[This article is part of a series of posts comprising a critique of Lutheran Christology, and the doctrine of ubiquity in particular]
Those who are familiar with Reformation history know that one of the greatest dividing issues between the Lutheran and Reformed churches is over the hypostatic union and the communication of properties. This division arose out of the initial dispute between Luther and Zwingli over the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, and how to understand His words of institution at the Last Supper.
Many Lutheran scholastic divines formulated and defended their doctrine of ubiquity throughout the early modern period, and the Reformed divines responded to them in turn. This debate still is ongoing today, but the amount of literature and research done on it is scarce (with the notable exception of Richard Cross, who has brought these issues back to light with his recent publications on scholastic Christology).
In this article, I want to examine an older Lutheran argument based on a scholastic distinction concerning the person of Christ. Seen in both Cyril of Alexandria and John of Damascus, the teaching is that statements such as "God died on the cross" or "the man Christ Jesus created the world", were understood to be true, not per se (as if the divine nature suffered or the human nature created the world), but κατ’ ἀλλο ("according to another"). The Latin equivalent would be "aliud et aliud." In other words, "God died on the cross" means that the divine person of the Logos suffered in His humanity. The acts and properties of one nature are attributed to the person denominated by the other nature. In these instances, "ἀλλο" refers to the two natures. This is the orthodox and proper sense of the distinction, which will be relevant for our purposes here. We now turn to clarify how the Lutheran divines utilized this distinction to support their doctrine of ubiquity, in which the human nature of Christ is omnipresent by virtue of the hypostatic union.
The Lutheran argument may be formulated as follows: "The body of Christ is indeed finite and circumscribed, per se [essentially or according to itself], but it is omnipresent and everywhere κατ’ ἀλλο, that is according to another thing; because the body has this quality not from the nature of a body, but from the hypostatic union, through which it is united to the Logos. The Logos is omnipresent, and shares with the body, such that it is also omnipresent."
In the first two genera of the communication of properties, Martin Chemnitz in agreement with Chalcedonian orthodoxy, uses the phrase “κατ’ ἀλλο” to refer to one of the two natures (this is the orthodox sense of the distinction). Thus God died on the cross κατ’ ἀλλο, according to the human nature. However, in the genus majestaticum Chemnitz changes the meaning and uses κατ’ ἀλλο to refer to the hypostatic union itself rather than the natures. An example may be seen in the following statement of Chemnitz:
“Cyril says, ‘The flesh of Christ is life-giving not according to itself (καθ’ ἐαυτην) but according to and through something else (κατ’ ἀλλο δι’ ἀλλο)’, in this case according to the union.’ ” (Martin Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Christ, trans. J.A.O Preus [St. Louis, MO: Concordia Press, 1971], pg. 184)
Chemnitz teaches an innovation by making κατ’ ἀλλο refer to the hypostatic union rather than the two natures. Indeed, St. Cyril of Alexandria makes it clear in his writings that the proper use of this distinction is in reference to one of the two natures:
“How was he [Christ] born and yet called everything into being, according to one nature and the other [aliud et aliud]. He was born in that he was man, and called everything into being in that he was by nature God. . . . How is he called only-begotten and firstborn? According to one nature and the other [aliud et aliud]. . . . Likewise how does he sanctify and yet was sanctified; baptizes and was baptized? Again, according to one nature and the other [aliud et aliud]. In what way is he said to be resurrected, vivified, and awakened from the dead? Of course, according to one nature and the other [aliud et aliud]. He suffers and does not suffer according to one nature and the other. For he suffered humanly in the flesh, because he is man, and he remains divinely impassible, because he is God. He himself worshiped with us, and yet still ought to be worshiped [by us]. This is also according to one nature and the other [aliud et aliud].” (Cyril of Alexandria, Scholia on the Incarnation, ch. 36)
Therefore, κατ’ ἀλλο should be said in reference to the natures, not the hypostatic union as Chemnitz wishes. This is the Cyrillian and Chalcedonian use of the distinction.
The following quotes from the Reformed scholastic Antoine de Chandieu (1534-1591) summarize a refutation of this Lutheran distinction. I am much indebted to him!
[Note: I have chosen to provide complete citations for both passages for the purposes of making it easier to cite these materials in academic research]
“You might say that the body is omnipresent not essentially, but communicatively. But I press this point: therefore [it would follow from the Lutheran argument that], the body is God communicatively. For if it is not communicatively God, then it is not communicatively omnipresent, and that because of the most simple essence of deity, as has been said.” (Antoine de Chandieu, De veritate humanae naturae Iesu Christi, theologia et scholastica disputatio [Geneva: Jean le Preux, 1588], pg. 11)
“Furthermore, if the body of Christ is finite in itself and thus remains finite in the personal union (which they both agree to), surely the body of Christ is not made infinite by the personal union. For to remain finite in the personal union and to become infinite by the personal union are said to be contradictory; nor should we seek aid from the distinction "in itself" and "in another sense," since we are speaking not of the body as a body, but as it is in the personal union.” (Antoine de Chandieu, De veritate humanae naturae Iesu Christi, theologia et scholastica disputatio [Geneva: Jean le Preux, 1588], pg. 62)
K.J. Drake gives an excellent paraphrase of Chandieu’s critique:
“Chandieu argues that the Lutheran use of the per se/κατ’ ἀλλο distinction results in a contradiction with other Lutheran claims regarding the preservation of the natures in Christ……He demonstrates this contradiction by comparing the use of the per se/κατ’ ἀλλο distinction with the Lutheran claim that ‘the communication [sharing] of properties was real, while preserving the special character of both natures.’ Chandieu argues that, while attempting to maintain the Chalcedonian logic of the incarnation, the proponents of ubiquity reject a confusion of attributes or peculiar properties and affirm the corollary that these properties remain intact in the hypostatic union. Thus, according to the hypostatic union, the properties of both the human and divine natures remain unchanged. The set of the human nature’s peculiar properties includes the attribute of being finite and circumscribed within the dimensions of the body. The proponents of ubiquity affirm this since they posit the finitude of the human nature per se, essentially or according to itself. If this is the case, then finitude is preserved according to the hypostatic union.” (K.J. Drake, The Flesh of the Word: The ‘extra Calvinisticum’ from Zwingli to Early Orthodoxy [Oxford University Press, 2021], pgs. 269-70).
In conclusion, if the Lutherans wish to be consistent both in their application of this distinction as well as claiming to believe that the properties of the human nature are preserved in the hypostatic union, the following contradiction would result: 1) the body of Christ has the property of spatial finitude, per se, which is preserved in the hypostatic union, κατ’ ἀλλο. 2) The body of Christ has the property of spatial finitude, per se, and also the property of omnipresence or infinitude, κατ’ ἀλλο, that is according to the power of the hypostatic union. 3) Christ’s body κατ’ ἀλλο, according to the hypostatic union, both has the property of being finite and not finite, which is a contradiction (K.J. Drake, The Flesh of the Word, pg. 270). The human nature is both finite and infinite when considered with respect to the hypostatic union.
