The following comes from Sanderson's treatise Logicae Artis Compendium (1615).
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Chapter 8. - On Modals.
This chapter deals with the determination and composition of propositions in relation to matter. There are four such modalities: Necessary, Impossible, Contingent, and Possible.
However, some add True and False to these, which is not entirely correct. Indeed, True and False determine the quality of the proposition more by the nature of the subject than by quantity. Furthermore, Per Se and Per Accidens can be reduced to these modalities: Per Se to Necessary, and Per Accidens to Contingent.
A modal proposition is one that is affected by one of these modalities. In every modal proposition, there are two elements: the Modus (mode) and the Dictum (statement). The Dictum is a categorical proposition about what exists, to which a mode is attributed. The Modus is the determination of it with respect to the subject, and, therefore, the Dictum has the nature of the subject, and the Modus has the nature of the predicate. For example, in the proposition "It is necessary that a human is an animal," "A human is an animal" is the Dictum, and it has the nature of the subject, while "It is necessary" is the Modus and is about the predicate.
The Modus can be expressed either adjectivally, as in "It is necessary for a human to be an animal," or verbally, as in "A human must necessarily be an animal." Modus can also be placed at the beginning, middle, or end of a proposition.
Modus is the determination of composition in a proposition with respect to matter. There are four such modes: Necessary, Impossible, Contingent, and Possible.
However, some people add True and False, Per Se, and Per Accidens to these, which is less accurate. True and False indeed determine the quality of the proposition more by the nature of the subject than by quantity, with consideration for the matter. Therefore, Per Se and Per Accidens can be reduced to these: Per Se to Necessary and Per Accidens to Contingent.
A modal proposition is one that is influenced by one of these modes. In every modal proposition, there are two elements: the Modus (mode) and the Dictum (statement). The Dictum is a categorical proposition about what exists, to which a mode is attributed. The Modus is the determination of it with respect to the matter. Therefore, the Dictum has the nature of the subject, and the Modus has the nature of the predicate. For example, in the proposition "It is necessary that a human is an animal," "A human is an animal" is the Dictum, and it has the nature of the subject, while "It is necessary" is the Modus and is related to the predicate.
The Modus can be expressed either adjectivally, as in "It is necessary for a human to be an animal," or verbally, as in "A human must necessarily be an animal." Modes can also be placed verbally at the beginning, middle, or end of a proposition. For example, at the beginning, as in the first example; in the middle, as in the second example; or at the end, as in "A human being necessarily exists as an animal," and it can convey a meaning or composition when the parts of the statement are understood simultaneously or separately. For instance, "It is possible for a sitting person to stand," which is false in a composite sense but true when considered separately.
Necessary is what cannot be otherwise, such as "It is necessary for a human to be an animal," and it has the force of universal affirmation. Impossible is what cannot possibly be, like "A human being a stone," and it has the force of universal negation. Contingent is what is, but could also not be, like "Socrates philosophizing," and it has the force of particular affirmation. Possible is what is not necessarily so but could be, such as "A woman being [cold]," and it has the force of particular negation.
The quantity of modalities, when considered with respect to Dictum (and it is a material quantity), is completely like that in pure categoricals. Without considering the Modus (which is formal), it is universal if it has a universal mode like Necessary or Impossible, and it is particular if it has a particular mode like Contingent or Possible. For example, "It is impossible for any human to be a stone" is particular, considering only the Dictum; but it is a part of the universal when considered along with the universal mode.
Regarding the Contingent, it is true when its matter is contingent, false when its matter is necessary or impossible. As for the Possible, it is true when its matter is necessary or contingent, false when its matter is impossible.
In the realm of Modal Logic, some fictitious terms are used to express opposition and equivalence: Purpurea, Iliace, Amabimus, and Edentuli. Each of these words with four syllables signifies one of the four modes in such a way that Purpurea corresponds to Possible, Iliace to Contingent, Amabimus to Impossible, and Neceffarium to Necessary. However, in each of these words, there are four vowels that indicate whether both the Dictum and the Modus are affirmed, both are negated, the Modus is affirmed while the Dictum is negated, or vice versa, following the verse: It destroys both; but A confirms both the scheme and the rule.
With these premises, the entire matter can be understood without needing the scope of regular rules from the subject's schema.
In this scheme, what is signified by one term can be equated with what is expressed by another term through some specific wording. They are opposed to each other in the schema as follows:
However, I do not delve into the conversion of Modalities here, for I do not wish to burden those who are interested in less necessary subtleties, which yield more trouble than benefits.
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