What is "the Will"?
-“The faculty of the will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing"
The Determination of the Will
-The will’s resolving upon a certain course of action is an effect, whose cause is a motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest
-That is, all motives have a “degree of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the will excited”. This previous tendency is what gives a motive to its strength. The previous tendency or strength of a motive comes from “many things appertaining to (1) the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, (2) the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and (3) the degree and manner of its view.”
-When one motive, existing in the understanding, emerges as the most inviting, then the will decides to send the appropriate signals for the mind to think, and/or the muscles to act, to attain that goal so as to have that greater joy or lesser pain that was just promised by the strongest motive in the understanding.
The Meaning of the Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inablity, and Contingency
-The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome, or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is impossible that it should not be.
-"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent, or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and besides our design and scope."
-"Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent, or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and besides our design and scope."
The Distinction Between Natural and Moral Necessity
-Natural necessity is “such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements”
-Moral Necessity is “that necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from . . . moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions"
Liberty and Moral Agency
-Liberty is "the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases."
-"A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishments; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty."
The Inconsistency of the Concept of the Will's Self-Determining Power
-"Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts the soul determines them in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or, which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts, by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the will is self-determined: that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the will, choosing that. Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom: but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently."
Can Volitions be Uncaused?
-Isaac Watts believed that while volitions within material objections are caused (due to being passive), while spirits (immaterial things) can spontaneously generate choices (due to being active).
-To this JE objected that the same mere potential or dormant activity that conceivably might exist in the soul cannot explain the great variety of acts performed by the soul. It is not possible, JE argued, that “the same cause, the same causal power, force or influence, without variation in any respect, would produce different effects at different times” (31.6).
The Great Inconsistency in the Arminian Scheme
-"In their attempt to understand the will as sovereign, the Arminians are faced with an inconsistency in whichever way they go. If they say every act of the will must result from a foregoing choice, then there can be no first act in the will which initiates the action, for a first act could not stem from a prior choice. But if they say the will acts without choice, then “this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the will’s determining its own acts"
Does the Will Act out of Indifference?
The idea of the willing choosing one thing over another (a core element within the libertarian notion of free will), while being indifferent is self-contradictory.
"For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no preference."
Even if there were evidence that the will acts out of indifference, it would not provide any support for the Arminian insistence that the will has liberty in that it determines its own actions, and that apart from any prior bias or dictate of the understanding. It is impossible to speak of the soul’s choosing “one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent in respect to each!” (42.7). Were action to arise directly out of a state of indifference, then “the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free will have no hand in the determination of the act” (44.3).
Liberty of Will and the Notion of Necessity Are Not Contradictory
Since volitional acts come to pass, they have a cause, and if something is truly the effect of a cause, then it is so by necessity, “for dependence on the influence of a thing is the very notion of effect”
Acts of the Will Connect With Dictates of Understanding
-Contrary to the Arminian supposition, all acts of the will stem by necessity from what appears as the greatest apparent good. When men “do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them” (48.3). If the will does not act by necessity from the last dictate of the understanding, then “in vain are all applications to the understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever . . .”
Volition Is Necessarily Connected with the Influence of Motives
"That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary connexion with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connexion and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the Will whatsoever is excited by some motive: which is manifest, because, if the mind, in willing after the manner it does, is excited by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seeks nothing, then it does not go after any thing, or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing, Which brings the matter to a contradiction; because for the mind to will something, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing."
God's Foreknowledge of the Volitions of Moral Agents
"From pages 61 through 73 JE argues that God’s omniscience includes certain knowledge of all the volitional acts of all men who will ever inhabit the earth. That the Bible makes predictions about what will happen in the future and tells how human history will end, is possible only because God knows the end from the beginning"
God's Certain Foreknowledge of Future Actions Shows They are Necessary
"The proposition upheld in this section is that if God truly knows all the tings that will happen, then their future existence is something of necessity and is free from contingency. “If future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event [as a prediction of it], then the future existence of that event is necessary” (78.4). God could have no knowledge of the existence of contingent events. In that they were contingent, they might never happen, and that would mean that existence could never be predicated of them. Consequently, knowledge of them would be impossible. This necessity by which all events, past and future, happen is necessarily implied by God’s omniscience. “If the foreknowledge [of an event] be absolute, this proves the event known to be necessary . . . either by decree, or some other way . . .” (77.4). It should be noted that only God’s omniscience regarding precisely what will happen makes the existence of all future happenings a necessity. Nothing about God’s decrees need be said to insure the certainty of all that will happen. Since few Arminians would want to deny God’s omniscience, therefore they should not regard the necessity of a future event’s happening as standing in the way of men’s freedom."
How the Arminian Notion of the Will’s Liberty Makes Every Act of the Will Necessary
Only now he (JE) adds a further difficulty to the Arminian scheme by arguing that if the will determines all of its own free acts, then each subsequent act is determined by necessity from each preceding act. But then if the Arminian tries to say that the acts of the will have no cause, then all liberty of the will is lost because each act then happens purely by contingency and through no choice. All would be well if the Arminian would admit that “human liberty is such that it may well stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding, and so is consistent with necessity” (83.1). But if they deny that the will acts by necessity from the last dictate of the understanding, then they must say that the will may act “without the least connection with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of reason” (83.4). But if the will acts with such “wild contingence” (83.5), then all dignity that men have attached to the concept of freedom vanishes.
God's Moral Excellence is Necessary, But Still Praiseworthy
"If Arminians praise God, even though he acts virtuously by necessity from the goodness of his nature, then they should not affirm that if people also act by similar necessity, they cannot be praised or blamed for what they do."
Scripture Regards Fallen Men As Given Up to Sin, Yet Still Blameworthy
Whitby acknowledges the existence of those whom God has given over to sin (Psalm 81:12), and concedes that these find it “exceedingly difficult” (95.8) not to sin. And so on his reasoning, “the nearer the difficulty [of avoiding sin] approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness, in proportion to that approach” (96.2). To avoid this problem Arminians often affirm that God does not hold fallen, sinful men accountable to live up to the full demands of the law, but since Christ atoned for all our ability to live up to the perfect law, we are responsible to obey only a “new law which requires no more than imperfect, sincere obedience, in compliance with our poor infirm impotent circumstances since the fall” (97.10). But, JE objects, if our servitude to sin removes us from responsibility to live up to the full law, then it would be pointless for Christ to atone for our failure to obey the full law, for in the Arminian scheme there can be no responsibility for failure to do what we have no inclination for by nature (98.3). Arminians also speak of God’s grace as being necessary to enable fallen man to obey even that milder, “new law” that God holds them responsible to obey. But JE objects that since this grace, then, must overcome what would otherwise be fallen man’s inability to obey even this milder law, this grace would fulfill no real need, since fallen man would already by exonerated by the mere fact that he could not obey, without divine assistance, even this milder law.
How Commands to Obedience Are Consistent with Moral Inability
"So moral inability is the willingness to be good or do right, which is the aim of all commands. In fact, the very existence of commands necessarily implies the rather prevalent existence of moral inability to obey them. If people always preferred to do the right and the good, then commands would be unnecessary. So while commands are always directed toward people who are not physically impeded from obeying them (no one holds a cripple responsible to chase down a bank robber), yet the very existence of commands enforced by sanctions means that there is a rather prevalent unwillingness, a moral inability, to do what is best for the society in which one lives, for oneself in the long run. Therefore “moral inability alone (which consists in disinclination rather than some physical incapacity) never renders anything improperly the subject-matter of precept or command, and never can excuse any person in disobedience . . . to a command” (104.2). Only “natural inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or external hindrance (which alone is properly called inability) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of command” (104.2)."
Virtue Cannot Arise from Indifference
In the Arminian scheme, indifference is essential to its notion of liberty and moral agency. But the trouble with this is that indifference is just one step short of a good disposition and right next door to an evil one. Indifference stands midway between an evil disposition and a good one. Then too, Arminians must say that virtuous acts which arise from a state of complete indifference do so only because of some accident that causes preference to replace indifference. But acts that arise from contingency, or accident, can’t be regarded as praise- or blameworthy, any more than rocks are blame- or praiseworthy because they happen to have snakes under them (114.9). So the Arminian notion of “indifference,” like their notion of sincerity, is incompatible with moral agency.
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