Jul 9, 2025

Refuting Common Rabbinic Arguments for the Oral Torah

 

The Jews have brought forth diverse arguments over the centuries in favor of their oral Torah, many of which have not received as many adequate responses in our day (at least, none that are in English). It is usually based on what they see as obscure passages in the written laws of Moses which must have some reference to an external source, rather than a cross-reference to another verse(s) in the Pentateuch; however, this latter source is very commonly the deciding factor which provides an easy explanation for any unclear passage in the Bible. In order to better understand the perspective of the Jews on how the alleged necessity of the oral law, and the ambiguity of the written Torah, I quote the following from Rabbi Judah Ha-Levi, in his famous polemical defense of Judaism: 

“If the consonantic text of the Mosaic Book requires so many traditional classes of vowel signs, accents, divisions of sentences and masoretic signs for the correct pronunciation of words, how much more is this the case for the comprehension of the same? The meaning of a word is more comprehensive than its pronunciation. When God revealed the verse: 'This month shall be unto you the beginning of months' (Exod. xii. 2), there was no doubt whether He meant the calendar of the Copts--or rather the Egyptians--among whom they lived, or that of the Chaldæans who were Abraham's people in Ur-Kasdim; or solar [or lunar months], or lunar years, which are made to agree with solar years, as is done in embolismic years. I wish the Karaites could give me a satisfactory answer to questions of this kind. I would not hesitate to adopt their view, as it pleases me to be enlightened. I further wish to be instructed on the question as to what makes an animal lawful for food; whether 'slaughtering' means cutting its throat or any other mode of killing; why killing by gentiles makes the flesh unlawful; what is the difference between slaughtering, skinning, and the rest of it. I should desire an explanation of the forbidden fat, seeing that it lies in the stomach and entrails close to the lawful fat, as well as of the rules of cleansing the meat. Let them draw me the line between the fat which is lawful and that which is not, inasmuch as there is no difference visible. Let them explain to me where the tail of the sheep, which they declare unlawful, ends. One of them may possibly forbid the end of the tail alone, another the whole hind part. I desire an explanation of the lawful and unlawful birds, excepting the common ones, such as the pigeon and turtle dove. How do they know that the hen, goose, duck, and partridge are not unclean birds? I further desire an explanation of the words: 'Let no man go out of his place [on the seventh day]' (Exod. xvi. 29). Does this refer to the house or precincts, estate--where he can have many houses--territory, district, or country. For the word place can refer to all of these. I should, further, like to know where the prohibition of work on the Sabbath commences? Why pens and writing material are not admissible in the correction of a scroll of the Law (on this day), but lifting a heavy book, or a table, or eatables, entertaining guests and all cares of hospitality should be permitted, although the guests would be resting, and the host be kept employed? This applies even more to women and servants, as it is written: 'That thy manservant and thy maidservant rest as well as thou' (Deut. v. 14). Wherefore it is forbidden to ride [on the Sabbath] horses belonging to gentiles, or to trade. Then, again, I wish to see a Karaite give judgment between two parties according to the chapters Exodus 21 and Deuteronomy 21:10. For that which appears plain in the Torah, is yet obscure, and much more so are the obscure passages, because the oral supplement was relied upon.” (Rabbi Judah Ha-Levi, Khuzari, Book III, §35; emphasis mine)

I will treat the most common examples the Jews bring forward, in a one-by-one fashion. I do not know the exact number of cases in the Torah which the rabbis bring forward in their desperate attempt to make us Christians accept their authority, much as the Papists do in their pleas for an infallible Roman magisterium to interpret sacred Scripture. I only wish to deal with the ones which are so frequently alleged against us, and which appear on the surface to be strong reasoning, but cast down upon closer examination. “He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbour cometh and searcheth him.” (Prov. 18:17) 

[1]. The Jews, like the Papists, insist that we cannot know the law of God and the true meaning of the Scriptures unless we give heed to their rabbinical courts. And there being many sandy foundations upon which they build their pleas, I shall begin with that text which is so often thrown in our faces, as it were, by them and their defenders. “If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, being matters of controversy within thy gates: then shalt thou arise, and get thee up into the place which the LORD thy God shall choose; 9 And thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire; and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment: 10 And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place which the LORD shall choose shall shew thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: 11 According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do: thou shalt not decline from the sentence which they shall shew thee, to the right hand, nor to the left.” (Deuteronomy 17:8-11). Thus we see the authority given by God to Moses and the Sanhedrin, and then to their successors - and the obligation of the Jews to listen to whatever they command. Hence, on the basis of verse 11, the rabbis can bind the consciences of men to anything whatsoever - “This is the meaning of the phrase ‘it is not in Heaven’: God Himself agrees with the sages from the outset. That is once the sages have given their ruling, even if they declare right left and left right, it is the law.” (Rabbi Nathan T. Lopes Cardozo, The Written and Oral Torah: A Comprehensive Introduction, pg. 78). Isaac Abarbanel tempers such comments by saying that this is only speaking of when the Sanhedrin might deviate from a general principle(s) to apply the law to a particular set of circumstances (on Deut. 17:11).

Response: Let us first see to what absurd length the Jews twist this verse in order that they may exalt their pretended authority over us, and over their own people so that they will not believe the gospel. Upon verse 11, Rashi says “even if he (the judge) tells you about what appears to you to be right that it is left, or about what appears to you to be left that it is right, you have to obey him; how much the more is this so if actually he tells you about what is evidently right that it is right and about what is left that it is left.” And the halakhic midrash says, אפילו ,ושמאל ימין — מראים בעיניך על ימין שהוא שמאל ועל שמאל שהוא ימין שמע להם סליק פיסקא “Even if it seems in your eyes (that they are telling you) left is right and right is left, listen to them.” (Sifrei Devarim, 154:5). And again, Nachmanides: — “The purport thereof is that even if you think in your heart that they are mistaken, and the matter is simple in your eyes just as you know [the difference] between your right hand and your left hand, you must still do as they command you….Scripture, therefore, defined the law that we are to obey the Great Court that stands before G-d in the place that He chose in whatever they tell us with respect to the interpretation of the Torah, whether they received its interpretation by means of witness from witness until Moses [who heard it] from the mouth of the Almighty, or whether they said so based on the implication [of the written words] of the Torah or its intent. For it was subject to their judgment that He gave them the Torah even if it [the judgment] appears to you to exchange right for left.”

There is not a word in this verse that grants any infallible authority to the Sages or Sanhedrin, that they may bind anyone to anything whatsoever. Jews would do well to read other parts of the Old Testament which indicate this truth with abundant clarity: “The priests said not, Where is the LORD? and they that handle the law knew me not: the pastors also transgressed against me, and the prophets prophesied by Baal, and walked after things that do not profit.” (Jeremiah 2:8), and also—“How do ye say, We are wise, and the law of the LORD is with us? Lo, certainly in vain made he it; the pen of the scribes is in vain. The wise men are ashamed, they are dismayed and taken: lo, they have rejected the word of the LORD; and what wisdom is in them? Therefore will I give their wives unto others, and their fields to them that shall inherit them: for every one from the least even unto the greatest is given to covetousness, from the prophet even unto the priest every one dealeth falsely.” (Jeremiah 8:8-10). It is as if the prophet Jeremiah himself foresaw the wickedness of the Jews in the rejection of their Messiah and idolatry of their rabbis, forsaking the commandments of God for the Talmudic traditions! 

[2]. “If the place which the Lord thy God hath chosen to put his name there be too far from thee, then thou shalt kill [זבח [of thy herd and of thy flock, which the Lord hath given thee, as I have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat in thy gates whatsoever thy soul lusteth after.” (Deuteronomy 12:21) - Here, God commands the laws of slaughter (שחיטה); "as I have commanded thee.” And yet no such passage is found in the written Torah where the laws of slaughter are described. Therefore, this shows that Moses and the Israelites received an oral tradition which enumerated such laws (Chullin 28a). 

Response: Just because the precise details of slaughter may not be contained in the written Torah, this does not mean that we must therefore bow to the rabbinic traditions. The Jews ought to read verses 15 and 16 of the same chapter: “Notwithstanding thou mayest kill and eat flesh in all thy gates, whatsoever thy soul lusteth after, according to the blessing of the Lord thy God which he hath given thee: the unclean and the clean may eat thereof, as of the roebuck, and as of the heart. Only ye shall not eat the blood; ye shall pour it upon the earth as water.” Thus, verse 21 is referring back to verse 15. The Jews must admit that this case by their own rabbinic hermeneutical principles, i.e. that of gezeirah shavah (an identical word in two texts establishes a connection between them which may be used in the legal interpretation thereof), since the same Hebrew verb זבח is used in both texts. Verse 16 also gives further direction concerning this shechita, that the blood must be poured out on this ground. This would rule out strangulation, for example, as a means of performing this slaughter. And then in verse 28 it says “Only be sure that thou eat not the blood: for the blood is the life; and thou mayest not eat the life with the flesh.” So then, this whole passage itself gives sufficient direction for this slaughter that need not invoke rabbinic tradition—though the Jews, straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel—will insist upon these absurd minutiae to the point of insanity!

[3]. The written Torah sanctions the death penalty for anyone who dishonors the Sabbath day by performing work [מלאקה [on it (Ex. 16:21-26; 20:10; 31:15; 35:2). And yet we nowhere find in the written text what counts as מלאקה, and therefore we do not know what is prohibited thereon—without something else to guide us in interpretation, as is the case with the Mishnah and Talmud.

Response: The rabbis would do well to remember one of their own axioms, that “the Torah spoke in the language of men.” (Berakhot 31b). Thus, the laws were not too hard to understand, but were readily accessible to those who heard them—it is expressly declared to be “near you and in your mouth,” not hidden in heaven or “beyond the sea.” (Deuteronomy 30:10-14). And in verse 14, it is said that the commandments are clear “that thou mayest do it.” Therefore, let us see how the law of the Sabbath was enforced on the children of Israel during the life of Moses and the giving of the Law. The Holy Spirit has recorded one such example for us: “And while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man that gathered sticks upon the sabbath day. And they that found him gathering sticks brought him unto Moses and Aaron, and unto all the congregation. And they put him in ward, because it was not declared what should be done to him. And the Lord said unto Moses, The man shall be surely put to death: all the congregation shall stone him with stones without the camp. And all the congregation brought him without the camp, and stoned him with stones, and he died; as the Lord commanded Moses.” (Numbers 15:32-36). If Moses had already received the full and complete Torah sheb’al Peh while on Mount Sinai, why is it that he did not know what to do with him? The Jews claim that all the opinions of the Sages were given to Moses on Mt. Sinai (Megillah 19b; Eruvin 13b), and so naturally this would have included the punishment for Sabbath breakers, i.e. stoning (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Shabbat §1), and all of the 39 prohibitions, since the Gemara is part of their oral law: “R. Levi b. Hama says further in the name of R. Simeon b. Lakish: What is the meaning of the verse: And I will give thee the tables of stone, and the law and the commandment, which I have written that thou mayest teach them? 'Tables of stone': these are the ten commandments; 'the law': this is the Pentateuch; 'the commandment': this is the Mishnah; 'which I have written': these are the Prophets and the Hagiographa; 'that thou mayest teach them': this is the Gemara. It teaches [us] that all these things were given to Moses on Sinai.” (Berakhot 5a); “Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: ‘Upon them and upon them’ — this refers to all the words: Scripture, Mishnah, Talmud, and Aggadah; even that which a diligent student is destined to teach before his teacher — all was already said to Moses at Sinai.” (Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 2:4). The rabbis interpret Numbers 15 to mean that Moses knew that the Sabbath-breaker was to die, but did not know his manner of execution (Sanhedrin 8a). However, this still would disprove the rabbinic tradition. For if the oral law had been revealed to Moses, wouldn’t he have known that breaking the Sabbath is punished by stoning? Why didn’t Moses know this already?

 [4]. The commandment "You shall not boil a kid in its mother's milk" appears three times in the written Torah (Exodus 23:19; 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21). This commandment appears in each of these places by itself, without any elaboration upon it or its meaning. It is the ruling of the Sages that this verse teaches that milk and meat should not be mixed together, either in cooking or eating (Chullin, 103b–116b, esp. 115b). Therefore, the ambiguity of this command in the written Torah shows the necessity of a rabbinic interpretation.

Response: We should first note how far some of the Jews have taken their superstitious interpretation of this text. For one, they have also enacted one of their gezayros in which they have banned the eating of dairy with poultry as well. However, some of them did not practice this, such as Rabbi Yose the Galilean and the Jews in his city (Chullin 116a). Upon Exodus 23, Rashi writes “In three different passages the law תבשל לא גדי is written: once for the purpose of prohibiting the eating of meat-food with milk-food, once to prohibit us from deriving any other benefit (besides eating) from such mixture, and once to prohibit the boiling of meat with milk.” One may also consult Mishnah Kiddushin 2:9 for this same interpretation of the rabbis.

It is the interpretation of many commentators, Jewish and Christian alike, that these verses are warning the Israelites against a particular practice of the heathen gentile nations around them which was part of their idolatry. So says Maimonides: “Regarding the prohibition of meat and milk: aside from the fact that it is undoubtedly a coarse and bloating food, I do not consider it unlikely that it is related to idolatry. Perhaps it was consumed in one of their rites or festivals. Supporting this is that the Torah mentions the prohibition twice in proximity to the command to make pilgrimage to God’s sanctuary three times a year (Exodus 23:17; 34:24). It is as if to say: “When you ascend to appear before the Lord your God, do not cook as they do.” This, to me, is the strongest reason for its prohibition, though I have not found it stated explicitly in the writings of the Sabians I have examined.” (Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, III.48). This may also be why the Septuagint translated "you shall not cook/boil” in Ex. 34:26, as οὐ Προσοίσεις, meaning “do not offer” or “do not bring forward.” This would entail that the Torah’s prohibition is not with regard to a general dietary principle, but is specifically forbidding a certain type of offering. And the gloss of the Samaritan Pentateuch upon Ex. 23:19 is כי עשׂה זאת כזבח שׁכח ועברה היא לאלהי יעקב; “Because if you do this, it will be as a forgetful sacrifice, and as insolence to the God of Jacob.” The two appearances of the prohibition in Exodus 23 and Exodus 34 both come immediately after instructions regarding various offerings that can be brought to the temple (Ex. 23:18; 34:25).

These laws could also be a prohibition against the literal cooking of an animal with its mother, due to concerns of cruelty towards the small animal; compare with Deut. 22:6-7. Philo of Alexandria wrote “Moses looked on it as grossly improper that the substance which fed the living animal should be used to season or flavor it after its death.” (Philo, On the Virtues, §143) Another reason why is this is not a general dietary restriction is what we read of Abraham in his interactions with the angels of the Lord before the destruction of Sodom: “And Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetch a calf tender and good, and gave it unto a young man; and he hasted to dress it. And he took butter, and milk, and the calf which he had dressed, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the tree, and they did eat.” (Genesis 18:7-8). Of course, there is some degree of dispute amongst Jews as to how closely the patriarchs such as Abraham adhered to all 613 mitzvot, as well as all of the rabbinic “fences” made with them. It is the opinion of this author that this seems to be more prevalent within the rabbinic literature: “We found that Abraham our forefather fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, as it is stated: “Because that Abraham listened to My voice, and kept My charge, My commandments, My statutes, and My laws” (Genesis 26:5), which indicates that Abraham observed all the mitzvot of his own accord and was rewarded in his old age as a result.” (Mishnah Kiddushin, 4:14, cf. Rashi on Gen. 32:5). This is also the opinion of Rav and Rav Ashi in Yoma 28b, and he is disputed by Rabbi Shimi bar Hiyya. However, many other Jews would say that Abraham did not know all of the 613 commandments, but only those which were explicitly given to him by God, such as circumcision (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Hilchos Melachim, 9:1); Rabbi Samuel ben Meir, Chizkuni, Sforno commentary, Ibn Ezra, Rabbi David Kimchi, and Rabbi Joseph Karo. 

Some Jews have explained Gen. 18:8 by saying that the calf and milk were eaten separately so as not to violate the prohibition against mixing milk and dairy. Thus, the Tosafists: “Seeing that Abraham is reported as first having served milky dishes, and the meat subsequently, it is reasonable to assume that he wished to give his guests something to eat before freshly slaughtered animals that had to have their blood removed could be cooked or roasted on the spit. The interval would have sufficed not to violate the laws of mixing milk and meat.” (Da’at Zekenim). This is a deceptive twisting of Scripture, which does not place any limit of time between the eating of the calf and the milk. Even one of their own midrash texts grants this “The Holy One, blessed be He, said to them, ‘At every moment, [there are] accusations between Me and Israel. Were you not there when you came down to Abraham and ate meat with milk, as it is said (Gen. 18:8) And he took butter and milk and the calf which he had dressed. And their child, when he comes from his teacher's house, and his mother gives him bread and meat and cheese, and he says to her, ‘Today my teacher taught me (Ex. 34:26) 'Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk.'’ She has no response for him. At that moment, the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses (Ex. 34:27) ‘Write thou these words.’ Until they had no response or reply.” (Midrash Tehillim, 8:2)

[5]. The laws of tefillin and tzitzit are part-and-parcel of the Jews’ tradition and practice. I desire to briefly show how it is not to be alleged as any proof for the oral Torah, and that the Jews do grossly and superstitiously misunderstand the teachings of Moses upon this point. For many of the rabbis insist that this command cannot be followed without their Talmudic customs, which detail the precise material, length, size of the letters and parchments, the type of ink which must be used, how many lines of each scriptural section, and type of animal from which the leather must be taken. These minutiae are claimed by them to go all the way back to Moses at Sinai, all the while offering no proof of this. (Shulchan Arukh: Orach Chayim, 32:7, 39, 42, 44, 49). The practice of tefillin is mentioned explicitly by our Lord Jesus in his rebukes to the wicked scribes and Pharisees: “But all their works they do for to be seen of men: they make broad their phylacteries (φυλακτήρια), and enlarge the borders of their garments, And love the uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues, And greetings in the markets, and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi.” (Matthew 23:5-7). Hence, we know the motive deep down for this practice, which is called out by Christ: the outward show of godliness which the Jews attempt to practice, to glory in their shame (Phil. 3:19). That this practice was common in the 1st century is evident not only from the words of our Lord Himself, but also from the report of Josephus: "They also inscribe on the doorposts the greatest of the things that God has enjoined them, and they display upon their arms what can signify strength, and upon their forehead whatever may indicate their memory of God’s grace toward them—these things being inscribed on the head and the arm so as to make the divine benevolence toward them visible and evident in all directions." (Antiquities of the Jews, book IV, ch. 8) Some scholars have argued that the practice of tefillin probably originated during the era of Hellenistic influence, in which amulets with inscribed text were superstitiously given various spiritual powers and abilities (Yehuda B. Cohn, Tangled Up in Text: Tefillin in the Ancient World [Providence, RI: Brown University, 2008]). “Originally, the ‘totafot’ and the ‘oth’ were perceived as magical, demonic symbols, and the use of amulets of this kind, which were attached to the head or arm, was common in the ancient world.” (Menachem Haran, The Biblical Collection: Its Consolidation To The End Of The Second Temple Times And Changes Of Form To The End Of The Middle Ages. Part B [2003], pg. 180)

Inside the box of tefillin, there are four passages of the Torah which the Jews

inscribe upon the parchments which are placed inside:

[1]. Exodus 13:1-10, “Sanctify to me….” (לי קדש)

[2]. Exodus 13:11-16, “When the LORD brings you….” (יביאך כי והיה)

[3]. Deuteronomy 6:4-9, “Hear, O Israel….” (שמע)

[4]. Deuteronomy 11:13-21, “If you observe my commandments….” (אם והיה שמוע)

In their superstition and blind zeal, the Jews interpret these texts literally to refer to a physical practice of wrapping the black leather straps around their arms and the box upon their head (situated between the eyes): “Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul, and bind them for a sign upon your hand, that they may be as frontlets between your eyes.” (Deuteronomy 11:18); “It shall be as a mark on your hand or frontlets between your eyes, for by a strong and the LORD brought us out of Egypt.” (Exodus 13:16). In verse 9, the memorial is called a ן֙וֹכרִָּז – signifying its purpose as a perpetual reminder of the deliverance from Egypt (the same word is also used in reference to the Passover; Ex. 12:14). Whereas, טוֹטָפוֹת is used only in these passages with respect to these phylacteries, although the direct parallel of language between Ex. 13:9 and verse 16 ought to be sufficient to show that it is not a literal thing here spoken of, as the Jews take it. With tefillin, there are two types: that which is bound upon the forehead, and that which is bound with leather straps around the left forearm, as said above. And the delusions attending this practice with which the Jews laughably deceive themselves ought to be know to all who are acquainted with the rabbinic writings in even the least measure. They do this so that they even stake part of their future hope of salvation upon it: “Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Anyone who has phylacteries on his head, phylacteries on his arm, ritual fringes on his garment, and a mezuza on his doorway is strengthened from all sides so that he will not sin, as it is stated in the verse: “And a threefold cord is not quickly broken” (Ecc. 4:12). This is interpreted as an allusion to the three mitzvot of phylacteries, ritual fringes, and mezuza. And the verse states: ‘The angel of the Lord encamps round about them that fear Him, and delivers them’ (Psalms 34:8). This is interpreted to mean that the angel of the Lord surrounds those who fulfill the mitzvot and saves them from sin.” (Menachot 43b); And also Maimonides: “Whoever wears tefillin on his head and arm, wears tzitzit on his garment, and has a mezuzah on his entrance, can be assured that he will not sin, because he has many who will remind him. These are the angels, who will prevent him from sinning, as [Psalms 34:8] states: ‘The angel of God camps around those who fear Him and protects them.’ Blessed be God who offers assistance.” (Mishneh Torah: Laws of Tefillin, Mezuzah and Sefer Torah, 6:13) And that is not such a literal wearing of leather and boxes which is being commanded by Moses, may be evident from the following reasons:

(1) The verse does not say “Make for yourselves…”, but rather that the memory of the Exodus and Passover “shall be for you טוֹטָפוֹת", which indicates that the language here is figurative, rather than a literal command to make such materials. The Septuagint uses ἀσάλευτον to translate טוֹטָפוֹת, the former of which means something fixed or immovable (Acts 27:41; Heb. 12:28), further indicating its metaphorical nature to describe how the children of Israel were to remember God’s law. (2) Many other Scriptures, including the very passages which the Jews place in their parchments, make it clear that Moses used a proverbial way of speaking to describe the level of devotion which the Israelites ought to have kept towards God, His commandments, and the remembrance of His mighty and salvific dealings with and toward them as a people. “And these words, which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart.” (Deut. 6:6), and also verse 8 in the same chapter, “And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand”; “Therefore shall ye lay up these my words in your heart and in your soul” (Deut. 11:18); “that the LORD'S law may be in thy mouth.” (Ex. 13:9); “Bind them continually upon thine heart, and tie them about thy neck.” (Prov. 6:21); “Set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon thine arm” (Song of Solomon 8:6); “Oh that one would hear me! behold, my desire is, that the Almighty would answer me, and that mine adversary had written a book. Surely I would take it upon my shoulder, and bind it as a crown to me.” (Job 31:35-36). Are then the Jews to tie leather straps around their necks? What about their shoulders? If they take Exodus 13:1-10 literally, why not do so with verse 9 and place parchments of the Torah inside their mouths? This is the absurd and ridiculous nature of the Jews and their interpretations of the Scriptures. And this figurative interpretation of these texts is not only that of polemicists against Judaism or of Christian Hebraists, but also of some of the Jews themselves; as Rabbi Samuel ben Meir (1085-1158): לאות על ידך – לפי עומק פשוטו יהיה לך לזכרון תמיד כאילו כתוב לבך על כחותם שימני כעין .ידך על; 'As a sign upon your hand’: According to the fundamental meaning – it should be a permanent reminder for you, as though written on your hand. Similarly ‘place me like a seal on your heart’ (Song of Songs 8:6).” And Ibn Ezra also admits of this interpretation, but rejects it solely on the grounds that it contradicts the rabbis: “And it will be as a sign for you upon your hand and as a memorial between your eyes”: There are two possible explanations. One is after the fashion of “bind them about your neck, write them upon the table of your heart” (Proverbs 3:3), in which case the meaning of “sign” is similar to a mnemonic device – and what will become “as a sign … and as a memorial”? Namely “that with a strong hand (the Lord brought you out of Egypt),” which you should thus preserve in your heart and for your child. And similarly the second verse (13:16) – and it will be for you “as a sign upon your hand and as totafot between your eyes,” namely “that with strength of hand the Lord brought us out of Egypt.” And the word totafot is a strange one in the Bible, and some say it is from the same meaning as hatef (i.e. preach) in Ezekiel 21:2. And the second explanation is according to its meaning to make tefillin of the arm and of the head. And because our sages of blessed memory shifted it in this way the first explanation is not valid. For it has no reliable witnesses as the second explanation does.”

In our day and age, there has been much study of the phylacteries in the Judean Desert, which have been discovered and researched by archaeologists. They date back to the 1st and 2nd centuries BC. In some respects, they differ from the tefillin prescribed by the Jewish law, for some of them only included the text of the Decalogue in them. 4QPhyl N, for example, includes text from the Shema but also from the Song of Moses (Deut. 32:45-47). Many of the tefillin from the Dead Sea differ in their size and shape, going against the rabbinic halakhah - as has been confirmed by Dr. Yonatan Adler, the main researcher of these ancient findings. So also, the rabbis rule that where the letter yod doesn’t touch the other letters in the parchments, the tefillin are invalid (Shulchan Arukh: Orach Chayim, 36:2). Some Jews have cited 2 Samuel 1:10 as proof for the practice of tefillin and therefore for the oral Torah (Rabbi Michael Shelomo Bar-Ron, Oral Torah from Sinai: The Case for the Authenticity of the Oral Torah Tradition from Alef to Tau [Lightcatcher Book, 2011], pgs. 101-102). The verse in question records the account of the aftermath of King Saul’s death and of the Amalekite who looted his corpse, saying “and I took the crown that was upon his head, and the bracelet (אֶצְעָדָה) that was on his arm, and have brought them hither unto my lord.” The Jews argue that this text is speaking of phylacteries that must have been worn by Saul. On the contrary, it is not clear that the word אֶצְעָדָה is even speaking of such a thing whatsoever; for elsewhere, it refers to a type of bracelet in the broad sense, as in Numbers 31:50, in which the Israelite officers and captains say to Moses “We have therefore brought an oblation for the LORD, what every man hath gotten, of jewels of gold, chains, and bracelets (אֶצְעָדָה), rings, earrings, and tablets, to make an atonement for our souls before the LORD.” Did Moses and the priests then take the tefillin and offer them as a sacrifice to God? Rather, the אֶצְעָדָה of King Saul was likely some sort of regal bracelet made from pure gold. And even Rabbi Michael Shelomo Bar-Ron admits that it may be referring to a type of bracelet which was used to keep the tefillin from slipping off of the arm of a typical Israelite warrior (Oral Torah from Sinai, pg. 103); such men often did wear their tefillin into battle in the rabbinic period (Gittin 57b-58a). However, if he concedes this interpretation of the word אֶצְעָדָה, his proof for the antiquity of the phylacteries has now been crushed.

[6]. It is apparent that the Jews of the Babylonian Exile knew the oral Torah and practiced it faithfully, for it said of Daniel that he risked his life to pray 3 times a day facing towards Jerusalem (Daniel 6:4-13). Daniel and his 3 friends also observed the dietary laws (Dan. 1:8-12). He could only have known to do such things based on the oral rabbinic tradition! (Rabbi Michael Shelomo Bar-Ron, Oral Torah from Sinai, pgs. 118-122). This would also include the command to have one’s windows open and pray on one’s knees. All such Jewish traditions are enumerated by Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Hilchot Tefillah & Birkat Kohanim, Ch. 5) 


Response: It is conceded that the practice of praying 3 times a day is an ancient Jewish custom practiced by the Israelites during this period, and before it. However, I deny that it proves any existence of an oral Torah, for this law is expressly instituted in the written Scriptures, for in Psalm 55:17 it says “Evening, and morning, and at noon, will I pray, and cry aloud: and he shall hear my voice.” And this also is done by Scripture for some of these individual times of day: morning (Psalm 5:3) and evening (Psalm 119:62) Daniel’s direction of prayer toward the temple appears to have been in fulfillment of the prophecy of King Solomon that this exact thing would indeed take place amongst the Jews after their exile (1 Kings 8:30, 48; cf. Psalm 28:2). As for the observance of certain dietary restrictions, the Scripture says “But Daniel purposed in his heart that he would not defile himself with the portion of the king's meat, nor with the wine which he drank: therefore he requested of the prince of the eunuchs that he might not defile himself.” (Dan. 1:8) - Daniel most likely did this due to the written Torah’s prohibition of eating any food from unclean animals such as swine and pig. Another reason would simply have been that many of the king’s delicacies would have been offered up to idols, and therefore violate the conscience of any Jew. “[One might say/It implies] to pour it [the wine] as a libation according to their rite for their gods.” (Ibn Ezra). We know from elsewhere in Scripture that this was an idolatrous practice of the Persians: “They drank wine, and praised the gods of gold, and of silver, of brass, of iron, of wood, and of stone.” (Dan. 5:4) And therefore, this would have constituted the basis for Daniel’s avoidance of such food and drink, rather than a specific oral tradition of the sages. And that this was a matter of conscience rather than binding law is evident from the later words of Daniel himself; “I ate no pleasant bread, neither came flesh nor wine in my mouth, neither did I anoint myself at all, till three whole weeks were fulfilled.” (Dan. 10:3). Presumably, thereafter, no such prohibition was being as strictly enforced?

[7]. The prophets warned the Jews to observe the oral Torah when they forbade the carrying of objects on the Sabbath (Jer. 17:19-24) and buying and selling on the Sabbath (Nehemiah 10:30-32; 13:15-18). Therefore, during the time of the prophets and the return from the Babylonian exile, there existed an authoritative rabbinic tradition which is traced back to Moses (Rabbi Tovia Singer, Let’s Get Biblical! Why Doesn’t Judaism Accept the Christian Messiah?, pg. 304). Response: As to the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath, the Jews call it hotza’ah, that is - you may not transfer an object between public and private domains. The reason why no such commands were given in the written Torah, was not that there was an oral law to supplement it (and contradict it often), but because the children of Israel in the wilderness did not have as clearly defined limits of public and private domains as when they lived in Jerusalem. In verse 22, the phrase “as I commanded your fathers” is modifying the previous two clauses, “neither do ye any work, but hallow ye the sabbath day”, and not the first clause concerning the carrying of objects between domains – therefore, the structural wording of Jer. 17:22 itself confirms that no such commandment concerning domains were given to the wilderness generation, whether written or orally. 

[8]. One cannot properly observe the Sabbath without the oral law, for it is said that we may not leave our homes on that day (Exodus 16:29-30), and that we must “restrain our feet” (Isaiah 58:13-14). Without the Mishnah and Talmud, it is impossible to observe these commandments and prohibitions, for the written Torah is ambiguous upon them. It is also mentioned in Acts 1:12, “Then they returned unto Jerusalem from the mount called Olivet, which is from Jerusalem a sabbath day's journey.” Response: According to the laws of the Jews, 2000 cubits is the limit for walking on foot during the Sabbath day, which they techum shabbat. I deny that this was not instituted in the written Torah, for the city limits are clearly defined when given to the Levites: “And ye shall measure from without the city on the east side two thousand cubits, and on the south side two thousand cubits, and on the west side two thousand cubits, and on the north side two thousand cubits; and the city shall be in the midst: this shall be to them the suburbs of the cities.” (Num. 35:5). And this same distance appears throughout the Scriptures as the bounds for keeping various commandments (cf. Joshua 3:4). Does one need an entire tractate of the Mishnah in order to figure this out?

[9]. In the written Torah, the commandment has been given that the Jews should attach fringes unto the corners of their arguments, and these they call ציצית, tzitzit. “Speak unto the children of Israel, and bid them that they make them fringes in the borders of their garments throughout their generations, and that they put upon the fringe of the borders a ribband of blue: And it shall be unto you for a fringe, that ye may look upon it, and remember all the commandments of the LORD, and do them; and that ye seek not after your own heart and your own eyes, after which ye use to go a whoring: That ye may remember, and do all my commandments, and be holy unto your God.” (Numbers 15:38-40). The Jews say: How are to observe this commandment without our oral traditions? How must a man know how to make such fringes without them? What are the materials, sizes, cloth, and color of these? Therefore, you cannot observe this command of Numbers 15 without the oral Torah. And this their practice is mentioned by our Savior in Matthew 23:5. 

Response: Concerning these tzitzit, I shall first declare a few more things which the Jews practice in relation to them so that we might have a better and more comprehensive understanding thereof: (1) The Jews boast that the numerical value (gematria) of the word tzitzit is equal to 600, and the 8 fringes and 5 knots add up to 613, the number of mitzvot (Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, 9:1). Therefore, the Jews wear a smaller garment around their waist through their entire day, called a tallit katan. (2) Due to the commandment to attach the tzitzah on the corners, it must be no further than 3 thumbreadths from the actual edges (Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, 9:3). (3) The tzitzit must be tied into 5 knots (representing the Torah), so that there will be 4 links between them. The 4 strings are inserted and then wound around 7 times. (Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, 9:5). First of all, I ask if there was such a detailed oral tradition given to Moses as to how to make these tzitzit, why are there so many various opinions amongst the rabbis as to the color thereof (תכלתTekhelet). Specifically, there is a dispute as to how many strands must be dyed. Maimonides says 1 of 8, Rabbi Abraham ben David says that it must be 2 of the 8, while the Tosafists say that it must be 4 of the 8. Who is right here? Even with their oral Torah, the Jews still do not know what to do! “There can never be any difference of opinion with regard to matters received through the Oral Tradition. Whenever there arises a difference of opinion with regard to a matter that shows that it was not received in the tradition from Moses our teacher. The following principles apply with regard to matters derived through logical analysis. If the entire body of the Supreme Sanhedrin agrees with regard to them, their consent is binding. If there is a difference of opinion, we follow the majority and decide the matter according to the majority.” (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, 1:3)

[10]. The written Torah commands the Jewish people to observe a Feast of Tabernacles (Sukkot) in Leviticus 23:39-44. It also mentions the four species with which the Jews are to make their booths: fruit of goodly trees, branches from a palm tree, and boughs of thick trees, and willows of the brook. How are we to observe this holiday without an oral Torah? For there are no written descriptions of how we are to make these booths, with regard to their shape and size, etc. 

Response: Once again, the Jews have chosen to strain a gnat and swallow a camel. For the Lord was not concerned here with all of the outward rituals and precise measurements of cubits, but rather that a memorial to the exodus from Egypt be instituted (Lev. 23:44). We deny that an oral law is proved from this feast, for we also deny that the Jews were commanded by God to be so overly burdened with such things. And that this may be further established, we have the testimony of the Jews that returned from exile: “And they found written in the law which the Lord had commanded by Moses, that the children of Israel should dwell in booths in the feast of the seventh month: And that they should publish and proclaim in all their cities, and in Jerusalem, saying, Go forth unto the mount, and fetch olive branches, and pine branches, and myrtle branches, and palm branches, and branches of thick trees, to make booths, as it is written. So the people went forth, and brought them, and made themselves booths, every one upon the roof of his house, and in their courts, and in the courts of the house of God, and in the street of the watergate, and in the street of the gate of Ephraim. And all the congregation of them that were come again out of the captivity made booths, and sat under the booths: for since the days of Jeshua the son of Nun unto that day had not the children of Israel done so. And there was very great gladness. Also day by day, from the first day unto the last day, he read in the book of the law of God. And they kept the feast seven days; and on the eighth day was a solemn assembly, according unto the manner.” (Nehemiah 8:14-18). From verse 16, it is seen that the simple instructions of the written law of Moses were sufficient to inform the Jews of their ceremonial duties in this matter. They knew the materials to use, and did not become scrupulous about those petty things with which the rabbis choose to vainly occupy themselves.

[11]. On Yom Kippur, the Jews were commanded; “It shall be a sabbath of rest unto you, and ye shall afflict your souls, by a statute for ever.” (Lev. 16:31). What does it mean to “afflict one’s soul”? How does one go about such a solemn task? Here again, the rabbinic traditions are indispensably necessary in order to understand how to observe the day of Yom Kippur properly. The affliction of the soul is things such as fasting (Yoma 79b-81a), no bathing (Shabbat 86a), no marital relations (Yoma 77a; Pesachim 53b), etc. 

Response: We know from the written Torah itself that this affliction of the soul is a reference to fasting, and not from the oral law. More peculiarly, no work was to be done on this day. “And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Also on the tenth day of this seventh month there shall be a day of atonement: it shall be an holy convocation unto you; and ye shall afflict your souls, and offer an offering made by fire unto the Lord. And ye shall do no work in that same day: for it is a day of atonement, to make an atonement for you before the Lord your God. For whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted in that same day, he shall be cut off from among his people. And whatsoever soul it be that doeth any work in that same day, the same soul will I destroy from among his people. Ye shall do no manner of work: it shall be a statute for ever throughout your generations in all your dwellings.” (Lev. 23:26-31) - For the verb anah is elsewhere used for fasting (Psalm 35:13; Ezra 8:21; Dan. 10:12). 

[12]. The statement “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (Ex. 21:24; Lev. 24:19; Deut. 19:21) is ambiguous in itself and teaches a general lex talionis. However, we must have the oral law in order to know that this is talking about monetary compensation, as the rabbis have interpreted it. It is not found in the written law of Moses.

Response: If the Jews that make this objection would read the surrounding context of Exodus 21, it is abundantly clear that compensatory damages (what American courts call “actual damages”; Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64 [1876]) is being spoken of, and therefore no extra tradition is needed to discover this: “And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed. And if a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall be surely punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money. If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe. And if a man smite the eye of his servant, or the eye of his maid, that it perish; he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. And if he smite out his manservant's tooth, or his maid servant's tooth; he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake. If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit ” (Exodus 21:18-28). The written Torah gives concrete legal cases here to illustrate the principle of lex talionis, showing that it is speaking of general types of compensatory damages, and not teaching a man’s eye should literally be gouged out, and tooth pulled with pliers!


May 30, 2025

Divine Simplicity and Predication in the Cappadocian Fathers

 

The following quotes are extracted from my published paper which deals much more in-depth with the topic at hand, and analyzes each of these texts. 

"For if you make change of names a sign of things having been named by men, you will thereby surely allow that every name has been imposed upon things by us, since the same appellations of objects have not obtained universally. For as in the case of Paul who was once Saul, and of Peter who was formerly Simon, so earth and sky and air and sea and all the parts of the creation have not been named alike by all, but are named in one way by the Hebrews, and in another way by us, and are denoted by every nation by different names. If then Eunomius' argument is valid when he maintains that it was for this reason, to wit, that their names had been imposed by men, that Peter and Paul were named afresh, our teaching will surely be valid also, starting as it does from like premises, which says that all things are named by us, on the ground that their appellations vary according to the distinctions of nations. Now if all things are so, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are not exceptions, for even they are among the things that change their name. For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the conception of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by words that vary at different times, not making, but signifying, the thing by the name we give it. For the things remain in themselves as they naturally are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought by such words as are available. And just as the essence of Peter was not changed with the change of his name, so neither is any other of the things we contemplate changed in the process of mutation of names." (Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, book VII, ch. 4)

"For all conceptions and terms which regard the divine are of equal dignity one with another, in that they do not vary in regard to the meaning of the subject matter to which they are applied. Our thought is not led to one subject by the attribution of good, and to another by that of wise, powerful, and just; mention any attributes you will, the thing signified is one and the same. And if you name God, you mean the same Being whom you understood by the rest of the terms. Granting, then, that all the terms applied to the divine nature are of equal force one with another in relation to that which they describe, one emphasizing one point and another another, but all bringing our intelligence to the contemplation of the same object; what ground is there for conceding to the Spirit fellowship with Father and Son in all other terms, and isolating Him from the Godhead alone?" (Basil of Caesarea, Letter 189)

"God, he says, has dominion over His own power. Tell me, what is He? Over what has He dominion? Is He something else than His own power, and Lord of a power that is something else than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of power. For that which is something else than power is surely not power, and thus He is found to have dominion over power just in so far as He is not power." (Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, Book IX, ch. 1)

"But let us still scrutinize his words. He declares each of these Beings, whom he has shadowed forth in his exposition, to be single and absolutely one. We believe that the most boorish and simple-minded would not deny that the Divine Nature, blessed and transcendent as it is, was 'single.' That which is viewless, formless, and sizeless, cannot be conceived of as multiform and composite. But it will be clear, upon the very slightest reflection, that this view of the supreme Being as 'simple,' however finely they may talk of it, is quite inconsistent with the system which they have elaborated. For who does not know that, to be exact, simplicity in the case of the Holy Trinity admits of no degrees. In this case there is no mixture or conflux of qualities to think of; we comprehend a potency without parts and composition; how then, and on what grounds, could any one perceive there any differences of less and more. For he who marks differences there must perforce think of an incidence of certain qualities in the subject. He must in fact have perceived differences in largeness and smallness therein, to have introduced this conception of quantity into the question: or he must posit abundance or diminution in the matter of goodness, strength, wisdom, or of anything else that can with reverence be associated with God: and neither way will he escape the idea of composition. Nothing which possesses wisdom or power or any other good, not as an external gift, but rooted in its nature, can suffer diminution in it; so that if any one says that he detects Beings greater and smaller in the Divine Nature, he is unconsciously establishing a composite and heterogeneous Deity, and thinking of the Subject as one thing, and the quality, to share in which constitutes as good that which was not so before, as another. If he had been thinking of a Being really single and absolutely one, identical with goodness rather than possessing it, he would not be able to count a greater and a less in it at all. It was said, moreover, above that good can be diminished by the presence of evil alone, and that where the nature is incapable of deteriorating, there is no limit conceived of to the goodness: the unlimited, in fact, is not such owing to any relation whatever, but, considered in itself, escapes limitation. It is, indeed, difficult to see how a reflecting mind can conceive one infinite to be greater or less than another infinite. So that if he acknowledges the supreme Being to be 'single' and homogenous, let him grant that it is bound up with this universal attribute of simplicity and infinitude. If, on the other hand, he divides and estranges the 'Beings' from each other, conceiving that of the Only-begotten as another than the Father's, and that of the Spirit as another than the Only-begotten, with a 'more' and 'less' in each case, let him be exposed now as granting simplicity in appearance only to the Deity, but in reality proving the composite in Him." (Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, book I, ch. 20)

"Now these modes of generation being well known to men, the loving dispensation of the Holy Spirit, in delivering to us the Divine mysteries, conveys its instruction on those matters which transcend language by means of what is within our capacity, as it does also constantly elsewhere, when it portrays the Divinity in bodily terms, making mention, in speaking concerning God, of His eye, His eyelids, His ear, His fingers, His hand, His right hand, His arm, His feet, His shoes , and the like — none of which things is apprehended to belong in its primary sense to the Divine Nature, but turning its teaching to what we can easily perceive, it describes by terms well-worn in human use, facts that are beyond every name, while by each of the terms employed concerning God we are led analogically to some more exalted conception." (Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, book VIII, ch. 4)

“If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of ungeneracy; if to define justice, be ready with the incorporeal as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God's attributes be convertible terms, there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in various and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death's dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between incorporeal and just, even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of the unending and the unbeginning, is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it. Such is our position.” (Gregory of Nyssa, Answer to Eunomius' Second Book; in NPNF2, 5:298)

"The life, he says, is not a different thing from the substance; no addition may be thought of in connection with a simple being, by dividing our conception of him into a communicating and communicated side; but whatever the life may be, that very thing, he insists, is the substance. Here his philosophy is excellent; no thinking person would gainsay this." (Gregory of Nyssa, Answer to Eunomius' Second Book; in NPNF2, 5:298)

“He called himself ‘door,’ ‘way,’ ‘bread,’ ‘vine,’ ‘shepherd,’ and ‘light,’ even though he is not a polyonym. All these names do not carry the same meaning as one another. For ‘light’ signifies one thing, ‘vine’ another, ‘way’ another, and ‘shepherd’ yet another. Though our Lord is one in substrate, and one substance, simple and not composite, he calls himself by different names at different times, using designations that differ from one another for the different conceptualizations. On the basis of his different activities and his relation to the objects of his divine benefaction, he employs different names for himself….If anyone should examine each of the names one by one, he would find the various conceptualizations, even though for all there is one substrate as far as substance is concerned." (Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium, 1.7)

"The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost alike hallow, quicken, enlighten, and comfort. No one will attribute a special and peculiar operation of hallowing to the operation of the Spirit, after hearing the Saviour in the Gospel saying to the Father about His disciples, sanctify them in Your name [John 17:17?]. In like manner all other operations are equally performed, in all who are worthy of them, by the Father and by the Son and by the Holy Ghost; every grace and virtue, guidance, life, consolation, change into the immortal, the passage into freedom and all other good things which come down to man….Identity of operation in the case of Father and of Son and of Holy Ghost clearly proves invariability of nature." (Basil of Caesarea, Letter 189; in NPNF2: 8:231)

“Moreover, in response to the objection that God will be revealed as composite unless the light is understood as the same thing as ingeneracy, we have the following to say: if we should understand ingeneracy as part of the substance, then there would be room for the argument which claims that what is compounded from different things is composite. But if we should posit, on the one hand, the light, or the life, or the good as the substance of God, claiming that the very thing which God is is life as a whole, light as a whole, and good as a whole, while, on the other hand, we should posit that the life has ingeneracy as a concomitant, then how is the one who is simple in substance not incomposite? For surely the ways of indicating his proprium will not violate the account of simplicity.” (Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium, 2.29)

"Now, if [the Holy Spirit] is divine, then certainly it is also good, powerful, wise, glorious, eternal, and all such names that lift our thoughts to a level appropriate to its grandeur. The simplicity of the subject ensures that it does not possess these names by participation (ἐκ μετουσίας), as if one could suppose that it is one thing in its own nature, but becomes something different through the presence of the aforementioned names. Such a situation is proper to those beings that have a composite nature. But all people equally confess that the Holy Spirit is simple; there is no one who would dispute it. So then, if the formula (λόγος) of its nature is simple, it does not possess goodness as something acquired (ἐπίκτητον). Rather, the very thing it is (αὐτὸ ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν), is goodness, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, eternity, incorruptibility, and all the names that are sublime and elevating." (Gregory of Nyssa, Against the Macedonians, §5)

May 28, 2025

Brief Thoughts on Deification

 

Oftentimes the Western understanding of deification/glorification is watered down by its opponents to a simple statement of “created grace.” However, at least within Thomism, our participation in God also includes things like the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity), the infused moral virtues, and the missions of the Trinity. This human participation in the divine pertains to all of our faculties, though sanctifying grace is the means in which it comes to the essence of the soul (John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus III, disp. 22, art. 1, n. 10  [Paris: Vivès, 1883-1886, 6:794]). 


Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 62, art. 1)


When it comes to the writings of the patristics (particularly the Greek fathers), nearly everyone has some level of familiarity with Athanasius’ famous axiom “God became man, so that man might become God.” Indeed, the doctrine of deification was something that was presupposed by Athanasius in his polemical treatises against the Arians (Norman Rusell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition [Oxford University Press, 2004], pgs. 170-172). If the Son’s incarnation is the source of the deification of human nature, then the Son Himself has not been deified by the Father, and thus is not God “by participation”, as the heretics believed. He is God by essence and nature, being homoousios with the Father. 


But in what does the deification of human nature actually consist, for Athanasius? Russell points out two levels for understanding it: ontological and ethical (The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, pgs. 184-185). The following passage from Athanasius constitutes for us a concrete example of how these two “levels” of deification are juxtaposed in his theology, both with regard to anthropology and soteriology:


“But let them understand that one assimilated to God by virtue and will is liable also to the purpose of changing; but the Word is not thus, unless He is 'like' in part, and as we are, because He is not like [God] in essence also. But these characteristics belong to us, who are originate, and of a created nature. For we too, albeit we cannot become like God in essence, yet by progress in virtue imitate God, the Lord granting us this grace, in the words, 'Be merciful as your Father is merciful:' 'be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect Luke 6:36; Matthew 5:48.' But that originate things are changeable, no one can deny, seeing that angels transgressed, Adam disobeyed, and all stand in need of the grace of the Word. But a mutable thing cannot be like God who is truly unchangeable, any more than what is created can be like its creator. This is why, with regard to us, the holy man said, 'Lord, who shall be likened unto you ,' and 'who among the gods is like you, Lord ;' meaning by gods those who, while created, had yet become partakers of the Word, as He Himself said, 'If he called them gods to whom the word of God came John 10:35.' But things which partake cannot be identical with or similar to that whereof they partake. For example, He said of Himself, 'I and the Father are one ,' implying that things originate are not so. For we would ask those who allege the Ariminian Synod, whether a created essence can say, 'what things I see my Father make, those I make also.' For things originate are made and do not make; or else they made even themselves. Why, if, as they say, the Son is a Creature and the Father is His Maker, surely the Son would be His own maker, as He is able to make what the Father makes, as He said. But such a supposition is absurd and utterly untenable, for none can make himself.” (Athanasius, Synodal Letter to the Bishops of Africa, §7)



My Thoughts on the Essence-Energies Distinction


The doctrine of a real ad intra distinction between God's essence (ousia) and His energies (energeia) is the linchpin of the entire Eastern Orthodox system. It is the foundation for their asceticism, liturgy, understanding of the sacraments, and of salvation itself. Along with the filioque, it is perhaps the chief point of disputation between the West (the Reformation and medieval Roman Catholicism) and the churches of the East (especially in Greece and Russia today, and many other parts of eastern Europe). It is also a part of Eastern dogma since Palamas' official canonization in the Synod of Constantinple (1368). This doctrine has received more attention in online apologetics and polemics with the rise of figures such as Jay Dyer, Ubi Petrus, Perry Robinson (who I have had the privilege to correspond with via email a few times), Deacon Ananias, and many other defenders of Eastern Orthodoxy.


Most of the Western responses to the essence-energies distinction come from Roman Catholic thinkers, with not much attention given to it within Protestantism (aside from a short video by Gavin Ortlund, which did not engage with primary sources as much as I'd personally hope for). I hope to provide such an engagement and critique in this article, relying on Palamas' own writings, some of the work neo-Palamites shortly after Gregory's death in 1357. The colossal work of Dr. Tikhon Pino has also proven a great help to me in understanding the Eastern doctrine of God.


I will begin with working through some of Palamas’ primary writings: particularly the Triads, Dialogue between an Orthodox and a Barlaamite, the One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, and his correspondence with Gregory Akindynos. I will also take the statements of the Palamite synods in Constantinople (1341 and 1351 respectively) as being a standard representation of Eastern theology concerning the nature of deification, participation in God through His “uncreated energies”, and the nature of the Old Testament theophanies and the glory of Christ on Mount Thabor. 

In his Triads, Gregory Palamas begins his defense of the Byzantine hesychasts. His first discussion unravels his view of the relationship between philosophy (particularly that of the Greek Neo-Platonists, whose views he mentions in Triads, 1.18) and man’s knowledge of God. Palamas takes issue with the entire method of the anti-Hesychasts, noting their extreme obsession with natural philosophy, it being one of the grounds which has led them to their “erroneous” notions of God.


“By examining the nature of sensible things, these people have arrived at a certain concept of God, but not at a conception truly worthy of Him and appropriate to His blessed nature.” (Gregory Palamas, Triads, 1.18)


This is not to say that Palamas condemns all philosophy simpliciter. He brings forth the analogy of a physician/apothecary who uses the flesh of a serpent to make medicine, separating the good from the bad. “But if one says that philosophy, insofar as it is natural, is a gift of God, then one says true, without contradiction, and without incurring the accusation that falls on those who abuse philosophy and pervert it to an unnatural end.” (Triads, 1.19). It is a gift of nature, not of divine grace. Palamas’ approach is in sharp contrast to that of Barlaam, who believed that even the pagan philosophers received “divine illumination.”


The chief concern of Palamas is to preserve the unknowable nature of God while also affirming man’s participation in Him. Thus the glory of Christ during the Transfiguration on Mount Thabor became his chief impetus for defending a distinction between the divine essence and energies. Since the glory of Christ was accessible to the human senses of the disciples, it could not have been the divine essence. However, the divine essence and energies are not two separate “things”, but two modes in which God is wholly present (Norman Russell, Gregory Palamas: The Hesychast Controversy and the Debate with Islam, pg. 23). 


It is worth noting in passing that the statement that “we know God by His operations, and do not know His very essence” is uncontroversial, and agreed upon by the Western churches as well. For example, Aquinas himself wrote “We cannot know him naturally except by reaching him from his effects [energies], it follows that the terms by which we denote his perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If, however, we were able to understand his very essence as it is, and to give him a proper name, we should express him by one name only. And this is promised to those who will see him in his essence." (Summa Contra Gentiles, I.31). This observation is not limited to the medieval scholastics. John Calvin said that “Indeed, his essence is incomprehensible; hence his divineness far escapes all human perception. But upon his individual works he has engraved unmistakable marks of his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered and stupid folk cannot plead the excuse of ignorance.” (Institutes, 1.5.1)


Grace (charis) is both created and uncreated. In his Letter to Athanasios of Kyzikos, Palamas discuss different senses in which the word “grace” might be used, referring both to the giving of the gift by the Holy Spirit and man’s reception thereunto. Thus, we see a fundamental Palamite distinction between the gift as the act of giving and the gift as something received. The former is uncreated, while the latter is obviously created. “Sometimes being deified is called deification, and sometimes that whereby the object of deification is deified, by receiving it, is called deification.” (Against Gregoras, 3.21)


In his second Triad, Palamas begins to bring forth a distinction between essence and energies, albeit not using that exact terminology as of yet. 


“But you who introduced the methods of definition, analysis, and distinction, come to know, and deem us the ignorant worthy to teach. For [the light] is not the essence of God, for the latter is both inaccessible and imparticipable. It is not an angel, for it bears the marks of the Master, and sometimes it goes out from the body—or it is not borne up to the unspoken heights without a body—and at other times it transforms the body and gives it a share of its own proper splendor . . . In this way, therefore, it also deifies the body, becoming visible—O the miracle—to bodily eyes.” (Gregory Palamas, Triads, 2.3.8)


Peter Totleben contends that Palamas’ early framing of the distinction in terms of the divine essence and the “uncreated light” tends to lean more into a real distinction, with his defense of hesychast mysticism lurking closely in the background. However, the framing of the distinction with the categories of essence and energies belong more to the realm of speculative philosophy (The Palamite Controversy: A Thomistic Analysis, pg. 32n63)


In the second Triad, Palamas clarifies multiple times that he is not teaching mere apophaticism simpliciter:


“Thus the perfect contemplation of God and divine things is not simply an abstraction; but beyond this abstraction, there is a participation in divine things, a gift and a possession rather than just a process of negation….If one speaks of them, one must have recourse to images and analogies—not because that is the way in which these things are seen, but because one cannot adumbrate what one has seen in any other way.” (Gregory Palamas, Triads, 1.3.18)


This contemplation of God’s energies is not done through the intellect or senses simply. Rather, it consists in mystical experience: “Following the great Dionysius, one should perhaps call it union, not knowledge.” (Gregory Palamas, Triads, 2.3.20). During this contemplation, one does not directly know through what medium he sees the divine energies. Palamas cites the Apostle Paul: “whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth.” (2 Corinthians 12:2-3)


In terms of the divine names, they do not properly describe God. Even the term “essence” is only improperly given to God, since He is ύπερόυσια:


“It is therefore not lawful, for anyone acquainted with the truth beyond all truth, even to name it ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ when naming it in the proper sense. Since, again, it is the cause of all things, and all things are around it and for it—and since it is itself before all things, having conceived them all in itself in a simple and uncircumscribed manner—it is named from all of them catachrestically, but not properly.” (Gregory Palamas, Theophanes, 17)


Therefore, when “the essence is known from the energy” this only pertains to “the fact that it is, not what it is….The essence is what is known through the energy as to the fact of its existence.” (One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 141). To me, it seems that Palamas’ system completely renders it impossible for us to have any knowledge of what God is (quid est). You can see here that Palamas also posits some sort of distinction between essence and existence in God, claiming that a real identity between them would make a statement like “God exists” redundant (e.g., ‘existence has existence’). Being (το όν) is itself one of the divine energies, according to Palamism, since God in Himself is υπερούσιος. This misunderstanding is based on a conflation of material and formal identity. A simple study of Aquinas on the divine relations or of Scotus of the formal distinction would erase this difficulty quite easily.


In fact, Palamas even says that there is no difference of signification between the divine names we ascribe to God based on the energies. 


“The divine essence, then, is altogether nameless, since it is also inconceivable. But it is named from all its inherent energies—none of the names there differing from one another in signification. For from each one of all the things said of God nothing else is denominated but that Hiddenness, which is in no way known as to what it is.” (Gregory Palamas, Against Gregoras, 4.48)


When it comes to defining what exactly are the divine “energies”, Palamas’ most important point of reference is the light of Christ on Mount Thabor, witnessed by the disciples during the Transfiguration. While Barlaam posited it as a created effect, Palamas firmly denied this, saying instead that it was “the effulgence, glory, and radiance of his nature, proceeding from him by nature.” (Against Gregoras, 4.40)


Q: Do the energies inhere in God, according to Palamism?


A: “Even the things said apophatically of God inhere (πρόεστι) in God naturally and are not nature, according to the divine Cyril [of Alexandria].” (Contra Akindynos, 4.11.25). Elsewhere, Palamas identifies these negations (timelessness, uncreatedness, etc.) with “the things around the essence (περι την ουσιαν).” Tikhon Pino describes Palamas’ view as being that there are “‘all things said of God cataphatically and apophatically’ are not essence but attributes inhering in the divine nature.” (Essence and Energies: Being and Naming God in St. Gregory Palamas, pg. 57). He explicitly describes the energies at one point as “those things that inhere in God by nature.” (Contra Akindynos, 4.7.13)


Palamism is unequivocally clear in its denial of the pure actuality of God. This is why Gregory refers to the energies/dynamis as “nothing other than a readiness to act.” (Gregory Palamas, Letter to Daniel of Ainos, 21). The energies of creation and providence and rendered as simply God’s ability to perform these respective acts whenever he so chooses (Tikhon Pino, Essence and Energies: Being and Naming God in St. Gregory Palamas [New York: Routledge Press, 2023], pg. 62). 


“it is not acting and energy but being acted upon and passivity which causes composition.” (The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 145)


Palamas distinguishes between an energy and its ad extra effect (αποτελεσμα). These “created signs” are actualized (ένεργηθεντα) by the energy, and therefore distinct (Contra Akindynos, 1.4.9). Not every spiritual gift bestowed by the Holy Spirit is to be identified with the uncreated energies per se (Tikhon Pino, Essence and Energies, pg. 87). For example, the miracle of Christ walking on water in itself is a created phenomenon, but the divine grace and power through which that miracle is performed is the uncreated energies (Gregory Palamas, Against Gregoras, 4.30). 


Most interestingly, we sometimes find Palamas speaking of the “beginning” and “end” to the energies. “Palamas is insistent that it is the acts themselves—creation, providence, foreknowledge—that come to be or pass away (or both), not merely their effects.” (David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, pg. 262). This is, of course, in continuity with 20th-century Eastern theology: “God himself changes for our sake in his operations, remaining simple as the source of these operations and being wholly present in each one of them.” (Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God [Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1994], pg. 126)


Elsewhere, Palamas distinguishes between the energies and their temporal manifestation, ascribing a temporal beginning and end only to the latter:


“The essence of the Spirit is completely hidden, while the energy of the divine Spirit, manifested through its effects, begins and ceases at the level of manifestation, without the creatures, as we have said, attaining to eternality….But the energy of God does not, for this reason, begin and cease unqualifiedly. For God, who is always active, has an unceasing energy, ever seeing all things and providing for all things. For my Father until now is working, and I am working [John 5:17].” (Gregory Palamas, Contra Akindynos, 6.21.78)


“What is manifested from the acting is not the essence of the one acting, but his power and energy, which was in him even before the manifestation.” (Letter to Damianos, sect. 16)


This distinction made by Palamas should give great caution to Eastern Orthodox apologists who wish to insist that Thomistic divine simplicity leads to the necessity of creation. Might their argument just as easily be leveled against Palamas when he distinguishes the uncreated energy from its manifestation in time? Is creation an uncreated energy of God? If it is simply that God has a power to create which is only acted out in the beginning of the world, then this seems to lead to a passive potency being in God. “For even if there has been no beginning and end of the creative power, still, there has been a beginning and end of its activity, that is, the energy at the level of what has been created.” (Triads, 3.2.8). Perhaps this is why there are a few occasions in which Palamas differentiates between dynamis and energeia: “Power advances into energy, and from the energy the creature comes to be.” (Triads, 3.2.19). In fact, Palamas even is willing to speak of actualization in God ad intra, by using the analogy of the “inner” and “outer” word, the former being the movement of the rational intellect, the latter being an external vocalization (Contra Akindynos, 5.13.55). 


The energies are also often described as the “things around God.” (ta peri Theou), including both affirmations and negations. Under this label include things like immutability, incorporeality, and invisibility (Against Gregoras, 2.7). This would also be an accurate label for the light of Christ at Mount Thabor (Triads, 3.1.20). 


When it comes to discussing the nature of the essence-energies distinction, the concept of “antimony” comes into the light. It may also be aptly termed the “coincidence of opposites.” Throughout Palamite literature, we see an attitude of comfort and complacency in affirming seemingly blatant contradictory statements about God, as for example that He is both seen and unseen, participated and unparticipated.


“The divine nature must be said to be at the same time both exclusive of and in some sense open to participation. We attain to participation in the divine nature, and yet at the same time it remains totally inaccessible. We need to affirm both at the same time and to preserve the antinomy as a criterion of right devotion.” (Gregory Palamas, Theophanes, in PG 150:932D)


“[Anti-Palamites] base themselves upon a rational, philosophical notion of divine simplicity, and fail to allow properly for the fact that in God the opposites coincide; he transcends our man-made conceptions of unity and multiplicity, which cannot be applied to him without qualification.” (Kallistos Ware, “The Debate about Palamism,” Eastern Churches Review 9 [1977], pg. 51)


It is this need to affirm both unity and multiplicity in God (the classic problem in philosophy of the one and the many) that is a chief reason for the East’s insistence on a real distinction between ousia and energeia. “It is completely impossible and utterly irrational for something to be both one and many in the same sense.” (Gregory Palamas, One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 117.11-13)


Once again conflating material and formal predication/identity, Palamas says that the difference of signification with divine names entails a real distinction between them ad intra:


“In the case of the energies, each of the names has a different signification. For who does not know that creating, ruling, judging, providing, and God’s adoption of us by his grace, differ from one another?” (Gregory Palamas, One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 144.7-9) 


It is obvious from Palamas’ own writings and from the Synodol Tomos that the East does indeed teach a real distinction between essence and energies. However, another instance of this teaching is found in the dialogue between John Kantakouzenos and the Latin legate Paul of Smyrna: 


We believe in the essence of God, as possessing the energy which proceeds from it without division. The energy does not exist as separate from the essence (οὐ διϊσταμένην) but differs from it according to the notion (διαφέρουσαν ἐπινοίᾳ) as warmth differs from fire or brightness from light….According to the teaching of the theologians and the decision of the Synod, the essence and the energy of God are, I assume, neither totally identical nor  totally distinct. In actual fact, both statements are true according to a different logical  criterion (οὐ μὴν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ). True, an object cannot be both the same and different according to the same logical criterion (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον). However, the union as well as the inseparability and the indivisibility are accorded to the reality ( τῷ πράγματι), whereas the distinction (διάκρισις) is merely accorded to the notion (μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ).” (Ep. Cant. 3.5.15, 17, in Iohannis Cantacuzeni Refutationes duae Prochori Cydonii; et, Disputao cum Paulo Patriarcha Lano: epistulis septem tradita, ed. Edmond Voordeckers & Franz Tinnefeld, [Turnhout: Brepols; Leuven: University Press, 1987]).


“There are three realities in God (Τριών όντων του θεού), namely, substance, energy and a Trinity of divine hypostases.” (Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters, 75.1-2)


Another facet which proves that the Palamites taught a distinctio realis is the accusation made by his opponents, particularly Barlaam and Akindynos, that Palamas’ doctrine led to some form of ditheism, in which there is a “higher” and “lower” divinity (θεότης) in God (Gregory Palamas, Contra Akindynos, 2.5.13; 6.3.6). Palamas gave further fuel to these accusations by insisting that the uncreated Light is subordinate to divine essence (how this does not introduce composition given Palamas' own criterion of passivity is quite the mystery to me!).

“The fact that there is a cause as well as something caused; participability and imparticipibility; something that characterizes and something characterized, etc. —the one transcendent and the other subordinate (ύπερκείμενον και ύποβεβηκός) - presents no obstacle to God’s being one and simple, having a single, equal, and simple divinity.” (Gregory Palamas, Third Letter to Akindynos, 3.7)


“The things contemplated essentially around God are many and yet do not in any way impinge on the profession of simplicity, all the more will this ‘symbol’ having the form of light, which is one of them, do it no harm.” (Triads, 3.1.19)


“When we call some divine power or energy of God ‘divinity,’ there are many divine energies that take this appellation. These include the energies of vision, purification, deification, and oversight, God’s being everywhere and nowhere, which is to say his being ever-moved, as well as the light that shone forth on Thabor around his elect disciples.” (Gregory Palamas, Theophanes, sect. 9)


“Just as the many Spirits do not do away with the unity, simplicity, and non-synthesis of the Spirit, since they are his energies, so, in the same way, even if someone should speak, in accordance with the saints, of many divinities, meaning the energies of the one Divinity (μιᾶς θεότητος), he does not do away with its unity, simplicity, and lack of synthesis. Beyond this, even if the name ‘divinity’ should signify many things, still none of the things signified is unsuited to the three Persons, so that even in this way there is a single divinity of the three.” (Gregory Palamas, Letter to Arsenios, sect. 4, in PS 2:317.25-318.5)


When it comes to this particular dispute, the most oft-quoted and studied passage is from the aforecited Third Letter to Akindynos (3.15), which technically has two versions which ought to be cited here in parallel format:


“There is, according to the theologians wise in God, a subordinate divinity (θεότης ὑφειμένη), as the great Dionysios says there, namely, deification, the gift of the transcendent essence of God (τῆς ὑπερκειμένης οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ).” 


This is John Meyendorff’s translation based on 12 of the 17 extant manuscripts of this text from Palamas. 

“There is, according to the theologians wise in God, a subordinate divinity: the gift of the transcendent [divinity] (τῆς ὑπερκειμένης).” 


This is how the text is cited by Akindynos himself (Orientalia Christiana Periodica, vol. 40 [1974], pg. 233)


From my point of view, this is a troubling terminology by Palamas whichever translation or version one chooses to uphold as authentic. The Russian Orthodox scholar and archimandrite Cyprian Kern (1899-1960) refers to Palamas’ language as “undeniably problematic.”  (Антропология свт. Григория Паламы [Moscow, 1960], pg. 313). 

 

“There should not be any wonder for us that, in God’s case, essence and energy are in some sense one and are one God, and at the same time essence is the cause of the energies and, in virtue of its being their cause, is superior to them. For the Father and the Son, too, are one thing and one God, and yet “the Father is greater” (Joh. 14,28) than the Son in terms of His being the cause. And if there [sc. in the case of the Holy Trinity], for all the self-subsistence of the Son and for all His being co-substantial [with the Father], “the Father is” nevertheless “greater” [than the Son], all the more will the essence be superior to the energies, since these two things are neither the same nor different in substance, as these properties [sc. being of the same or of different substance] regard self-subsistent realities and no energy at all is self-subsistent.” (Gregory Palamas, On the Divine Energies and Participation in Them, §19, in Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράματα. ed. Panagiotes K. Chrestou, 5 vols. [Thessaloniki: Kyromanos, 1962-1992], 2:111)


It is obvious that Palamas is saying that the distinction between the essence and energies is the same as the distinction between the divine Hypostases, both relying on a common basis, i.e. causal relations. Just as the Father is superior to the Son by virtue of being His eternal cause (αἰτία) as Begettor, so also is the transcendent essence superior to the energies by being their cause, and yet they are still one God. 


Palamas seems to even be saying here that the superiority of essence over energies is even greater than that between the Father and the Son, since “these two things are neither the same nor different in substance,” since speaking of identity and distinction in substance pertains only to that which is self-subsistent, which is obviously not applicable to God’s uncreated energies


One rather curious observation made by John Dematracopoulos is that some of Palamas’ Byzantine supporters made great use of the concept of επίνοια to soften the essence-energies distinction (“Palamas Transformed: Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s ‘Essence’ and ‘Energies’ in Late Byzantium,” in Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual History 1205-1500, ed. M. Hinterberger & Ch. Schabel [Leuven: Peeters, 2011], pgs. 281-292). I will attempt here to give a detailed outline of this phenomenon as observable in Byzantine Palamism of the mid-14th century:


[1]. “To see that essence and energy are not in every aspect one and the same thing, but are united and inseparable and yet are distinguished only conceptually, pay attention to how the saints state that these things are two and testify both to their unity and distinctiveness. … Hence we do not state that there are two deities or Gods, as they [sc. the antiPalamites] slander us; instead, what we state on the basis of what we have learnt from the saints is that this Deity, which is participated in by those who are deified, is not a proper essence or substance, but a natural power and energy present within God Himself, the Holy Trinity, absolutely inseparable and indivisible [from Him], the difference [between them] being only conceptual… The holy Fathers and Doctors, as we have already said, even if they say that God’s essence is one thing and His energy is another thing, conceive of the energy—and they write thus—as inseparable and indivisible from the essence, as proceeding from it and as having existence and being present only in this very essence, since the separation (or, better, the difference) is construed only conceptually. Thus, in the case of those things which have their existence in other things, but do not subsist or exist autonomously in themselves, one does not speak of composition, as we have said.” (Philotheos Kokkinos, Κεφαλαια της αίρεσεως Άκινδυνου και Βαρλαάμ, §4, 8-9, cited by Demetracopoulos, 283-84)


[2]. “That substance is one thing whereas hypostasis is another does not entail that substance exists in separation from hypostasis; nor does the fact that essence and energy are not the same entail that the divine energy is separated from the divine essence; on the contrary, the distinction between them is conceptual, whereas their unity is real and indivisible.” (Neilos Cabasilas, Oratio brevis de Gregorii Nysseni dicto; “Increatum nihil nisi…”, §12)


[3]. “We believe that God’s essence has energy, which emanates indivisibly from it and does not lie at a local distance from it, but just differs from it conceptually, in the manner that heat differs from fire and shine from light, to use the examples put forward by the theologians, e.g., by Cyril (of Alexandria) and Basil (of Caesarea), who have verbatim as just mentioned.” (John Kantakouzenos, First Epistle to Paul, 1.13-18)


[4]. The most succinct neo-Palamite explanation of the concept of επίνοια in relation to the essence-energies distinction comes from Theophanes of Nicaea, who applied the language of a “conceptual distinction” only to the notion of separability, while also maintaining a distinctio rationis:


“The divine essence and energy differ from each other in reality, because, as has been sufficiently shown, they are both real things; on the other hand, they are divided and separated from one another only conceptually, not really; for, according to the divine Anastasius, ‘they cannot be separated from each other’, just like the heatness in the fire cannot be separated from the fire and the sunlight from the sun. Even more, these things form a unity only partially (indeed, the sunlight is connected with the disk and its source only as far as some part of it, whereas its largest part runs through the end of the world), whereas in the case of the divine essence and energy the connection is not regarded as partial, but, since each of them is “incircumscribable”, exists in each other in its totality.” (Theophanes of Nicaea, Ἐπιστολὴ ἐν ἐπιτομῇ δηλοῦσα τίνα δόξαν ἕξει ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐκκλησία περὶ τῶν παρὰ Παύλου προενηνεγμένων ζητήσεων, in MS. Barocci 193, ff. 86r)


I understand myself that it is quite difficult to put all of this data into one coherent critique of Palamism, and so I have chosen to conclude this article with a series of questions which I hope will pave the way further in East-West dialogue, and perhaps spark renewed interested in Eastern theology amongst the confessional Reformed folk, of whom I am a humble part.


[1]. Is simplicity itself an energy of God which is distinct from the essence? If so, then how can Palamas continue to claim any notion of simplicity whatsoever? We would then have an essence which is non-simple in itself but "is simple" through a distinct energeia. If simplicity is not distinct from the essence, then this is a case in which some attribute or perfection which is predicated of God is admitted to be really identical to His essence.


[2]. Why do later Palamites seem to soften the "realness" of the distinction between essence and energies?


[3]. Is the Palamite notion of ἐπίνοια the same as what we find in St. Basil of Caesarea (see Radde-Gallwitz and Delcogliano).

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