In proceeding to a disputation concerning the civil punishment of heretics, and whether it be lawful or no, it behooves us to begin with a delineation of the precise nature of the human conscience and the liberty thereof, understood in its true and proper sense, against the cavils of the Libertines and Anabaptists.
The Hebrew term used for conscience, commonly rendered as “heart”, is לֵבָב. “And David’s heart smote him.” (2 Samuel 24:10); “The king said moreover to Shimei, Thou knowest all the wickedness which thine heart is privy to.” (1 Kings 2:44). Though the term “heart” is used, the more proper meaning is in reference to the inner mind, will, and understanding of man. לֵבָב is constantly used to denote the inner man in contrast to the external man (Deuteronomy 30:14; 1 Samuel 16:7; Joel 2:13).
Rutherford defines conscience simply as “knowledge with a witness” (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience, pg. 2). However, this type of knowledge is not identified with the whole faculty of man’s understanding, but rather in specific relation to his moral acts and relation toward God and man.
“Conscience is considered by Divines as a principle of our acting in order to what the Lord commands us in the Law and the Gospel; and it cometh here to be considered,in a three-fold consideration. 1. As Conscience is in its abstract nature; yet as it is in man only, I speak nothing of the conference of Angels, and Devils. 2. As the Conscience is good or bad; for the conscience in Adam, before the fall was in a great perfection, and the Glorified spirits carry a good conscience up to heaven with them, as the damned take to hell a piece of hell within them, an evil conscience, yet there was neither in Adam, nor can there be in the Glorified, an evil conscience, nor any ſuch accidental acts of Conscience, as to accuse, smite, torment. 3. Conscience is considered as acting well or ill, it hath influence on the affections, to cause a feast of joy, to stir up to faith, hope, sadness.” (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience, pg. 3)
In our study of the conscience, we may consider 1) its nature; 2) its object; and 3) its office.
[1]. Nature - Conscience is neither an act or habit, but rather a power of the practical understanding according to which a man is obliged to pass judgment on himself concerning his state and condition, actions, desires, and words. Note that it is not a distinct faculty from the understanding, but rather the understanding in so far as it gives judgment. It does not seem correct to speak of the conscience as an inclination of the will, since Scripture describes it as a knowing power (Ecclesiastes 7:22), which the will does not do.
[2]. Object - The object of conscience is God’s revealed will to us in both Tables of the Moral Law. This would also include natural law.
[3]. Office - Conscience is similar to the speculative understanding in that it has a discursive nature to it. It may apprehend moral truths about God and Christ, and then that He requires obedience of, that Christ is the only Savior, etc. There are two sorts of operations of conscience, some a) illicit and b) commanded. Illicit acts of conscience are things such as to discern, direct, and excite.
The Toleration of False Religions and Heretical Sects
The law of the Old Testament was explicit and clear in what was to be done to false prophets and those who attempted to seduce the Israelites away from the worship of the true God into idolatry and whoredom: “If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, 2 And the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; 3 Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul. 4 Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and ye shall serve him, and cleave unto him. 5 And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in. So shalt thou put the evil away from the midst of thee.” (Deuteronomy 13:1-5)
Here we must recognize the distinction between positive and negative coercion. The Magistrate may never use the sword to attempt to bring unbelievers into the faith. "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal." (2 Corinthians 10:4).
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| A good example of the terrible consequences of giving too much power to the State in religious matters |
“If a Christian Prince subdue a Pagan nation, he cannot force them with the sword to a positive receiving of the doctrine of the gospel, but if it be a nation expressly blaspheming Christ, as the nation of the Jews now do, he may compel them to an abstinence from a professed blaspheming of Christ, because he is to use the sword against blasphemy.” (Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries, Pt. 2, sect. 1, ch. 6, q. 2)
Darius made laws against the blasphemy of the God of Israel (Daniel 3:29). Emperor Constantine enacted the closure of pagan temples. King Ferdinand of Spain expelled the Jews who would not become Christians.
If a nation generally embraces the Christian faith, then Magistrates may compel them to profess the truth sworn in baptism (2 Chronicles 15:8, 12). For example, there could be some laws requiring some form of mandatory church attendance in a nation in which Christianity is the established faith of the people and their laws.
“But the sword is a means negatively to punish acts of false worship in those that are under the Christian magistrate and profess Christian Religion, insofar as these acts come out to the eyes of men and are destructive to the souls of these in a Christian society; Tis even so (and not otherwise punishable by the magistrate) for he may punish omissions of hearing the doctrine of the Gospel and other external performances of worship, as as these omissions by ill example or otherwise are offensive to the souls of these that are to lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty; nor does it follow that the sword is a kindly means to force outward performances, for the magistrate as the magistrate does not command these outward performances as service to God, but rather forbids the omissions of them as destructive to man… so doth the Magistrate not directly command going to Church as a worship to God, so as his commands have influence on the conscience as the pastors’ commands have, but he commands going to Church and hearing so as the omission of hearing hurts the society whereof God has made him a civil and politic head.” (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against Pretended Liberty of Conscience [London: Andrew Crook, 1649], pgs. 50-52)
Objection: All of this would lead to nominal Christians, hypocrites, and false professors. Conversion to the faith must be willing and voluntary.
Response: It is readily granted that Magistrates have no power over the internal beliefs and conscience of men, and they cannot compel men to positively become Christians by the point of a sword (John 18:36). Take note of the above distinction between positive and negative coercion. The compelling power of Magistrates is terminated upon the external profession itself, not upon a hypocritical profession qua hypocrisy (as these are motives oftentimes not known to other men, much less civil leaders). By this objection’s reasoning, a Magistrate may not compel his subjects to abstain from murder and rape, since many avoid those crimes merely out of a fear of bodily punishment, rather than the fear of God.
A Magistrate cannot compel a man to be internally peaceable, not hate his neighbor, or not desire to commit adultery or rape. Yet it does not follow from this that he ought not punish the external commission of these sinful crimes.
We must distinguish between obstinate arch-heretics who persist in teaching their heresies to the disturbance of both church and civil society. Such persons, after all other attempts are made to restore peace, should be punished by the Magistrate (Deuteronomy 13:5-7; Zechariah 13:1-6). The most prominent example of this would be the anti-Trinitarian heretic and blasphemer Michael Servetus.
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| The worst part is that it could only be done once! |
Zechariah 13 speaks of the age of the gospel in verse 1: “In that day there shall be a fountain opened to the house of David and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem for sin and for uncleanness.” This is an obvious reference to the preaching of the remission of sins through Christ. See also verse 7 which speaks of Christ and His death at the hands of the Jews. Yet verse 2-3 of the same chapter give warrant for the punishment of heretics under the New Testament: “And it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord of hosts, that I will cut off the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more be remembered: and also I will cause the prophets and the unclean spirit to pass out of the land. And it shall come to pass, that when any shall yet prophesy, then his father and his mother that begat him shall say unto him, Thou shalt not live; for thou speakest lies in the name of the Lord: and his father and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through when he prophesieth.” (Zechariah 13:2-3)
Many of the arguments which Libertines and Anabaptists bring against the civil punishment of heretics rely chiefly on the fact that the magistrate cannot compel the conscience (which we concede; the status quaestionis is concerning external acts of heresy). However, neither can ecclesiastical censure. Are we then to tolerate heretics and false teachers in the church, contrary to the crystal-clear word of Scripture (Titus 1:13; Revelation 2:14-15, 20)?
Objection: If the Magistrate may civilly punish and coerce heretics, then he is compelling them to act against their conscience, which would be sin.
Response: Suppose a man, according to his conscience, offers up his child as a burnt offering in sacrifice to Molech? Should the Magistrate punish this, though he thinks he is performing a moral good in so doing? The answer is plain and obvious.
It is true that an erroneous conscience still obliges us to not act against it, but it does not follow from hence that we are to positively follow an erroneous conscience.
“It is most false then,that these Libertines say that the Word does not actually oblige, except it be understood, for the understanding, information, and indictment of conscience,doth not add any actual obligation to the Word that it had not before, it only is a Reporter, to carry both the Word and the actual obligation to the man;the Herald promulgating the law, adds no obligation actual potential to the law that it had not before, only it makes a union,in distance, andneare application and conjunction between the actually obliging law, and understanding knowledge of the perſon,or subject,who is obliged to keep the law, though it be true the fire cannot actually burn, but as timber is cast to it, yet the fire hath from its own nature both potential and actual burning, not from the act of casting the timber in the fire.” (Samuel Rutherford, A Free Disputation against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience, pg. 134)
One such Old Testament example in narrative form in support of the duty of magistrates to care for true religion is in the story of Micah, the Ephraimite: “And the man Micah had an house of gods, and made an ephod, and teraphim, and consecrated one of his sons, who became his priest. In those days there was no king in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes.” (Judges 17:5-6). Note the structure of the two verses. Micah’s act of idolatry is expressly condemned by the Scripture, and then following this proclamation, it is noted that there was no king in Israel to prevent such evils from occurring, implying that it is in his de jure power to do so.
What the Israelites kings commanded and did as godly rulers, and not as the theocratic kings of Israel and types of Christ, it is lawful for Christian magistrates to imitate under the New Testament. When King Manessah repented of his wickedness, he removed the idols and strange gods (2 Chronicles 35:15-16). The prophet Jehu praised King Jehoshaphat for removing the Asherah out of the land (2 Chronicles 19:3).
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