As is well known by some, John Duns Scotus holds to the position that in Christ there is a created human act of existence distinct from the divine esse. This is in direct contrast to the traditional Thomist position that there is one esse in Christ, that of the divine person of the Word, through the humanity formally exists.
We begin with a more general Scotist metaphysic about how parts have esse in their whole(s):
“A part coming to a whole does not give esse to the whole, but rather receives [esse], since it is perfected by the form of the whole…But the human nature united to the Word is not informed by the Word, but remains simply distinct [from the Word].....The existence (existentia) of a foot is not other than that by which I exist. But the opposite holds here [i.e. in the hypostatic union].” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, III, d. 6, q. 1)
In this same section (Ordinatio 3.6.1), Scotus answers a number of popular objections given by Aquinas and the Thomists:
Thomist Objection: “Because the esse constitutes a being [ens], and thus, if Christ were to have two esse, Christ would be two beings.” (Ordinatio 3.6.1, n. 2)
Scotus’ Reply: “Although in Christ there are two wills, he is not however two willers, because the concrete is not numbered without numbering the supposit, – as is plain about him who has two sciences, who is not called ‘two knowers’; so in the matter at hand, if there are several esse each of which will be the esse simply of the supposit, it does not follow that the supposit is ‘two beings’. And in the form of arguing, “the esse constitutes the thing, therefore several esse are several beings,” there is a fallacy of the consequent, from destruction of the antecedent and [then] of the consequent; for the division of antecedent and consequent involves a negation about each.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)
Objection: “The infinite cannot receive esse from a creature; therefore neither does it have any created esse from the assumed nature.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)
Scotus’ Reply: “It is plain through the same thing, because the infinite receives no perfection which may inform it; however just as this nature is united to him [the Word] without the passive reception of any perfection in the Word, so the Word is from this union existent with the existence of this nature.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)
A number of positive arguments may also be educed for asserting that there is some created esse in Christ distinct from His divine esse:
"The foundation of a relation naturally precedes the relation, and according to actual esse precedes the notion of an actual relation. This union was an actual relation. Therefore its foundation is naturally prior to it according to actual esse. But that foundation was the total nature itself. Therefore [the total nature itself has actual esse]." (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.6.1, n. 23)
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| Bartholomew Mastrius (1602-1673) |
“Creation is terminated first and per se to the being of existence, just as generation is a transition from non-being to being, namely of existence (Physics 5). But the soul of Christ was created, and the body of Christ was generated. Therefore, his soul receives the being of existence from an efficient [cause] through creation, just as the body [receives it] through generation; but it does not receive uncreated being, because that is not the term of creation or of human generation. Therefore, the soul and body have a being of human existence other than the being of divine existence.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 1)
“Fifthly, it is also proven by a theological argument. The uncreated existence is something absolute and essential in God, and consequently common to the three persons. Therefore, if by assumption the humanity is united to the divine existence, such that it formally exists through it and not through its own existence, it follows that the union of the incarnation was made in something essential, and so all three persons would have assumed human nature, which is repugnant to the faith. Or at least it must be conceded that in the mystery of the Incarnation two substantial unions intervene: one of the essence of the humanity with the absolute and uncreated existence of God, the other of the existing humanity with the suppositum of the Word, or with his relative subsistence, which is a great inconvenience.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, ibid.)
In response to this second argument of Mastrius, Diego Alvarez insisted that the human nature was united immediately to the subsistence of the Word and mediately or secondarily to the uncreated existence of the divine nature. On the contrary, Mastrius responds, a mediate union with the divine existence (such as the Thomists posit here) does not suffice for the human nature to exist through it, just as in order for the human nature to be truly and formally united with the divine subsistence, it must be immediately united to it.
And yet, all sides of this question agree that the human nature exists in the Word. How can the Scotists consistently maintain this according to their view? Mastrius proposes this manner of solution:
“The humanity is said to exist in the Word, insofar as its existence is terminated by the subsistence of the Word, in which it subsists; thus also an accident is said to exist in a subject, not because it formally exists through its existence, because of itself it has its own existence, but because it does not have that terminated in itself, but in the substance; whence its existence has rather the nature of inexistence than of existence simply, and therefore it is said to inhere in another, and not to exist per se, and it is a dependence of the caused on the cause, such as is not the dependence of the humanity on the Word, which is by way of simple communication, and depends on it, as on a pure term of the union, which it founds to it, as to an alien supposit, to which it is communicated, as terminating, denominating it man.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)
Thomist Objection: Since a subsisting supposit is that which is properly said to exist (in contrast to a nature, which has esse as “that by which”), if there is one supposit, there must also be one existence. Christ is one supposit, therefore, etc.
Scotist Response: “Existence is not a personal property, as if following upon subsistence or personality, but it is a property of nature, indeed it is the very nature, as it is in act, and what receives being is the very singular nature; but the supposit is said to be made last according to the last denomination only.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)
This Scotist model is more important than we might first expect. For Mastrius, the human nature communicating esse to the Word (namely, the Word being the term of the humanity’s dependence) functions as the truth-maker for statements like “The Word is a man”:
“That the divine Word exists through created existence can be understood in two ways: in one way, as God; in another way, as man; certainly the Word does not exist through created existence insofar as it is the Word, or as to the divine nature; but there is no absurdity in the Word existing through created existence insofar as it is man, or as to the human nature; for the Word is truly and properly man for this reason, because it exists in the humanity or because the humanity exists in the Word, and just as it is truly called man from the humanity, so from the humanity it is truly called existing by created existence. You will say, hence it follows that created existence is a perfection of the personality of the Word. The consequence is denied, because the Word is the pure term of this dependent existence, not the subject, nor does it have itself as act, nor as potency.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)
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