(The following is taken from John Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus [Lyon: Laurentius Arnaud, Petrus Borde, Johannes, and Petrus Arnaud, 1678], pgs. 592-598)
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Article VI - Whether in substantial generation there is a resolution of every form down to prime matter.
To reduce prime matter to prime matter is the same as to remove every form, both substantial and accidental, when generation occurs. We inquire whether every form, both substantial and accidental, is taken away from matter when something new is introduced, in other words, whether the same accidents that were in the corrupted thing remain in the generated thing. However, we are not currently discussing the resolution of every substantial form, but we assume that matter is entirely stripped of substantial form when generation occurs because in a composite there are not multiple substantial forms, as we will show in question 1 of On the Soul. Therefore, when one substantial form is excluded so that another may be introduced, all preceding substantial forms are stripped away.
Therefore, the difficulty lies in the resolution of every accidental form. On the one hand, it seems that not all accidents can be corrupted, but they should remain at the moment of generation. This is because, at that instant, there should be dispositions that make the matter disposed and determined for this form rather than another. Otherwise, the matter would remain indifferent and undetermined for such a form. Similarly, the accidents that act as the generating agent's power should remain at that instant, as the generating agent is not conjoined with them. In that instant, generation must proceed from something that acts effectively, not from the generator, since, as we suppose, it is not there. Nor is it from the power of the generator, the heavens, or any other agent left behind because this power would be subject to change and exist in the thing that is corrupted. Therefore, if all accidents cease at that instant, that power also ceases. Moreover, there is a special consideration for some accidents that cannot be entirely separated from matter, such as quantity, which follows matter itself. Just as quality follows the form and through quantity, matter is divided and made divisible. It is assumed that at the moment of generation, undivided matter separated from other matter is postulated, having quantity by which this division takes place. This is especially relevant in humans, in whom quantity cannot be attributed except to matter alone since the form is spiritual. Therefore, the quantity of matter is not eliminated when a human is produced, and consequently, it seems that other accidents that are subject to the substance through quantity are not removed. Finally, there is the difficulty regarding certain accidents that do not appear to belong to the generated thing unless they remain in the matter itself. For instance, we observe the same scar, the same black color, the same marks, etc., in a corpse. Sometimes, the heat remains within the viscera of a dead animal, which cannot be generated by its corrupting agent, especially when it is suffocated with water, as water cannot generate heat. Similarly, if an animal is lifted up, the new motion cannot be generated in the corpse because the corpse cannot produce it. Such a generative principle is absent, as the generator does not possess impulsive force since it is not living. Therefore, these accidents are not separated from the matter itself, nor are similar accidents produced, as there is no cause from which they could originate.
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| John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) |
On the other hand, two well-known principles in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas contradict this view. First, accidents are subject to the whole, and when the whole perishes, accidents also perish. Second, matter receives a substantial form before receiving an accidental form. Therefore, when the substantial form is removed, all previously received accidents are also removed. Otherwise, some accidents would remain immediately received in the matter before the substantial form.
Hence, this difficulty mainly depends on another one to be discussed later: question 9, namely, whether the subject of accidents is only matter or the composite itself. Those who hold that matter is the immediate subject of accidents consequently argue that it is not necessary to dissolve all accidents in the introduction of the substantial form. This view is advocated by Francisco Suárez in Disputation 14, Metaphysics, Section 3. He cites many ancient philosophers and refers to the position of the University of Coimbra in Book 1, De Generatione, Chapter 4, Question 18, Article 1, especially by prominent figures like Gabriel, Ockham, and Gregory. It might also seem that Murcia shares this view in Disputation 1, De Generatione, Question 5, and others among more recent philosophers.
Nevertheless, the view of Saint Thomas Aquinas is that in substantial generation, accidents should be resolved, so that nothing that existed in the corrupt is left in the generated, but rather newly produced. This is clear from Saint Thomas himself in his First Part, Question 76, where he says, "It is impossible for any accidental disposition to fall in between the body and the soul or between any substantial form and its matter." He supports this argument immediately afterward. The same doctrine can be found in Book 1 of De Generatione, Lecture 10, where he says, "The accident of the same species does not remain, but what was there before is corrupted by the accidental corruption of the subject, and a similar accident, following the form, arrives anew." A similar sentiment can be found in questions concerning spiritual creatures, Article 3, Reply to Objection 1, and in questions concerning the soul, Article 9, Reply to Objection 5. Thomists, including Cajetan, Soncin, Capreolus, Báñez, and others, generally follow this view. They are cited and followed by the University of Coimbra in Book 1, De Generatione, Chapter 4, Question 18, Article 2, the Carmelites in Book 1, De Generatione, Disputation 3, Question 6, Fonseca in his Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 28, Question 20, Section 2.
The foundation for this view is twofold, as discussed above. The first point, that the entire composite and not just matter is the subject of accidents, should be demonstrated by us later, in question 9.
The second principle, as presented by Saint Thomas earlier, is that while matter is receptive of both substantial and accidental forms, it receives them in a certain order. This order arises because these forms are hierarchically related, with one essentially presupposing the other. For example, the vegetative level presupposes the sensitive, and the act of the intellect presupposes the potentiality of the intellect. Similarly, the accidental being presupposes substantial being, naturally coordinating with it and depending on it. Substantial being, however, is conferred by the substantial form.
To fully grasp this, we must distinguish between accidents that are properly passions and those that are common. If they are proper accidents, it is certain that they do not adhere to matter or unite with it except through the form because they do not suit matter unless they emanate from the form. They do not emanate from the form unless they are united to matter because they do not emanate from it unless it has existence. The form, when it is in matter, has existence because it either depends on it or is created in it. Therefore, it is prior for a form to exist in matter and give it existence than for accidents emanating from it to remain in matter. Consequently, when heat is produced in fire, it cannot be the same as what was in the wood when it was being prepared for the fire because the heat emanates from the introduced form of fire.
However, if the accidents are common or can be called common because although they emanate from the form, they emanate according to a common grade, not according to the ultimate difference, as quantity emanates from the degree of the body, which is common to all elements, whether simple or mixed. The same reasoning applies to these accidents as to the proper ones because, as St. Thomas Aquinas points out in Part 1, Question 78, Article 6, just as different degrees of the same form are given, so each genus or degree of form has its own proper accidents. Therefore, if these accidents emanate as mentioned and follow this line of reasoning, they necessarily presuppose the form in matter, so they emanate from it, rather than being placed in matter before the substantial form to which the immediate order of matter pertains because matter is the potentiality for the substantial form and, therefore, immediately pertains to the substantial act. Thus, if dispositions that are required by their nature and that determine matter are not received in it before the form, much less can accidents that are not essentially connected with matter be received. Moreover, the relationship of matter to the substantial form is immediate and essential before it regards the accidental form. Matter is the potentiality for the substantial form, and its immediate corresponding act should be the substantial act. It is named and constituted as potentiality by its order to the act. Therefore, before the accidental, it should consider the substantial form as its primary intention, but it also pertains to the execution because what essentially and primarily determines the relationship is more quickly reached in execution than what is secondary since essence is constituted in execution and not only in intention, unlike what is secondary. Furthermore, since the accident depends on the substance in existing because the substance exists on its own, while the accident is non-existent and adherent, what comes first in the order of existence is also the first in the order of execution, not just in the order of intention. Execution regards the existence of the existent. If the substantial form gives substantial being to matter and consequently gives being in the order and line of existence, which is prior in adhering, then, in this order of execution, the substantial form must precede the accidental form. Therefore, because the accident depends on the substance in the order of existence, it strongly resembles dependence on the efficient cause, insofar as the efficient cause presupposes existence so that the effect depends on it. Thus, with His immediate efficiency, God can supply the actual dependence of the accident on the sustaining substance because in this regard, the efficient can do the same as the sustainer. Therefore, once the substantial form is removed, matter cannot retain accidents. Hence, accidents do not pass numerically from the corrupt to the generated because they do not immediately exist in matter.
You might argue that it suffices for supporting accidents to have partiality, which matter possesses. Therefore, you may say that even though it assigns a primary and essential order to the substantial form, matter is still sufficient to support accidents, especially those that emanate from it, like quantity or common accidents.
Secondly, the fact that accidents do not necessarily corrupt even though the form changes to a substantial one is because something else that equally sustains such an accident in existence is substituted in its place. This is why we said above that prime matter does not perish when a new form arrives, even though its existence changes, because something else equally gives existence to matter.
In response to the first point, it is argued that it is not sufficient for matter to have partial existence to support accidents. Firstly, because matter does not possess partial existence; rather, it receives existence solely from the form. This is because the form provides substantial existence and, therefore, the primary existence that underlies everything else. Otherwise, it would not be substantial. Consequently, matter does not presuppose something prior in itself. Secondly, even if it had partial existence, it still could not support accidents unless it depended on the whole or composite as if it were existing for something else. Thus, matter alone is the principle that sustains accidents as the "that." However, if the principle "that" is removed or destroyed without being replaced by another that fulfills all its functions, then the principle "that" neither acts nor receives. It is false that quantity emanates solely from matter since it emanates from the degree of corporeality provided by the form. We observe that quantities vary according to different forms. If the same quantity always inhered in matter, then accidents would be more closely and intensely united to the matter than the substantial form, which varies. However, matter essentially refers to the substantial form before referring to the accidental form.
Regarding the second point, it is said that an equivalent is not substituted for the accident because a different subject cannot contain the same accident numerically. This is because one natural cause does not entirely contain the effects of another, even in terms of complete individuation. Only the first cause can completely contain and supply everything due to the complete subordination of the secondary cause to the first cause in every aspect of being, as we discussed in Question 12 of Physics and will address in the following question. By this reasoning, God, as the sustainer of the accident outside the subject, preserves it numerically the same. However, with matter, when different forms are substituted, the same accident is preserved numerically because each form is inadequately regarded by matter and is capable of preserving it. On the other hand, the accident does not regard multiple subjects but is adequately sustained by one, thereby being individuated.
Regarding the first point about dispositions that determine matter and the efficiency of generation in the last instant, we will address this in the following article as it involves a specific difficulty.
In response to the second point, it is stated that quantity does not necessarily follow matter in a clinging and emanating manner. Instead, it follows matter as it exists under a form and acquires the degree of corporeality bestowed upon it by that form. Quantity is considered an essential accident of matter, just as quality is an accident of form. This is due to both similarity and generality.
Firstly, quantity is attributed to matter due to its similarity with matter's passive nature. In a similar manner, quantity is inherently non-active.
Secondly, it is attributed to matter due to its generality. Quantity is as general to matter as the degree of corporeality. No form of matter is found without corporeality, and none without quantity.
Regarding the statement that matter is individuated by quantity and should be assumed as individuated at the moment of generation, it is responded that matter is not individuated by substantial quantity but by its inherent incommunicability. Quantity contributes to multiplication and division, not so much to the concept of individuation as to its differentiation. Quantities divide and multiply, but it is the substance or matter itself, not the quantity, that determines diverse substantial individuation. This will be explained more fully in the next question when discussing the principle of individuation.
Hence, the quantity that individuates and is individuated by matter is sufficient if it possesses, at the moment of generation, priority in terms of formal cause over the form, dispositional cause over disposition, and material cause over matter. However, it is not necessary for this quantity to be coeval with matter and perpetually inherent in it. This will be further clarified later. This does not pose a specific difficulty in the case of humans because although their form is essentially spiritual, it is formative and virtually corporeal, as it provides the degree of corporeality that gives rise to quantity, just as it does with other corporeal accidents. Therefore, the entirety resulting from this, which is simply corporeal (i.e., a human being), is capable of quantity as "that." The principle for receiving quantity as "that" is matter itself, as it serves as the substrate for the form and provides the degree of corporeality.
In response to the second point, it is stated that the accidents that remain in the generated entity are not the same in number as those in the corrupted entity but are similar, as explicitly taught by St. Thomas in his work on generation (1. de gener. lect. 10). Some forms have such a symbolic relationship and affinity that they tend to seek similar accidents, especially at the beginning of their generation when they have not yet achieved their full perfection. During this early stage, transmutation is relatively easy, such as the transformation from an embryo to an animal or from an animal to a cadaver. As these are vital forms, they tend to progress towards another form, and this prompts them to seek similarity in their accidents.
Sometimes, the generating agent produces an accident similar to what was present in the corrupted entity due to the necessity of the matter from which the generation occurs. It should be noted that forms, when generated anew or during processes like augmentation or nutrition, may not possess their proper accidents or intrinsic passions as part of their inherent nature but may acquire many common accidents as a result of the determination of the matter into which the form is introduced. Common accidents do not emanate directly from the form but are provided by the generating agent according to the suitability of the matter and the circumstances. For example, when a living being is killed by water, fire, or iron, and the form of a cadaver is generated, whether by those agents or by celestial causes as the primary agent, common accidents are produced. These common accidents are determined by the resistance or demand of the matter. Hence, when a dead animal's form is introduced, a certain amount of heat can still be produced. Although the form of a cadaver is introduced by the cold agent, this agent, while primarily producing cold, can also acquire qualities of warmth when it acts against the resistance of the matter. Similarly, sometimes such heat is generated through antiperistasis, or the surrounding action of the opposite quality, as introduced by the form of the cadaver itself, acting as a direct cause. The concept of antiperistasis will be explained further in question 5.
By the same reasoning, we observe that the nutritive faculty sometimes generates food with additional qualities and alien properties due to the influence of the matter, which imparts its own qualities to the nutrition. Likewise, animals are sometimes generated with different qualities, even though the seed is good, because of the mixture with the blood, which is the matter. Thus, the agent or generator must not only be considered in terms of its inherent power or modification due to resistance and reaction but also in terms of the power it derives from external sources, such as celestial influences and other surrounding circumstances. All of these factors determine or provide the power to generate certain common accidents in accordance with the demands of the matter in which it operates.
Therefore, the generating agent or agent is not solely defined by its intrinsic power but also by its relation to the matter, circumstances, and other surrounding influences. It can generate similar qualities, scars, impulses, and other such common accidents not by its inherent force but by continuing the impulses in the body of the deceased, as the impressed power from the agent on the dying animal, which is being corrupted, does not encounter a resistance contrary to its extinction. Instead, it determines the agent undergoing corruption and imparts to it the power to continue a similar impulse in the cadaver.
It should be noted that the senses do not perceive any change in this process, as their function does not involve indicating changes in individual things resulting from the mere corruption of the subject, where a similar accident of the same species is substituted, but rather in cases where an alteration or mutation occurs in the accident without the substitution of a similar one.
But you might still object with reference to Thomas Aquinas, who, in "Contra Gentiles," chapter 18, states: "The matter of a human being, after his death, which was subject to such a form, remains with the same dimensions it had, so as to be individual matter. Therefore, the matter is not stripped of every accident, at least not of quantity, by which it is marked and determined, so as to be this individual matter. This is confirmed because the antecedent dispositions have nothing contrary to cause their corruption by subsequent ones, as they are of the same nature with them; therefore, they persist. Nor can it be said that they are defined by the definition of the subject, for it is quite the opposite, as the ultimate disposition, when joined to the generated form, is not corrupted by its destruction, but rather is generated then. A disposition beneath the ultimate one is compatible with the subject undergoing corruption. Therefore, they do not terminate solely due to the subject's definition but rather due to the contrary. However, this does not apply because the ultimate disposition is not contrary to the preceding one; it is of the same species, for example, heat as an eighth with heat as a seventh."
Response: What St. Thomas means is that the matter remains with the same dimensions fundamentally, insofar as matter is the root of those dimensions, not formally. This is because the same quantity does not remain, nor does the same form. Nevertheless, there is an order in matter to the same form, that is, to the soul, for its restoration through resurrection, so it remains the same dimension fundamentally.
St. Thomas confirms this by saying in the same text that corporeity is twofold: one is substantial corporeity, which is the nature of the body as belonging to the genus of substance, and this is nothing other than the form itself. The other is accidental corporeity, which is the species of quantity, which is the body. St. Thomas continues: "Although the corporeity of the human body ceases to exist when it corrupts, it does not prevent the same human, numerically, from rising again because the same corporeity remains, with the same form of a human being." Therefore, St. Thomas understands that the quantitative dimension does not remain the same in the matter of a human, but the same order to the human form remains. Consequently, it will have the same dimensions because it will have the same corporeity.
We will explain other passages from St. Thomas in question 7 and 9 of the Third Part in the following article.
Regarding your second point, dispositions that precede are not directly corrupted by the ultimate disposition as if they were contrary to it, but indirectly. This is because they introduce an incompatible form to the preceding one, and consequently, the subject of such preceding dispositions is destroyed. Thus, these dispositions terminate to define the subject in which they existed, but it is not incongruous for something to be indirectly and accidentally corrupted by its like, with the foundation on which it relied being destroyed.
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