[The following is taken from the Select Disputations, 5:277-339]
Before I approach the Problems, I define both the "what" and the "how" of justification—what it consists of, what its meritorious cause is, and what its distinction is.
As for the first point:
Justification is a judicial sentence of the supreme Judge, which includes, or formally states, these two judgments: the condemnation of the guilt and punishment of sins, that is, the remission of sins or absolution from sin; and the judgment of the right to eternal life. Thus, these two moments in the act of justification are to be considered, both of which are about its essence or formal nature. They occur simultaneously in time but not in nature, nor in ignorance.
The meritorious cause is the obedience of Christ imputed to us. This can be considered either closely or materially, or proximately or formally. In the former consideration, Christ is our surety, mediator, and sponsor, who, with respect to his obedience, is as if the subject that is, and the principle that is. Thus, obedience is the principle by which. In this obedience, something can again be distinguished as material, namely, the obedience itself in fulfilling the debt; and something as formal, namely, satisfaction or merit. The former is said in relation to God, to whose justice it satisfies; the latter in relation to us, for whom he has obtained or acquired justice. Now, there was a twofold debt to be paid by us to God: one absolute, universal, and perfect obedience, namely, obedience to be rendered to God according to the law; the other hypothetical, particular, and accidental, inasmuch as, by hypothesis and due to the intervention of sin, man is obligated to endure compensation by suffering. Regarding this, see 1st part, select disp., title "On the right and justice of God." Christ took both of these debts upon himself and paid them for us as our Sponsor.
In the latter consideration, imputation occurs, which some theologians call the form of justification (properly speaking, it is the formal principle of it, or the form of the impulsive cause of justification; about which, more later). Just as the obedience of Christ is the material, for we are not justified by the obedience or righteousness of Christ unless imputed and by that imputation—without divine imputation, it would not be ours. Therefore, that marvelous and divine exchange should be observed here, as mentioned in 2 Corinthians 5:21 and Romans 5:19, by which our debt is imputed to Christ, who did not contract it, and, in turn, the payment of Christ is imputed to us, which we did not provide.
However, just as our debt is twofold, so is the twofold righteousness or obedience of Christ as the sponsor, the twofold payment, the twofold imputation, and, as a result of it, the twofold effect: freedom or immunity from the guilt and punishment of sin, and the right to eternal life.
III. Justification is distinguished into that which is from the prior and that which is from the posterior. The former is properly the declaration or demonstration of justification from the prior, as the cause from the effect. Again, justification from the posterior or demonstration is twofold: either before God and in the court of divine law or conscience, or before humans, in the civil court. Both of these distinctions have been sufficiently and thoroughly elucidated by our commentators on James 2 and Romans 4. Additionally, there is another distinction initiated by some more recent scholars, into active and passive, or external and internal. The former is universal, extending to all the saved, in one instance, first made in paradise, after the sad fall was given and the mediator was promised; preceding all calling, regeneration, and faith; indeed, preceding the existence of all the justified, except for the prototypes. This justification is actually the same as the promise of grace and the remission of sins through Christ, or with the pronouncement of the sentence of absolution. The latter is particular, made as many times as the number of the saved, and subsequent to the calling and faith of each individual.
I. Problem: Are the terms "imputing" and "justifying" synonymous? Answer: By no means, as is evident from an induction of scriptural passages.
II. Problem: Does the term "imputing" denote a gracious estimation? Answer: No, it is never used in this sense in the Hebrew word "chashab" and the Greek word "logizo" in the scriptures. Nor is this meaning supported by Greek and Latin writers. Arminius wrongly attributed this hypothesis to his error regarding the imputation of faith and the non-imputation of the righteousness of Christ.
III. Problem: Is imputation justification, or its form? Or does justification formally consist in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ? Answer: No, because according to all theologians, the righteousness of Christ imputed (which is the same as the imputation of the righteousness of Christ) is the cause of justification, by which and for which the sinner is justified.
However, an objection is raised, widely asserted by our theologians, that the mode of justification is through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and not through the proper fulfillment of the law or inherent righteousness. Response: That statement refers to the antecedent and cause of justification, not to its form or essence. Thus, in response to the question of how Gentiles and Christians know God, it is answered that the former know through natural revelation, and the latter through supernatural revelation.
Where a distinct mode of knowledge designates the specific cause of each, just as the knowledge of the faithful is not formally divine supernatural revelation, nor vice versa, but knowledge occurs through revelation as its proper cause. And so in other cases, where the phrase consists in it, it is and happens in that manner, etc., are not to be taken as formal but as causal. The sons of logic should consult here for improper predication.
It is objected that imputation and justification go hand in hand. Response: It is so, but it does not follow that one is formally the other, or that the conceptualization of one is the formal representation of the other. Just as effective calling and union with Christ are inseparable from justification, and justification from sanctification: which, however, should not be confused but distinguished as cause and effect, or at least as antecedent and consequent.
IV. Problem: Is it accurately and properly said that the parts of justification are two, the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and that justification consists in these two? Response:
Conclusion: The phrase "to consist in both" could be tolerated or excused: in remission, as in the formal part or prior moment of its form; and in the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, as in the proximate cause. For it admits latitude in something. Although such a phrase is not without ambiguity or confusion.
Conclusion: I do not see how it can be said that there are two parts, or members, or moments of the act of justifying, as long as we speak acroamatically and logically. For neither is the efficient or antecedent cause a part of the thing, nor vice versa. Because a part enters into the essence of the thing, if it is essential; or at least into its integrity, if it is integral; or its form, if it is formal. But now the imputation of the righteousness of Christ precedes, indeed, and causes justification, because God justifies us on account of it. Also, add that the active imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which some theologians seem to understand here, is no more the justification itself formally so called than the passive imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Just as active righteousness, with regard to the reason of causality, corresponds to passive righteousness, and vice versa; so, in the judgment of eternal life because of the active righteousness of Christ, corresponds to the judgment of damnation or remission of sins. And just as in that twofold act the imputation of the righteousness of Christ constitutes the meritorious cause of justification, but not its form or formal act, so in that twofold act of remission or absolution and the adjudication of life, justification itself formally consists.
Not as parts or members of one integral act, remission with imputation, whether active or passive righteousness, nor the imputation of righteousness, whether active or passive, or both, with the remission of sins or adjudication, or even with the adjudication of life. Therefore, it is properly a regard of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the remission of sins, as the antecedent to the consequent, and as the cause to the effect. Where such a regard and order of one to the other exists, there is no coordination or co-ordination. Just as in the act of saving faith, the assent general and the special and fiducial assent are subsumed and coordinated, and in these two moments, the proper and true essence of faith is constituted; not, however, in the general assent, which is the first moment or member of faith, and in some efficient or prevenient grace, whether it be God's or Christ's meritorious cause.
V. Problem: Does the decree of justification make any part or moment in justification itself? Response: No, for the calling, regeneration, justification, adoption, or sanctification should not be confused with the decree; internal action with the external emanation; eternal with the temporal; or the decree or will of God with execution and accomplishment, which can be exemplified by the decree of creation or the decree of salvation, which are distinct from creation and salvation themselves.
VI. Problem: Should justification be considered an instantaneous, individual, at once total and perfect action, without succession and without a gradation of intensity, and thus distinguished from sanctification? Response: Generally, according to our theologians, we think that it should be understood distinctly depending on the various meanings of the term.
Conclusion: Justification, when indicating the universal, external, and active, is performed all at once.
Conclusion: Justification, when indicating the particular, internal, personally applied, or passively non-sensory and from the prior, is performed all at once in one moment for the initial implantation of faith.
Conclusion: Justification, as it denotes the sensory and direct application from the prior, is often repeated.
Conclusion: Justification, as it denotes the sensory demonstration and declaration from the posterior, is often repeated and admits of degrees.
VII. Problem: Whether, if justification is truly instantaneous, total, and perfect, should it be said that future sins are also forgiven consequently? Response: The hypothesis is presupposed against the successive remission of the Catholics, which they make through consecutive steps or parts progressing according to the progression of the parts of human satisfaction. However, preserving the distinction between the instantaneous justification and the sensory or sensible application of the same, which is often found and renewed, and progresses successively, admitting more or less. See this distinction in Ursinus, Perkins, and other interpreters of the Lord's Prayer, on the 5th petition. As for the consequence drawn from this, regarding the remission of future sins, we affirm with the distinction applied: we deny with regard to the latter. For the sense and evident demonstration of such remission necessarily follows not only sins already committed but also renewed actual repentance and faith. Practical considerations, signs, and indications in treatises on the practice of repentance, faith, and conscience aim at the latter part of this distinction. Although the assertion under the first part of the distinction may seem paradoxical or harsh to some, it must necessarily be established and defended, as we do not wish to deviate from the foundations of the doctrine of grace, the Covenant, regeneration, justification, faith, and baptism. Amesius in his work "The Marrow of Theology," chapter 27, sections 23-24, indicated this assertion. In the year 1634, I defended the same in "Thersites Heautontimorumenos." Later, in 1646, the distinguished theologian André Rivet in his "Discussion of Grotian Dialogues," section 13, chapter 6, seemed to deny that sins are forgiven before they are committed. However, this must be understood concerning that sensory forgiveness or condonation, not the true active or even passive forgiveness implanted in the first instant of faith through regeneration.
Problem: Is faith commanded by the Decalogue? Response: Affirmative. Because it is a theological virtue, and every theological virtue is commanded by the Decalogue. The catechisms and interpreters of the Decalogue, both from our side and the Catholic side, commonly agree on this. Among others, and above all, Peter Baro Stepanus, a theologian from Cambridge, extensively supports this opinion in his works published in London in the year 1580. Testimonies from Melanchthon, Calvin, Martyr, Viret, Bullinger, Beza, Borrhaus, Noëllus, Hemmingius, Urbanus Rhegius, and Kneustub are cited in support of this. Although generally agreeing with him, I strongly disapprove of his own interpretation, which he clearly reveals on page 107, asserting that the first and right affection of the will, by which one begins to love God demonstrated to oneself from the understanding, desiring to be led by it, is of the nature of faith, not its effect. On page 129, where he describes the process of justifying faith, he presents it as follows:
1) Liberation from the error of the mind and the celestial knowledge of Truth in it.
2) Desire of the will toward the known good and hatred of evil.
3) In the same will, hope and confidence in the known and loved good to be obtained.
4) Sending possession of Christ, or his apprehension, and application to us.
5) Christ dwelling in us.
6) Testimony of the Holy Spirit concerning Christ dwelling in us.
7) Charity, or love, toward God whom we already honor as Father, whence good works.
8) Hope and confidence as a crown: these render the spirits more certain.
9) Hence the perseverance of the elect, fortified by which they strive steadfastly toward eternal life.
However, this theologian, having fostered opinions akin to Semi-Pelagianism and having begun to spread them there, and these opinions being censured at Lambeth by other theologians (see the published articles called Lambeth Articles, edited by D. Thyssius under the care of Professor Harderovicius), abandoned his extraordinary theology profession and the University of Cambridge. Today, Socinians disagree on this question, imposing ambiguous play on the less cautious, substituting the gospel for the law, the covenant of works for the covenant of grace, and works or evangelical obedience (as they call it) for justifying faith. Remonstrants, in their Confession chapter 12, enumerate certain special acts or virtues under the First Commandment but omit faith. In their catechism, they also omit knowledge and other spiritual virtues. By this counsel, they themselves declare and one who knows about these things may think.
Objection: There is no mention of Christ in the Decalogue, who, nevertheless, must be received by faith as the only Mediator. Response: Special truths, which are the object of faith, are not referred to in the precept of the Decalogue, just as attributes and works of God, the Trinity, creation in the image of God, the fall, eternal life, resurrection, the person of Christ, and his office, etc., are not mentioned. However, in the general category of duties prescribed for us to obey, both toward God and toward our neighbor, the worship of God, both natural (consisting of faith, hope, and charity) and instituted, is commanded. The material and formal objects of these virtues are not explicitly explained. Therefore, when in the first commandment we are prohibited from having other gods and adhering to them, conversely, we are commanded to adhere to one God alone, and to bear faith, hope, and charity toward Him alone: faith, indeed, for the first truth, and hope and charity for the first goodness. Thus, it is evident that divine faith is prescribed to me; it naturally follows that everything divinely revealed, whether it be a common or special precept, promise, common or special commination, or any common or special prediction, is to be believed with certain faith. Therefore, such an explanation is made through the first and most evident consequence and subsumption. Everything credible from God, who is the first truth, proposed and revealed by divine faith, is to be believed. But the Gospel or the evangelical promise of salvation through Christ is such credible matter: Therefore.
And thus, it has features regarding Baptism, the Lord's Supper, Antichrist, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the Apostles, the calling of the Gentiles, the conversion of the Jews, the state of the Church before the second coming of Christ, and other prophecies and predictions in the New Testament; all of which are not explained by the law of the Decalogue, yet they are prescribed to be believed in general, under which all singular things revealed or to be revealed by God are included. I believe this response is sufficient. Others add that the covenant of grace and redemption through Christ are typified in the preamble of the Decalogue. However, the Socinian objection returns: Faith in Christ, the Lord's Supper, etc., are not commanded by any precept of the law; consequently, Christ is the new legislator who brought new laws, new evangelical precepts. Besides this solution, Baro has another one on page 39. Furthermore, the objection says that the law of the Messiah is most frequently mentioned, and His sacrifice is a perpetual foreshadowing and representation in ablutions and sacrifices. However, this response does not address the proposed question and objection. He had already said, and rightly proved, on page 37 that faith in Christ is commanded by the first precept of the Decalogue. Against this assertion and proof, he presents an objection that is now refuted. It cannot be solved by a response about the ceremonial law because it differs from the moral law, not only in terms of law, as it is moral, but also because it is typic, that is, it contains the Gospel. See question 19 of our Catechism and common places of Maccovius. Concerning its material aspect, the actions prescribed there are properly called the law. However, concerning its formal aspect, the mystic meaning and sealing of those actions, it is properly called the Gospel or the promise.
II. Objection: The law only commands us to love God and people, but not to believe. Response: Baro seemingly responds to this objection on page 42, stating, "But, indeed, if you only consider the words, but if you explore the sense of the words, as interpreters do, you will find that love is commanded by the law in which faith is included. Indeed, it is said positively that faith is included, although not formally, when love is mentioned, according to the rules of common scholasticism. Nothing is loved unless it is known, and we only love as much as we know. However, it is said that love is the summit of the law, not faith, in Matthew 22, Romans 13, Galatians 5, because love is greater than faith (1 Corinthians 13:13), because faith is effective through love (Galatians 5:6), because it is perfected by it, meaning that it is shown to be true and living through love (James 2:18, 22, 26), and finally, because the state of man here, through grace, and in heaven, through the glory united to his living God by the act of charity, the ultimate act, is fulfilled and specified: according to the common rule - the last act specifies. See our Exercise on Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica I-II, question on the subject and formal act of beatitude in the second part, question.
Therefore, it follows that faith is fulfilled and perfected by charity, and consequently, charity can be called its form or its ultimate and specifying act. Response: No. For it is one thing for faith to be fulfilled or perfected, and indeed formally formed by charity, and another for the state of a faithful person here, through faith, and in heaven, through the intuitive presence of the living God, to be fulfilled and ultimately perfected by charity. We concede the former, but we deny the latter. For faith and charity are distinct virtues in form and species, as inferred from 1 Corinthians 13:13, Galatians 5:6, etc.
III. Objection: Contrary to which one sins by not believing or infidelity, from which faith in the God-Redeemer or in Christ is prescribed. But against the Gospel, one sins by unbelief. Therefore, faith is not prescribed by the law, and the Gospel is a new law. Response: The objection presented with this reasoning, before the arising or exposing of Socinian controversies, was left sufficiently secure in its place, as is usually done, by some, even if not admitted, at least not effectively repulsed. Phrases such as the new law, the evangelical law, evangelical obedience, evangelical precepts, Christ's precepts, as they are now used, due to the heterodox errors that they hide, should be avoided or used only with an added explanation and caution. I therefore distinguish the term "Gospel" and "evangelical preaching," which is sometimes broadly understood as the entire saving doctrine preached under the New Testament; sometimes strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace, which is specifically and perpetually distinguished from the law of commandments; sometimes very strictly for the doctrine containing the promises of the covenant of grace after the manifestation of Christ. If the Gospel is taken in the second and third meanings, it is asked: Does it prescribe any precepts, either old or new? Response: No. Or at least, is that one commandment strictly or very strictly understood, "Believe in the Gospel," or "Believe in Christ," prescribed? Response: No. Therefore, you might ask: Is only this prescribed by the law, specifically by its first commandment? Response: Yes. For the duty of faith, or believing everything revealed by God, is prescribed by the law alone. But the object of this faith, or the things to be believed, namely, those special ones, which are the promises of the Gospel, or Christ the Savior, or salvation through Christ, are revealed and presented by the Gospel alone, not by the law, whether commanding or promising. Therefore, the law has faith as its immediate and direct object among other duties and prescribed acts of man, and the Gospel, strictly speaking, has faith that is believed, or things to be believed, or the very truths of faith, or those credenda, which are the promises of the covenant of grace, or the Evangelical ones.
Regarding the difficulty in the objection presented, the consequence of the major premise is denied, and the reason for the denial becomes clear in the instances mentioned. One sins against God, against creation, and all other benefits of God, against the grace extended, against our repeated promise to God, against Baptism, against partaking in the Lord's Supper, against brethren, against any neighbor, against God's chastisements, against parental admonitions, against the sermons of ministers. Yet, those are not prescribing laws. Therefore, you see the need for a distinction here: either against the motive or reason moving, or against the object against which the sin is committed (as in Psalm 51:6, Luke 15:18, 1 Corinthians 5:13), or against the law of God revealed by God, whether naturally or supernaturally, internally or externally, commonly or specifically. In the second and third ways, we deny that one sins against the Gospel; in the first way, we concede. For as long as it contains those outstanding promises of the covenant of grace, it is itself the most excellent motive by which and for which we should be led away from all sin and encouraged toward all virtue (even faith, hope, etc.).
However, you might insist: One who sins through unbelief, given that he sins against the first commandment of the Decalogue, seems nevertheless to sin against the Gospel, which presents such outstanding truths. Response: Indirectly, and as it goes against those excellent motives stimulating us to our due duty, I concede; directly and against the object prescribing or ruling, or against the law and norm prescribing, I deny. For one thing is a gratuitous promise that, in its kind and aspect, moves and stimulates me, and another is a prescriptive law that obliges me.
Problem: Is faith an act, a passing action, or a habit, a disposition inherent and enduring? Response: Both are proven later. 1. Because in Hebrews 5:14, it is expressly called a habit. 2. Because from its acts, whether elicited or commanded, it is the principle by which it is distinguished (Galatians 5:6, Ephesians 3:7, 12). 3. Because the new creation, and all its parts, are something habitual and enduring; therefore, faith is also. The antecedent is proven from John 3:7,6, where the spirit is said to be, and Ephesians 2:10, where workmanship is, and Ephesians 4:24, together with Colossians 3:10, where the image of God is, and 2 Peter 1, where divine nature is. 4. 4. Because it is said to be clothed with the whole new man and to become a partaker of the faithful man. (Ephesians 4:23-24, 2 Peter 1:4). Therefore, it is an adjunct and something habitual. 5. Because it is said to exist, remain, and dwell in believers (2 Timothy 1:7, Colossians 1:4) and not to fail (Luke 22:32). 6. Because believers are denominated from it in concrete, just as others are denominated righteous, courageous, temperate, liberal, etc. (See also analogous arguments in the works of philosophers like Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, where he proves virtue to be a habit.) 7. Because it is said to abide in unbelievers while other parts of the new creature grow, fulfill, perfect, and abound (Philippians 1:6, 9, Colossians 1:6).
Problem: Is it an infused habit or an acquired one? Response: It is an infused habit, and this is proven by all those arguments by which the efficacious grace of regeneration is established in the first moment of conversion, simultaneously refuting the pretense of free will as a forerunner, or preparatory disposition, or synergy, as discussed in Part 2, section "On Regeneration." However, with respect to those who are regenerated in infancy and are continuously brought up in faith from tender age, faith might, in some sense, be called a habit gradually acquired, formally so named, with its beginning, however, being infused and impressed through the initial regeneration. While some might call this principle faith, many prefer to label it an analogue of faith, a non-formal faith, such as the seed and root of faith or the spirit of faith. This can be conceived as a kind of spiritual power or a disposition of the spiritual being from which, through successive spiritual acts, progressively elicited and more and more completed, a habit is eventually born. For more on this, see the discussion on regeneration.
Problem: Is it one simple habit, or is it composed or aggregated from several? Response: This question can be understood in three ways: whether historical, justifying, and miraculous faith are three distinct habits and three distinct faiths; whether general and special assent are two habits or one; whether general faith in the intellect and trust in the will, along with special assent in the intellect, both direct and reflex, are formally justifying faith or habits of faith. If they are, then whether faith, in this sense, is a simple or composite habit. The first question is determined negatively by our theologians, removing one of the objections raised by the Papists. Some who seem to address this are Pareus and Ames, against Bellarmine, and in Part 2, section "On Miracles." As for the second, it is responded that the double assent does not make two habits distinct in species and form or a composite habit any more than historical knowledge and assent, two distinct general faiths, or knowing with practical application, two practical sciences, or each concept of a genus joined with the concept of a difference alters the species of a thing.
As for the third question, its various parts and contents should be distinctly unfolded as follows: a) Whether trust or faith or hope (as Ames distinguishes against Bellarmine) is formally justifying faith, or whether it is a proper principle and instrumental act through which we first apprehend and unite ourselves to Christ and are thereby justified. b) Consequently, whether justifying faith, in its proper form, exists solely in the will. c) Whether all those acts enumerated by Ames in his "Medulla" (Book 1, Chapter 3) and "Ego" (in Part 2, section "On the Practice of Faith") are formally part of the essence of faith. d) If they are not, then who among them is the formal and proper instrument, and what is the formal effect of justification? e) How they should be ordered and which one precedes or follows another. There are mainly three opinions: The first belongs to those who attribute the subject and formal act of justifying faith to the mind, such as Zanchius, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Gomarus, Maccovius, and Dan. Dyke in his commentaries on the Epistle to Philemon. The second is held by few who assign it solely to the will, notably Ames. The third, more common, requires, apart from the general assent of the mind, an additional special application in faith and trust of the will. Many Reformed theologians, especially those who opposed the Papacy, adhere to this view. Their aim is to demonstrate that in a truly converted and faithful person, there can and should be a special application, certainty, and trust. They argue against the Papists, asserting that a general assent to scriptural truth, combined with mere moral certainty or perpetual doubt about God's grace and one's own salvation, is insufficient. On this matter, we believe none of our theologians disagree. However, the current question, according to the logical distinction without regard to Papist doubts, does not concern the requisites and distinctions conjoined in the state of a truly faithful and converted person, nor the required act of the will for eliciting the assent of special and applying faith. Instead, it focuses on the formal nature of faith, precisely what it consists of, and whether the trust of the will is the essence or form of faith, or a necessary adjunct akin to docility, susceptibility, intellect, and will, which are essential concomitants of man. It also addresses the question of whether the assenting and certitude of the mind, or the trust of the will, precedes in the order of nature. I do not think many have contemplated this specific aspect, no more than the controversy between Thomists and Scotists regarding the subject and formal act of beatitude, as we observed in a specific discussion in Part 2, section "On Beatific Vision," on this issue earlier.
Therefore, having set forth the indubitable and commonly accepted orthodox hypotheses, partly opposing Socinianism and partly Roman Catholicism, we now present an examination of the arguments regarding the trust of the will in private colleges, as the occasion compels us. The hypotheses are as follows:
The distinction of justifying faith from hope, charity, obedience, fidelity, repentance, or reformation in a strict sense.
Regarding the necessary requisites for salvation, piety in practice, and solid consolation, emphasizing not only faith, general assent, and general certainty but also special and applicative certainty and a special and firm trust of the heart. Thus, these cannot be more separated from each other than animality from rationality in a human, or susceptibility, intellect, and will from rationality, or these from each other.
The sophism, which Bellarmine posits and is followed by the Remonstrants in their Apology against justification, involves the instrumental effect of faith, as if it inferred this absurdity: the object comes posteriorly to the act revolving around the object, or the effect is prior to its instrumental cause. This is well resolved in Part 2, Section "On the Practice of Faith."
Let us now address the arguments that have been brought forward regarding the subject of justifying faith, the will, and its formal act, namely trust.
Argument from the definition of faith: Since faith is the acquiescence of the heart (that is, the will) in God as the author of life and eternal salvation, or in this manner: faith is the virtue by which, adhering to God's fidelity, we strive towards Him so that we may obtain what He proposes to us. We respond that justifying faith does not consist in the mere acquiescence of the will in God as our Father and the author of life and salvation. It should have been proven that it is formally the acquiescence of the will and not of the mind, by which we assent to and receive that special truth proposed and attested to within us by the Holy Spirit, in this manner: God is your God, Christ is your Savior. As for the proofs from the cited texts, we say the following:
Concerning Isaiah 10:29, it is not taught there that an elicited act of properly accepted faith is to be elicited, but rather an act of trust, which accompanies or follows the act of faith, certain assent, and the will's concurrence with the preceding wing of hope; and this is indicated when it is added "in faith," that is, through faith or through the act of faith elicited.
As for Ephesians 3:12, when we are said to have confidence or trust through faith (see Beza's notes there), we say that trust is an act through faith and after the special and applying faith; however, the act of special and applying faith is not an act through and after trust.
Regarding Psalm 37:5 and Jeremiah 17:7, we say that nothing else is preached there than the act, duty, necessity, and fruit of trust, which we concede.
Indeed, neither can nor should a person be a servant of God without trust any more than without faith. However, it does not follow that one is the other, or that the elicited and formal act of one is the act of the other, or that the act of one precedes the act of the other. Thus, in Psalm 32:11, Philippians 3:1, and 4:4, compared with Romans 5:2, 2 Corinthians 6:10, and 1 Peter 1:8, spiritual joy is commended or called the joy of faith. However, it does not follow that justifying faith formally consists in joyous hearing. We will address John 1:12 and 3:33 shortly.
Argument: Receiving is an act solely of the will, not of the mind. Yet, the act of justifying faith is described as receiving in John 1:12. Therefore, Response: An objection might arise whether it is necessarily proven from these texts that receiving is an act elicited, formal, and of the will, and not of faith, as distinguished from trust. Yet, trust is attributed to faith metonymically, being antecedent and consequent. Setting aside the lesser issue for now, we deny the major. The reason is that reception in the Scriptures is also attributed to the mind, such as knowledge and assent. In Proverbs 1:5, 4:2, and 9:9, "to know" is called "to receive" - "laqach." Thus, wisdom is attributed to those who receive it as an act of reception. In Greek and Latin philosophy, commonly used terms include perception, conception, apprehension, comprehension, etc. For wisdom, concerning the teacher, is called doctrine, tradition, etc., while concerning the learner, it is called learning, lesson, acceptance, λήψις.
III. Argument: Election is an act solely of the will, not of the mind. Believing is choosing or election. Therefore, Response: Though the minor premise may be debated, for the sake of brevity, we now deny the major. The reason is that just as commanding and pursuing are attributed to the will, so judging, directing, and sharing are attributed to the practical intellect. Thus, in Greek philosophy, habits and acts of the mind, not the will, are attributed to knowledge, judgment, and opinion. The entire doctrine of counsel, an act of the mind and practical judgment, shows that election concerning various proposed means primarily takes place there. Refer to the Scholastics on 1.2, question 13, article 1.
Example: Since faith tends towards the good that is offered to us, and to tend towards the good is of the will, not the intellect. Response: It is of both: For the practical intellect tends towards the same good through judgment and direction, and the will in its own way, that is, through command and pursuit. Thus, wisdom, universally recognized as a habit of the intellect, not the will, has as its proper object good.
Regarding this, let Aristotelian and Scholastic Ethicists consult 22. qu. 47, art. 1, qu. 48, art. 1, and qu. 52, art. 2.
Example 2: Because tending towards the good is the act of election and thus of the entire person (John 6:35). Yet, this in no way agrees with the act of the intellect. Response: It might be objected that if it is the act of the entire person, it cannot be solely attributed to the will. Faith is the act of the entire person; therefore, distinguish: To know, to believe, to trust, to hope, to rejoice, to love are acts of the entire person, as the principle and subject "what"; and they are nevertheless of the intellect or will as the principle and subject "by which" or formal. To believe or to attribute trust solely to the will should not be exclusively to the entire person or exclusively to the act of either; since the one necessarily and essentially has the other as a consequent, concomitant, and conjoined, while the other necessarily and essentially presupposes it, and their dependence on each other is essential.
IV. Argument: Because salvific knowledge is not given in anyone without it being found in those to be saved, diverse, unless consequently, depending on the act of the will, i.e., trust. Response: If by knowledge, knowledge, assent, and general faith in the truths of faith are understood: Deny the antecedent. But if it is faith or special and applicative assent, which has as its object that truth - Christ is your Savior; God is your God - deny the antecedent. And this is truly "τὸ χριστιανὴν," whether trust and acquiescence of the will precedes that salvific knowledge and certain assent or whether it follows and accompanies it. We affirm the former; deny the latter. No argument or medium appears here to prove the opposite. It is, therefore, a bare repetition of the antithesis and a request for what is in question.
V. Argument: That truly Christian faith, which takes place in the intellect, always relies on divine testimony as divine (John 3:33). But it cannot be received unless from a pious disposition of the will towards God. Response: It is only established that some act and affection of the will precedes faith or assent, both general and special. However, it is not thereby established that special and justifying faith is formally an act of the will, no more than it follows that general faith (which the author himself, along with all our scholars and Scholastics, places in the intellect) is an act of the will because the act of commanding the will to elicit assent precedes it. Consult the Scholastics on 22. qu. 2, art. 1, and 1.2. qu. 9, art. 1.
VI. Because to believe in God is to believe to adhere to God, rely on God, acquiesce in God as in our life and salvation, who is all-sufficient (Deuteronomy 30:20), therefore, faith is true and proper trust. Response: If in the antecedent proposition "to believe" is taken properly and formally as relying on God and acquiescing in God, the antecedent is denied. However, if it is taken improperly, metonymically, and effectively, the antecedent is granted, and the consequence is denied. Thus, when the Word of God is said to be our life, it does not follow that the Word or faith is formally life itself. Likewise, James 1 is called the visitation of widows causally, not formally. And so, death is said to be the separation of the soul from the body, etc. Consult Rhetoricians on Metonymy and Logicians on improper predication.
The additions prove nothing.
It is about the choice and apprehension of a sufficient means, in which a certain and absolute persuasion of a future good is founded, as people are said to have trust in wisdom, power, friends, and wealth (Psalm 78:22). Response: First, it presupposes that the election and apprehension are not solely the proper domain of trust and will and cannot be attributed in any way to the intellect, which has been proven otherwise above. Second, it tacitly seems to attribute to dissenters that they assume all persuasion, assent, and certainty, or certain knowledge, to be about future good. However, they unanimously teach that faith properly concerns and deals with the present reality it apprehends.
It is. The true nature of solid faith is explained with phrases like "lean not on your own understanding" (Proverbs 3:5), "trust in the name of the Lord" (Isaiah 50:10), "trust in the Lord and do good" (Psalm 37:3), "on God rests my salvation and my glory; my mighty rock, my refuge is God" (Psalm 62:7), "everyone who believes in him will not be put to shame" (Romans 10:11). Therefore, faith is formally trust, and consequently, it is in the will alone. Response: The antecedent is denied concerning the cited Old Testament passages. These passages do not explain the nature or essence and formal act of faith, but either trust or hope, which are adjuncts to faith.
VI. We concede, however, that those are acts and motions of the will. Let us not light a torch at noon; let the passages in the original text be examined now. And if anyone cannot swim without a cork, let them see these stolen phrases explained from the sources of languages by the great among theologians and philologists, Fr. Gomarus, in his Diatribe on Faith, subject to commentaries on the epistle to the Hebrews; with which, if time allows, compare Matthew Mart's Onomasticon on the words "fides" and "fiducia." Regarding the phrase "for he who believes," Rom. 10:11, it does not necessarily signify the formal act of trust and will any more than the Hebrew word constructed with a preposition, also used of Moses and other prophets (2 Chronicles 20:20), where in Greek it is ΜΙΣΕΥΣΕΝΤΕ & ΠΟΠΥΡΥ, and of God's miracles (Psalm 78:32) where in Greek it is interpreted as ἐκ ἐπίστευσαν ἐν τοῖς θαυμασίοις αυτό. And concerning God's precepts, Psalm 111:6.
Then, the given particle "in" can sometimes signify trust; hence, it will be proved that this sense is proper, not metonymic. But if metonymic, how will it be proven that the formal nature of faith is trust, and consequently, that faith is in the will alone, as in its immediate subject?
Third, it could be said that the particles "in" and "with" admit various explanations, some of which may well suit this phrase "in" or "with." Indeed, the consequence of trust and acquiescence of the will could be deduced from those particles. However, we do not wish to insist on this exception unnecessarily, lest we seem to have compiled this abundance idly; the statements made thus far should suffice.
VII. What consists of union with God is not an assent given to the truth about God. But faith consists of union with God. Therefore, the major consequence is proved: Because an assent given to the truth about God can in no way bring about union with God.
Proof of the minor: Because faith is the first act of our life, by which we live to God in Christ. Response: It is said improperly or absurdly and falsely that faith consists in union with God, that is, that it formally is union with God. Union is neither the form nor the difference of faith; in fact, it is not even the genus. Union differs from faith in the whole predicate, as it is a relation, and this is an action or quality. Hence, in both definitions of faith presented by the opponent, it is defined by trust and acquiescence, not by being united. Theologians commonly and most accurately, including the opponent himself, teach that faith is the instrumental cause of our union and communion with God through Christ, and consequently, of justification and adoption. Therefore, what precedes union as an instrumental cause in the order of nature cannot be formally union.
If one wishes to speak causally to the contrary, we do not object that union with God consists in faith. Consider how the Apostle speaks about life in Galatians 2:20, "Christ lives in me, and I live through faith." Behold the meritorious and instrumental cause of life, distinct from its effect, that is, from life itself, which cannot therefore be said to be formally and properly union with God or our life by which we live to God in Christ. It must always be considered that our theologians warn that justifying faith is not considered absolutely, in itself, as a virtue or good work, but relatively, organically, and by means of another, namely, the gratuitous divine ordinance and Christ's righteousness, which faith receives. Thus, this whole argument collapses. An exception may also be made, ambiguously saying, "an assent given to the truth about God." If it means general assent, no orthodox person immediately attributes union to it; but if it refers to special and applicative assent, union is deservedly attributed to it as an instrument divinely ordained for this purpose. If one wishes to reform the argument and propose it in this way: "Through that by which, as its proper principle and instrument, we are united to God, and live to Him and in Him, that is formally justifying faith." But by an act of the will, trust, as its principle, etc. Therefore, deny the minor. Trust is an addition and consequent special and applicative effect.
VIII. The surrender by which one gave oneself to God in Christ, as a sufficient and faithful Savior, is made by the consent of the will alone, and in no way by the assent of the intellect. Therefore, faith is in the will alone. Response: Deny the consequence. This cannot be established by any reasoning unless one says that surrender is formally identical to believing or justifying faith. However, the opponent cannot say this, nor does he. Rather, he says the opposite with these words: "Even the believer, after the sense of misery and all kinds of liberation within himself and in others, has a need to surrender to God." Hence, I turn this argument back onto him: "What is formally and formally necessary for the act of justifying faith, that act is not the act of faith itself. Or, what is required as a condition in the one believing, that is not the very formal act of the believer or faith. But surrender or the act of surrender is required as a condition antecedent in the one believing. Therefore, this argument is sufficiently weakened. Moreover, about that surrender, what it is, and what order it has, whether in antecedence or in concomitance or consequence, is not something to be discussed here. For given that any necessary condition for the one believing is that it is formally an act of the will, it cannot be inferred in any way that it is formally believing or the act of justifying faith; rather, the opposite follows, that it is not. Just as sorrow for sins, despair of salvation in oneself and one's works, the desire for grace are necessary for the one believing (as shown in the outline and method of the practice of faith and repentance in the second part of theological disputations titled "On Regeneration and the Practice of Faith"), and these are in the will; however, none of these has called forth formal and formed acts of faith, either direct or reflex.
IX. Argument: It seems to be directed toward humans, that is, based on the hypothesis and concessions of those who posit faith in the intellect. However, they necessarily admit that there is some movement of the will in offering that assent, just as in human faith, it is said to be voluntary to grant faith to someone. Response: The entire argument is granted, and above, we have stated that this is the common doctrine of the Scholastics regarding faith or assent in its general sense. The same should be affirmed about faith or special assent. But the opponent continues:
If, however, faith depends on the will, it is necessary that the primary principle of faith is in the will. Response: Let this be granted or conceded. But does it follow from this that faith, both general and special, is formally trust and an act of the will? Certainly not. For that act of command by which the will moves the intellect is not formally or properly trust, that is, security in dangers, as trust is usually defined. Furthermore, this argument is turned against the opponent in the following way: "That of which the primary principle is in the will and which depends on the will in this respect is not formally an act of the will. But the primary principle of faith is in the will, etc. Therefore, the major consequence is evident. Because the principle is not what is principiated. The opponent's argument is similar to this: "That of which the primary principle is in external sense and imagination and which depends on them in this respect is formally an act of sense and imagination, or is only in sense, etc. But in physical knowledge, for example, the primary principle is in sense and imagination, etc. Therefore, physical knowledge is formally only in sense and imagination and, consequently, in no way in the intellect." Thirdly, the opponent counters his own argument by saying that doubt opposes faith, hesitation, error, and disbelief. But doubt, error, deception, whether in general or in special faith, is in the intellect. Therefore, faith is also in the intellect. This is how theology, which the opponent elsewhere placed in the will, is convincingly shown to be in the intellect based on his own propositions, as it is defined by him as doctrine, and terms such as wisdom, knowledge, prudence, etc., are considered judgments in the intellect. And thus, all the arguments, if they are to be called arguments, at least as presented by the opponent as arguments or in place of arguments, do not appear to have other premises with which the conclusion and thesis that faith is formally trust and an act of the will have been repeatedly asserted and refuted.
We conclude so far that we see no reason why there should be an exclusive emphasis on the will against the intellect, and why the more common opinion should not be left in its place. This common opinion speaks in a popular and exoteric manner without the application of a meticulous distinction between reason and the formal act of faith or believing, and between the necessary adjunct, the essential constitutive of faith, and the essential consequential. Meanwhile, we suggest to scholars engaging in these discussions that it seems necessary to follow sources that exclusively attribute justifying faith to the will, subject, and proximate principle:
Phrases and terms like "adhere to God," "choose," "acquiesce," etc., are used confusingly and should have been first unfolded from Scripture and good authors. They should be distinctively applied to the cited texts, as is done with faith, trust, joy, hope, charity, etc. Without this, there is a risk that faith, hope, charity, obedience, faithfulness, and their formal and elicited acts may become confused.
The acts of the will, by which the intellect is moved to produce its acts as a formal and eliciting principle, need to be distinguished from the formal and elicited acts of the intellect itself. Therefore, what is formally the intellect, attributed to the will, is called its act, to believe with certainty, and is given the status of a formal, eliciting, and immediate or proximate principle, when it is only an effective motivating or imperative principle and a mediate or proximate one.
Throughout the preliminary considerations, the entire course of this disputation, and in all arguments and solutions, the opponent does not insinuate or observe with sufficient accuracy and clarity—at least in a way that any reader could perceive—the distinction between the general faith common to hypocrites and the unregenerate, if considered materially and objectively, and the faith or certain special assent proper to the truly regenerate and salvifically converted. Consequently, the Papal controversy about only general faith, without special assent, trust, hope, joy, charity, and all the axioms and associated elements, is not distinguished from the problematic and Logical-Theological controversy that revolves among orthodox theologians. If these theses are distinguished from each other, and their respective arguments, exceptions, etc., are clearly and methodically assigned, and if they are presented concisely (as the opponent is adept at logically and sharply pressing and, as it were, punctuating his adversaries with great subtlety and skill), there is no doubt that much light and clarity will be brought to the discussion.
The opponent does not employ or seem to acknowledge the distinction between the act of Apopopias or special and justifying faith in a direct or simple sense and in a reflexive sense. However, this distinction is useful in explaining the nature of faith and in solving the sophism that states, "What all are bound to believe is true; But that Christ died for you, etc." This sophism, frequented by Perkins, Gomarus, and other orthodox theologians, merits recognition.
The saving faith is not accurately reduced to its proper category, and in that proximate genus (divine faith), or close genus (faith), or remote genus (intellectual habit), which is distinct from science—a knowledge through a cause—is not designated. The same is said about the kind and definition of trust. Hence, during the course of the discussion, faith and trust, along with their properties and attributes, are confused.
In many matters, as well as in this subject, because faith and trust are necessarily connected, they are treated as the same thing or one is substituted for the other.
Let us now proceed to the objections that I seem to have noted against the arguments of the opposing opinion.
I. Objection: Commonly, to believe signifies an act of the intellect giving assent to the testimony presented. But since, consequently, the will tends to be moved and extends itself to embrace the proven good, faith also appropriately designates this act of the will. This understanding is necessarily implied in this context.
Response: We concede that trust is a consequence of faith, and we turn the argument back against the opponent. Faith is not formally an act of the will, nor is trust formally faith. Through faith, or a certain persuasion and assent about a good, the will consequently moves and extends itself to embrace the good.
If the acquiescence and trust of the will in the good are formally faith because it follows, why is joy and mental tranquility not also faith? Since where there is faith and persuasion about the good, there the will tends to move toward joy, hope, mental tranquility, and security.
We acknowledge that the term "faith" is sometimes used (improperly, by metonymy) to denote trust. However, in this matter, in Scripture, when dealing with divine faith in general or justifying faith in particular, it is not necessarily to be understood in this way. This can be shown through an induction of relevant passages, if the paper allowed for it.
II. Objection: Special assent, by which we establish that God is our God in Christ, is not the first act of faith but an act emanating from faith. For there is no internal certainty in another person regarding this truth, nor is there a truer apprehension of it before you have singularly applied yourself to God by faith.
Response:
The entire objection is granted. In the simple or direct act of faith, Christ is first received and applied individually before it can be conclusively affirmed that Christ died, God is God to you, and your sins are forgiven. This can be compared to Gomarus in very learned discussions on the death of Christ and in the treatise on faith in his comments on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Then, this argument could be turned against trust in the following way: Trust and acquiescence in our God, as God through Christ, is not the first act of faith but an act emanating from faith. For there can be no greater trust and acquiescence of the heart in God as yours unless you have first believed and known with certainty through divine faith, that is, you have believed and known individually that God is yours through Christ. Nothing is willed singularly (especially God as our God) unless it has been believed and known, and this is the knowledge of faith.
III. Exception: Although in Scripture, sometimes the assent to the truth, which is about God and Christ (John 1:50), is held as true faith, there is always included a special trust. Thus, in all passages where the discourse is about saving faith, which presupposes trust in the Messiah, etc., or is designated through that assent as its effect, it is explicitly mentioned as an effect through its cause (John 11:25-27).
Response: Firstly, if the assent is understood in a general sense, we deny that it includes special trust. If the special assent is understood simply as the first direct assent (a different statement should be made about the reflexive act of faith), we concede that trust is concluded as a consequence or concomitant, but not as the antecedent and presupposed. However, however it is understood to be included, the argument can be turned as follows: What is included in faith is not formally faith or the formal essence of faith. But trust is included in faith. Therefore,
Secondly, if sometimes metonymically the word "faith" signifies trust, and sometimes (indeed, almost always, as evident from an inspection of the passages) properly signifies assent, why should we more firmly establish that faith is formally trust based on the force of the former usage in those specific texts, rather than establish that faith is formally special assent based on the force of the latter usage in many more texts? What phraseology, what analogy of Scripture, what rationale, what usage of the term "faith," "pistis," "pisteuo," among philosophers, orators, historians, poets, or Greeks, compels us to this conclusion?
IV. Exception: It is objected that trust is said to be the fruit of faith, but that is true of trust as it receives God in the future and is a firm hope. However, as it receives God in Christ, offering Himself in the present, it is faith itself. Hence, titles arise in Scripture that attribute to faith qualities such as παρρησία, πληροφορία, υπόςασις. Response: Elsewhere, the opponent distinguishes trust in faith and hope. With this distinction admitted, the opponent must still prove that this trust and acquiescence of the heart or will in God is formally justifying faith, through which, as an instrument divinely ordained, we are united to our God through Christ. And it must be proven that such trust is naturally prior to every act of faith, assent, persuasion, and special and applying certainty. Please define trust and acquiescence as security in dangers or evil or as the enjoyment of God as God for the present. Thus, it should be demonstrated with at least one argument that trust can and should be conceived and held by believers antecedently to all certainty, assent, persuasion, and special and applying divine faith, and antecedently to spiritual and salvific union with God through Christ as our God. So far, I have not seen such an argument. Indeed, against the correct proposition of the controversy, without elaborate argumentation, it is clear that divine and firm trust and acquiescence are not in God as ours unless it is established and believed singularly and with divine faith in this special truth presented to me that God through Christ is my God. That the act of special apprehension and certainty is in the mind, no one, I think, will deny. Refer to Part 2, Select Discourses on the Practice of Faith. This can also be easily observed in the comparison of human trust or acquiescence in a supporter or friend who presents themselves as wholly yours in the present, with human faith and persuasion about that supporter or friend, considering them as wholly yours.
Regarding the citation of the Greek terms παρρησία, πληροφορία, etc., by the opponent, along with the cited Scripture texts, Gomarus explained them in the aforementioned treatise in such a way that I believe no difficulty remains. Therefore, I leave it to our diligent scholars to pursue further.
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