Gisbertus Voetius: Disputation on the Advent of the Messiah (Genesis 49:10)

 

The following is taken from the Select Disputations, Vol. 2, pages 57-77.

Leaving aside other arguments, we now focus on Genesis 49:10, which all Christian scholars (as far as I know) cite as proof of the coming of the Messiah, using the following reasoning:

He who, according to God’s prediction, was to come before the scepter was taken away from Judah has already come.
But the Messiah was to come before that happened.
Therefore, the Messiah has already come.

The major premise is proven: because long ago the scepter and the ruler were taken away from Judah. For indeed, the Jews are no longer a people governed by their own laws, their own government, their own magistrates, or judges—nor in any corner of the world. Instead, they are subject to foreign rulers, whether Christian, Muslim, or pagan.

The minor premise is confirmed by the very words of the text, together with the interpretation of the Targums and the ancient Rabbis, which the Jews themselves cannot deny.

1. The sacred text itself reads:

לא יסור שבט מיהודה ומחוקק מבין רגליו עד כי יבא שילה ולו יקהת עמים
“The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet, until Shiloh (that is, the Messiah) comes, and to him shall be the obedience of the peoples.”

2. The Targums read:

   • Onkelos: “The ruler shall not cease from the house of Judah, nor the scribe from his descendants forever, until the Messiah comes, whose is the kingdom, and the peoples shall obey him.”

   • Jerusalem Targum: “Kings and rulers shall not cease from the house of Judah, nor teachers of the Law from his children, until the time when King Messiah comes, to whom the kingdom belongs, and all kingdoms of the earth shall be subject to him.”

   • Jonathan ben Uzziel: “Kings and rulers shall not cease from the house of Judah, nor scribes teaching the Law from his seed, until the time when the Messiah, the King, comes, the little one from his sons, and because of him the peoples shall melt away.”

3. The Talmud (Sanhedrin, ch. Helek) also interprets this of the Messiah.

4. Likewise, Bereshit Rabbah (folio 110): “Shiloh—this is King Messiah.”

5. Baal HaTurim gives a cabalistic interpretation: the word Shiloh numerically equals Messiah the King. (The letters of משיח equal 358, the same as שילה יבא).

6. Rabbis such as R. Bechai and Rashi (Sel. Iarchi) interpret the verse about the Messiah. David Kimchi explains Shiloh as “his son,” meaning either David or the Messiah.

7. Some later rabbis twisted the passage to refer instead to Saul, David, or Nebuchadnezzar.

8. Even among the Muslims, Ahmad ibn Idris (as quoted by Hottinger in Thesaurus Philologicus, p.163) used this very verse to prove the coming of the Messiah. If even the Ishmaelites bear witness against the Jews, why should we not use their testimony?

To further strengthen this interpretation against the Jews, certain words of the text must be considered.

The key word is שבט (shevet). In Scripture, it has eight senses:

1. Properly, a rod, staff, or stick.

2. By metonymy, a spear or weapon.

3. A reed (as in Judges 5:14).

4. By extension, punishment, scourge, or blow.

5. By metaphor, a tribe (as descended from one father, like a branch from one tree).

6. A scepter, the sign of royal power.

7. Power, rule, dominion, or jurisdiction.

8. By abstraction for the concrete, a ruler, prince, or judge.

Here, the last three meanings best apply: shevet as scepter, authority, and ruler. Thus, the verse means that the rule and authority of Judah will not cease until the Messiah comes—a reading consistent with the Hebrew phrase, the context, the analogy of faith, and accepted even by Jews as authentic.

This explanation, taken from the Rabbis (R. Joel ben Sueb and R. Isaac), they wish to apply to this passage, although with some slight variation; and R. Menasseh ben Israel repeats both of these interpretations in his Conciliator. But below, in the thesis itself, we refute it.

The fifth [interpretation], by way of metaphor, denotes a tribe; because, just as a rod grows from one tree, so a tribe arises from one father. (Gen. 49; Num. 2, 26, 31). To this also belongs its synecdochical meaning, by which it denotes a family (Judg. 20:12). This meaning, observes the most celebrated theologian Peter Molinaeus (Lib. 4, Vates, cap. 7, 8), fits this passage very well and avoids many difficulties.

Yet I do not see that the sentence flows so smoothly in this way. For what is the meaning of the phrase, “a tribe shall not be taken away from Judah”—that is, from the tribe of Judah? As if you were to say: a people will not be taken from a people, a nation from a nation, a family from a family. It seems to me unusual and somewhat harsh. Therefore this Hebraic idiom ought first to be proved by examples from Scripture. For when Scripture intends to denote the extinction or abolition of a thing, or its total corruption as to its species and form—whether natural or artificial—it is accustomed to use such phrases (Hos. 1:9; Ps. 83:5; Job 7:8–10, 12, 14).

Therefore I would prefer here to “hold back” (ἐπέχεων), and to follow the well-worn, safe path, that is, the received and common Christian interpretation concerning the scepter. For this both agrees with the Hebrew phrase, and with the context (since the legislator, corresponding to the scepter, is joined with it by one verb, “shall be taken away”), and it accords with faith and the analogy of the Scriptures. Indeed, it ought to be accepted by the Jews themselves, and it is received as authentic, as was said in the preceding thesis. This alone—even if the other considerations were in balance—would move me to prefer this interpretation above the other.

The sixth meaning, by metonymy of the material, denotes the scepter, the symbol of the kingdom or principality (Ps. 45). The seventh, by metonymy of the sign, denotes power, kingdom, dominion, jurisdiction (Isa. 14; Zech. 10). The eighth, by metonymy of the abstract for the concrete, denotes a king, prince, or judge (2 Sam. 7; 1 Chron. 17). These three last interpretations have place here either conjunctly or interchangeably.

For just as shebet (שבט) by metonymy of the material denotes a scepter, that is, the outward symbol of power or rule, so by metonymy of the sign and the instrumental cause it denotes power, jurisdiction, kingdom, dominion, empire; and consequently, by metonymy of the abstract for the concrete, a prince or judge. And this interpretation I judge to be the genuine one.

It is divided into two: either strictly, so that it denotes only royal authority; or more broadly and generally, so that it denotes every form of political power or jurisdiction with sovereignty—whether in the form of government it was royal, ducal, dictatorial, monarchical (more or less limited), aristocratic, democratic, or mixed—and independent of all foreign authority, or more or less dependent.

The latter interpretation we embrace; so that here, just as in Ps. 45:6, scepter—the symbol, namely, of authority and rule—metonymically signifies power, principality, government. For thus also the Targums, and the Septuagint (archon), and Aquila (skēptron). So also R. Aben Ezra, R. Moses Gerundensis, R. Bahya, R. Hezekiah (author of Hizkuni), Isaac Abravanel, and the commentary Bereshit Rabba, with R. Menasseh himself admitting it.

Secondly, Judah in Scripture denotes: (1) the person, namely, the son of Jacob; and other individuals bearing the same name; (2) the tribe, or the descendants of Judah; (3) the people among whom, after the secession of the ten tribes and their deportation to Assyria (so that they were no longer a people, Hos. 1; 2 Kings 17), the appearance of a people and of government remained, until the destruction wrought by Titus, the son of Vespasian.

Thus it came about that little by little the scepter departed — first, indeed, the royal one; then the ducal; next, the judicial, in part and as far as its exercise was concerned; and finally, every scepter that had to do with right and title.

And those [people] were properly and distinctly, from the ten tribes, already in the writings of the Old and New Testament called “Jews” — Ezek. 4.14; 12.55; Neh. 4.2; and metonymically “Judah” in Hosea 4.15. This signification suits our text.

For we indeed admit that the same people, even after the division of the kingdom, is called by the common name “Israel” (a synecdoche of the whole for a part) — both because they were from Israel, and because the tribe of Benjamin, and many from the other tribes, were incorporated into them (on which matter see our disputation On Judaism). But this does not prejudice our interpretation. For here the Jewish people is expressly distinguished from the rest of the Israelites.

Moreover, it is not to be understood of the person of Judah the patriarch, but of the Jewish people, as is confirmed by the Targumim — Onkelos, Jerusalem, and Jonathan — and most Rabbinic interpreters.

III. Thirdly, it signifies “lawgiver,” a prince who establishes laws and prescribes statutes for the people (Deut. 33.21; Is. 33.22; Ps. 108.9). The Septuagint here renders it ἠγούμενον (“leader”).

If anyone should explain it here as “scribe,” with the Targumim, we do not object, since nothing thereby accrues to the Jews, nor is anything taken away from our argument. Thus also the Mauritanian Arabic version translates it ואלרסם (Varraṣim), that is, “lawgiver.” Among Christians, Munster renders it “scribe”; but in his notes explains it as “teacher, publisher of statutes, lawgiver” — which pleases more. Likewise the author of Nizzachon explains it through מושל, that is, “ruler, lord, leader of the land.” From this, however, later Jews diverge greatly, who interpret it as Talmid, that is, “disciple,” sitting at the feet of princes.

IV. Fourthly, ערכי, “until, while, as long as,” as in Gen. 26.13 and 41.49. So too the Targumim render it expressly: “until he comes,” “until the time when he comes.” The Septuagint: ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ (“until he shall come”). The meanings that R. Menasseh assigns to this particle, after others, you may see already discussed by Galatinus (De Arcanis Catholicæ Veritatis, Book IV), by Helvicus in Elenchus Judaicus, by Matthias Martinius in his notes on Gen. 49.10, and in the Etymologicum, and also by us below in the last thesis.

V. Fifthly, ינא, “may come.” R. Menasseh gives it two meanings: one general — “to go, to come,” etc.; the other more specific — “to kill, to perish.”

But that later interpretation does not at all suit this passage, as will be shown below.

VI. Sixth, Shiloh (שילה). This word is retained by Christian translations — the English, Danish, French, Italian (Deodati), the Zurich Bible of Leo Juda (sometimes also called Vatablus’s, since it was published with his notes), Munster’s, Pagninus’s, and Arias Montanus’s. Among Jewish sources, also the Mauritanian Arabic version (so I call it to distinguish it from the Arabic of R. Saadiah Gaon and from the Oriental Christian translations).

Four principal interpretations occur:

1. “He to whom [it belongs],” or “whose it is” — as though it were written שלו.

2. The city Shiloh.

3. “Bring,” or “offer to him,” namely gifts.

4. “Error.”

5. “His offspring,” i.e. “his son,” by metonymy of container for the contained.

6. “Salvation” or “Savior, Deliverer,” etc.

7. “Sent one,” as if it were written שליח (shaliach) or שלוח (shaluach), which is the same as the Arabic الرسول (ar-rasūl) and Greek ὁ ἀπόστολος (“apostle”).

The first explanation is supported by the Septuagint: τὰ ἀποκείμενα αὐτῷ (“the things laid up for him”). R. Menasseh also reports this interpretation, making it equivalent to לו אשר, “that which is his,” the ה being taken for a ו.

Response:

1. But such a thing is not found in the text, nor in the Masorah of the Masoretes. How then could anyone prove the word to be a compound of ש and לו? Especially since the vowel under ש is not segol but hireq, long; nor is it dageshed. And if one wishes to invent another reading outside the sacred text, how will he maintain the full integrity of Scripture, according to the common faith of the Jews?

2. And if you interpret it so, what intelligible and rational sense emerges? “Until he comes, which is his?”

3. As to the Septuagint: Flaminius Nobilius, in his notes to the Paris Bible, gives another reading: ᾧ ἀπόκειται (“to whom it is laid up”). But whether one receives it or not, it departs from the Hebrew text, whose authority and integrity are defended by Whitaker, Chamier, and Rivet in his Isagoge, etc. They also prove corruption in the Greek text — and more recently Hottinger.

The second interpretation is held by R. Menasseh and some Rabbis he cites; but we shall refute it below as most absurd. The third is also reported by R. Menasseh. Response: it departs from the sacred text, for it does not contain the letter sin (שׂ) but shin (שׁ); and the difference between those letters is evident from Judges 12:6. Further, the second letter of the word is not aleph (as the imperative sa, “bring” or “offer,” from the root nasa, would require), but yod. Finally, it diverges from the authentic Jewish Targumim and Talmudic sources, which interpret it very differently, as we have noted above.

The fourth interpretation, so far as I know, is applied here by no one.

The fifth has supporters among Talmudists and Rabbis; their words can be seen cited by our lexicographers and in the writings of the adversaries of the Jews. Among these, readily at hand is Buxtorf’s Epitome Radicum under the entry שילה, and Hugo Grotius in Book 5 of On the Truth of the Christian Religion. He cites R. Selomo (Rashi), Ibn Ezra, and Onkelos. But here Grotius looked with borrowed eyes, or repeated this on another’s authority — perhaps because he did not himself understand the sources, or was too occupied to inspect them; or else, following his usual manner in theological writings, he indulged too much his zeal for citing authorities, shaping their words and deeds to his purpose. Christopher Cartwright, in his notes on Genesis 49:10, saw this and gently reproved him.

The sixth interpretation has supporters among both Jews and many Christians. According to us, there may be a double exposition: either that it denotes “his offspring,” i.e. by metonymy “his son,” as Bereshit Rabbah with many Rabbis (cited by Buxtorf and by R. Menasseh) interprets; and so too Philippus de Aquino, a converted Jew, in his Dictionary. Or else that it denotes “peace, prosperity, felicity,” as Vatablus explains it from the root שלה, “to be tranquil, quiet,” hence “the bringer of peace, deliverer, savior, author of felicity.” So Oleaster, Fagius, Forster, Melanchthon, Mercerus, Castellio, Drusius, Schindler, Amama. And this etymology I prefer. See on both these interpretations the lexicographers Pagninus, Buxtorf, Schindler, Matthias Martinius in his Etymologicum, and Sixtinus Amama in Antibarbarus, Book 2, p. 444.

The seventh interpretation is embraced by many Roman Catholics, so as to defend the Vulgate translation. But in so doing, while accusing the Jews of corrupting the text, they not a little promote their cause and weaken the Christian argument, as Galatinus himself admits (De Arcanis Catholicae Veritatis, Book 4, ch. 4). See Amama, Censura Vulgatae Versionis; Rivet, Exercitation 181 on Genesis; Martinius in his Etymologicum under “Shiloh”; Chamier, Panstratia; Glassius, Philologia Sacra.

Other interpretations, such as “Siloh,” I will not examine further. See Martinius in the Etymologicum.

For our present dispute with the Jews, those two interpretations suffice: the fifth and the sixth. Let the Jews choose whichever they prefer, though in our own judgment the latter is to be preferred.

VII. Seventh, “Obedience of the peoples” (עמים יקהת). So Targum Onkelos: עמי ישתמעון וליה, that is, “and the peoples shall obey him.” The Jerusalem Targum agrees. The Mauritanian Arabic paraphrase has ממ אלא יחתמעון ואליה, “and to him the peoples obey or are subjected.” Others render it “gathering.” But whichever you choose, it is all the same, and our argument proceeds.

And this, indeed, is our argument for the coming of the Messiah. The arguments of the Jews, by which formerly and still today they assail the coming of the Messiah, were long ago refuted—see Galatinus, Book 5; Plessæus, ch. 7; Helvicus, in the appendix to the Elenchus; Jacob Martini, Disputation 6. The specific objections against the passage Genesis 49:10, much of which R. Menasseh repeats in his Conciliator, Question 65, have been answered by those same authors. Add also Lyranus, in his Postilla on Genesis 49, Willet there, Rivetus in Exercise 181. For whatever interpretations of that passage heaped up from the Rabbis he sets forth, they do not promote his cause, but only blot the paper with worthless scribbling: first, because he does not fortify them against the replies of our writers; second, because all of them depart from the sense of the Targums, the Talmud, and the ancient Rabbis—so often pressed by us—whose authority, since it binds him, R. Menasseh with his followers passes over in shameful and disgraceful silence; third, because they are contrary not only to the analogy of Scripture and its context, as well as the sacred language itself, but also to other doctrines and assumptions of the Jews themselves; and finally, because he himself hesitates and wavers, not knowing where he may fix his step. For thus he says about his eleven interpretations: Be that as it may, whether you embrace this or that among the other expositions, the difficulty is removed, etc. ‘I know indeed that different interpretations have pleased different men: but these seem to me sufficient: more learned men may choose whichever they judge to be the truest.’

The main objection which is raised against our major conclusion—and to which even R. Menasseh seems especially to cling as to a sacred anchor—we dissolve in this way. R. Menasseh, with Isaac Abravanel, presupposes from a certain saying of the ancients, that the “scepter” here signifies dominion or jurisdiction, however small, and that this has not yet been taken away from the Jews. But why, I ask? Because, after the destruction of the Second Temple, two families of the line of David migrated into Spain and Gaul (according to the testimony of R. Isaac Guiat), from which line Abravanel always remained head of Israel. He adds from R. Isaac Arama (commentary on Genesis, fol. 92) that Benjamin of Tudela testifies that he himself had seen with his eyes at Baghdad Israelites escorting some Prince of David’s line riding in a chariot, shouting along the way, ‘Make way for the son of David!’ The words of Benjamin, to which R. Arama seems to allude, are found in his Itinerary, pp. 70, 72, in the edition of Constantinus l’Empereur. Moreover, R. Aben Ezra also testifies that in his own time there was at Baghdad (that is, in Babylonia) a family of David’s line, and that great honors were paid in Persia to princes from that stock. Aben Ezra, on Genesis 44, says that “princes of the captivity” there ruled over the people, etc.

Reply. As if someone were to recount Lucian’s True History, or Thomas More’s Utopia, or the unknown southern land! For, first, R. Arama with no good faith reports Benjamin’s story and adds fables to fables. For Benjamin (p. 70) says there were then at Baghdad ‘about a thousand Jews’ (יהודים אלף כמו), that is, almost a thousand. But the other (Arama) swells it up to ‘many thousands and dominion.’ Benjamin (p. 72) relates that on the day when the Jewish Prince goes to salute the Caliph, he is acclaimed. But the other changes the day of acclamation into the Caliph’s birthday. Benjamin (p. 74) says that on the day when a new “head of the exile” is created by the Caliph, the Prince of the Jews is carried in the Caliph’s secondary chariot to his house. But the other says that this is done at the celebration of the Caliph’s birthday. Benjamin mentions only a great company, pomp, and acclamation; the other adds this coloring of his own, זכר—that is, “R. Benjamin remembered”—and בעיניו שראה “that he saw with his own eyes.” As though Benjamin were to recount nothing except what he had himself seen! The contrary is attested by the preface attached to the Itinerary, and by David Gans in his Tzemach, that is, his chronicle, where he discusses Benjamin.

Secondly, Benjamin’s credibility is slippery throughout his whole history, especially when he blows the trumpet of Jewish glory; as anyone will see who glances through some of it, and as has been abundantly shown by his editor Constantinus l’Empereur in his notes, his dedicatory epistle, and his preface to the reader. See especially p. 98, where he speaks of four tribes beyond the River Gozan (to whom access is impossible) not subject to any power, but bound in league with the Turkish pagans, men without noses, etc.; p. 111, on the catching of eagles; p. 112, on Israelites in the Indian mainland called Baadam, subject to no foreign nation or ruler; pp. 70–75, on the dominion and splendor of the Jews of Baghdad; p. 101, on the empire of the Jews in the mountains of Nisbon; p. 115, on Ali son of Abitaleb, Sultan of the Saracens of Egypt, who at that time did not even exist; p. 44, on Lot’s wife; p. 45, where he tells a pleasant tale about the sepulcher of David.

In short, that liberty or authority of the Jews in their schools and synagogues—which concerns the election and ordination of doctors and ministers in sacred things, public order (ἐντάξια), and solemn rites, etc. (which even today among the Mohammedans, and perhaps among some Christians, may easily be purchased for money)—this he transforms into political dominion, or jurisdiction with empire; whereas it is nothing else but a merely scholastic and ecclesiastical authority or liberty, if we may so speak. And if it extends to marriages and other secular and political matters, it ought to be called nothing else but exemption, privilege, indulgence; which is separated by the whole heaven from the scepter, legislation, judgment, autocratoria. And this the prudent reader may gather, not obscurely, even from Benjamin himself, pp. 70–75, compared with p. 115—whatever purple exaggerations he may paint—for there he himself acknowledges a higher lord, namely the Saracen ruler.”

III. But what if once upon a time in Baghdad, or in Egypt, or elsewhere, for a brief moment such a thing had existed (which we by no means concede) — is the matter thereby satisfied? Tell me then, where now are those families, those princes, those honors, those acclamations? “It may be,” says R. Menasseh, “that the same thing is still preserved today in certain places unknown to us.” And a little later: “Indeed, even now in many places, descendants of the tribe of Judah still have a certain jurisdiction and remain as heads of the rest. This small dominion will endure until the time of the Messiah, when it will then be enlarged.”

This bold conjecture stands in direct contradiction to common experience and the clear light of all known facts. Produce your geographers, historians, Jewish travelers, Muslims, Christians, neutrals or freethinkers: for neither Persia, Babylonia, Morocco, Constantinople, Agra (the capital of Hindustan, or India in the empire of the Great Mogul), much less Rome, Venice, Prague, Frankfurt, Amsterdam (where Jews dwell) — none of these places are beyond the reach of years or the paths of the sun. Was it not shameful for a man to chatter thus in Amsterdam, where one can find so many who carefully investigate every region and corner of the inhabited world, whether known or unknown?

IV. This fiction also contradicts the sense and confession of the Rabbis, both ancient and recent, who call the state of the Jews after the destruction of the Second Temple exile, captivity, affliction, etc. Consult the Targum on Hosea 3:4. Add the words of R. David Kimchi on Hosea 3:4:

"And these are the days of exile in which we now are; we have no king, nor prince from Israel. For we are under the power of the nations, and under the power of their kings and princes."

So too Maimonides, in his commentary on the Mishnah (Berakhot, fol. 58a): From the time we were exiled from our land, we have had no power to establish laws. Yet far more bitterly does Don Isaac Abravanel complain — though at Isaiah 53:3 he twists it with his gloss — namely, that the Jews are despised by all other nations, and that among them there are no outstanding or eminent men. Indeed, in his earlier exposition on verse 8 (ed. Constantin l’Empereur) he states that the third kind of evil of the exile is:

“That there is no kingdom in Israel, nor dominion, nor judicial scepter.”

Where then is the scepter? Where the lawgiver? Likewise Maimonides, in the same commentary (Berakhot, fol. 58). Moreover, the Jews of today in their letters make use of the era of their captivity, as may be seen in the letters published by Buxtorf. Even Benjamin himself laments captivity and exile (galut) (pp. 128–129).

V. This fiction also contradicts the theology of the ancient Talmudists, who taught that the Sanhedrin sat in the court of Israel, and hence proved from Deuteronomy 17:8 and Genesis 49:10 that it was in Judah and not in Benjamin. From this we gather that, according to their own view, since that Senate (in whose hands was political authority, which some even take Genesis 49 to mean properly) was to remain in the Holy Land — indeed in Judah — until the coming of the Messiah, it cannot therefore be said or conjectured that any government, principality, or polity remained elsewhere after the destruction of the Temple. So rightly observes the learned l’Empereur in his commentary on Middot 3.1 (pp. 106–107).

VI. It is astonishing that R. Menasseh, who prefers to rely on more recent authors, never read the dissertation and notes of l’Empereur on Benjamin, nor his refutation of Abravanel and Alshech — where, on Isaiah 53:3 (p. 86), he so excellently exhibits those two eminent men, Benjamin of Tudela and Don Abravanel, set in direct opposition to one another. These ought to have been read and refuted, if he had any confidence in his own case, before burdening readers with those fables of Benjamin.

VII. I dare say that R. Menasseh ben Israel never even read Benjamin; or if he did read him, he nevertheless preferred to cite Benjamin through the authority of R. Isaac Arama, so that the tale might be presented to the reader with greater appearance of weight — for Benjamin himself is often confused, or at least speaks more faintly, than R. Arama reports him. And thus we have refuted this exception of R. Menasseh. Let us also briefly glance at other difficulties raised either among Jews or Christians.

Our writers have labored much over the historical controversy concerning what sort of continuity the Jewish scepter had after the return from the Babylonian captivity up until Christ. The difficulty lies in this: the Hasmoneans were of the tribe of Levi, and Herod was an allophyloi (foreigner). The opinion does not please us which says that the Hasmoneans were of the tribe of Judah through the maternal line. Nor does the opinion of Scaliger, Torniellus, and Casaubon satisfy, who contend that Herod was a Jew. More tolerable is the view which holds that the senators of the Sanhedrin, or at least their prince, were of the tribe of Judah — a view also held by R. Menasseh.

But the whole difficulty is removed if we say that the principate and judgment did not depart from the Jewish people, nor did the appearance and form of the Jewish polity perish, even though not all the princes or chiefs were of the tribe of Judah. For how, for example, do we still believe the Roman Empire, the German Empire, or the kingdom, government, and people of France, Spain, Poland, or Hungary to exist and rightly so called — although not all their emperors or kings have been of that people?

If anyone seeks further investigation of this controversy, let him consult Pererius, Cornelius à Lapide, Burgensis, Willet, Pareus, Rivetus on Genesis 49; Baronius (vol. 1) with the antagonists Casaubon, James Capel, Richard Montagu; Scaliger in De Emendatione Temporum; Cunæus De Republica Hebræorum, book 1, ch. 9–10; Scultetus Exercitationes Evangelicae book 1, ch. 2–4; Amama Antibarbarus book 2, p. 444; Helvicus Elenchus Judaicus; Jacob Martini disput. 2; Galatinus book 4, ch. 5–7; Spanheim Dubia Evangelica part 2.

As for us — so that we may provide some instruction in the midst of such varied methods of Christian argumentation from this passage against the Jews, and form some reconciliations of concepts — we will first supply the general sources of solutions, and then respond to certain special exceptions or doubts one by one.

Sources of solutions and reconciliations are these:

1. The disagreements among Christians concerning the application of this prophecy — which Julian once objected (as reported by Cyril of Alexandria) — are either merely grammatical, or chronological concerning hypotheses of chronology. But this does not hinder agreement in the substance of the matter, or in the principal argument we have proposed above in thesis 3. The same must be answered to the objection concerning the argument from Daniel 9. For wherever you begin to count the seventy weeks of years (i.e. 490 years), they have long since elapsed.

2. A people, formally considered — that is, a commonwealth, polity, or dominion — remains, even if the status and mode of government changes. See the political writers, especially Grotius (De Jure Belli et Pacis book 3, ch. 15). Thus, for example, the Israelite or Jewish polity remained, though the mode of government varied: royal, ducal, Sanhedrinic.

3. When a people, kingdom, or republic is conquered by an outsider and becomes tributary, or is even reduced to a province, nevertheless the republic or polity does not thereby cease to exist. Thus among the Jews at the time of Christ’s coming, the scepter and government were not entirely taken away, for the authority of their own magistracy, though greatly diminished, still endured, and the priesthood continued.

4. The scepter is not to be said as taken away from Judah, nor not taken away, except from the time it was first conferred upon them. But when it began to be conferred is not much to labor about. Whether it was in David, or in Rehoboam when the people and kingdom of the Jews were properly so called, in distinction from the people and kingdom of the ten tribes (from whom all scepter and kingdom were taken away in 2 Kings 17), our argument nevertheless stands.

Let us now briefly examine some of the special and principal objections and exceptions, glosses and conjectures of the Rabbis, and likewise the doubts and difficulties of some Christians.

1. Some say by Shiloh is meant David. So Aben Ezra in his commentary.
Response: First, this gloss contradicts the text. For how could the scepter be said not to depart from Judah, which before David had never been in the hand of the tribe or people of Judah in distinction from the other tribes? As is plain from 1 Kings 12:17–19 compared with Hosea 1:4–6 and 2 Kings 17:7. Secondly, it contradicts the exposition of the Targumists and Talmudists, who are authoritative for the Jews. Not to mention the other Rabbis already cited.

2. By Shiloh some understand Nebuchadnezzar, who was sent by God and took away the scepter from Judah. So some Rabbis, and with them Lyranus in his Postilla.
Response: (1) This gloss contradicts the reading of the text and grammar. For there is no שליח or שלוח from the root שלח, “to send,” but שילה, which is altogether different. Let beginners in the language consult the lexicons of Pagninus, Schindler, Buxtorf. (2) It contradicts the analogy of the context. For the taking away of the scepter and the Babylonian captivity was not a peculiar blessing by which Judah’s brethren would praise him (Gen. 49:8), but rather a peculiar curse. (3) It contradicts the Targumists, Talmudists, and Rabbis above cited, who by Shiloh understand the Messiah, not Nebuchadnezzar. (4) We answer ad hominem, that it contradicts the context: for in the Babylonian captivity the scepter was indeed taken away, but not the mechoqeq (legislator, i.e. scribes of the law), as the Chaldean paraphrasts explain. For their existence is attested in Targum Canticles 6:1.

3. By Shiloh some understand the city Shiloh, referring to Jeroboam, who was anointed there. So R. Joseph, R. Abraham, R. Beha.
Response: (1) This presupposes what is false against sacred history (1 Kings 12:25). For he was not anointed in Shiloh, but in Shechem. (2) It requires a great assumption not easily conceded, namely that in sacred phrase a place-name should be used for the person who lived or acted there. This must be proved. (3) Again, it contradicts the light of sacred history (2 Chron. 11:17; 12:2–13; 13:2–19). For by the defection of the ten tribes the scepter or authority of magistrates, judges, scribes was not taken away from Judah. (4) It contradicts the analogy of the context in Genesis 49:8. For the peculiar blessing and exaltation of Judah was not the secession of the ten tribes, but rather a plague.

IV. It is properly understood that the city of Shiloh is meant, in the sense that the scepter will not depart until Shiloh either perishes or is devastated; after whose devastation David, from the tribe of Judah, obtained the kingdom.

Response:

1. This contradicts grammar in two ways:

   • First, because יָבֹא (yabo, “shall come”) is explained as meaning “perish, be devastated, be lost, cease to exist.” But can this be demonstrated from Judges 19: the sun set (בָּאֲשֶׁמֶשׁ)? That is, the setting of the sun in our hemisphere is its disappearance or abolition? I do not think so; lest the physicians seem as happy as the grammarians. Let them consult their Targumists and Rabbis (especially Psalms 19 and 104), who explain the movement of the sun and the terms of Scripture designating it.

   • Second, Shiloh is a city of the feminine gender; yet in Genesis 49:10, Shiloh is treated as masculine, and constructed with the masculine verb יָבֹא (jabo).

2. It contradicts the light of sacred history, which shows that after the devastation of Shiloh (1 Sam. 5), the kingdom was not given to David of the tribe of Judah, but first to Samuel of the tribe of Levi as overseer, and then to Saul of the tribe of Benjamin.

3. Above all, it contradicts the text of Genesis 49:10. There it is said, “The scepter shall not depart…” Yet these Rabbis not only absurdly but also improperly substitute — or are compelled to substitute — “the scepter shall not be conferred.” Such perverse distortions cannot be tolerated. How, indeed, would the syntax hold, through which the verbs of giving are constructed, with all other words of that sort, which signify that something is acquired by a person or thing?

4. Finally, it contradicts their own authentic exposition in the Targum and Talmud, as we have said multiple times, where Shiloh designates the Messiah.

V. By shebet (rod), not to be taken away from Judah, it can also be understood as the rod of affliction and humiliation. Some Jews say this, as noted by R. Menasseh.

Response:

1. This contradicts the analogy of the context in two ways:

   • First, because it does not cohere with yabo, the legislator, or magistrate. For what meaning would one make if one said, “The affliction shall not be taken away from Judah, nor the magistrate or scribe from under their feet”? Everything flows and coheres best if the scepter and magistracy are joined, and the same verb shall not depart applies to both.

   • Second, because the perpetual affliction of the Jews is not a peculiar blessing and exaltation over all the brothers, as Jacob intended in his patriarchal oracle.

2. It contradicts sacred history, which testifies that under David, Solomon (1 Kings 4:25), Abijah, Asa, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, etc., the rod did not lie upon them.

3. It contradicts the authentic Targumic exposition:

   • Onkelos: שולטן עביר (“one exercising dominion”)

   • Jerusalem Targum: יהורח מרבית מלכין, “kings from the house of Judah”

   • Jonathan: יהורה מרבית ושליטין מלכין, “kings and princes from the house of Judah”

   • Many other Rabbis explain this word similarly; also in the Arabic translation of the Pentateuch (Mauritanica): אלקריב alcadfi — the scepter.

VI. If shebet is to be understood metaphorically as support, the argument no longer holds. In this sense, it would mean: the rod, staff, or support of Judah, nor legislators or scribes who console or exhort them to endure adversity, shall never fail; the Jews in captivity will never be left without aid, even if oppressed by king or nation — some support will always reach them. R. Menasseh cites here the wisdom of the ancients from Bereishit Rabba 8–9.

Response:

1. It presupposes, but does not prove, that the word shebet, by itself, without a substantive adjunct or vicarial pronoun denoting subject or object (as here), can metaphorically denote support. In his enumeration and demonstration of all meanings of this word (p. 88), he does not even mention this. Proof is awaited.

2. It contradicts the Chaldean paraphrasts, whose exposition is authoritative, as shown above.

VII. Even if shebet is taken to mean the scepter, the argument does not proceed against the Jews: for the scepter is still among the Jews, if not in fact, at least by law; thus the scepter of Genesis 49 is to be understood as the scepter of legal authority, according to R. Moshe Gerundense and R. Bechai.

Response:

1. It contradicts the text, which speaks of fact and exercise, and thus Onkelos expresses: שולטן עביר יערי לא, “he who exercises authority shall not fail.” Targum Jerusalem and Jonathan express similarly: אריתא מאלפי ספרין, “doctors (or scribes) teaching the law.”

2. From this exposition, it seems to follow that the scepter, magistracy, legal experts, and all authority, which are attributed to Judah, would be taken away after the coming of the Messiah. This, however, contradicts the hope of the Jews concerning the fullness and glory of the earthly kingdom of their Messiah, both as to actual power and as to fact. See the description by Münster in the prolegomena to the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, and by Buxtorf in Synagoga Judaica.

VIII. Once more, the taking away of the scepter is understood here; yet from this the Jews are not dispossessed, for the scepter remains with the Israelites of the ten tribes, still in Scythia (beyond the Caspian Sea), whence the Messiah is to come. 

1. The story about Israelites beyond the Caspian Sea is a fable, to be rejected by all geographers and travelers. Already some centuries ago the same or a similar thing was spread (see Benjamin of Tudela, cited above), but it was never proven.

2. Furthermore, the Israelites of the ten tribes, after the last deportation into Assyria (2 Kings 17 compared with Hosea 1:6), ceased to exist as a people — that is, as to the form and appearance of a nation. The Jewish commentators themselves on Hosea 1:6 acknowledge this. For they coalesced with and were mixed either among the Gentiles, or with the Jews, or were transformed into Samaritans, whom they are accustomed to call Cuthaeans or Cuthites.

   • Those who mingled with the Jews can no more be said to “still reign” than the Jews themselves.

   • Those who degenerated into Gentiles are no longer Israelites, since the whole form and nature of their polity, both ecclesiastical and civil, was lost.

   • As for the Samaritans, what they are and what the Jews think of them we shall show below in the disputation De Iudaismo.

3. It contradicts Micah 5:1, where the Messiah is said to come forth from Bethlehem and from Judah, not from Scythia, nor from the Caspian Gates, nor from the remnants of the ten tribes — whom the Talmudists in Sanhedrin ch. 11 say are condemned and have no part in the world to come.

4. Even if we grant that some sort of dominion still remained among the ten tribes in Scythia, nevertheless it cannot be inferred from this that the Jews of today, whether Western or Eastern, possess the same, nor that their captivity and servitude ought therefore to be called a “kingdom.” For the text of Genesis 49 does not speak of the ten tribes, but of the tribe of Judah specifically, as distinct from the others, which is said to rejoice in peculiar prerogative and excellence.

IX. But if among the Jews of Europe there is no dominion, yet in Babylon it is said still to continue. Something like this Aben Ezra seems to intimate on that passage, and Isaac Arama with Benjamin (cited above).

Response: See above how this fiction has already been refuted, etc. For from Jacob down to David no one of the tribe of Judah held the scepter. Therefore the passage in Genesis 49 cannot be expounded of a continuous or perpetual dominion until the coming of the Messiah.

Response: This is entirely conceded (see the previous thesis, source 4). For the text does not say that from the time the oracle was given by Jacob the scepter should belong to the princes of that tribe, or to the tribe itself in a royal way, or in any other form of dominion. Not at all. And if some Christians, and even some Jews with Aben Ezra, suppose that prophecy to have been fulfilled in the dignity of the tribe of Judah as standard-bearers (Numbers 2:3 and Judges 1:2) or in the prefecture of Othniel (Judges 3), in our judgment they are far from the mark.

X. From Zedekiah to Christ, no one of the tribe of Judah held the key of the kingdom, except Zerubbabel. Afterwards there were either no leaders of the Jews, or else the Hasmoneans from the tribe of Levi; these were succeeded by the Roman governors, and by Herod, an Idumean.

Response: All this is conceded. But from this it does not follow that the scepter and judgment were taken away from Judah, since we place the succession of Judah not in princes descended from Judah, but in the kingdom, or polity, or commonwealth of the Jews as such. Still, it is questioned what must be said about the time of the Babylonian captivity: where then was the scepter and the lawgiver or magistracy? I do not see that it is necessary to flee to Jewish histories or the apocryphal narratives of the pseudo-Daniel about Jewish ethnarchs and judges. It is easier to say that the seventy-year captivity or exile, which afflicted many Jews, did not yet take away altogether every form and appearance of a people, since not a few were left in Judea, and many were dispersed among neighboring nations. (See Rainolds, Lectures on the Apocryphal Books, vol. 2.)

XI. The text teaches what will happen after the coming of the Messiah, not before him. The reason is that here eternity is signified; and by the accent Jetib it is joined to the preceding words, and separated from the following particle כי (ki). So the sense is: “The scepter shall not depart, etc., forever (or eternally), after (or when) Shiloh comes, i.e. the Messiah.” Thus Bechai and other recent writers, and Bereshit Rabbah as cited by R. Menasseh.

1. This exposition is in more than one way contrary to grammar.

   • First, because the particle עד (ʿad) in construction before another particle does not mean “eternity,” but “until,” as in Genesis 26:13 and 41:49.

   • Second, because the accent Athnach under the preceding word (רגליו, “his feet”) indicates a pause, and shows that what follows pertains to the next clause and must be joined with כי (ki). This grammatical argument is strong enough ad hominem, that is, against the Jews themselves, who often argue from the function of accents in the division of sentences.

   • Third, because the accent Jetib is one of the minor disjunctives, and is very rarely employed to divide sentences; at least it cannot connect a word with what precedes when the preceding word is already marked with a major pause. Especially since elsewhere the same accent, and even the very word עד (ʿad), is plainly distinguished from the preceding and joined with the following, as in Exod. 23:30; Ruth 1:13; Judges 4: last verse; 1 Sam. 22:3; Exod. 32:33. This argument, drawn from the axioms of the Rabbis’ own grammar, ought to carry weight against them. If novices in this matter wish to see the solution with their own eyes, let them consult Buxdorf’s Thesaurus Grammaticus, at the end, where he deals with the distinction of sentences.

   • Fourth, because it contradicts the authentic exposition of their own Targums. For thus Onkelos renders: עד דייתי gnad de-yete, that is, “until he comes.” The Jerusalem Targum: עד דייתי זמן gnad zman de-yete, i.e. “until the time when he comes.” Jonathan: עד דייתי זמן gnad zman de-yete. To these agrees the Mauritanian Arabic translation: إلى أن يجي ila an yaji, “until he comes.” Not to mention Bereshit Rabbah and Ketanna, Moses Hadarsan, Aben Ezra, Shlomo Yarchi (Rashi), David Kimchi.

XII. It is objected: The text of Genesis 49:10 is corrupt, and the word “Shiloh” is a mere barbarism; and the old Latin Vulgate translator seems to have recognized an ancient reading “שילח” (Shilach), as Fagius confesses in his notes on the Targum. Some Jews derive “Shiloh” from the root שלח (to send); therefore no solid argument can be formed from this word for the coming of the Messiah.

Response. Thus indeed some Roman Catholic writers argue, in order to defend the authenticity of the Vulgate; among whom Morinus is conspicuous in his Exercitations on the Samaritan Pentateuch and its defense. But how solidly he argues, and how little such sophistry advances the cause of Christians against the Jews, Hottinger has shown at length in his Antexercitationes, and more recently Christopher Cartwright in his annotations on Genesis. Against other Romanists the same case has been argued by Glassius in Philologia Sacra I.i.1, by Rivetus, Chamier, and others cited above. I therefore will not fight the same battle again, lest I be too prolix. I only add this point: Morinus gravely contradicts himself, when he calls the word “Shiloh” unknown and inexplicable, accusing it of barbarism and solecism, and contends that no valid argument can be drawn from it against the Jews. Did he not remember that among the converted Jews was Philip of Aquino, professor of Hebrew at Paris, who read the word as it stands in the original text, and interpreted it far otherwise than the Vulgate Latin, in his most complete Hebrew dictionary (as he called it), written in Hebrew, published in Paris in 1629, with the splendid commendations and approvals of the Bishop of Soissons, of the Paris Sorbonne, of Harlay, Petavius, Gaulmin, Morainvillier, De Muis, Gabriel Sionita, and of Morinus himself? — whose very words are these:

“I have read this Hebrew-Talmudic Dictionary, a specimen of this kind of work composed by that most learned man, a Jew converted to Christ, Philip of Aquino, professor of Hebrew at Paris. I judge that it will be most useful to ecclesiastical doctors and interpreters of Holy Scripture. And if, as it has happily and diligently been begun to be published, it shall at last be brought to completion, Europe has seen nothing to compare with it in this kind of study.”

Therefore, was Philip of Aquino — such a great master of Hebrew — a barbarian, when he expounded the word Shiloh as בנו (bno) “his son”?

And these, indeed, are the objections raised against our argument from Genesis 49:10.
Now let us consider, first, the general objections by which they seek to prove in general that the Messiah has not yet come; and then the special objections by which they think they can prove that Jesus of Nazareth is not the Messiah.

The objections of the first kind can mostly be reduced to one chief argument, which today they especially employ. It is this:

Where the times predicted by God have not yet been fulfilled, that cannot be the time of the coming of the Messiah. But at the time we designate (namely, about 1650 years ago) these things were not fulfilled, nor indeed even now do we see them fulfilled. Therefore, the Messiah has not come.

They seek to prove the minor premise by enumerating various passages in Scripture, such as:

• Isaiah 2: of the mountain of the Lord being exalted above the other mountains;

• Isaiah 11: of the wolf dwelling with the lamb, etc.;

• Ezekiel 47: of the waters flowing from the sanctuary, and of the trees whose leaves do not wither;

• Isaiah 2: of swords being beaten into plowshares;
  — and similar things, around forty in number, as I was informed by one who had held frequent formal disputations with the Jews of today.

Response.
One solution fits all these: they are not to be understood properly but metaphorically; not bodily but spiritually; and thus they have already been partly fulfilled, and are still being fulfilled daily.

In working out this general reply we shall proceed in two steps.

1. First, we will lay down certain postulates, or rather commonly accepted hypotheses, as the groundwork of our proof.

2. Then we will present the proof itself.

Hypothesis 1. The words of Scripture are sometimes to be taken properly, literally, simply, and—where the subject matter requires it—externally or bodily; but sometimes improperly, metaphorically, allegorically, spiritually, or mystically. This diverse mode of understanding sacred text is recognized by the Talmudists and Rabbis, who use the terms: משמע, פשט, כמשמעו, הפשט לפי for the simple and literal sense, and דרש, דרוש, משלי, משל דרוש על for the allegorical and mystical sense. No one who has even glanced at Talmudic and Rabbinic commentaries can be ignorant of this. Therefore I will not prove it further. See the Talmudic formulas about mystical sense in Halichot Olam p. 115, and the very learned dissertation of Constantine l’Empereur prefixed to that book.

Hypothesis 2. Improper, metaphorical, spiritual, or mystical senses are found in historical texts (1 Kings 22; Job 1), in legal reproaches, threats, and exhortations (Hosea 1), in prophecies and promises (Isaiah 11, 19).

Hypothesis 3. The proper, simple, literal sense is to be abandoned, and the improper, spiritual sense embraced, whenever the circumstances of the text will not admit the literal sense, or when—if neither sense is expressly determined—the analogy of Scripture and of faith forbids the former and compels the latter. This can happen in two ways:

• either when the literal sense contains absurdities, contradictions, things repugnant to divine truth, law, nature, or majesty;

• or when it contains things absurd to sense, experience, or the light of right reason.

Thus the Talmudists and Rabbis themselves often, for this reason, abandon the simple and literal sense and adopt the improper, parabolic, allegorical, spiritual, or hyperbolic. See their commentators on Hosea 1; Job 1; 1 Kings 22; Isaiah 11, 13, 19; Ezekiel 47.

Hypothesis 4. Many of the phrases in which the prophecies and promises of the days of the Messiah are expressed must certainly be understood improperly, metaphorically, and spiritually, as is evident from those passages where the same phrases occur in contexts of sacrifice, priesthood, altar, water, etc. (Psalm 50:14; 51:19; Isaiah 12:3 compared with 44:3, 19; 66:20–21; Hosea 14:3).

II. Having laid down these premises, let us now apply them to the controversial texts which the Jews object to us.
Repeating our distinction, and proving both its parts from Scripture, we answer by denying that all those prophecies are to be taken properly and bodily.

1. Because the Jews up to now have not proved—indeed they do not even attempt to prove—from the analogy of the context or of faith that such a sense is required. Yet the burden of proof lies on those who argue.

2. Because they cannot be taken literally. For if all the things predicted concerning the days of the Messiah, his benefits, and the state of the faithful people in the New Testament, must be understood properly and bodily, then all of them must be so understood, nor can any reason for difference be given.
   For example:

• of Levites and priests not only from the tribe of Levi or the family of Aaron, but also from any nation (Isaiah 61:6; 66:20–21);

• of the temple, with a form far different from that which God prescribed (Ezekiel 40–41 vs. 1 Chronicles 28:19);

• of an altar in Egypt (Isaiah 19), although God had chosen only one place (Deuteronomy 12:14);

• of incense and offerings throughout the whole world (Malachi 1:11), not only in the chosen place.

But all these are absurdities and contradictions. In order that such may not be admitted, we must keep the Talmudists’ own rule of interpreting Scripture, which corresponds to one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles of R. Ishmael, collected from the Talmud and published in Latin by the convert Philippus de Aquino in Paris, 1629. Namely: כתובים שני (“two passages of Scripture appear to contradict each other, until a third verse comes and resolves the apparent dispute”). R. Ishmael adds: “The Rabbis hand down that it is impious to suppose that anything in the holy writings is contradictory to itself.”

Therefore, unless we wish to make God and His Word contradictory, we must say: the command of God concerning outward and ceremonial worship was meant to be abolished; but the promises and prophecies concern metaphorical and spiritual worship, which was to be substituted in its place, and which is expressed in the typical or ceremonial language of Old Testament theology and religion. In the writings of the New Testament similar phrases are thus to be expounded (Romans 15; Revelation 1:5–6; Hebrews 13), clearly indicated by distinctive words such as “of God,” “spirit,” “spiritual,” “rational” (John 4:24; 1 Peter 2:4; Romans 12:1; Galatians 6:8; Romans 2:29), or by proper synonyms (Revelation 8:3).

3. Because the Jews themselves, without constraint, recur to the improper and spiritual sense in this very matter. Thus R. Alshech on Haggai 2 says that the temple “to come” (עתיר) will be רוחני (rouchani = spiritual), and its walls “spiritual walls,” meaning that pious men themselves are the chief temple, as he himself says there. Apply this distinction to the temple described by Ezekiel, and you will reconcile the Scriptures. Of this spiritual temple, in which under the New Testament worship is to be given, see John 4:23–24; Ephesians 2:21–22.

Likewise they interpret Isaiah 11:6–7. Maimonides, in Yad Chazakah at the end, says that in the days of the Messiah nothing will be changed in the governance of the world, nor will anything be innovated in the works of creation, and that those sayings of Isaiah 11 are משל וחידות (“allegory and riddle”). And R. David Kimchi, on Isaiah 11, admits that some explain the whole passage as mashal (parable or allegory). Shortly afterwards he himself approves this opinion and adds the reason: “Because the nature of things will not be changed in the days of the Messiah; the lion and bear will seize and eat flesh as they do now.” And this agrees with the Talmud, tract. Shabbat 63a, where R. Samuel is introduced saying: “There is no difference between this age and the days of the Messiah, except that the kingdoms shall be subdued.”

And Malachi 1:11, where incense and the meal-offering are said to be offered everywhere, is interpreted metaphorically of prayers. Thus the Targum: וצלותכון “and your prayers shall be as a pure offering before Me.” Likewise Rashi and Ibn Ezra with their Rabbis interpret it of prayers offered everywhere, which would be accepted by God as incense and the meal-offering. Although they do not apply this place to the days of the Messiah, but elsewhere, still it is enough for us that so many similar examples can be returned upon them, to show that in the disputed places they object to us against the coming of the Messiah, we may do the same as they themselves think lawful in other places. The same reasoning applies to similar cases.

If in one prediction (Isaiah 11:6–7) a spiritual and allegorical sense is admitted, why not also in the later part of the same chapter (vv. 15–16), and in Isaiah 2:2 and 19:18–19, and in Ezekiel 47:12?

By such a distinction we blunt this chief objection of the Jews of today. And we have pursued it at greater length, because it not only refutes the cause of the Jews, but also that of the chiliasts and similar sects, as well as of the Papists, who from Malachi 1 and Hosea 14 argue for an external and literal sacrifice—an argument this distinction utterly overthrows.

As for the special objections by which they try to prove that Jesus of Nazareth is not the Messiah, it is hardly worth the effort to refute them one by one in detail. It will be enough, in general, to point out the method of dealing with such objections.

These objections are of two kinds. The first are those that indirectly attack Jesus by applying to others what properly belongs to Him alone. The second are those that directly and explicitly aim at Him by name.

Regarding the first kind, we must require that they demonstrate that the prophecies in the Old Testament about the Messiah can truly be applied to some specific person. Here all the false Messiahs—if any such ever appeared or were so regarded—must be listed. Those before the destruction of the Temple: Judas the Galilean, Theudas, the magicians and bandits, the Egyptian, and that other who led people into the wilderness (see Josephus, Antiquities Book 20, ch. 11; Wars Book 2, ch. 14). And those after the destruction: Bar Kochba, Moses of Crete (of whom both Jewish and Christian annals, chronicles, and universal histories speak), and Simeon mentioned by Benjamin of Tudela in his Itinerary, p. 93. Let them choose whichever of these they like. But, I suppose, they will not choose any—for they themselves have already exposed them all as impostors.

Nor, I think, will they wish to apply the Messianic prophecies to anyone outside Judaism—for example, to Mani, Muhammad, David George, or other enthusiasts and fanatics of that kind—who, if not all, at least some, ascribed to themselves prophetic functions belonging to the Messiah. Still less would they apply them to the Roman Pontiff (that notable pseudo-Messiah in interpretation), any more than to their own “Armillus” (as they call him).

Nothing, therefore, remains for them but to apply the prophecies to their supposed “Messiah son of Joseph,” who they claim already exists in the world, but is hidden among the lepers of Rome. This fable of a “twofold Messiah” may be seen in Galatinus (De Arcanis, Book 3, ch. 2), in Buxtorf’s Synagoga Judaica, ch. 36, and in Constantinus l’Empereur’s preface to Halichot Olam. But how ill this putrid invention of a double Messiah—one of them ulcerated and leprous, the son of Joseph—agrees with Scripture has been shown by Helvicus, Jacob Martini, and others.

Indeed, the Jews themselves give up this fiction, when they twist Isaiah 53—where this “dual Messiah” is supposed to be found—away to mean Abraham, or Hezekiah, or the people of Israel, as can be seen in Abarbanel’s commentaries (published and refuted by Constantinus l’Empereur).

As for the second class of objections—those directly against the doctrine, life, and gospel history of Jesus Christ—they have been already refuted by Munster, in his notes on the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, against the virulent author of the Nizzachon. And it will be easy to scatter these objections, once the true interpretation, defense, and harmony of the New Testament passages with the Old Testament are set forth.

Here students will find useful the textual notes already indicated elsewhere. If anyone desires more, let him consult the reconcilers (συναλιφανῶν) and interpreters of “difficult” or “apparently inconsistent” passages, among whom Spanheim in his Dubia Evangelica deserves recommendation.

In the explanation and defense of the argument from Genesis 49:10, one may also consult, among the more recent writers, Tarnovius (Biblical Exercises Book 2, p. 545), Amama (Antibarbarus Biblicus, p. 444), Rivetus (Exercises on Genesis, pp. 177–179, especially), and Cartwright, in his selections of Targumic-Rabbinical comments on Genesis 49:10 and in his additions, where this subject is expressly treated.

Besides the authors on Jewish controversies already cited—namely, Munster (in his prolegomena and notes to the Hebrew Matthew), Plessaeus, Broughton, Helvicus, and Jacob Martini—the Hebrew student will profit from reading Munster, Broughton’s Hebrew epistle to Rabbi Abraham Ruben, his tract on the Trinity, and his Hebrew disputation against Rashi and David Kimchi (proposed April 12, 1545, by August Varenius, Professor of Hebrew at Rostock).

To these may be added, for those with leisure, the anonymous amicam disputationem adversus Judaeos (a friendly disputation against the Jews), published in Latin at Amsterdam (as I conjecture) in 1644. Although that author defended nothing against the Jews except what he saw the Socinians and Remonstrants walking hand in hand with them in, so that he omitted the first four questions (which had been proposed by the Jewish disputants)—namely, about the Trinity, about the necessity of faith in the Messiah for remission of sins, about the unity of the Messiah’s person, and about His two natures—still, it may usefully be compared for knowing the arguments of more recent Jews, and the replies made to each question.