(The following is taken from John Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [Lyon: Laurentius Arnaud, Petrus Borde, Johannes, and Petrus Arnaud, 1678], pgs. 884-887)
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In our intellect, there are three intellectual operations, which are simple apprehension, enunciation, or judgment, and discourse. This is attested by experience in us and has often been explained in summaries. Distinguished scholars, such as St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, q. 58, art. 5), affirm this. It is also derived from Aristotle's text in "De Anima" (Book 3, Text 21, Lecture 11). In this text, Aristotle teaches that there are two operations of the intellect, namely simple apprehension and composition. Aristotle does not call it enunciation but composition, encompassing even discourse under this term, which consists of a certain composition, not in an enunciative but in a deductive way, connecting concepts.
Now, regarding these operations, some doubts arise. First, we must inquire about the origin of why these operations in humans are distinct. The answer is that it arises from the imperfection of our intellect because we proceed from imperfection to perfection, and from potentiality to act. This is taken from St. Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae (I, q. 58, art. 5), where he teaches: "Our intellect proceeds from potentiality to act and from imperfection to perfection. Therefore, when it cognizes or sees something, it does not immediately grasp everything that can pertain to it. It needs to pass to something else and compose with it to know if it pertains to it. The intellect of the angels, on the other hand, is perfect in the intellectual order and, therefore, immediately penetrates anything that pertains to it because it does not use discourse but comprehension. Thus, there is one simple mode of operation in angels, which is so virtuous that it is equivalent to our discursive thinking and multiple acts."
Angels, being completely separated from the body and corporeal communication, also have perfect intellects. They do not need to successively acquire knowledge because they use comprehension instead of discourse. They immediately grasp everything that is in the object.
However, you might argue that, concerning things that do not naturally pertain to any being but pertain morally or supernaturally, an angel may need composition and acquire them successively. Furthermore, with regard to negative propositions or divisions, when an angel negates something, like saying "a stone is not an angel," which is not contained in the species of a stone, and an angel wishes to know both extremes, they might need to connect two different species through a composition of concepts and not elicit a single act but two acts, one for each extreme.
However, it will not be said that composition or discourse is due to the presence of multiple species converging into a single act in an inadequate manner. Rather, it arises from the plurality of acts formed from different species and by comparing them, not by a simple usage of both species in forming a single act. However, if an Angel does not wish to see each negated extreme distinctly and explicitly within themselves but rather sees the negation of something through the negated form and recognizes its contradiction in the concept of truth as false, then it is enough to see the affirmation itself. This is because once the affirmation is posited, the negation of it is known as false. And with some nature known, it is known that there is nothing else beyond it. In this way, that negation is touched upon as if in a confused or oblique manner. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 58, art. 4, reply to objection 2.
Secondly, you'll inquire into what constitutes the simplicity of apprehension and composition. For, on the one hand, many complex things pertain to the first operation. For example, definitions pertain to the first operation. As St. Thomas Aquinas says in De Anima (Lecture 11, Book 3) and in Summa Theologiae (I, q. 17, art. 3, and I, q. 58, art. 4). On the other hand, composition itself does not exclude simplicity. A proposition is formed from several concepts in a unified and indivisible concept. Because that simple concept is a quality, as we have said in summaries, article 2. Therefore, simplicity does not contradict composition.
The response is that simple apprehension or composition is not determined by its inherent simplicity or composition in the being of quality or entity. Nor is it due to simplicity or composition in the object's entity itself. However, composition primarily pertains to some artificial construction that is formed within cognition from multiple pieces of knowledge. Conversely, simple knowledge excludes this. The reason is that what the intellect primarily aims for through composition and division is to attain truth through artifice or construction. It cannot do this by comprehension as an Angel does in a single intuition. Therefore, that which is said to pertain to the first operation is what is understood without that artificially composed construction but is an extreme or a part in the order of attaining truth. Hence, it is not resolvable into another part, and this pertains to the first operation.
On the contrary, whatever has the nature of a whole that can be artificially constructed and resolved is said to pertain to composition. If all of this is representable in a single quality and entity in several coordinated things, it is considered a composition. This happens accidentally in relation to the artful construction of truth. Thus, it is not called a simple or compound operation in terms of the simplicity or comparison of concepts as if they were physical or entity-based. Instead, it pertains to the artificial one, proceeding from one to another while preserving the unity of the construct, which may even generate a single image entity-wise. However, it must at least presuppose multiple acts and concepts from which this image arises and is formed by comparing one to another. This is different from an Angel who does not gather truth from multiple sources but shines with intellectual simplicity, as mentioned by St. Dionysius in "De Divinis Nominibus" (Chapter 7).
As for the objection concerning the simple operation that composes a definition or a complex term, the response is that it is not a composition perfectly consummated. It is not a composition in the sense of a whole and term being compounded together. Rather, it is an imperfect composition because only a part is composed, not the whole. For instance, when a limb or a head is formed, these parts are constructed from other parts, such as the arm being formed from the hand and the forearm, consisting of bones, flesh, nerves, and so on. Nevertheless, these parts do not yet compose the whole in a simple manner; they only compose a compound part. Therefore, the essence of a whole is not fully realized there, and the generation and formation of composition only exist in the complete whole. However, in artificial things, especially in constructs of reason that are mostly formed by arrangement and relation, it is easy for something that is a part to change into a whole and vice versa. This is also true for real artificial constructs; a house that is a part of another structure can be separated and become a whole, and vice versa. In fact, water, which is initially a whole, can become a part by mixing with other water and can become a whole again by being separated from it. So, as long as something is considered as a part, even if it is complex and composed, it pertains to the first operation because the construction or formation doesn't simply compose the whole or manifest the truth but only part of it, and it only forms one end of this constitution. However, when something is considered as a whole, it pertains to the comparison and division. Nevertheless, the truth is found only in declarative sentences, as discussed in the Summa Theologica, question 5. Thirdly, you inquire whether the second operation is the same as judgment or whether there is a distinction between two types of composition, one in the form of enunciation and the other in the form of judgment. The response is that judgment is sometimes used more broadly to denote any differentiation between one thing and another, just as external senses distinguish between white and black, bitter and sweet. This is why St. Thomas Aquinas says in Summa Theologiae (II-II, q. 68, art. 3) that the proper operation of the senses is judgment concerning their proper objects. We discussed this further in Summae, question 5, article 2. At other times, judgment is taken more strictly to mean assent or dissent regarding a truth or falsity, which occurs through affirming or denying. In this sense, judgment is either made through the comparison and relation of extremes or presupposes it and falls under assent or dissent. Therefore, this kind of judgment is not found in animals because they lack the capability of comparison. In Angels, judgment occurs in a more eminent way since they comprehend and judge without the need for comparison. In us, because affirmation or negation concerns connected extremes, or truth, not a simple thing, it pertains to the second operation.
The difficulty lies in two aspects. First, whether judgment is an act distinct from the apprehension or representation of enunciation, or whether it is the same as the formation of enunciation and judgment. Second, assuming it is a distinct act, whether it is a simple act or a composite act. To the first question, the response is that there is undoubtedly a distinction between enunciation as apprehended or represented and judgment, which is the mental assent or dissent to a particular determination. This is evident from the fact that sometimes we apprehend an enunciation or composition and suspend judgment, as when we say, "Are the stars in pairs or not?" An enunciation, in this case, is formed, making a proposition about the predicate and the subject, but judgment is withheld because the truth is not yet fully known. If the truth is evident, judgment cannot be suspended, as the intellect, when evident premises are given, is compelled to assent to the conclusion, as we often discuss in the question 24 of Logic. Therefore, when the intellect is not compelled, it can suspend judgment while still forming and representing enunciation, as it forms the entire basis upon which judgment can later affirm or deny. Hence, enunciation as represented and apprehended is distinct from judgment. As for the second question, assuming that judgment is a distinct act, the question arises whether it is a simple or composite act. In response, it is argued that the act of judgment is not a perfectly composite act since it does not compose a whole and its parts. For instance, when we form a limb such as an arm or a head, these parts are composed of other parts like hands, forearms, bones, flesh, nerves, and so on. Yet, these parts do not completely compose a whole in a simple manner; they only form a compound part. Therefore, the essence of a whole is not fully realized there. However, in the case of artificial constructs, especially those of reason that are formed through arrangement and relation, it is easy for something that is a part to change into a whole and vice versa. This is also true for real artificial constructs; a house that is part of another structure can be separated and become a whole, and vice versa. In this way, as long as something is taken as a part, even if it is complex and composed, it pertains to the first operation because the construction or formation does not simply compose the whole or manifest the truth but only part of it, forming only one end of this constitution. However, when something is considered as a whole, it pertains to the comparison and division. Nevertheless, the truth is found only in declarative sentences, as discussed in the Summa Theologica, question 5.
Regarding the second point, some argue that judgment is a composite act. This is affirmed by Pat. Suarez, who claims that judgment is not distinct from composition and comparison of the united extremes. Just as we cannot apprehend a proposition in a simple act, especially in negative propositions, we also cannot judge in a simple act.
However, it is responded that judgment does not require formal composition but, rather, presupposes it. This is because judgment does not form the composition and union of extremes but compares the composed enunciation to what exists in reality with determination and the adherence of the intellect. A simple comparative act is sufficient for this purpose because it does not involve uniting or combining elements but considers the conformity or non-conformity to reality in a simple comparison. This comparison presupposes the union of extremes, and that conformity or comparison to what exists in reality is taken not as a specific act but as a determination that causes the intellect to adhere to the proposition as true or conforming to reality.
As for the objection that this judgment, which is distinguished from the formation of enunciation, pertains to the third operation, it is responded that judgment is not discourse because it is not a process of inference but rather pertains to the second operation. In the second operation, there is a comparison or relation of the composed enunciation to what exists in reality, along with the adherence of the intellect. The second operation deals with truth or falsity, which is not immediately evident from the simple and naked enunciation, and thus, it is in a state of imperfection. To manifest this truth, which cannot be immediately known, there is a need for inquiry and discourse, which through their proofs, make the truth evident, and order and determine the intellect to know whether something is so or not in reality. This is done through a conclusive comparison and relation, which is judgment. Therefore, the second operation, in an imperfect state, is oriented towards discourse, and discourse leads back to the second operation in a perfect and complete state, where the intellect rests in assent to the truth.
Regarding the fourth point, it is inquired whether distinct concepts are formed through these three operations. It is clarified that it is explicitly taught by Saint Thomas Aquinas in several places that there are distinct concepts formed in the first and second operations. In the first operation, the nature or essence of a thing, or the thing itself in itself, is represented. In the second operation, the truth that is not sufficiently explained by the first operation is represented, as it shows how a thing corresponds or does not correspond to something else. Thus, in the second operation, there is a concept formed which is different from the concept formed in the first operation.
However, it does not appear that discourse gives rise to a separate concept. For when we think, there is not yet a fully formed word, as Augustine teaches according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, the concept is formed both in the first and second operations, as they involve representing distinct objects. In the first operation, it is the nature or the thing in itself, and in the second operation, it is the truth which is not fully unfolded in the first operation.
It is not sufficient to claim that several concepts from the first operation, when coordinated among themselves, are sufficient for the second operation. This is refuted because coordination based on succession alone is not enough. Instead, there should be a coordination based on proportion and suitability through predication. Sometimes, a simple concept can follow another one, differing from it and not suited to it. Therefore, in order to see this suitability or unsuitability and the proportion of one concept to another, some special knowledge and penetration of one extreme to another is required. Coordination through succession in concepts is not enough; there needs to be coordination regarding the suitability and proportion between concepts.
However, whether that concept of the second operation is one in terms of being, yet respects the coordination of those simple concepts in the sense that several inadequate objects are coordinated as one, though suppositively multiple concepts are presupposed in the first operation, from which their coordination and collation result in the concept of the second operation, we discussed in the Summularum, and we will touch on it in the following article. It is sufficient to note that Saint Thomas Aquinas in 1st part, question 85, article 5, response 1, states that the composition and division of the intellect is due to a certain difference or comparison. When several things can be understood under one reason of comparison, or difference, or unity, by one species or one knowledge, or one concept, as will be discussed in the following article, then it does not contradict that this comparison or difference that constitutes composition or division can be terminated by one concept, although formed and gathered from many that precede in the simple or first operation so that the second, formed comparatively from them, is far from the condition of an angel who, though he comprehends a composite thing, does not do so in a compositional or comparative manner, nor is he formed from presupposed and compared many, but apprehends the whole in one act and comprehension. In us, however, just as a mixed thing is made up of non-existing but preceding, altering, and corrupting mixtures, so from preceding compared concepts, one results, which is called composite objectively and by reason of what is presupposed.
Regarding discourse, since it does not consist of a single proposition but rather involves several propositions that do not make or compose a third one but infer, it seems that it does not produce a distinct word from the propositions. Instead, it deals with them in different ways and relations, either as inferential or inferred. Therefore, as discourse involves a transition from one proposition to another, it must include the second operation to produce that which pertains to a proposition, and regarding what is motion or inference, it requires the third operation, which pertains to considering that word or concept as modified. Thus, when it is said that it is a distinct operation, it means that it has a distinct modality but not a distinct reality from what is represented by the propositions themselves. However, when moving from simple apprehension to the composed representation, a distinct object becomes apparent in representing the essence or truth. Therefore, discourse, according to causality (i.e., inference), presupposes discourse according to succession (i.e., multiple succeeding propositions), as Saint Thomas Aquinas mentions in 1st part, question 14, article 7. Yet, it does not result in one proposition from several propositions.
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