Voetius' Definition of Free Will: "the faculty that can out of itself and according to a mode of acting that fits its nature, choose and not choose this or that, by virtue of the power of its internal, elective and vital command" (Andreas Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, pg. 440)
Here, Voetius combines freedom of contradiction (to will p or not will p) and freedom of contrariety (to will p or q) in his definition of freedom. Thus, indifference was essential for Voetius in defining the faculty of free choice.
Two Types of Indifference
1) Indifference regarding the means that will be used for the particular (at least, apparent [insert footnote from Turretin on will seeking objects as an apparent good]) end.
2) Indifference of volition (multiple potencies) prior to the determination of the practical judgment of the intellect.
Voetius says that these two types of indifference constitute the essence of human freedom. He defends this with a syllogism:
P1: The essential structure of freedom is that by which the will has a mastery of the act that is maximally appropriate to a creature.
P2: These two indifferences grant to the will such a mastery of the act that is maximally appropriate to a creature.
C: These two indifferences constitute the essential structure of freedom.
(taken from Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 159)
Three Types of Hypothetical Necessity (Basic Formula: If p, then q)
1) Necessity arising from the divine decree: In order to explain this type of necessity, Voetius appeals to Philippians 2:13; "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." Voetius puts forth a relationship or parallel between the way God wills contingent acts and the way that rational humans will contingent acts. God (independently) wills B, thereby removing indifferent to A or C (in the sense that Voetius understands it, namely the composite sense). In a similar manner, the human wills B (dependent on God), removing the indifference to A or C. Thus, the terminus ad quem is the same with the divine decrees and human contingent acts (secondary causes), though the origins are different (Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, pg. 245) However, we must note that this does not mean that the divine cause and the human cause combine as a tertium quid, because the decrees are the divine essence, and as such cannot be subject to any change, since God and His decrees are immutable (Mal. 3:6; James 1:27; Isaiah 14:24-27; 46:10; Proverbs 19:21). The will of God is nothing itself than the essence itself willing (insert citation from Turretin here).
2) Necessity arising from physical premotion: Voetius defines physical premotion as “the force (virtus) applied by God to awaken a creature that is capable of a second act." This plays into why Muller rightly caricatures the Reformed Orthodox view of free choice as "dependent freedom." By "second act", Voetius seems to be referring to volition and a concrete act that takes place in time (Reformed Thought on Freedom, pg. 165). He also expressing this idea by speaking of a divine action "virtually passing over to us." Yet another important distinction is added by Voetius, which is that the virtus applied by God to awaken a man towards actuality in act and volition tends towards the same decreed effect which the man would have done if this physical premotion did not exist in the first place.
3) Necessity arising from the practical judgment of the intellect: This kind of necessity not only concerns the potency, but also the act. Several objects are presented before the intellect, and the intellect determines not only the volition towards x, but also the act itself.
Appendix: Defining the Composite and Divided Senses of Propositions
"Composite sense is taken from the composite modal, and divided sense from the divided modal. And these consist in this: that in the composite sense the simultaneous presence and the union of two forms in one subject is signified; whereas in the divided sense is meant the union, or fitting, of two forms in a subject, not at the same time, but successively, or where one excludes the other; for this is divisive. Whence it is never valid to go from a divided to a composite modal proposition, or from the divided sense to the composite, just as it is not valid to go from fitting successively to fitting simultaneously. And therefore the composite sense is properly signified by a composite modal proposition, where the mode is predicated of the whole saying. For it signifies that the form of the predicate and of the subject under this mode are joined and come together at the same time. And the divided sense is signified by a divided modal proposition, where the mode only affects the copula. Thus it denotes that this mode fits the subject, and not that it fits the form of the predicate and subject at the same time. This is an example, if you said, That a black thing is white is possible, That a sitting person stands is possible. In the composite sense this signifies that the joining together of sitting and standing is possible. But if you said. A person sitting possibly stands, or can stand, this signifies in the divided sense that the power to stand fits the subject sitting, and not the power to stand at the same time as the sitting. Therefore when in the subject and predicate forms are introduced that are opposed—because for instance one form does not exclude the subject’s potency to receive the other, and excludes only co-existence and being present together with it—then in the divided sense this potency remains as long as the first form is present in the subject; for that form either takes away the potency nor gives it. And so when I say, The will moved efficaciously is able not to act in the divided sense, I do not signify that separate from efficacious motion the will is able not to act; but that while the efficacious motion is present in the subject there remains the potency to its opposite, and not the potency to join the opposite with the form, efficacious motion. Thus the divided sense places in the subject a potency to its opposites successively combined; the composite sense denotes a potency to opposites simultaneously combined." (John of St. Thomas, Outlines of Formal Logic, trans. Francis C. Wade [Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1955], pgs. 88-89)
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