers. However, the 1788 revisions still support the notion of the government supporting Christianity and godly morals. They will not be an aid to those whose primary goal is political correctness in the 21st century.

A constant phrase we will encounter in Reformed literature on church-state relations is "circa sacra", which literally means "around the sacred." This preposition "around" makes all the difference here. The civil magistrate has authority around the church, but not in the church. This will be more fully explicated below, along with weighty biblical evidence.

 The Reformed divines of the 16th and 17th centuries were incredibly careful to guard against the Erastian teaching of some of the high church Anglicans, which gave too much power to the English monarch in religious affairs, often resulting in the persecution of true believers (think of the 1662 Great Ejection or the Act of Uniformity during the Restoration reign of King Charles II). In those instances, some of the very men who wrote these words in the Westminster Confession were unjustly expelled from their pulpit by the government. That is one of the extreme dangers we must be on guard against in our study of this issue.

The Civil Magistrate’s Authority Circa Sacra

The civil magistrate is not a vice-regent of Christ who has received commission from Him to exercise acts of government in the church in His stead. This belongs only to the church officers, to whom Christ has committed the keys of the kingdom (Matthew 16:18-19; 18:15-18). Christ alone is the Head of His bride, the Church! This title, generally speaking, ought not be applied to the king or ruler of any godly nation. 

While the Reformed consistently deny (contra Erastianism) that the civil magistrate is the proper and formal subject/receptacle of ecclesiastical power, they do affirm, in agreement with Scripture, that the civil magistrate does have the care of certain external things pertaining to the church and the protection of the worship of the true God. We may distinguish and enumerate the following instances of such power as given to the Magistrate (as done by the English Presbyterians at Westminster):

[1.] The Civil Magistrate has a defensive power in protecting the church and the worship of the true God (Isaiah 49:23; 60:10; 1 Timothy 2:2) :—

(1) He removes all external impediments of the true religion. Examples of this in Scripture are King Asa (2 Chronicles 15:8, 16), Josiah (2 Kings 23:8-25), and Jehoshaphat (2 Chronicles 17:3-10).

  

(2) He may encourage the public exercise of Christ’s ordinances in the worship, discipline, and government of the Church, as King Jehoshaphat did (2 Chronicles 20:5-12). Moses commanded that the King of Israel be in conformity to the divine Law and study it continually (Deuteronomy 17:18-20). 

(3) The Magistrate helps provide the Church with any external necessities and provisions. Thus King Solomon set up the Temple (1 Chronicles 22), and King Hezekiah provides materials for the sacrificial offerings and vessels (2 Chronicles 29). It will not aid the Tolerationists to say that these acts were peculiar only to the kings of Israel and Judah, since the Gentile ruler Artaxerxes is commended by God for aiding in the rebuilding of the Temple after the Exile (Ezra 7:26-27). 

[2]. The Civil Magistrate has a didactic power which pertains to the good order and regulation of the Church: —

(1) He may help in the reformation of a corrupted church, as Moses did (Exodus 32), or King Josiah (2 Kings 23:1-26). 

(2) He can convene Ecclesiastical synods, as David did (1 Chronicles 13:1-2; 23:1-2), as well as Solomon (1 Kings 8:1). This example was followed by the pious emperors in the first four Ecumenical councils (Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, Chalcedon). 

“Firstly, in itself and intrinsically, it belongs to the Church; but to the Magistrate belongs the consent, not per se, but per accidens, namely, as a man with his circumstances, and relative to the polity in which the Church exists. The common reason is this: nature teaches that no assembly of people from various provinces of a kingdom or nation can be publicly held without the consent of the Magistrate, let alone from various kingdoms and nations. For it is in his interest to know who, what kind, and why they are gathering.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Politica Ecclesiasticae [Amsterdam, Joannes à Waesberge, 1663–1676], 1:190-191)

[3]. The Civil Magistrate has a compulsive and coercive power in some matters of religion: — He may punish church-officers who are subject to the government insofar as the minister is part of the civil state, and thus one of the magistrates’ subjects. Thus Solomon exiled the High Priest Abiathar for participating in Adonijah’s rebellion (1 Kings 2:26-27). This refutes the opinion of Papists who declare their clergy completely exempt from civil judgments. 

King James VI and I; an example of a godly Christian magistrate

A historical example of the circa sacra principle outside of Scripture would be the acts of the Scottish Parliament during the early reign of King James VI in the year 1567. Acts were made against fornication, Popery, atheists in government, etc.

This power of the Magistrate should never hinder the proper powers and liberties of the Church. For example, the Magistrate may not hinder the church from convening synods herself (as in Acts 15). 

From this we see that there is a distinction between that which is formally ecclesiastical and that which is objectively ecclesiastical (but formally civil). There is a power circa sacra which belongs to the Magistrate with respect to ecclesiastical things in their civil formality. This distinction was taught by the unanimous testimony of our Reformed divines, of which the following examples may suffice:

“Authority concerning the Church and religion is not of a single kind. Some authority pertains only objectively, while other authority is formally ecclesiastical. Objective authority relates to matters and persons of the Church as its objects. Formal ecclesiastical authority does not concern only the object but also the manner in which it is exercised—ecclesiastically rather than politically. The first type of authority belongs to one who defends the Church, supports good pastors, restrains the wicked, ensures the external order of the Church, preserves both tablets of the Divine Law, and strives, as far as possible, to sanctify God's name among his subjects and to propagate Christ’s Kingdom. The second type of authority belongs to one who preaches the Gospel, resolves controversies based on the Word of God, administers the Sacraments, ordains pastors, exercises discipline over the sacred flock, prescribes sacred rites, and establishes spiritual laws according to the norm of Divine Law. These two types of authority differ greatly. The former belongs to this world and is subordinate to God’s universal kingdom in this world. The latter is not of this world and serves Christ’s Mediatorial Kingdom. The former is armed with the sword and operates coercively. The latter is ministerial, acts under a foreign command, and employs spiritual penalties, which are not civil punishments but rather fraternal corrections.” (Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae [Tiguri: Ex Officina Heideggeriana, 1732], Vol. 2, ch. 27, pg. 626)

“XV. Ecclesiastical power is either internal, direct and formal, occupied with the administration and exercise of sacred things (such as the preaching of the word, the administration of the sacraments and the dispensation of the keys); or external [literally, extrinsic], indirect and only objective (such as is concerned with sacred things, as to procurement and disposition, that all things be done decently and in order in the house of God). The first belongs to pastors alone… the latter belongs to Christian magistrates and princes, inasmuch as they ought to be the guardians of both tables; as in a well-regulated family the father disposes and arranges all things, the execution and performance of which belongs to the domestics…” (Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3:316)

“That it has a coercive, supreme, and formal power specifically over ecclesiastical persons, matters, actions, and causes—not in themselves or as such, but insofar as they pertain to this present world, to the external man, and to external, natural, or civil goods. That is, inasmuch as these matters are externally linked to the public or private affairs of the Republic, whether they are to be tolerated or not tolerated, established or not established, defended or not defended, whether obstacles to them should be removed or not removed, and whether they should be secured or not secured by public authority.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Politicae Ecclesiasticae, 1:131)

The Magistrate does have power to command the Church to do her civil duty. Thus he and the Church have command over the same objects, but for the magistrate it exists insofar as the object is formally civil; for the Church it is considered in the respect of it being formally spiritual and ecclesiastical. In 2 Kings 23:4, 21, 25, we read “4 And the king [Josiah] commanded Hilkiah the high priest, and the priests of the second order, and the keepers of the door, to bring forth out of the temple of the Lord all the vessels that were made for Baal, and for the grove, and for all the host of heaven: and he burned them without Jerusalem in the fields of Kidron, and carried the ashes of them unto Bethel….21 And the king commanded all the people, saying, Keep the passover unto the Lord your God, as it is written in the book of this covenant….25 And like unto him was there no king before him, that turned to the Lord with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his might, according to all the law of Moses; neither after him arose there any like him.”

In 1 Chronicles 13:1-5, we read “And David consulted with the captains of thousands and hundreds, and with every leader. 2 And David said unto all the congregation of Israel, If it seem good unto you, and that it be of the Lord our God, let us send abroad unto our brethren everywhere, that are left in all the land of Israel, and with them also to the priests and Levites which are in their cities and suburbs, that they may gather themselves unto us: 3 And let us bring again the ark of our God to us: for we enquired not at it in the days of Saul. 4 And all the congregation said that they would do so: for the thing was right in the eyes of all the people. 5 So David gathered all Israel together, from Shihor of Egypt even unto the entering of Hemath, to bring the ark of God from Kiriath-jearim.” 

From these two scriptural examples of Kings David and Josiah, we see that the Christian Magistrate has the biblically-warranted authority to command the Church to perform their proper duties insofar as they are outward duties in the external civil realm under his jurisdiction. However, he does not, as the magistrate, command these duties insofar as they are the spiritual ordinances instituted by Christ, such as preaching the Word, the administration of the sacraments, and excommunication. On the converse side, he does not prohibit sin as sin and under pain of eternal wrath (the Church does this), but insofar as it is externally damaging and scandalous to the State and disturbs the peace and good order thereof (Samuel Rutherford, The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication [London: John Field, 1646], pg. 550)

What about cases in which the Magistrate is not a Christian, but an unbeliever? He still does have a regal power to rule over Christian men. He cannot command Christian duties per accidens, because he will not do so (although not wanting the power thereof per se). Christians were to respect and submit to heathen magistrates in all things lawful (1 Peter 2:17), just as the people of God submitted to Cyrus, Nebuchadnezzar, and Darius. Paul prays for all civil leaders (1 Tim. 2:1-3). 

As said, the material objects of church and state with regard to religion and morals are the same, but they are considered under different forms. The church and the magistrate both may punish incest; the church does so in an ecclesiastical and spiritual manner, while the magistrate may justly execute a bodily punishment for such crimes. Thus magistrates’ lawful rulings may be called the affairs of God (2 Chronicles 19:6). The Magistrate and the Church can command or forbid one and the same thing. However, the manner of this commanding is different, since we are dealing with two types of power (civil and spiritual): 

“And the King as the King, his end is edification and spiritual good of souls also, but always by a kingly power, and in a coactive way, by the sword, whereas the Church, are in their care of edifying souls, to use no such carnal weapons in their warfare, 2 Cor. 10:4.” (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries, Pt. II, sect. 5, ch. 6)

“The spiritual and ecclesiastical nature of a thing, as such, is not the immediate or per se object of political power and direction, whether it be called architectonic or ministerial. But what is adjunct to that spiritual aspect (namely, human action, place, time, civil qualities, relations, known and open assemblies of the faithful, public or private administration of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, admitting and defending) is the per se and immediate object of political power as such. And thus consequently the spiritual thing itself is called the object of the same power, but mediately, indirectly, and per accidens. In the same way, color or something colored as such is the direct, immediate, and per se object of vision; but the son of Darius is an indirect, mediate, and per accidens object. For it happens that the son of Darius occurs to me here and now and is seen by me.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Politica Ecclesiasticae, 1:150)

All of this evidence from Scripture and Reformed history is a stumbling block in the way of those who pronounce unqualified warnings against “Christian nationalism” with vague terminology and who slap this label upon anyone who wishes to go beyond the elementary-level ideas of the “separation of church and state” and “liberty of conscience.” As I said earlier, the historic Reformed position to which I adhere is not the same as the theonomic and theocratic vision of Doug Wilson and the aptly named “Moscow Mood.” Those who would critique me must honor that difference.

I desire to see more reckoning with this material from the popular-level figures of evangelicalism who currently are on a rampage against the possibility of Christian nations. If they wish to condemn us, they will have to condemn all of the confessions and names I have mentioned above, the old Puritans they quote in their sermons will be thrown under the bus as well. On top of that, they are setting themselves against the righteous kings of Israel and Judah, who did not adhere to “toleration” and strict separationist ideas (the so-called “American experiment”; albeit I have shown in other articles that our founders thought of the U.S. an Anglo-Protestant nation with broad support for Christian religion), but instead honored the Lord in their rule, punished idolaters, and upheld both Tables of the Law. Were they Christian Nationalists? We cannot say. It is anachronistic to impose such terminology upon them. But what does Scripture tell us of these men? It says they did what was “right in the eyes of the Lord.” (1 Kings 15:11; 22:43; 2 Chronicles 14:2; 20:32; 24:2; 31:20-21; 34:2).  

[End note: I give much credit to Travis Fentiman of Reformed Books Online. He has numerous pages providing a wealth of Reformed and Puritan writings on this subject, and has himself written an excellent treatise on it]

A Brief Explanation and Defense of General Equity

 

Defining Law in General

“Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action.” (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, intro., sect. 2)

“Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (I-II:1:1 ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason..” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-I, Q. 90, art. 1)

“Even if, in fact, all just laws come from God, and have been established by the eternal reason of his will and even if in this respect, they are all divine, still because of the variety of people and of methods by which they have been revealed and spread, they occur in three types: natural law, human laws, and divine laws.” (Jerome Zanchius, On the Law in General, trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra [Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Library Press, 2012], pg. 8)

The chief end of law is towards the common good of the people. The chief cause of obligation is the supreme will of God, as James Wilson said. The genus and specific difference of law is that it is an ordering of reason toward the common good of the community. This ordering of reason consists in 1) the reason of the one who orders; 2) the reason of those who are government; 3) the very reason of ordering between both. 

We can divided the law into the eternal law of God, or laws established in time. The former is defined by Junius as “the immutable concept and form of reason existing in God.” (Franciscus Junius, The Mosaic Polity, trans. Todd M. Rester [Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Library Press, 2015], 42). The latter are divided into natural laws and human laws. By "human laws", we mean those positive statutes of nations and courts throughout history. This would include "common law", i.e. the unwritten precedents of law, especially in England's history (as a key example). 

The positive laws of nations and political laws are, or at least should be, derived from the principles of natural law. This may be seen in the distinction between the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. For example, take a law in which a besieged city is not allowed to open the city gates. The spirit of this law is for protection against a hostile enemy. But if in the case of a battle, they did not open the city gates to that nation’s soldiers and they were all slaughtered outside, then this would be a violation of the spirit of the law.

“The law of nature is immutable; not by the effect of an arbitrary disposition, but because it has its foundation in the nature, constitution, and mutual relations of men and things.” (James Wilson, Lectures on Law, part 1, ch. 3)

The Judicial Laws of Moses

The written law has three basic parts: commands, promises, and threats.

Leviticus 19 is an example of a passage containing moral (vv. 11-13), ceremonial (vv. 5-8), and judicial laws (vv. 9-10). 

Moses himself teaches some type of distinction between the Ten Commandments and other laws in Deuteronomy 4:13-14: “And he declared unto you his covenant, which he commanded you to perform, even ten commandments; and he wrote them upon two tables of stone. And the Lord commanded me at that time to teach you statutes and judgments, that ye might do them in the land whither ye go over to possess it.”

In a civil state or commonwealth, laws are made with respect to four social categories: —

1) Between the Magistrates and the citizens

2) Between the citizens themselves (a few examples, among many, would be Num. 31:33-34; Exodus 21-22; Leviticus 19:13; Deuteronomy 19:4-7, 15-21)

3) Within the household (the most basic societal unit), between husbands and wives, masters and servants, parents and children.

4) Between citizens and foreigners.

The Jewish state and its government contained a mixture of monarchy and aristocracy.. It had monarchy in that the Lord chose one man to represent the people of Israel (Deut. 17:15; Num. 27:16), as with Moses and Joshua, and then the kings during the period of division between Israel and Judah. It also had aristocracy in terms of there being the ruling 72 elders over the people. Deuteronomy 1:15 says “So I took the leaders of your tribes, wise and reputable individuals, and installed them as leaders over you.” Deuteronomy 16:18 shows that these leaders were to be native Israelites from among the people, and not foreigners.

In the judicial laws of Moses, the principle and end of the laws is divine and immutable, however their matter and form may be mutable.

In the immutable part of political laws (and therefore the Mosaic judicial laws) we distinguish the origin, object, and end. The origin is that from which the law flows as its proper source, and the object is that which the law regulates. 

Franciscus Junius cites the warnings against familial idolatry (Deut. 13:6-8) and the administration of the death penalty to witches (Exodus 22:18) as examples of immutable laws, since they proceed from pure and unalterable principles, namely that the Lord alone is to be worshiped and invoked. Furthermore, in the case of punishing witches, Scripture tells that the end of such laws is the glory of God (Deut. 18:12-13). Therefore, there is a perpetual obligation of the moral equity in such a law. 

There are particular determinations in the judicial laws of Moses that are mutable. In particular, laws are mutable if they were made to Jews insofar as they were Jews, as distinct from common and natural law which was made to them as a human nation like others. 

For example, it is part of the common law of nations and the light of Nature that theft should be punished by the civil magistrate, however the specific manner or degree of that punishment may vary according to circumstances. In the Mosaic law, one such penalty for a man who stole livestock (such as an ox or sheep) was that the offender would restore five oxen to the person he stole from (Exodus 22:1-4). However, this specific penalty is not binding on all nations today, though the principle of punishing theft (generally considered) is obviously binding. 

Samuel Rutherford made a strong case for why the moral law binds the civil magistrate to punish arch-heretics and false prophets who seduce others to their eternal perdition (I hope to address the civil punishment of heretics in another post soon, Lord willing). The seduction of souls is an act against the moral law. Hence, the New Testament warns us against such people (Matt. 7:5; Rom. 16:17). The punishment of such wicked men pertains to the moral law and has perpetual obligation. The punishment of it also pertains to natural law, hence Job, a Gentile, could say that it was to be punished by the judge (Job 31:26-28). In general, the promotion of the worship of the true God pertains to the light of nature, hence it was justly done by Gentile kings such as Darius (Daniel 3:29) and Artaxerxes (Ezra 7:26-27). Even pagan and heathen nations punished public atheism (Plato, Laws, Book 10, 884a). 

Reformed divines also explained that the Judicial Law can be considered in three different respects:

“The judicial law is entirely abrogated [1] so far as it concerns the distinction of Jews from Gentiles, and the typical signification of the kingdom of Christ. However, [2] as far as it concerns a form of civil government, it is abrogated in some particular aspects. For whatever was a particular proper right, such as peculiarly concerned the Jews, of which sort was the law concerning the office of the Levites, as another concerning inheritances not being transferred from one tribe to another, all of this kind have ceased. But [3] insofar as it concerned common right, enacted according to the law of nature for all men together, of which sort are the laws concerning the punishments for crimes, these same judicial laws all remain.” (Johann Heinrich Alting, Scriptorum Theologicorum Heidelberensium: Tomus Primus [1646], pg. 112)

“Therefore the judicial laws of Moses according to the substance and scope thereof must be distinguished . . . . . Some of them are laws of particular equity, some of common equity. Laws of particular equity, are such as prescribe justice according to the particular estate and condition of the Jews’ Commonwealth and to the circumstances thereof . . . . . Of this kind was the law, that the brother should raise up seed to his brother, and many such like: and none of them bind us, because they were framed and tempered to a particular people. Judicials of common equity, are such as are made according to the law or instinct of nature common to all men: and these in respect of their substance, bind the consciences not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles: for they were not given to the Jews as they were Jews, that is, a people received into the Covenant above all other nations, brought from Egypt to the land of Canaan, . . . but they were given to them as they were mortal men subject to the order and laws of nature as all other nations are.” (William Perkins, A Discourse of Conscience [1596], pg. 17)

A concrete biblical example in the New Testament of the principle of general equity can be seen in the words of the Apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 9, concerning payments given to the ministers of the Gospel:

“Or is it only Barnabas and I who have no right to refrain from working for a living? 7 Who serves as a soldier at his own expense? Who plants a vineyard without eating any of its fruit? Or who tends a flock without getting some of the milk? 8 Do I say these things on human authority? Does not the Law say the same? 9 For it is written in the Law of Moses, “You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain.” Is it for oxen that God is concerned? 10 Does he not certainly speak for our sake? It was written for our sake, because the plowman should plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of sharing in the crop. 11 If we have sown spiritual things among you, is it too much if we reap material things from you? 12 If others share this rightful claim on you, do not we even more? Do you not know that those who are employed in the temple service get their food from the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in the sacrificial offerings? 14 In the same way, the Lord commanded that those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel.” (1 Corinthians 9:8-14)

Thus the apostle Paul brings forth a judicial law of Moses, takes the general principle of ethics therein, and applies to ministers under the New Testament as an argument for stipends. Notice verses 9 and 10 - "Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he not certainly speak for our sake?". Paul explicitly says that the judicial laws were "written for our sake", and not only for the Jews. However, he is not teaching theonomy (as seen in figures like R.J. Rushdoony, Greg Bahnsen, or Doug Wilson), since he also says that the positive and particular circumstances of the law do not apply ("Is it for oxen that God is concerned?"), but rather the general principle therein. 

Ignatius of Antioch and the Office of the Episcopate

While on his way to being martyred in Rome, St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch wrote seven letters to various churches (these seven epistles are regarded by most scholars today as being his authentic ones). He speaks of bishops and presbyters on a number of occasions in his addresses. His remarks are always studied by any divine seeking to better understand church polity, particularly given his early date and comprehensiveness in speaking of the distinct offices (but as we will see, not distinct orders) of bishop, presbyter, and deacon. In the 19th century, disputes raged over the authenticity of the Ignatian epistles, but their genuine nature was forcefully argued and defended by John Lightfoot, who has edited a version of the Apostolic Fathers. I have not dug into these disputes and have always assumed and believed in the reliability of the seven epistles traditionally ascribed to Ignatius of Antioch, and I have not seen anything in them which would move me to have reason for serious doubt. 

Ignatius' remarks on the government of the early church are numerous and profound. The following passages are the ones most commonly brought forward by the advocates of episcopacy:

“See that you all follow the bishop, even as Jesus Christ does the Father, and the presbytery [priesthood] as you would the apostles; and reverence the deacons, as being the institution of God. Let no man do anything connected with the Church without the bishop. Let that be deemed a proper Eucharist, which is [administered] either by the bishop, or by one to whom he has entrusted it. Wherever the bishop shall appear, there let the multitude [of the people] also be; even as, wherever Jesus Christ is, there is the Catholic [Universal] Church. It is not lawful without the bishop either to baptize or to celebrate a love-feast; but whatsoever he shall approve of, that is also pleasing to God, so that everything that is done may be secure and valid.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Smyrnaeans, ch. 8) “It is therefore befitting that you should in every way glorify Jesus Christ, who has glorified you, that by a unanimous obedience you may be perfectly joined together in the same mind, and in the same judgment, and may all speak the same thing concerning the same thing, 1 Corinthians 1:10 and that, being subject to the bishop and the presbytery, you may in all respects be sanctified.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. 2) “Wherefore it is fitting that you should run together in accordance with the will of your bishop, which thing also you do. For your justly renowned presbytery, worthy of God, is fitted as exactly to the bishop as the strings are to the harp.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. 5) “Now the more any one sees the bishop keeping silence, the more ought he to revere him. For we ought to receive every one whom the Master of the house sends to be over His household, Matthew 24:45 as we would do Him that sent him. It is manifest, therefore, that we should look upon the bishop even as we would upon the Lord Himself.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians, ch. 6) “It is therefore necessary that, as you indeed do, so without the bishop you should do nothing, but should also be subject to the presbytery, as to the apostle of Jesus Christ, who is our hope, in whom, if we live, we shall [at last] be found.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Trallians, ch. 2) “In like manner, let all reverence the deacons as an appointment of Jesus Christ, and the bishop as Jesus Christ, who is the Son of the Father, and the presbyters as the sanhedrin of God, and assembly of the apostles. Apart from these, there is no Church.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Trallians, ch. 3) “Be on your guard, therefore, against such persons. And this will be the case with you if you are not puffed up, and continue in intimate union with Jesus Christ our God, and the bishop, and the enactments of the apostles. He that is within the altar is pure, but he that is without is not pure; that is, he who does anything apart from the bishop, and presbytery, and deacons, such a man is not pure in his conscience.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Trallians, ch. 7) “which I salute in the blood of Jesus Christ, who is our eternal and enduring joy, especially if [men] are in unity with the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons, who have been appointed according to the mind of Jesus Christ, whom He has established in security, after His own will, and by His Holy Spirit.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Philadelphians, ch. 1) “I exhort you to study to do all things with a divine harmony, while your bishop presides in the place of God, and your presbyters in the place of the assembly of the apostles, along with your deacons, who are most dear to me, and are entrusted with the ministry of Jesus Christ, who was with the Father before the beginning of time, and in the end was revealed.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. 6) “As therefore the Lord did nothing without the Father, being united to Him, neither by Himself nor by the apostles, so neither do anything without the bishop and presbyters.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. 7)

All of the above quotations are the main ones cited by the advocates of jure divino episcopacy. But they do not help their cause. For though Ignatius does indeed speak of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, he nowhere says that the first two are distinct orders of the Christian ministry. We have seen earlier that a single minister presiding over others is not in principle contrary to the polity of the Reformed churches; this is most clearly seen in the case of the superintendent’s ministry within the Church of Scotland. 

Indeed, it appears that the bishop in Ignatius’ writings presided over a single congregation rather than an entire diocese:

“It is not lawful without the bishop either to baptize or to celebrate a love-feast; but whatsoever he shall approve of, that is also pleasing to God, so that everything that is done may be secure and valid.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Smyrnaeans, ch. 8) 

To Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, Ignatius says: “Let not widows be neglected. Be, after the Lord, their protector and friend. Let nothing be done without your consent; neither do anything without the approval of God, which indeed you do not, inasmuch as you are steadfast.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to St. Polycarp, ch. 4)

“When Ignatius speaks of the church at worship, with the episkopos at the center, surrounded by a crown of presbyters, the picture that may readily be derived is one of a single domestic Christian community, like that of Apostolic Church Order.” (Alistair Stewart, The Original Bishops: Office and Order in the First Christian Communities [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014], pg. 265)

Ignatius also asserts that presbyters succeed the apostles, and that this is one of the grounds of the church’s submission to their authority:

“Since therefore I have, in the persons before mentioned, beheld the whole multitude of you in faith and love, I exhort you to study to do all things with a divine harmony, while your bishop presides in the place of God, and your presbyters in the place of the assembly of the apostles, along with your deacons, who are most dear to me, and are entrusted with the ministry of Jesus Christ.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. 6)

“It is therefore necessary that, as you indeed do, so without the bishop you should do nothing, but should also be subject to the presbytery, as to the apostle of Jesus Christ, who is our hope, in whom, if we live, we shall [at last] be found.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Trallians, ch. 2)

“See that you all follow the bishop, even as Jesus Christ does the Father, and the presbytery as you would the apostles; and reverence the deacons, as being the institution of God.” (Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Smyrnaeans, ch. 8)

How does Felix Cirlot respond to all of this? He insists that if we are to take Ignatius as teaching a presbyteral succession, then we must also confess the bishop to succeed Christ (Apostolic Succession: Is It True?, pgs. 611-612). Yet I respond that no such inference need be made here from this desperate attempt of Cirlot to evade Ignatius’ clear words. For though Ignatius does indeed confess some degree of preeminence of the bishop (though not a distinction of order, which is what must be proved), he is talking here about the obedience owed to Christian ministers. It is sufficient for us that he says that the church ought to follow the presbyters as those who preside “in place of” the apostles. 

As for Ignatius himself, Alistair Stewart is correct to point that the fractured nature of the Christian communities of Antioch at the time of his epistles makes it difficult to see him as a monoepiskopos over that area (The Original Bishops, pgs. 259-60). It was unlikely for Jewish and Gentile congregations at this time to recognize such a leader over them. 

We may also consider under the evidence of Ignatius his interactions with Polycarp of Smyrna. We do know that Ignatius refers to him as an episkopos (Epistle to Polycarp, ch. 1; Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. 15). Yet the case becomes a little less clear in light of Polycarp addressing his greeting to the church of Philippi with “Polycarp and his fellow presbyters.” (Polycarp, Epistle to the Philippians). Commenting on this, Allen Brent writes:

“The letter begins: ‘Polycarp and his fellow-presbyters.’ Though these words seem to indicate Polycarp’s de facto pre-eminence, they do not seem to suggest that he held an office distinct from the presbyterate that he could exercise de jure, as Ignatius’ claims about the bishop’s office would require.” (Allen Brent, “The Enigma of Ignatius of Antioch,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 57 [2006], pg. 433)

Alistair Stewart does indeed go a bit further than Brent wishes in terms of recognizing the primacy and leadership of Polycarp amongst the Christians of Smyrna. However, Stewart clarifies his position acutely: “If federation is a reality at Smyrna, there is no reason why he should not indeed be an episkopos, although his episkope is exercised within a single congregation…Although Polycarp comes to him and is recognized by Ignatius as an episkopos, it is clear that other households came to him, as they receive mention by name and greetings. The fact that other families visit him is an indication that there are multiple households in Smyrna and loose central organization. Again this implies that Polycarp may be an episkopos, but not that he is the monoepiskopos. Rather he is simply an episkopos among others in the Smyrnaean ecclesiastical community, and it is as a household episkopos that he visits Ignatius. Irenaeus, moreover,who was in a position refers to him as an episkopos.” (Alistair Stewart, The Original Bishops: Office and Order in the First Christian Communities [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014], pgs. 208-209)

“However, Ignatius is not clear. His language reflects the realities of a single domestic congregation; with a single episkopos and gathered presbyters, his vision, as [Allen] Brent reminds us, is liturgical rather than juridical, and the idea that Ignatius is encouraging Polycarp to become a monoepiskopos is predicated on the basis that collective leadership is more original than individual (the old consensus), and that reference to a sole bishop must be reference to a monoepiskopos rather than to a domestic leader. Clearly, Polycarp is no monoepiskopos.” (The Original Bishops, pg. 212)

Allen Brent’s most thorough treatment of the ecclesiology of the Ignatian corpus can be found in his paper “The Ignatian Epistles and the Threefold Ecclesiastical Order.” (The Journal of Religious History, Vol. 17, No. 1 [June 1992], 18-32). Based on several passages from Ignatius, Brent shows that he views the corporate personality of the church being spiritually united and represented in the bishop, presbyters, and deacons. 

“The Magnesians he sees through ‘Damas your god-worthy bishop and the worthy presbyters Bassus and Apollonius, and my fellow slave, the deacon Zotion’ (Epistle to the Magnesians, 2). In these aforementioned persons, he claims to ‘see and have communion fellowship with your whole gathered church’ (Epistle to the Mag., 6.1). ‘Polybius your bishop’ reveals to Ignatius the ‘unwavering and blameless mind’ of the Trallians, and gives him such joy that he ‘sees their whole gathered church in him’ (Epistle to the Trallians, 1.1.” (Allen Brent, “The Ignatian Epistles and the Threefold Ecclesiastical Order,” pg. 20)

For Brent, Ignatius is thinking not in terms of strict ecclesiastical government, but in terms of an apocalyptic or visionary view of the church in its liturgical state:

“Just as, given the visionary nature of his description and the physical restrictions of his imprisonment, Ignatius’ evidence for the actual church Order of the churches of Asia to whom he wrote must be questioned, so must his evidence regarding the Roman community. His epistle to the Romans cannot be used against the existence of a bishop at Rome at this time any more than the letters to the churches of Asia can be used in favour of there being single-bishops there. Ignatius is not purporting to describe a situation but rather, as argued here, the literary form of his work is that of a vision.” (Allen Brent, “The Ignatius Epistles and the Threefold Ecclesiastical Order,” pg. 28)

I think Stewart has some forceful reasons for thinking the Ignatian episkopos is more akin to a congregational leader. At the same time, we should take into account that Ignatius sometimes names the bishop, e.g. Onesimus in his Epistle to the Ephesians. However, I don't see this as excluding Stewart's interpretation. We should also consider Allen Brent's argument that Ignatius is thinking in more apocalyptic terms rather than laying out a policy or form of ecclesiastical government. This would seem to make sense with the "mystical" tone in which Ignatius talks about church leaders. 

Presbyters in Alexandria and the Right to Ordain

 

It is my contention that the strongest evidence for a historical defense of presbyterian ordination is to be sought in the city of Alexandria, which placed its apostolic origins at the feet of St. Mark. According to Eusebius, Annianus was the first bishop, and names Kerdon, Primus, Justus, and Keladion as some of the successors (Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 3.21; 4.4; 4.19). 

Alistair Stewart is correct to point out that “it is noteworthy that nothing is said within the Mark legend of Mark’s death, implying a certain uncertainty on Eusebius’ part as to how it is that Annanius comes to be bishop.” (The Original Bishops: Office and Order in the First Christian Communities [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014], pg. 189)

A recently discovered Ethiopian text constitutes a strong piece of early evidence for the cause of presbytery:

“Māriqos Evangelist entered [Alexandria] on the seventh year of Neronǝs; he appointed 12 presbyters and seven deacons, and he gave them the following rule: A[ft]er the bishop of [Alexandria] has died, the presbyters will gather and they will lay their hands in the faith of God upon the one, among them, that they all will have selected, and thus they will appoint him as their bishop, at the presence of the corpse of the dead bishop. is doctrine has remained for the bishops whom they elect among the presbyters, from ʾAniyānos until the blessed Ṗeṭros, who is the sixteenth bishop of [Alexandria] is happened, not because there was any preference for the juridical principle that the presbyters should <appoint> — this had not been granted — yet because, on the contrary, a bishop had not yet been appointed for every region. After the blessed Ṗeṭros, it was established that the appointment of those to be appointed would be done by the bishops.” (Historia Episcopatus Alexandriae, 4th century text, Aksumite Collection, Collection Σ, fol. 5r)

I have yet to any response to this. Alistair Stewart never addresses it in his work, nor any other writers against presbyteral ordination that I have studied (such as Felix Cirlot's magnum opus Apostolic Succession: Is It True?). They are to be excused for this of course, since this Ethiopian text's publication is relatively recent. However, it ought to send a shock wave against those who question Jerome's reliability in this regard, to which we now briefly turn. 

The most famous testimony on this quote is from Jerome, who wrote “At Alexandria, from Mark the Evangelist until Heraklas and Dionysius, the bishops, the presbyters always elected one from themselves, and put him in a higher rank, and named him bishop.” (Jerome, Epistle 146). Those who seek to answer Jerome by having him to speak only of presbyters electing a bishop, to the exclusion of ordination, fight against themselves and Jerome’s own words. He here distinguishes the duties of the Alexandrian presbyters to elect the bishop and “put him in a higher rank, and name[d] him bishop.” This latter action must be something different from election (lest we reduce the words of Jerome to a tautology). If it is not ordination and the conferral of office, then what is it?

A smaller source is from the Apophthegmata Patrum (The Sayings of the Desert Fathers). A group of Arians approached Poemon the anchorite and contend that the archbishop of Alexandria was ordained by presbyters (PG 65:341B). 

There are also two significant pieces of later evidence beginning with Severus of Antioch (arguably the most well-known of the Monophysites) in the mid 6th century.

[1]. "And the bishop also of the city renowned for its orthodox faith, the city of the Alexandrines, used in former days to be appointed by presbyters; but in later times in accordance with the canon which has prevailed everywhere the solemn institution of their bishop has come to be performed by the hand of bishops, and no one contemns the strictness which prevails in the holy churches and has recourse to the former practices, which have yielded to the later clear, strict, approved, and spiritual ordinance." (Severus of Antioch, “Letter 93,” in The Sixth Book of the Select Letters of Severus, patriarch of Antioch [London: Text and Translation Society, 1903], 2:213)

Severus must be here speaking of the early Egyptian presbyters performing ordination, or else his testimony is made into a complete absurdity. For clearly the later canonical practice of ordination by bishops is put by Severus into an antithesis against the early practice of appointment by Alexandrian presbyters. Otherwise, what is so special an unique about the role which Severus ascribes to presbyters? These ministers had a power which 

[2]. “The evangelist Mark appointed, together with the Patriarch Ananias, twelve other priests who could support him (in his ministry) and that, at the patriarch’s death, could appoint, instead of him, one of the twelve, while the other eleven placed their hands on his head, blessing him and consecrating him patriarch. Their task was then to choose a man of proven virtue, and to order him priest with them instead of the one that had been made patriarch, so that they were always twelve in number. The twelve priests of Alexandria continued to elect the Patriarch, following this rule, choosing him among the twelve priests, until the time of Alexander, Patriarch of Alexandria, who was one of three hundred and eighteen. In fact, he forbade the priests to elect a patriarch and also ordered that, on the occasion of the death of the patriarch, the bishops should gather together and elect the patriarch. He also ordered that, on the occasion of the death of the patriarch, they elect a man of proven virtue of whatever country, either one of the twelve priests or another that they had been found worthy, and consecrate him patriarch. It was thus interrupted the old rule that the priests were the ones who had to elect the patriarch, and the election went to the bishops.” (Eutychius of Alexandria, Eutychii Annales, in Eutychii Patriarchae Alexandrini Annales. Pars Prior, ed. L. Cheikho [Beryti-Parisiis, 1906], pp. 95, l. 13–96, l. 3; see also PL 111:982)

From the underlined portion of this text, we conclude that the Alexandrian presbyters ordained both their patriarch, and the priest who was to take his place after the installation of the former. 

In all of these sources, there is disagreement as to when monoepiscopal system became established in the Alexandrian church. Severus of Antioch and Eutychius placed it around the time of Alexander (the well-known bishop who first excommunicated Arius). That would place it in the beginning of the 4th century. In modern scholarship, this opinion is followed by W. Telfer (“Episcopal Succession in Egypt,” in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, Vol. 3, no. 1 [January 1952], pg. 11). Jerome says it emerged during the episcopacy of Heraklas and Dionysius (this would be around AD 232-264 if we were to include both reigns together). 

Some today have proposed that Demetrius (AD 189-232) ought to be regarded as the first proper “episkopos” in Alexandria (C. Wilfred Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity: From Its Origins to 451 CE [Leiden: Brill, 1990], pgs. 61-62). Stewart is correct to point out that patristic testimony indicates only that Demetrius simply tightened episcopal control in the Alexandrian church after a period of persecution (particularly in his treatment of Origen), not that he was the first monoepiskopos. Stewart instead proposes another time for the standardization of monoepiscopal government in Alexandria: the patriarchate of Julian (AD 178-189), basing it on Eusebius’ words that “In his first year Julian became bishop of the Alexandrian churches, after Agripinnus had held the office for twelve years.” (Ecclesiastical History, 5.9), and the contemporary sayings of Clement of Alexandria regarding changes in the Egyptian church polity. 

“Eutychius is generally considered to be a blundering and incompetent historian, but the inability of Severus to refute his statement that there were no bishops in Egypt outside Alexandria for the first two centuries C.E. (beyond stating that ‘the bishops’ met together on three occasions) lends some credence to his statement that Demetrius first consecrated bishops in Egypt.” (C. Wilfred Griggs, Early Egyptian Christianity: From Its Origins to 451 CE [Leiden: Brill, 2000], pg. 91)

Alistair Stewart explains away the laying on of hands (χειροτονιον) as simply a rite of election done by presbyters, rather than ordination (The Original Bishops, pg. 194). Yet he does not take this same explanation of the Greek when he examines Acts 14:23 (The Original Bishops, pg. 36). Why does he choose to invent a new meaning for χειροτονιον when it involves presbyters, and not when it is used with respect to Paul and Barnabas?

Papal Approval of Presbyteral Ordination

Lawrence Crumb has written an excellent paper titled "Presbyteral Ordination and the See of Rome", in which he provides a good historical case, particularly from the medieval area, that there were instances in which popes approved presbyters to ordain other presbyters, abbot, deacons, and subdeacons. The trickiest issue here is whether the orders in question that could receive ordination from priests were part of the four "major orders", as articulated within Papist canon law. I have set forth here the cases which Crumb examines:

Pope Innocent IV taught that a cleric could confer any order which he himself held and had received, and that a priest may ordain where there is papal approval. (Franz Gillmann, Zur Lehre der Scholastik vom Spender der Firmung und des Weihesakraments [Paderborn, 1920], pg. 88)

On February 1, 1400, Pope Boniface IX conferred the power to ordain priests upon the Augustinian abbot of St. Osyth (Sacrae Religionis). It was revoked 3 years later after the complaints of Bishop Robert Braybrooke of London. We know that this bull had respect to the major holy orders since these orders are mentioned by name in the 1403 bull of revocation (J. A. Twemlow, Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters [London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1893-1960], 5:534-35). The original bull is recorded twice in the Calendar of Papal Letters. 

In 1489, Pope Innocent VIII, by the bull Exposcit tuae devotions, “conferred on the four Proto-Abbots of the Cistercian Order and their successors the privilege of ordaining their subordinates to the Sub-diaconate and the Diaconate. The Cistercian Abbots were still using this privilege in the 17th century without hindrance.” (Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, pg. 459). There has been some scholarly dispute over whether the Exposcit bull merely confers upon abbots the power to ordain the sub-diaconate, or also the diaconate as well. In 1954, Mgr. A. Mercati found the bull recorded in the Pontifical Archives of the Vatican which established that it referred to both the diaconate and sub-diaconate. The bull states that the reason for giving the abbots special powers was “so that the monks of the said order be not obliged to run here and there outside of the cloister in order to receive [these orders].” 

Pope Martin V issued the bull Gerentes ad vos (1527) which also gave abbots the power to ordain. This bull was discovered only recently in 1943 by K.A. Fink. “According to the terms of this bull, the Cistercian abbot of Altzelle, in the diocese of Meissen, was granted “authority to ordain to all the sacred orders for the space of five years, and not only his own religious, but also the clergy who served the parishes appropriated to the abbey.” (Lawrence N. Crumb, “Presbyteral Ordination and the See of Rome,” Church Quarterly Review 164, no. 350 [January-March 1963], pg. 20)

I may write more in the future on how the medieval canon lawyers approached the bishop-presbyter distinction, particularly within Gratian's Decretum and the commentaries on it. For now, I will end with a quote from Pope Gregory VII which will dip our toes in the water:

“First of all, it must be noted that in these apostolic instructions, under the name of "bishop," presbyters are also included. For it would be inappropriate for the Apostle, after describing the bishop, to immediately address deacons if presbyters were not encompassed under the description of the bishop. Presbyters are second to the bishop and undoubtedly ranked above deacons. Either the Apostle never spoke of the ordination of presbyters, or he included them under the name of bishops. But it would be incongruous to omit the teacher while describing his minister, since the teacher is more necessary for ecclesiastical arrangements. Moreover, when the Apostle commands Titus to ordain presbyters in cities, he immediately informs him about their ordination, saying: "A bishop must be blameless." Similarly, he writes to Timothy: "Do not neglect the grace given to you through prophecy with the laying on of hands by the presbytery," and shortly thereafter adds, "Do not be quick to lay hands on anyone," which specifically pertains to bishops. Therefore, he refers to the same individual as both bishop and presbyter. Thus, both Blessed Jerome and Saint Ambrose, faithfully explaining the Apostle's statements, testify that among the ancients, the bishop and presbyter were the same, with one name denoting the office and the other the age. However, as Jerome asserts, when individuals began to consider those whom they baptized as belonging to themselves rather than to Christ, to prevent schisms, it was decreed throughout the whole world that one of the presbyters should be placed over the others, to whom the entire care of the church would belong. After describing the bishop and presbyter, the Apostle cautiously adds instructions concerning deacons, saying:

Degrees of Excommunication within Congregations and Presbyteries

 

In the Old Testament church, the Jews would exclude from the holy things those who were tainted with uncleanness and/or ritual impurity. Thus Miriam was excluded from the camp while she was infected with leprosy (Numbers 12:15). The sons of Korah were punished and cursed for their rebellion against Moses (Numbers 16).  

It was required of those who would partake of the Passover that they were morally and ritually clean before the Law of God (Ezra 6:21; Ezekiel 22:26). This provides some strong biblical precedent for congregations having the authority to bar unrepentant offenders from the Lord’s Supper (1 Cor. 5:6-7). 

The Scottish minister and Hebraist scholar John Weemes (1579-1636) mentions the following degrees or levels of excommunication amongst the Jews (The Christian Synagogue [London: John Bellamy, 1633], pg. 146). Rabbinic literature and the Jewish halakhah gives us more insight into each of them: 

1) Niddui (נִדוּי) - This refers to when one is cast out of the synagogue. An offender may be warned 3 times (twice in one day, and once in another day). This period alone was strict enough to impose that no members of the offender’s immediate household may sit even with four cubits of his presence (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 334). Excommunication itself lasts for a 30-day period. If the offender does not repent within that time frame, another 30 days is repeated. After that, a formal judgment is pronounced against him. They are, of course, still permitted to pray in the synagogue and study the Torah.   

“When it is stated that a generally excommunicated person is subject to all the restrictions of excommunication, this applies specifically to someone excommunicated by a court, which means they are excommunicated from everyone. This applies whether the individual failed to come to court, did not comply with a ruling, acted rebelliously, or committed a transgression. Whether the excommunication was issued by the court or by individuals, the restrictions are the same, both in their city and in another city.” (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 334) “Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to him: Rav Ḥisda said as follows: Before excommunicating a person, the court warns him three times, on Monday, Thursday, and the following Monday. The Gemara notes: This applies in a case where one ignores a monetary judgment that was issued against him. He is warned three times that he must repay his debt. But in a case where one behaves disrespectfully toward a Torah scholar, he is immediately ostracized." (Moed Katan, 16a)

2) Cherem (חרמ) - Cherem was a more formal curse and censure upon an offender. The cherem was solemnly pronounced by an assembly of at least 10 (Pirke deRabbi Eliezer, ch. 38). Excommunication was not considered annulled unless formally lifted by the relevant rabbinic or synagogical court (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 334). One famous historical example of the cherem was the ruling against polygamy by Gershom ben Judah (AD 960-1040). Baruch Spinoza was also excommunicated by the Jews. 3) Nezifah (נזפה) - This was a milder form of admonition or rebuke by a learned or eminent person (especially a rabbi or nasi). The person who received such a rebuke would consider themselves excommunicated for 1 day. In Talmudical law, such a person was not required to separate from society (Moed Katan, 16a). The Talmud lists 24 offenses punishable by excommunication (Berakhot, 19a). In the ancient church after the New Testament, there were four degrees of penitence amongst those who had been excommunicated or barred from the Lord’s Supper: προσκλαυσις, ακροασις, ύποπτωσις, συστασις (George Gillespie, Aaron’s rod blossoming, or, The divine ordinance of Church-government vindicated [Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, and Oliver & Boyd, 1844], pg. 261) [1]. προσκλαυσις - The penitent wept at the church door, asking the congregants to pray for him. [2]. ακροασις - The penitent was admitted to hear preaching amongst the catechumens. [3]. ύποπτωσις - A preparatory reconciliation with the church, with renewed admission into the church, but nonetheless not admitted to the sacrament yet. [3]. συστασις - The penitent was admitted to the sacrament only after there was strong evidence of his sincere and continuing repentance and walk in holiness. The canons of the Synod of Ancyra (AD 314) give us great insight into how the early church dealt with lapsed congregants, backsliders, and those who had yielded during times of persecution or had participated in any way in the pagan worship of idols:

“Concerning those who have been forced to sacrifice, and who, in addition, have partaken of feasts in honour of the idols; as many as were haled away, but afterwards went up with a cheerful countenance, and wore their costliest apparel, and partook with indifference of the feast provided; it is decreed that all such be hearers for one year, and prostrators for three years, and that they communicate in prayers only for two years, and then return to full communion.” (Council of Ancyra [A.D. 314], Canon 4) “As many as have not merely apostatized, but have risen against their brethren and forced them [to apostatize], and have been guilty of their being forced, let these for three years take the place of hearers, and for another term of six years that of prostrators, and for another year let them communicate without oblation, in order that, when they have fulfilled the space of ten years, they may partake of the communion; but during this time the rest of their life must also be enquired into.” (Canon 9) “Let those who have been or who are guilty of bestial lusts, if they have sinned while under twenty years of age, be prostrators fifteen years, and afterwards communicate in prayers; then, having passed five years in this communion, let them have a share in the oblation. But let their life as prostrators be examined, and so let them receive indulgence; and if any have been insatiable in their crimes, then let their time of prostration be prolonged. And if any who have passed this age and had wives, have fallen into this sin, let them be prostrators twenty-five years, and then communicate in prayers; and, after they have been five years in the communion of prayers, let them share the oblation. And if any married men of more than fifty years of age have so sinned, let them be admitted to communion only at the point of death.” (Canon 16) This distinction is also found in Nicaea: “Concerning those who have transgressed without necessity or the confiscation of their property or without danger or anything of this nature, as happened under the tyranny of Licinius, this holy synod decrees that, though they do not deserve leniency, nevertheless they should be treated mercifully. Those therefore among the faithful who genuinely repent shall spend three years among the hearers, for seven years they shall be prostrators, and for two years they shall take part with the people in the prayers, though not in the offering.” (Council of Nicaea, Canon 11) Thus we see that there were differing levels of prostrators, hearers, and those who may partake in prayers, and then the final step was readmission to the Eucharist. “Weeping takes place without the gate of the oratory; and the offender standing there ought to implore the faithful as they enter to offer up prayer on his behalf. Waiting on the word, again, takes place within the gate in the porch, where the offender ought to stand until the catechumens depart, and thereafter he should go forth. For let him hear the Scriptures and doctrine, it is said, and then be put forth, and reckoned unfit for the privilege of prayer. Submission, again, is that one stand within the gate of the temple, and go forth along with the catechumens. Restoration is that one be associated with the faithful, and go not forth with the catechumens; and last of all comes the participation in the holy ordinances.” (Gregory Thaumaturgus, Canonical Epistle, canon 11) Congregationalist Perspective: “For if he [the offender] refuse it, the offended brother is by the mouth of the Elders to tell the Church, and if he hear the Church, and declare the same by penitent confession, he is recovered and gained, and if the Church discern him to be willing to hear, yet not fully convinced of his offense, as in case if hereby; They are to dispense to him a public admonition; which, declaring the offender to lie under the public offense of the Church, does thereby withhold or suspend him from the holy fellowship of the Lord’s Supper, till his offense be removed by penitent confession. If he still continue obstinate they are to cast him out by Excommunication.” (1648 Cambridge Platform, ch. 14, sect. 2) According to Rutherford, one should not leave a church simply because the elders may be negligent for a time in discipling scandalous and profane members. “[They ought to] modestly and reasonably say that Archippus (Col. 4:17) and others do not fulfill their ministry which they have received of the Lord.” (A Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Paul’s Presbytery in Scotland [London: John Bartlet, 1642], pg. 98) There was extensive debate at the Westminster assembly over the excommunication of the incestuous man, particularly whether it was an exercise of extraordinary apostolic power or may rather have set a precedent for ordinary fixed churches (the more standard view). Lazarus Seaman (d. 1675) insisted that excommunication contains both a negative privative act and a positive act (Session 86, November 1, 1643, in Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly, 2:258). He does not elaborate upon this further. Objection: There is no distinction to show that a congregation may admonish [and bar a person from the Lord’s Supper], and yet not excommunicate. Response: “The proposition in hands may be determined without debating this question; for if excommunication belong to the presbytery in case of appellation, reference, insufficiency, or alteration, it is enough to uphold the truth of the proposition.” (George Gillespie, Notes of Debates and Proceedings of the Assembly of Divines and Other Commissioners at Westminster, pg. 24) Question: Is it necessary for the whole church to be present for the administration of church-censures and acts of excommunication? Answer: Reformed divines have typically answered this question in the affirmative. (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries, pgs. 40-50; George Gillespie, A Dispute against the English Popish Ceremonies, Pt. 3, ch. 8) The people ought to help carry out the sentence of excommunication, but not in blind obedience. Consider the following reasons:—

[1]. When the sentence of the elders is unjust, it ought not to be executed by the people. The footmen of Saul justly refused to execute the priests (1 Samuel 22:17).

[2]. There is a difference between the practical certainty of conscience in matters of fact, and in matters of law (juris). In a question of law, all ignorance is culpably evil in those who undertake obedience to unjust commands; the people of the Church should do nothing but what they know to be lawful. The executioner who beheaded John the Baptist sinned, because he was obliged to know that a prophet who rebukes incest in the King ought not to be put to death. The command of superiors does not of itself make an action lawful. 

[3]. In questions of fact, there is not required the same certainty which we see in questions of law. By “question of fact,” we mean a question in which the subject is a matter of fact, but the attribute is a matter of law (The Due Right of Presbyteries, pg. 45), as, for example, where Lord’s priests in giving David the shew-bread committed treason against King Saul? It is this type of uncertainty which is excusable in the congregation when it comes to excommunication:

“Now though Soldiers, Lictors, or People join to the execution of a sentence, and have their doubtings anent the fidelity of the witnesses, yet when all diligence morally possible is given to try the matter, they may well be said to do in faith, though they have not certainty of faith concerning the fact, because there cannot be certainty of Divine Faith in facts; men’s confession, sense, the Testimony of witnesses cannot breed Divine Faith: yea here the Judge himself may condemn the innocent, and yet the sentence of the Judge may be most just because the witnesses are Liars, and the Judge giveth out that sentence in Faith, because God’s Word hath commanded him to proceed,....if they [the Congregation] know the fact in Law deserveth such and such punishments, where the sentence is not manifestly false and unjust, but in the matter of Law just, though erroneous in matter of fact, all possible diligence being used by the judges, they are to execute that sentence upon the testimony of the Judges, though they be not personally present at the proceedings of the Judges and Eldership.” (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries, pgs. 46-47)

[4]. It is not absolutely necessary that every individual member of the Congregation be present. Some may be absent in cases of sickness, far-away travel, imprisonment, etc. “Mr Seaman said, A Christian, by baptism is made a member of the whole visible church, —must therefore the whole be convened, because his membership concerns them all?” (February 9, 1644 in George Gillespie, Notes of Debates and Proceedings of the Assembly of Divines and Other Commissioners at Westminster, pg. 15) 

[5]. Only Elders have judicial authority in excommunication. The hearing of testimonies was given to them (1 Timothy 5:19). If all of these types of acts were given to the people (which belong to pastors and ruling elders), why not they (including women and children) receive the entire office itself? The daughters of Zelophehad stood before Moses, Eleazar, and the priests, as judges, and the congregation were witnesses (Numbers 27:1-2). The judicial sentence of their inheritance was given by Moses (vv. 6-7). 

“Excommunicated persons though they be debarred from the Lord’s Supper, and delivered to Satan, and to be accompted as heathen and publicans, yet are they not altogether and every way cut off from the visible church….our meaning is, that the excommunicated person is deprived of actual fellowship with Christ in the Seales of the Covenant.” (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries, pg. 272, 275)

Excommunication is a medicinal ordinance, not a vindictive one (1 Cor. 5:5; 1 Tim. 1:12). Ergo, such a person is not altogether cut off from the Church, since he is still able to hear the preaching of the Word (though barred from the sacraments) for the means of his salvation and restoration to church communion. 

Some of the scholastics, such as Franciscio Suarez (Francisco Suarez, De Censuris in Communi, disp. 5, sect. 1) and Domingo de Soto, believed that excommunication did not remove the baptismal character or passive power to receive sacraments. Rather, an excommunicated person is deprived of all actual fellowship with Christ in the seals of the Covenant of Grace. 

Congregationalists have also erred in their view of excommunication, primarily stemming from their belief that only regenerated persons are true members of the visible church catholic (John Cotton, The Way of the Churches of Christ in New England, ch. 3, sect. 3). It would follow from this that none are to be excommunicated but regenerated persons, and then they could not be cast out of the visible church, since they are the essential matter of it, as the Congregationalists teach.