(This article series is for the most part simply my notes taken from my study of Dr. Beau Branson's PhD dissertation The Logical Problem of the Trinity, where he gives an analysis to how Gregory of Nyssa works at solving this very problem in his letter Ad Ablabium).
In the 4th century, a bishop named Ablabius wrote to the great church father St. Gregory of Nyssa, asking about how the Trinity is secure against the charge of polytheism. Gregory of Nyssa wrote a very interesting and well-thought response to this question in a treatise now known as "On Not Three Gods". In this article series, I will be examining this treatise and how it provides a solution to the modern problem in the philosophy of religion/analytic theology known as the "Logical Problem of the Trinity" (LPT).
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| St. Gregory of Nyssa |
The question of Ablabius is this: why is it forbidden to say that there are "three gods" when there are three persons (or hypostases) with the same nature (ousia) (in the process of appealing to Peter, James, and John, who though sharing humanity as their same nature, yet are referred to as "three men")?
Gregory first provides a solution, which as he says, does not actually answer the problem at all, and then provides two of his own arguments to explore the issue further (the first of which functions differently than the second). Beau Branson has distinguished them into the "Unity of Nature Argument" (UNA) and the "Unity of Action Argument" (UAA).
St. Gregory of Nyssa's Argumentation
[1]. Unity of Nature Argument - Gregory begins by noting that common everyday language of men can be misleading in certain circumstances (such as when discussing God's nature). Here is the crux of this argument from Gregory himself:
"Now, we first claim that it is a certain misuse of convention to name men, who are not distinguished by nature, in the plural according to the very name of the nature, and to say that there are many ’ men, which is like saying that there are many human natures." (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)
Gregory supports this point by noting that when we address someone, we call them by their proper name (e.g., Peter, James, or John) not by their nature ("man" or "human") since that would result in confusion. Everyone would be thinking that they are the one being addressed, thus this is a clear proof that "nature" (ousia), strictly speaking, is indivisible.
It is necessary to briefly discuss Gregory's view on defining ousia and hypostasis. The patristic scholar Richard Cross argued convincingly that Gregory (as well as Basil) uses ousia synonymously with the word physis ("nature").
Gregory also uses a semantic of collective nouns on a number of occasions in Ad Ablabium. Here is an example of this:
"And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality... [λέγεται . . . μοναχῶς . . . ἐν πλήθει νοεῖται]" (https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2905.htm)
Gregory is saying things similar to the well-known Greek grammarians of his time, Apollonius Dyscolus and Dionysius Thrax.
"There are some words that imply quantity, even though they are singular in form. . . [ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καί τινα ἔστι δι’ ἑνικοῦ χαρακτῆρος πλῆθος ἐμφαίνοντα] " (Apollonius Dyscolus)
It is crucial to note these two passages from St. Basil the Great, which provide an obvious background to Gregory's thinking concerning ousia and hypostasis:
"ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as the common has to the particular. Every one of us both shares in existence by the common term of essence (ousia) and by his own properties is such an one and such an one. In the same manner, in the matter in question, the term ousia is common, like goodness, or Godhead, or any similar attribute; while hypostasis is contemplated in the special property of Fatherhood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify" (Basil, Letter 214)
"The distinction between ousia and hupostasis is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith. We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding the particular to the common. The Godhead is common; the fatherhood particular. We must therefore combine the two and say, I believe in God the Father. The like course must be pursued in the confession of the Son; we must combine the particular with the common and say I believe in God the Son, so in the case of the Holy Ghost we must make our utterance conform to the appellation and say in God the Holy Ghost." (Basil, Letter 236)
"In other words, what it seems to me that Gregory is doing is leaving points 1 and 3 of this perhaps then-common picture in place, and merely rejecting 2 – the collective theory of universals – and replacing it, as Cross has argued, with a theory of an in re universal that is monadic (not divisible into “parts”) and which is “wholly present” in each of its particulars. Then he simply draws the obvious conclusion that all nouns signifying natures (including “man”) are always to be used in the singular (just as “army” would be in the example above). Read in this light, Gregory’s argument seems to make much more sense. In the first sentence below, he finishes making his metaphysical point about whether universals are indivisible monads or divisible collections. In the second sentence, he goes on to point out the linguistic fact that there are collective nouns such that, semantically they indicate a collection of individuals, but their correct syntactic form is nevertheless singular." (Beau Branson)
St. Gregory views "is God" as signifying an activity or operation (energeiai).
"For now, though, we’ve seen that for Gregory “God” is not a kind term, but an agent noun. Thus, although Gregory can and does enter into debates that assume “God” is a kind term like “man,” his actual view is that it is more like “rhetorician” or “shoemaker” " (Beau Branson)
It is likely that Gregory changed his view on this at some point in his life. Before he wrote Ad Ablabium, Gregory wrote Ad Graecos, where he said quite clearly that "God" does signify the divine ousia, however even there Gregory modifies his meaning as Branson explains:
"So, even here, although he goes along with the idea that “God” signifies the ousia, he allows that it does so only by way of signifying that ousia’s “natural idioma” – the energeia of “beholding” – and in turn the energeia itself “signifies” the ousia. Now, whatever the nature of this “signification” going on between an energeia and an ousia (presumably something like the way in which smoke – naturally – “means” fire), it seems clear that, even in Ad Graecos, Gregory takes it that the primary signification of “God” is actually the energeia of “beholding." (Beau Branson)
This idea is seen prior to Gregory in earlier fathers of the church:
"But to the Father of all, who is unbegotten there is no name given. For by whatever name He be called, He has as His elder the person who gives Him the name. But these words Father, and God, and Creator, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but appellations derived from His good deeds and functions" (Justin Martyr, Second Apology, Chapter 6)
We should note that many of the presuppositions of the UNA are not accepted by Gregory himself. This is shown quite clearly by the fact that Gregory does not end with the UNA, showing that he doesn't view it as the ultimate answer to Ablabius' question.
"Gregory argues, even if “God” did not signify an energeia (beholding), it still could not denote the divine essence (as his opponents claim), because the divine essence is “above all names,” and “God” is a name." (Beau Branson)
What then is the role of the UNA in Gregory's argument? It essentially functions as a back-up argument, so that even if Gregory were wrong about "Godhead" being a signification of the energeiai, then his main point, that there is only one God, is still maintained, since there is obviously only one divine nature.
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| The Role of UNA in St. Gregory's Argument (Branson, pg. 150) |
One last concept helpful to understand here is that of the idiomata.
"Gregory takes the idiomata to be what individuates the hypostases" (Branson)
"But note also the role of idiomata here. We are told that each of us individuals “participates in existence by the common logos of the ousia,” i.e., we exist only in virtue of instantiating our essence or nature. Thus, on Basil’s view, and Gregory would certainly follow him here, there cannot be any hypostasis that does not have an ousia or nature." (Branson)
We should also discuss Gregory's letter to his brother Peter (hereafter Ad Petrum) where he discusses in more detail the distinction between ousia and hypostasis. This letter is also given the attribution of Letter 38 of Basil. There are a few things to note on this letter:
[1]. Much of the letter's discussion is reminiscent of the Stoic discussions about common and proper nouns, which as we will see, is the background for Gregory's way of defining ousia and hypostasis. "the Stoics defined proper nouns by way of idiomata. For the Stoics, a common noun “signifies” a common quality, and a proper noun “indicates,” not, as we might expect, an individual, but a peculiar quality (ἰδία ποιότης)." (Branson)
"There is some scholarly debate as to whether the Stoic idiomata are simple, non-shareable qualities (like Socrateity), or whether they are only unique combinations of in-principle shareable qualities (like the combination of whiteness, snub-nosedness, and so forth, that is only exhibited by Socrates, even though any of these qualities taken by itself might be exhibited by other individuals). (Sorabji, for example, maintains the stronger view, that for the Stoics each distinguishing mark is unique to the individual.) I will not enter into the details of that debate here. I only want to note that there is a case to be made that the Stoics take this stronger view of idiomata. And to the extent that Gregory’s discussion seems influenced by the Stoics, or by the grammarians (particularly Apollonius, in my opinion), we might reasonably conjecture that he would hold this stronger view."
"What is important for our purposes is that idiomata are part of the Stoic criterion of individuation for particulars." (Branson)
[2]. "where individuals differ in their individual definitions, Gregory speaks of their differing with respect to idiomata, which seem to be either qualities or bundles of qualities that individuate an individual" (Branson)
"In Ad Petrum, Gregory says quite explicitly that the idiomata of the Trinity are neither shareable nor even compossible (i.e., not constantiable), so that the relation between hypostases and idiomata is neither one-to-many nor many-to-one, but one-to-one. This seems similar to Stoicism. For the Stoics, for an idioma to be shared by two material substrata would simply be for numerically one qualified individual to subsist in two different material substrata at the same time, i.e., to be bi-located – which they regarded as absurd. Conversely, for two distinct idiomata to be instantiated in the same material substratum would just be for two distinct qualified individuals to be co-located – also an absurdity in the Stoics’ view. This might be taken as good evidence that Gregory has in mind the stronger view of idiomata after all." (Branson)
Two Views on How Hypostases are Individuated
1) " An idioma is an element of a bundle, and each idioma in the bundle is, by itself, sufficient to individuate a hypostasis." (Branson)
2) "An idioma is an element of a bundle, but only the bundle as a whole is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. (Idiomata themselves, individually, are actually in-principle shareable qualities.)"
However, the argument which Gregory puts the most amount of emphasis on in his defense of Trinitarian theology is the Unity of Action Argument (UAA), which is what we will now our turn our attention to in the next article in the series.
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