In Ordinatio, Book I, dist. 8, question 4 - John Duns Scotus poses the following question, which has been the occasion of much dispute and strife amongst the scholastics: “Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections preceding the Act of the Intellect?”
It is first of all crucial to note that Duns Scotus firmly holds to the firm and absolute simplicity of God’s essence. The attributes are really identical to each other, and really identical to the essence. “But each attribute contains the divine essence according to every notion of ideal perfection." (Ordinatio I, dist. 8, q. 4, n. 6)
After discussing and refuting the views of Henry of Ghent and his commentators, Scotus gives his own solution, introducing the formal distinction:
“So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing – but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing. The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which ‘grade’ however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 8, q. 4, n. 192)
What Scotus is saying is that formalities apply on the general scale to both infinite and finite being. If the attributes have formal identity in God, then they have identity in general which could be applied to creatures. Wisdom and goodness have different definitions, and it is this which proves a formal distinction between them:
“But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect, when combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not, by its collative act, cause the truth of this proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.” (ibid., n. 193)
“I say that in the divine essence, prior to the act of the intellect, there is entity A and there is entity B, and this [one] is not formally that [one], such that the paternal intellect, considering A and considering B, has from the nature of the thing the basis for this composition to be true: A is not formally B — not, however, merely from some act of the intellect concerning A and B.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 7, n. 44)
In order to clear many of the complex difficulties which surround the doctrine of the formal distinction, it is most profitable for us to see how Scotus understands formal identity, and the concept of “formalities” (or rationes) more broadly. In terms of the first concept, it is “wherein something said to be the same includes that to which it is the same in its formal ratio, and therefore, primarily and per se.” (Ordinatio I, dist. 2, q. 7, n. 44).
“Formal identity, according to this definition, is found between two things of which one is the definition, or a part of the definition, of the other.” (Maurice J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics [Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1944], pg. 34)
A common attack and misunderstanding made against the formal distinction is that it is equivalent in function to a distinctio realis. Thus, many insisted that the Council of Rheims’ condemnation of Gilbert de la Poree (1148) for teaching a real distinction between essence and person in God would presumably extend to cover Scotus’ teaching as well. However, it is crucial to note that the formal distinction, while not being the same as a merely conceptual distinction, is one which is not unrelated to created intellects as such:
“More important perhaps is the fact that Scotus calls the distinction one of reason (distinctio rationis). This fact alone should make it clear that he did not claim the nonidentity in question could be defined or described apart from some reference to an intellect. If no intellect could exist, there would be no formal distinction. While Scotus insists the distinction is prior to the act of thinking (and hence is not created by the mind), he never says it is prior to the possibility of thought. Indeed, the possibility of knowing (which is one way of describing the intellect) and the possibility of being known (which is another way of saying "formality") are correlative terms. Each entails the other. Neither is logically nor ontologically prior, but they are technically simul natura.” (Allan B. Wolter, “The Formal Distinction,” in John Duns Scotus: 1265-1965, ed. John K. Ryan & Bernadine M. Bonansea [Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2018], pg. 52)
What does Scotus mean when he speaks of “formalities” or ratio? This is aptly and thoroughly discussed by Dr. Grajewski. As we have seen above, it is closely tied to the concept of definitions, and it forms the backbone for the formal distinction to begin with. A diversity of definitions entails a diversity of formalities. In this context, “definition” is referring to the quidditative concept which expresses a thing’s conceivability, not to statements of genus and difference.
For starters, formalities are not to be confused with forms. Though they both are “inhering” in their subjects, formalities are really identical with their subjects, while the form is not.
Secondly, a formality is not a being of reason (ens rationis). It is true that formalities are only known by an act of the intellect, but they are not a product of the mind. It is not a “thing” (res), but “of the thing” (rei). “I concede that the essence contains all actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as formally the same, because then it would contain [them] univocally.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 5, 448a)
“I say that in man, for example, in reality there are two metaphysical realities or formalities, namely animality and rationality, between which a formal distinction exists, which cannot be called two entities, because thing and entity in metaphysical rigor import that which has its own essence and existence directly and primarily, and is the term of physical causality in created things; but formality is said to be that which exists and is outside of nothing not by reason of itself and directly, but only indirectly, by reason namely of that of which they are something, not in any way in the manner of a part, in which way matter and form are said to be something of the composite, but it is something of the thing through identity, insofar as it is some grade as it were metaphysical of the integral and total essence of the thing.” (Bartholomew Mastri, Disputationes theologicae [Venetiis: Pezzana, 1757], Vol. 1, disp. II, q.1, art. 2)
A formality is an objective ratio which is really identical with the thing in which it exists. It is included in the essential definition of that thing, and its quiddity exists independently of the created intellect:
“Because to include formally is to include something in its essential notion, such that if the definition of the includer were assigned, the included would be the definition or a part of the definition. But just as the definition of goodness in general does not contain wisdom within itself, so neither does the infinite [contain] infinite [things, formally]. Therefore, there is some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as their definitions would be distinct, if they were definable. But a definition not only indicates a notion caused by the intellect, but the quiddity of the thing; therefore, there is no formal identity on the part of the thing.” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 8, q. 4, n. 18)
It is not just with the divine attributes and essence that Scotus employs his formal distinction. He also uses it in reference to the transcendentals and metaphysical grades of being. In terms of a more concrete and easy-to-understand example, it would be the formal distinction between animality and rationality in the nature of man. Though these two formalities are one identical reality in man, it is obvious that there are distinct concepts and rationes, since brutes have animality without rationality, and angels (separate substances) possess rationality and intellect but not animality. Scotus says that this is a clear-cut case of a formal distinction.
As is commonly the case with the Subtle Doctor, his opinions and views are made further clear by his later followers, particularly Cresenctius Krisper and Bartholomew Mastrius. It is the latter whom we bring in here to continue to understand the defense that exists for the formal distinction.
“The formal distinction ex natura rei is what was distinguished above from a distinction of reason, which is made by the intellect. It is that which exists between multiple formalities of the same thing, which are rooted in the same physical entity, and identified in being. Such a formality is called an objective formal ratio, and is conceptible in itself. Therefore, those things are said to be formally distinct according to the nature of the thing which have different formalities or conceptible reasons, such that in defining each, the adequate objective concept of one is not the same as the other.” (Bartholomew Mastri, Cursus Philosophicus in Quinque Tomos Distributus: Tomus Primus [Venice, Nicolaum Pezzana, 1757], d. 1, q. 5, art. 2, pg. 97)
There is a twofold formal distinction: actual and virtual.
[1]. Actual formal distinction - “occurs between multiple formalities which exist in the same physical thing actually, not merely virtually. They have diverse conceptible reasons prior to any operation of the intellect.” (Bartholomew Mastri, Cursus Philosophicus in Quinque Tomos Distributus: Tomus Primus, pg. 97). Examples: divine attributes in God, the powers of the human soul
[2]. Virtual formal distinction - As is clear from the name ascribed to it, this distinction occurs between formalities that contained virtually, and not actually. “This gives occasion for the intellect to form multiple inadequate concepts from the same object. Thus, the intellect actually distinguishes formalities that were only virtually distinct before.” (Mastri). Example: The powers of heat and drying are virtually contained in the sun in a single eminent power. The intellect distinguishes through an abstraction of concepts.
It is crucial to note that a definition (something we are chiefly concerned with here) expresses a thing as it is in reality, and not merely its conception by the intellect.
Affirmation and negation are the basis for contradictions, and contradictions in turn are part of the basis for a distinction. Hence, when there is a formal and actual contradiction, there must be some formal distinction. A virtual/eminent multiplicity in the thing (which Cajetan and other Thomists assert) is not sufficient to remove the contradiction, otherwise actual contradictions would be verified of the same thing in the same respect.
“A contradiction always implies a distinction between what it is predicated of, and it implies a distinction of the same type: if it's a contradiction of reason, it implies a rational distinction; if it's real, it implies a real one. Therefore, an actual contradiction implies an actual distinction, not merely a virtual one.” (Mastri)
“Contradiction is based on distinction, and multiple things pertain according to the principle of distinction. Hence, if affirmation and negation are formally and simply found in divine matters, this cannot be due to virtual distinction alone, since this is not a proper distinction and formal, but only equivalent. This is further clarified by the fact that contradiction follows the nature of its foundation, and so it is preserved in some nature as it is found in the foundation. Since an effect cannot exceed its cause in perfection, if its foundation, which is distinction, is found in some nature only virtually and according to some aspect, then contradiction cannot be formally and simply found there. Therefore, as mentioned above, distinction of reason cannot be the basis for real contradiction, but only of reason. Similarly, distinction of virtuality cannot be the basis for formal and actual contradiction from the nature of the thing, but only for virtual contradiction.” (Bartholomew Mastri, Disputationes theologicae [Venetiis: Pezzana, 1757], Vol. 1, disp. II, q.1, art. 2)
Furthermore, without the formal distinction, we don’t seem to have any mechanism to avoid such absurd conclusions as “God punishes through His mercy”, which both Thomists and Scotists would reject. This is because the attributes are each formally included in the concept of the other, and therefore, there is no way to avoid such a conclusion with only a virtual distinction.
“Moreover it follows that one attribute can be predicated of another in the abstract, not only by identical and real predication, but also quidditative and formal, and thus it could be said, that the wisdom of God is formally the goodness of God, and that divine justice is formally divine mercy; and consequently to these propositions these others would also be true; intellect loves, will understands, God through justice has mercy and spares, through mercy punishes and chastises; indeed these propositions would not only be true on the part of the thing, but also through intellect in the opposite opinion, because however inadequately we conceive these attributes always one is formally included in the concept of the other at least implicitly.” (ibid.)
The Scotistic “Achilles” Argument:
If, prior to any act of the intellect, x is communicable and y is incommunicable, then x and y are distinct prior to any act of the intellect.
Prior to any act of the intellect, the divine essence is communicable and paternity is incommunicable.
Therefore, the divine essence and paternity are distinct prior to any act of the intellect.
Thomists have differed in their responses to this Scotist argument. Waldrop and Lamantia both argue that these rebuttals generally are either theological or philosophical dead ends and non-starters. For example, Cajetan went so far as to seemingly accept the possibility of true contradictions in God (the same identical thing being both communicable and incommunicable): “For from this, that there is one ratio in itself, it does not follow, ‘there it is only communicable or it is only incommunicable:’ but it remains that it is both communicable and incommunicable.” (Cardinal Cajetan, Commentary on the Summa Q. 39, art. 1 VIII). For Cajetan, these contradictories can both be present in an unlimited formal ratio. Similarly, Rodrigo de Arriga said that the virtual distinction “consists precisely in this, that two predicates of themselves contradictory really and truly agree with the same indivisible entity and with one real formality.” (Arriaga, Cursus Theologicus d. 42, sect. 1, n. 6-8)
Cajetan also argues that the formal distinction would be greater than a real distinction, since it distinguishes according to the most intimate of the thing, namely its formal notion (Commentary on Being and Essence, ch. 6, q. 13, sect. 114). Hence he believes it would compromise the divine simplicity. As we have seen already, Scotists such as Mastri argue that the formal distinction does not suffice to posit any sort of metaphysical composition.
The scholastic theologian John Poncius (1603-1661) came up with a different scheme to answer Cajetan’s objection. For him, there is only an imperfect union of formalities; this union involves metaphysical composition when there is dependence on an external cause. Since the identity between attributes and essence does not involve any sort of this dependence, there is no composition in God. However Mastri goes against Poncius, saying that the identity of two things depends not so much on any “external cause”, but rather on their formal reasons. The external cause does not impact whether or not there is composition in the thing itself.
“Anything that is composed has its origin in part because it lacks the perfection of the thing from which it is composed. However, it is inconceivable for the infinite, which is the most complete of all, to lack any perfection and adopt a ratio of one part to another. Therefore, the immediate deduction of divine simplicity is not a result of independence but of infinity.” (Scholastic Renaissance)
Jean Baptiste Gonet says that the divine essence has both absolutely and relative rationes (respectively). He would therefore use a reduplication strategy to avoid the Scotistic Achilles. In my humble estimation, the most interesting Thomistic responses come from John of St. Thomas and Pedro de Godoy (1599–1677), the latter of whom will be quoted here:
“The fact that the divine entity is at once communicable under one aspect, and under another aspect incommunicable, while remaining really indistinct, arises from its perfection and infinity…To say that contradictory propositions can truly be asserted of essence and paternity does not require a rational distinction between one entity and another, but that one and the same entity, though indivisible by reason, can be considered under diverse offices or functions. That is, it can be in the Son under the office of essence, but not under the office of paternity—thus, the Son is God but not the Father. The same is to be said of the other relations: namely, for the Father to be God and not the Son, the entity and formality, although indivisible by reason as essence and filiation, is in the Father under the office of essence, but not under the office of filiation.” (Pedro de Godoy, Disputationes theologicae in primam partem divi Thomae: Tomus Primus, pg. 94)
Aristotle said that a contradiction applies when it is of the same, concerning the same, and according to the same. I do not see how Godoy’s explanation fails to meet these three criteria: “affirmation and negation cannot be said of one and the same thing under the same aspect; therefore, wherever affirmation and negation are applied, a distinction must exist. The minor is proved: Essence is affirmed of the Son under the notion of entity, but paternity is denied of the Son under the same notion. Therefore, affirmation and negation apply to essence and paternity under the notion of entity.” (Pedro de Godoy)
It is this notion of the entity that is God performing different “roles” or “offices” which is somewhat surprising to see from a Thomist theologian. Now, all the orthodox agree that what can be affirmed of the divine essence can be denied of the Person(s), and vice versa, despite the real identity between essence and person in God. Thus we can say that the essence is unbegotten and ungenerate, while the Son is (contra Eunomius). However, it is unusual to say that the essence is both communicable and incommunicable, and that it does so by performing different roles. As far as I know, Godoy does not elaborate on this curious terminology.
The following are some of the most significant Thomist arguments against the formal distinction, along with their Scotist responses:
[1]. “If they [divine attributes] are distinguished by a real formal distinction, a real formal composition will result from them…Composition is the union of distinct things: Therefore, just as the union of distinct things by a real entitative distinction is a real entitative composition; so too, the union of distinct things by a real formal distinction is a real formal composition….For the definition of composition is that it is the union of distinct things: Therefore true composition only requires distinction, and the union of extremes, not necessarily requiring that they be compared among themselves by way of act and potency.” (Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae, pg. 76) Notice in the last part here that Gonet claims that distinction simpliciter suffices for composition. If so, this would argue just as much against a virtual distinction as it would against Scotus’ formal distinction!
Scotist Response: Distinction can indeed entail composition, but only when it is a distinctio realis. A real distinction in turns excludes real identity, the lack of which is required for a thing to be composed (properly speaking), and the presence of which entails absolute simplicity. Since the Scotists posit the real identity of the divine essence and attributes, this excludes a real distinction, but not a formal distinction. Furthermore, may not this same reasoning be used against the virtual distinction of the Thomists? Does that not lead to a virtual or eminent composition in God?
[2]. “By the very fact that the divine essence is posited as really formally distinct from the attributes, it is posited as formally actualizable and perfectible by them: Therefore it is compared to them as potency to act, and perfectible to perfective; hence although this comparison would be necessary for true composition, this would not prevent there being composition in God…if it cannot subsist with real formal composition, it cannot stand with real formal distinction either.” (Jean Baptiste-Gonet, Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae, pg. 76)
Scotist Response: The relation of potentiality to act (such as is found between genus and difference) comes from their imperfect real identity, not from any formal distinction. When there is real identity, this entails pure actuality — since nothing can be in potency to itself. Just how the soul is said to “inform” the body denominatively, but when the soul is considered in relation to the whole human composite, it is an essential “part” of the composite and is not conceived under the notion of a substantial form. Thus, the divine essence can be formally distinct by wisdom without being informed or actualized by it.
[3]. “A third reason is drawn from the infinity of God and the nature of the purest act. The formal reason of divine essence, and of each attribute, is no less infinitely simple than its entity: hence just as the uncreated entity of God, because it is infinitely simple, seeks to really identify itself with every perfection and entity that does not imply imperfection in its concept; so too does the divine formality, by the same reason of infinity, demand formal identity with divine relations and attributes..” (Clypeus theologiae Thomisticae, pg. 77)
Scotist Response: It is enough by the reason of God’s infinity for there to be that real essential identity between essence and attributes. It is not required that there be a formal identity between quidditative concepts. “Although real infinity, by its formal definition, identifies anything that is compatible with itself because it repels having the nature of a part with another part, and thus constitutes with anything compatible with itself one whole in the totality of identity, yet it does not formally identify within itself the perfections simply as such, which it contains identically.” (Bartholomew Mastri)
[4]. If the attributes are not formally identical to each other and to the divine essence, it follows that God could conceive Himself (through His knowledge of simple intelligence) as being without one of His perfections, which is contrary to His nature.
Scotist Response: There are two types of knowledge: quidditative knowledge, which pertains to essential predicates, and comprehensive knowledge, which deals with both essential and formal aspects. God’s simple comprehensive knowledge extends to both His primary (quidditative) and secondary perfections (qualitative). Furthermore, the formal distinction only allows for a precise abstraction, not for a divisive conception. The divine intellect is perfect and comprehends all things in one simple and eternal act, making it impossible for Him to conceive of one attribute without the others.
Francisco Suarez admits a type of intermediate distinction, but declines to call it “formal” (On the Various Types of Distinctions, trans. Cyril Vollert, [Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1947], pg. 27). He prefers to call it a “distinction from the nature of the case” or a “modal distinction.” The reason why is that a “formal distinction” is of wider extension and could easily be confused with a major real distinction. Suarez even says that it is permissible to speak of paternity and filiation as formally distinct, since they differ in “the objective notions of their relations.” (On the Various Types of Distinctions, pg. 27).
Scotist Argument: Things that differ ex natura rei differ in definition, even if they are entitatively the same. But the attributes differ in definition from one another and from the essence, while remaining entitatively the same. Therefore, they differ ex natura rei; and consequently, by a real formal distinction.
Thomist Response: “If the things differ by adequate definition of their nature in itself, I grant the major. If they differ only as conceived by us, I deny the major; and I likewise deny the consequence under the same distinction. For intellect and will can be defined in two ways: [1]. By a definition given as they are in themselves, known by God or perhaps the blessed. [2]. By a definition given as we conceive of them imperfectly and through foreign species. If they are defined in the first way, the same definition applies. From which it does not follow that they are distinguished by a real formal distinction prior to our intellect’s act, because our definitions refer to how we conceive of them, not to how they are in themselves…For such a definition, it is sufficient that it be matched with the essence of the defined thing, not as it is in itself, but as it is imperfectly conceived by us…For in order for them to be essentially really distinct, it would be necessary that the definitions be distinct and each adequately matched. ” (Pedro de Godoy, Disputationes theologicae in primam partem divi Thomae: Tomus Primus [Venice: Antonii Zatta, 1763], pgs. 88-89)
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