Addressing Recent Controversies Concerning Antisemitism and Jews

 

I do not normally write concerning the current events taking place in the United States and the world today, but when I notice that a particular theological theme and debate has entered the church afresh as a result of such current events, I feel it may be beneficial to address it.

A year ago on October 7, 2023, the terrorist group Hamas led an attack against the State of Israel, launching them into the longest raging armed conflict yet. Israel's actions in Gaza have led to the death of thousands of civilians, women and children being a large portion among them. Israel's war acts have led to global outrage and condemnation from both the popular Left and more traditional Right-wing thinkers. The majority of congressional Democrats and Republicans continue to spend foreign aid on Israel's siege of Gaza, and most recently, their conflicts with Iran and Lebanon. There is a justified fear of the Middle East entering its own world war (with the possibility of Western nations becoming involved). 

Within the Reformed world, there has been a lot of reflection on what the proper attitude of Christians towards Jews ought to be. Many popular level Baptist figures like James White, Owen Strachan, and others have been addressing it. On the other side, more confessional folks like Stephen Wolfe, Michael Spangler (who was divested, justly in my opinion, from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church due to his association with the Lutheran Neo-Nazi Corey Mahler who was excommunicated by the LCMS), and Jon Harris have weighed in. There has been a fresh wave of those who have an utter hatred for Jews simply on the grounds of race and prejudicial stereotypes (Mahler being a prime example). On the other hand, many have been falsely accused of antisemitism for having traditional views on these matters not much different than what we see in the early church fathers and our Reformed forefathers in the faith. I will give some special attention to the latter in this article. 

In this article, I want to try a navigate a way through this mess. I have great concerns with respect to both extremes within Christendom. In particular, I wish to define what I do and do not consider antisemitism (and provide reasons for my views) as well as show how Reformed divines historically addressed many of the challenges we are seeing today.

What Is and Is Not Antisemitic

1) It is not antisemitic to point certain general truths and statistics related to Jews and Judaism. For example, data from the Pew Research Center indicates that the religious group with the highest average income in the United States happens to be Jews. Similarly, many Jews are involved in financial and banking professions and are skilled at building wealth. Simply noticing and recognizing this is not antisemitic. It is a statistical fact. 

One of Christ's condemnations of the Pharisees was that they "devoured widows houses." (Matthew 23:14; many modern translations note that this verse is missing from some manuscripts. A case for its authenticity has been done by James Snapp). Thus, the Jewish religious leaders of Christ's day unjustly stole estates and property from the poor. If our Lord Himself would condemn this type of financial sin, why may not we do so also if it occurs?

It would however be very problematic if someone were to take a general statistical truth and insist that every person of Jewish ethnicity commits the sin of greed. Such an accusation (without evidence) would be slanderous and immoral.

2) It is not antisemitic to assert without qualification that the Jews killed the Lord Jesus Christ. In 1 Thessalonians 2:14-16, the Apostle Paul tells us the following: "For you, brothers, became imitators of the churches of God in Christ Jesus that are in Judea. For you suffered the same things from your own countrymen as they did from the Jews, who killed both the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and drove us out, and displease God and oppose all mankind by hindering us from speaking to the Gentiles that they might be saved—so as always to fill up the measure of their sins. But wrath has come upon them at last!" 

The teaching of the New Testament could not be more clear. The greatest opponents and enemies of the Lord Jesus during His earthly ministry were the Jewish teachers of the law and their followers, whom Christ called "children of the devil" (John 8:44). 

However, it was not the Jews alone who bear responsibility for the murder of the Messiah. The Romans, Pontius Pilate, and King Herod also share in the guilt of the worst sin in human history. 

The reason why Scripture emphasizes the Jewish role in the crucifixion is because of their special status as the covenanted people of God. The knowledge and light they had received made their sin all the more aggravated. Nonetheless, let us remember that some of those same Jews repented and believed the Gospel when present at the Apostle Peter's sermon as reported in Acts 2 & 3. Our prayer for Jews today is that they would repent of their unbelief and hatred of Christ, and be saved (Romans 10:1). God has the power to graft them in again to the covenant of grace (Romans 11). 

3) It is not antisemitic to point out the war crimes of the State of Israel. Anyone who spends enough time on the Internet may see the horrors of Zionist atrocities in the Gaza Trip since October 2023. The videos of dead children and mutilated people being pulled out from under rubble ought to give great pause to those wishing to promote the false teaching of Dispensationalism in the church. Christians are in no way whatsoever bound to the preferences and actions of Jews today. No ethnic group is blessed by God simply qua ethnicity. It is true that many nations and societies are much better than others and have received more common grace and expose to the Gospel, but it is not because anything intrinsic in them, but solely because of God's grace (Deuteronomy 7:6-8; Matthew 3:9; Romans 9:6-11). 

4) It is not antisemitic to acknowledge and notice the role of unbelieving secular Jews in various communist and left-wing movements which are currently leading in the destruction of the West. Karl Marx himself was Jewish, as well as some people who were involved in the Bolshevik Revolution (Leon Trotsky, ) and the Menshevik faction (Julius Martov, Pavel Axelrod, Aleksandr Martynov, etc.) The doctor who first promoted and practiced transgender degeneracy was a Jewish man named Magnus Hirschfeld. His clinic was later destroyed by the Nazis (whom I will address in a moment). Charles Silverstein was the individual who influenced the decision of the American Psychiatric Association's decision to declassify homosexuality as a mental illness. Al Goldstein was a wicked man who promoted the normalization of hardcore pornography and openly stated that their hatred of Christ and of Christian values motivated some Jews to participate in the pornography industry. Similarly, the owner of one of the most popular pornographic websites (I have chosen to omit any names so as to not incite sinful curiosity in any person more prone to be tempted) in the world is a Jewish rabbi. 

I believe that is problematic to assert that all Jews individually are subversive and promote anti-Christian ideas. Such is obviously not true given that there are prominent right-winger thinkers and leaders who are Jewish, such as Curtis Yarvin and Stephen Miller (the latter of whom served our country during the Trump administration). We must also acknowledge ethnic Jews who do embrace the gospel and the teachings of Scripture. No prejudice of any type ought to be shown against them (Galatians 3:28). 

5) Our Reformed forefathers addressed with care the issue of how Jews should be treated in Christian nations by godly magistrates. It was common consensus that since the Christian magistrate should suppress public idolatry and blasphemy against Christ, Jewish synagogues and the Talmud shouldn't be tolerated (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience [London: Andrew Crook, 1649], pg. 316). 

One of the most comprehensive examples I've found is from the eminent Dutch divine Gisbertus Voetius (who I quote often on this blog). Voetius considered the following eight things to be detrimental to the conversion of the Jews and Christian societies ("De Judaismo," in Select Disputations, 2:109-110):

1. Granting them civil privileges and immunities.

2. Allowing them to associate too freely with Christians in society.

3. Granting them any degrees or authority, in government, in business, in medicine, in academics.

4. Allowing their divinations, or kaballistic-magical superstitions.

5. Allowing them unjust divorce and polygamy.

6. Allowing the practice of usury.

7. Allowing the public exercise of the Jewish religion, including the publishing of works teaching their Talmudic blasphemies.

8. Harshness and injustice toward them.

It may seem like #1-7 would be what Voetius is trying to warn against in #8. However, I'd contend that most of these are pretty common sense. For the sake of prudence, I would not advocate for some of these (particularly #3 and also #1 depending on how it is understood) in contemporary Western society. However, the others are perfectly within the purview of the Reformed tradition's teaching on the civil magistrate's authority concerning religious matters in a commonwealth. See the English Presbyterians' treatise Jus Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici for an air-tight biblical defense.

A Word about the Obvious Dangers of Nazism

It shouldn't have to be said, but apparently some people on the Right need a fresh reminder of the evils of the ideology of National Socialism and violent race hatred that we see by Hitler's Germany during the Second World War. As I noted earlier, Rev. Michael Spangler was justly divested from the Orthodox Presbyterian Church due to his promotion of Corey Mahler's Stone Choir Podcast. Mahler is a heretic who has openly promoted the absurd and evil lie that Adolf Hitler was a Christian. It is perfectly reasonable to have suspicion towards a Reformed person who associates with such men.

Jon Harris, of the Conversations that Matter podcast, has written an excellent article documenting how many Right-Wing conservatives opposed Hitler and how the Nazis were diametrically opposed to Christianity as a whole. Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the SS, said "We shall not have succeeded until we have utterly rooted out Christianity." The Nazis also promoted a type of Marcionism by denying the teachings of the New Testament about Christ, and also their entire rejection of the Old Testament. More historical evidence for this can be seen here.

Questions about serious diplomatic mistakes made by Britain in the 1930s which helped stir the flame of war and concerns about Allied atrocities (such as the Atomic Bombings of Japan and the destruction of Dresden) are perfectly legitimate areas of historical inquiry. Writers like Charles Tansill, Patrick Buchanan, Victor Davis Hanson, and Ian Johnson have both articulated well-thought arguments for their positions on this. This discussion was mostly recently returned to the forefront due to Darryl Cooper's appearance on Tucker Carlson's podcast.

The same thing also applies to taking note of the mass murders committed by one of the Allied leaders, Joseph Stalin (the Soviet Union's crimes against humanity in WW2 are often overlooked today). It is simply a fact that Stalin had already killed millions more than Hitler before WW2 began. 

Aside from all this, Christians must never give any sympathy to National Socialists. They were unequivocally mass murderers and haters of the Gospel. It is true that the Left is currently a much more severe threat to the church and the West, given that they hold much control over our federal government, academic institutions, the media, and entertainment industries. By way of analogy: two sharks are both dangerous, but the one who is closer to you with more immediate power to harm you would be obviously me the more clear danger at the time. This does not in any way mitigate the danger of the other shark in itself. 

This is why I do not agree with the Twitter maxim "No enemies on the Right." I grant that conservative Christians should not be preoccupied with the lesser danger (see above paragraph), but that does not mean that we should not call it out for what it is. 

How do Synods and Ecclesiastical Rulings Bind the Conscience?

 

In Reformed polity, the judicial power of the Synod pertains to things like excommunication, church-censure, and depositions. The best and most comprehensive explanation I have found of this is in the Dutch Reformed scholastic divine Gisbertus Voetius, from his magnum opus on church government Politicae Ecclesiasticae (4 vols!):

“I add that they have legislative power to make ecclesiastical laws that bind the conscience, not indeed directly, primarily, and immediately, but indirectly, mediately, and by consequence…They also make laws or constitutions and canons about particular orders, modes, and other circumstantial aspects of conducting sacred rites and exercising ecclesiastical government and discipline, to the reception and observance of all which, insofar as they do not contradict divine and natural law, consciences are bound mediately, indirectly, and by consequence,....We see, therefore, that in this whole line of argumentation, the statement is a figment: that true and genuine power of government is to formally contain the power properly and principally of making laws for consciences, binding and obliging the conscience primarily, per se, immediately, and directly. If this fabrication were granted or conceded, it would follow that magistrates have no remaining legislative power, nor parents, masters, or teachers any power of commanding children, servants, or students, nor the latter any glory or necessity of obeying.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Politicae Ecclesiasticae, Pt. III, Book IV, tract. 1, Q. 7)

Obj: If Synods and their decrees ought to be tried and examined by the Word of God, and are not binding in and of themselves, then how can they be authoritative in any manner, when anyone may reject them by private judgment? 

Resp: “That any man should duly, and as he ought beleeve, and receive the decision of a Synod, it must be both true, and he must believe and know that it is true, but that it may oblige him and doth oblige him, whether his conscience be erroneous or no, is as true, for then this Commandment (Thou shalt not kill) (Honor thy father and thy mother) should lay no obligation on a man that believes it is service to God to kill the Apostle, as Joh. 16. some doe. For no man is exempted from an obligation to obey God's Law, because of his own sinful and culpable ignorance, for we speak not now of invincible ignorance of these things which we are not obliged to know or believe. But if our sinful and erroneous conscience free us from actual obligation to be tyed by a Law, then our erroneous conscience freeth us from sinning against a Law, and so from punishment, for whatever freeth a man from actual obligation freeth him also from actual sinning, for all sinne is a doing against a Law-obligation, and if so, then are none to be led by any rule but their own conscience, the written Law and Gospel is not henceforth our rule any more.” (Samuel Rutherford)

Obj: Is an erroneous conscience binding?

Resp: “The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though non obligat, yet ligat; though we be not obliged to doe that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to doe that which it condemneth….Because he who doeth anything against his conscience, doeth it against the Will of God, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, for so much as that which conscience counselleth or prescribeth, it counselleth it under the respect and account of the Will of God He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the King, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the King himself. So he that contemneth his conscience, contemneth God himselfe, because that which conscience counselleth or adviseth, is taken to be God's will.” (George Gillespie, A Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies
 [Leiden: W. Christiaens, 1637], pg. 16-17)

“It is most false then, that these Libertines say that the Word does not actually oblige except it be understood, for the understanding, information and indictment of conscience does not add any actual obligation to the Word that it had not before, it only is a reporter, to carry both the Word and the actual obligation to the man; the herald promulgating the law adds no obligation, actual or potential, to the law that it had not before, only it makes an union in distance, and near application and conjunction between the actually obliging law and the understanding knowledge of the person or subject, who is obliged to keep the law.” (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience [London: Andrew Crook, 1649], pg. 134)

Any will that is acting against its conscience is wrong and sinful. The Synods cannot oblige a person to act against his conscience:

“For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (Article 3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-I, Q. 19, art. 5)

Obj: If a person only obeys the Church when they judge to be biblical and lawful, then ecclesiastical authority is rendered to be null and no more than binding than the private counsel of an individual.

Resp: " It follows in no sort, if rulers are only to be obeyed when they bring God’s Word, that then they are no more to be obeyed than equals and inferiors, because there is a double obedience, one of conscience, and [one] objective, coming from the thing commanded; And in respect of this, the Word has no less authority, and does no less challenge obedience of conscience, and objective, when my equal speaks it in a private way, yea, when I write it in my muse, than when a pastor speaks it by public authority; For we teach against Papists that the Word borrows no authority from men, nor is it with certainty of faith to be received as the Word of man, but as indeed the Word of God, as the Scripture says: 1.  There is another obedience-official, which is also obedience of conscience, because the Fifth Commandment enjoins it.  Yet not obedience of conscience coming from the particular [positive aspect] commanded in human laws, as human; so I owe obedience of subjection, and submission of affection, of fear, love, honor, respect, by virtue of the Fifth Commandment to rulers when they command according to God’s Word, and this I owe not to equals or inferiors; and so it follows not that the power of rulers and synods is titular, because they must warrant their mandates from the Word…3. That I owe no more objective subjection of conscience to this, ‘Thou shalt not murder’, ‘Believe in Jesus Christ,’ when rulers and pastors command them, than when I read them in God’s Word…whether public or private person, adds not any intrinsical authority to the Word, for then the Word should be more or less God’s Word, as the bearers were public, or private, more or less worthy.  As God’s Word spoken by Amos, a prophet, should not be a word of such intrinsical authority as spoken by Moses, both a prince and a prophet." (Samuel Rutherford, The Divine Right of Church Government [London: John Field, 1646], pgs. 210-211)

Scriptural Proofs for the Office of the Ruling Elder

 

In the Old Testament, we do see a distinction between priests and the elders in the Jewish church, and between the civil and ecclesiastical Sanhedrim:

“8 If any case arises requiring a decision between one kind of homicide and another, one kind of legal right and another, or one kind of assault and another, any case within your towns that is too difficult for you, then you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose. 9 And you shall come to the Levitical priests and to the judge who is in office in those days, and you shall consult them, and they shall declare to you the decision. 10 Then you shall do according to what they declare to you from that place that the Lord will choose. And you shall be careful to do according to all that they direct you. 11 According to the instructions that they give you, and according to the decision which they pronounce to you, you shall do. You shall not turn aside from the verdict that they declare to you, either to the right hand or to the left. 12 The man who acts presumptuously by not obeying the priest who stands to minister there before the Lord your God, or the judge, that man shall die. So you shall purge the evil from Israel.” (Deuteronomy 17:8-12)

“Thus says the LORD, ‘Go, buy a potter’s earthenware flask, and take some of the elders of the people and some of the elders of the priests.’” (Jeremiah 19:1)

“Of the Izharites, Chenaniah and his sons were for the outward business over Israel, for officers and judges.” (1 Chronicles 26:29)

“Moreover in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites, and of the priests, and of the chief of the fathers of Israel, for the judgment of the LORD, and for controversies, when they returned to Jerusalem.” (2 Chronicles 19:8)

“As also the high priest doth bear me witness, and all the estate of the elders: from whom also I received letters unto the brethren, and went to Damascus, to bring them which were there bound unto Jerusalem, for to be punished.” (Acts 22:5)

Some (such as Thomas Bilson) have thought that texts like 2 Chron. 19:8 are simply referring to civil magistrates. However, they are expressly distinguished from them in verse 11 of that same chapter. Similarly, the elders are distinguished from the heads of the twelve tribes in Deuteronomy 5:23; 2 Kings 10:5; Joshua 8:33.

These elders of Israel acted as the representatives of the people. In Exodus 12:3, the Lord prefaces the institution of the Passover with the words “Tell all the congregation of Israel….”, and in verse 21 “Moses called all the elders of Israel and said to them….”. Thus, the elders represented the people.

Obj: In Deuteronomy 21:3-4, we read of the “elders of the city” who deal with cases of unsolved murders. Thus, these were simply the civil magistrates amongst the Jews.

Resp: On the contrary, these decisions were ecclesiastical, as in verse 5 where the dispute is settled by the priests and Levites. Furthermore, verse 2 distinguishes the elders of the city from the judges thereof. 

A concrete narrative example is Jeremiah 26, when the prophet Jeremiah is condemned to die by the priests and prophets of the people (Jer. 26:8-9), but his life is spared by the civil officials (vv. 10-11, 16). Thus, these civil and ecclesiastical courts were distinct. 

Some of the rabbinical writings of Jewish law also give us some indications about this. In the Talmud (Sanhedrin 2a, 13-14) and Mishnah (Sanhedrin, 1.6), the Great Sanhedrin was made up of 70 judges (71 with Moses included during his lifetime) and the Lesser Sanhedrin had 23 judges. In Luke 22:66, we read of an “assembly of elders” at Jerusalem.

In the times of the New Testament, the Lord Jesus made a distinction between the civil courts and the Synagogue (Matthew 10:17). 

One key New Testament text for the proof of this distinct office of the ruling elder is Romans 12:8 - “Or he that exhorteth, on exhortation: he that giveth, let him do it with simplicity; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness.” 

Note here that the apostle, in enumerating various gifts and duties of Christ’s church, lists “ruling” as distinct from the act of exhorting. Some have objected that Paul here is referring to those who rule families, but this does not accord with Rom. 12:5 which speaks of Christ’s body and members. The apostle is therefore speaking about the church here in this text. 

Obj: In Romans 12:8, Paul is speaking merely of spiritual gifts, not of church offices.

Resp: On the contrary, verse 4 says “For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office.” Thus, not all church members are to attend to the ruling spoken of in verse 8.

The next text to examine is 1 Timothy 5:17 - “Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially [μάλιστα] they who labor in the word and doctrine.”

The great Scottish divine Samuel Rutherford gives five considerations upon this text to show that Paul is teaching that the ruling elder is a distinct office:

“But we desire that the confluence of these five may be looked onto : as 1. There is a genus, a general attribute πρεσβυτεροι, Elders ; and this agreeth both to well ruling Elders, and to those which labor in the word and doctrine. 2. There be here two participles, προεστῶτες, κοπιῶντες. 3. Two articles, οἱ, οἱ.  4. Two species, two kinds of Elders, under the generall attribute of πρεσβυτεροι As the one species or kind is, οἱ καλῶς προεστῶτες, such Elders as rule well ; and the other kind of Elders be οι κοπιῶντες ἐν λόγῳ καὶ διδασκαλία, such as labor in the Wordy as Pastors ; and in Dottrine, as Doctors. And fifthly, which is most considerable, here be two Participles, two Articles, two special Elders divided and separated διακριτως, by the discretive particle (μάλιστα)......also that μάλιστα is a particle of discretion and multiplication of divers kinds to me is clear, as Titus 1:11. There be many unruly and vain talkers μάλιστα οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς, especially those of the circumcision. If μάλιστα the particle do not divide two sorts of vain talkers some vain talkers of the circumcision and some vain talkers not of the circumcision; then must this particle conjoin them, and make no vain talkers save only these of the circumcision ; and Paul shall say thea, there be many unruly and vain talking persons of the circumcision but especially those of the circumcision ; which nonsense is not to be ascribed to the spirit of God.” (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries [London: E. Griffin, 1644], pgs. 145-46)

One contrasting interpretation of the key term μάλιστα in this text is that it does not (as Rutherford says) function in the distinctive sense of enumerating two types of elders and a "multiplication of diverse kinds [genera]", but rather descriptively, so that the sense would be “Let the elders who rule well be counted worthy of double honor, namely those who labor in the word and doctrine.” However, this rendering of μάλιστα would make other texts in Scripture absurd. If we compare such passages, it is clear that μάλιστα functions in the distinctive sense (aside from the passage that Rutherford quotes from Titus 1:11):

"All the saints greet you, especially [μάλιστα δὲ] those of Caesar’s household." (Philippians 4:22)

“no longer as a bondservant but more than a bondservant, as a beloved brother—especially [μάλιστα] to me, but how much more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord.” (Philemon 1:16)

“But if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” (1 Timothy 5:8)

Gisbertus Voetius provides us with a good argument from reason as to why this interpretation of 1 Tim. 5:17 is absurd:

“If προιστημι encompasses labor in preaching and doctrine (which is intended by the adversaries' interpretation); then it would follow that one who labors in one part of his office (in preaching and doctrine) is more worthy of double honor than one who labors in all parts of the office. This is indeed absurd, as it involves a contradiction: the whole is greater than its part.” (Gisbertus Voetius, Politicae Ecclesiasticae, 3:444) 

It is further evident that 1 Tim. 5:17 is speaking of the office of elder by the fact that verse 18 quotes Scripture saying that “the laborer deserves his wages.” And yet not all in the church are given wages and stipends as a result of their labor therein. Thus, Paul is speaking of church officers here.

Some have said that the text should be rendered thus: “Let elders that rule well, be counted worthy of double honor, laboring greatly in the Word and doctrine.” By this faulty logic, we would need to render 1 Timothy 4:10 as follows: “God is the Savior of all men who believe much.”

Obj. If there are two sorts of elders, then there are two sorts of bishops, since Presbyterian polity teaches that these terms are synonymous in their biblical usage.

Resp: The Presbyterian position is that the preaching elder and “bishop” (episkopos) are the same, not that “bishop” and elder as a general category are the same. 

Obj. In Eph. 4:11, Paul does not list the ruling elder as one of the offices instituted by Christ for the church. Ergo, it is not a legitimate ecclesiastical office.

Resp: If this reasoning were true or valid, it would follow that we are not believe in the Holy Spirit as God, since John 17 says it is eternal life to know the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit not being mentioned in this particular text. Furthermore, Paul in Eph. 4 is listing the offices essential to planting a church, not for a church already constituted. 

The final text worth addressing here is 1 Corinthians 12:28 - “And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues.”

Presbyterians have classically interpreted the “governments” Paul speaks of here as referring to ruling elder.

Obj: Paul is here dealing only with “governing” in the abstract as a spiritual gift, and not a concrete office, as he enumerates “apostles” and “prophets.”

Resp: In verses 29-30, Paul interprets himself and speaks of the things mentioned in verse 28 insofar as they exist in individual people - “Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? are all workers of miracles? Have all the gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?”

Duns Scotus on the Semantics of the Communicatio Idiomatum

 

How does Duns Scotus deal with the problem of contradictory properties being predicated of the single person of Christ? We should begin by understanding his semantics of qua-propositions:

“‘Qua’... properly denotes that that which follows it is the formal reason for the inherence of the predicate: such as ‘a human being, qua white, or qua coloured, is seen’.” (Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, 3.6.2, n. 3)

In the same context of discussing whether it is true and proper to say that “Christ is a creature” without any qualification, Scotus offers more insight into his view of christological semantics. 

Scotus does not accept the traditional reduplication strategy that we see in Thomas Aquinas. Rather, he says we must add a “specificative” qualifier:

“When some affirmative proposition is false from repugnance of the extremes [sc. the terms], whatever reduplication or determination is added that does not take away the repugnance of them does not take away falsity from it; now reduplication properly taken does not diminish either extreme, because it is the determination of extreme to extreme; therefore it does not make true any false proposition that was false without reduplication. However, if there be added to one of the two extremes, as to the predicate, something specifying or qualifying it, so that the thing qualified is not repugnant to the other extreme as the thing non-qualified was repugnant before, then a proposition with such qualifying determination can be true, and not [true] without it.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.11.2)

If we say that “Christ according as He is a man is a creature”, Scotus rejects this on the grounds that the qualifier “as He is a man” is modifying a concrete subject term (“Christ”). To make it true, we must instead add the specificative qualifier to the predicate term so as to say, “Christ is a creature, according as He is a man.” 

One of Scotus’ points in refutation of the strategy of qualifying the subject term (“Christ according as He is a man is a creature”) is that this type of proposition would entail saying something like “this man is a creature”, which is false since “this man” names the concrete person of Christ, which is divine and therefore uncreated. 

“If ‘according as he is man’ he is a creature, then according as he is ‘this man’, because he is not another man than ‘this man’; but if ‘according as he is this man’ he is a creature, ‘this man’ is a creature. Proof of the consequence: because a predicate can be enunciated absolutely of that which follows a reduplication, as: ‘if man according as he is colored is seen, a colored is seen’; therefore, if ‘according as he is this man’ he is a creature, truly this man is a creature…….because what is enunciated of a supposit with reduplication of species is enunciated of the same supposit simply, as ‘if Peter is insofar as man, therefore Peter is simply’; and so in the matter at hand; therefore etc.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.11.2)

Scotus does nonetheless accept cases in which the properties of a part are predicated of a whole to which the part belongs:

“If ‘healthy’ is naturally or principally in a human being according to the chest, that is, according to the heart (which is what I understand by ‘chest’ here), the animal can then be said to be unqualifiedly healthy if the chest is healthy. But if this property or its opposite is naturally in another part [of the animal], then the [whole] animal is not said to be [unqualifiedly] healthy in so far as the property denominates this part, since then two contradictories could be simultaneously said of the same thing.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.11.2)

However, this can’t entail the truth of the statement “Christ is a creature”:

“To the matter at hand I say that ‘creature’, if it is not of a nature to be asserted of a whole by reason of a part (except perhaps by reason of that part by which the whole has first being, or by reason of the total being of the whole), and humanity or human nature in Christ is not the first being in Christ nor his total being, this which is ‘creature’ cannot be asserted of Christ – by reason of created nature – either simply [sc. ‘Christ is a creature’] nor with reduplication [sc. ‘Christ as man is a creature’].” (Ordinatio, 3.11.2)

In summary, the way Scotus deals with this issue of christological consistency and avoiding contradictory predications is by making ‘qua’ refer to the predicate term rather than the subject term. For example, we would interpret “The Ethiopian is white qua teeth” to mean “The Ethiopian is white-toothed.” This would mean interpreting “Christ qua man is passible” to mean something like “Christ is a passible-man”. 

Richard Cross objects to this Scotist model on the grounds that it would seem to imply that Christ is not properly said to be passible at all, thus risking the true humanity of Christ and invoking the Docetist heresy:

“But [saying “Christ is a passible-man”] avoids contradicting ‘Christ is impassible’ only at the price of denying that being a passible-man or being passibly-hominized is an instance of being passible at all.” (Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus [Oxford University Press, 2002, pg. 204)

Now, how does Scotus ground the truth of christological predicates? Take the case of Christ's existence and statements like "Christ is created" (which is true only of the human nature). 

“It remains that the whole issue concerns the predicate: whether ‘beginning’ implies a beginning according to the first esse of the thing of which it is said, or [merely] according to some esse that belongs to it simply speaking (simpliciter). If [read] in the first way, the proposition [‘Christ began to exist’] is false, just like ‘Christ was created’ is. If [read] in the second way, Christ began to exist simply speaking, since any esse of a substance is esse simply speaking, and Christ began to be according to his human esse, which is the esse of a substance. The second [reading] is more in accord with the sense of the words, because just as, in the case of those things like Christ that have more than one esse, second esse means esse simply speaking, and not (from the sense of the words) the first esse of the thing of which it is said, so ‘beginning’, determined by second esse, seems to mean beginning in esse simply speaking, though not [beginning] in the first esse of the subject. Simply speaking, then, from the sense of the words it can be conceded that Christ, as it implies the thing which is the Word-man, began to be, that is, had some esse simply speaking which he did not have before.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.11.3, n. 3)

“Scotus argues that ‘Christ began to be’ is true under a certain understanding of the sense of the predicate, where the sense of the predicate is determined by the reference of the subject term to a whole that includes a person (and its essential nature) along with a further kind-nature (individual substance) as parts.” (Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus [Oxford University Press, 2002], pg. 129)

“The difficulty is . . . whether the beginning said by such a predicate [‘Christ began to be’] signifies the beginning of the whole in virtue of its whole, or in virtue of a part; and if in virtue of a part, of which part.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.11.3, n. 2)

In Ordinatio 1.2.2, nn. 379-80, Duns Scotus distinguishes two different types of communication in the context of dependence relations:

[1]. Communication ut quod - the relation that exists between a whole individual essence and the suppositum of which it is an essence. 

[2]. Communication ut quo - that by which something is a being in a quidditative way (ex: accidents being communicated or predicated of a substance).

If an accidental property is communicated to and predicated of the human nature, and the human nature is predicated of and subsists in the Word, does it follow that the accidental property depends on the Word?

Scotus does grant that the dependence relation is transitive, meaning that the accidental human properties depend on the Word since the human nature to which these properties properly belong subsists in the Word:

“While the dependence of an accident [of Christ] is somehow upon the singular substance [viz. Christ’s human nature], it only ends with the singular as incommunicable [viz. the divine person]. For if it depends on the singular substance as communicable (since this substance is the being of that to which it is communicated), the dependence only ends with the letter.” (Duns Scotus, Quodlibet, q. 19, n. 13)

There are other passages in which Scotus seems to explain this in such a way as to make it the basis for christological predication as well as “dependence” statements:

“How therefore is the Word called ‘willing’? I say that just as the Son of God is called ‘colored’ because the body of Christ is colored, so He is called ‘willing’ because the soul is willing, and because the nature subsists in the Word, who is for this reason thus denominated.” (Duns Scotus, Reportatio, III, d. 17, q. 1, n. 4)

“The important thing to note is that the predication does not require any ontological communication of the property — the activity of willing — to the divine person either. The property is ontologically communicated to the human nature, and the human nature is ontologically communicated to the Word. But there is no ontological communication of the human accident to the divine person, and the linguistic predication relation is grounded simply in the pair of ontological communications from the human nature to the Word, and from the human accident to the divine person.” (Richard Cross, “Dependence and Christological Predication,” Carthaginensia 36, no. 70 [2020], pg. 413) 

Communication, then, is Scotus’ truth-making relation for predicating various human properties of Christ the divine Logos. 

The Concept of Alloiosis in Zwingli's Christology

 

The following passages give us a concrete definition of what Zwingli’s doctrine of alloiosis is and how it functions in the context of christology and the communicatio idiomatum:

“Alloiosis, which we have understood as a ‘jumping’ locution (named by Plutarch), is a trope in which the customary order or meaning (ratio) is changed, when there is a leap or alteration from one to the other, on account of some likeness of grammatical features.” (Ulrich Zwingli, Amica exegesis, in Corpus Reformatorum 92:679.6-10)

“Alloiosis is . . . that jump or change or, if you prefer, alteration by which, speaking of the one nature in him [viz. Christ], we use words pertaining to the other.” (Ulrich Zwingli, Amica exegesis, in CR 92:680.1-681.1)

“A rhetorical figure which permits reference to one thing or nature in terms of, or by means of, another thing or nature.” (Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1985], pg. 30)

Thus, Zwingli interpreted the words of Institution in a more figurative sense, in which “the intended subject of predication is distinct from the subject in the uttered locution.” (Richard Cross, Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates [Oxford University Press, 2019], pg. 74)

However, alloiosis functions differently for Zwingli when the subject of the relevant predication is the person of Christ. In these cases, the sense and reference of the predicate is what changes, rather than the sense of the subject-term. For example, the phrase “the Son of Man is in heaven” would be interpreted as “Christ has a divine nature that is in heaven.”

“Zwingli is the direct inheritor of one very significant aspect of Alexandrian Christology—specifically, a version of the CN-semantics defended by Athanasius and Cyril. I am aware that this is not the usual interpretation of Zwingli. From Luther onwards (as we shall see in a moment), Zwingli was portrayed in Lutheran circles as tending in a Nestorian direction, following more broadly Antiochene traditions in Christology. This, it strikes me, is a complete misunderstanding of Zwingli’s position.” (Richard Cross, Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates, pgs. 76-77)

Cross further argues that Duns Scotus had a view of vivification similar to alloiosis in his interpretation of John 5:21 (‘Christ gives life to whom He will’) in Ordinatio, IV, d. 48. q. 1). Thus, Zwingli is not entirely without precedent.

How did Luther argue against the Swiss reformer’s view of christological semantics? To this purpose, we turn our attention to his Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper:

“If Zwingli’s alloiosis stands, then Christ will have to be two persons, one a divine and the other a human person, since Zwingli applies all the texts concerning the passion only to the human nature and completely excludes them from the divine nature. But if the works are divided and separated, the person will also have to be separated, since all the doing and suffering are not ascribed to natures but to persons. It is the person who does and suffers everything, the one thing according to this nature, and the other thing according to the other nature, all of which the educated know perfectly well.” (Martin Luther, Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, in LW 37:212-13)

In other words, Luther thought that alloiosis divided the person in a Nestorianizing way. Luther misunderstood Zwingli’s two types of alloiosis (ones where the subject term functions as a trope, and ones when the predicate term is figurative trope) as being one and the same category of alloiosis. An example of Luther’s misrepresentation can be seen in the following text:

“He [viz. Zwingli] calls it alloiosis when something is said about the divinity of Christ which after all belongs to his humanity, or vice versa—for example, in Luke 24[:26], ‘Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer and so enter into his glory?’ Here he performs a sleight-of-hand trick and substitutes the human nature for Christ.” (Martin Luther, Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, in LW 37:210-211)

Basically, Luther thought that Zwingli would interpret Lk 24:26 as merely meaning that “the human nature suffers and enters into glory.” However, as Cross notes, this is not Zwingli’s view:

“Luther’s point, in other words, is that Zwingli would claim that there is no sense in which ‘Christ should suffer and so enter into his glory’ is true, and that the relevant true locution is ‘the human nature should suffer and so enter into [its] glory’. But this is not Zwingli’s view at all. As Zwingli deals with cases of type-two alloiosis, they are true of the grammatical subject, albeit under an appropriate interpretation of the predicate: it is true that the person of Christ ‘should suffer and so enter into his glory’, and it is true because Christ has a nature that does these things—just as in CN-semantics. So Luther has again been misled by Zwingli’s terminology into treating the two cases of alloiosis as the same kind of linguistic phenomenon, involving a subject-jump.” (Richard Cross, Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates, pg. 81)