Scotist Perspectives on the Relationship between Being and the Ten Categories

 

One of the disagreements between the respective schools of the Thomists and Scotists is with regards to the proper signification that obtains between being as such as the ten categories of Aristotle. I seek to outline the views and arguments of the Scotist school in this article and give my opinion on the relevant questions. I decided to address the matters in this order: 1) the formal and objective concept of being; 2) The univocity and analogy of being; 3) Is being abstracted from its inferiors prior to the operation of the intellect? For each of these issues, I have also provided some of the important Thomist objections to them along with Scotist responses.

The Formal and Objective Concept of Being 

(Much of the Scotist position here is based on Crescentius Krisper's Philosophia scholae Scotisticae. I used authors such as Grenier, Poinsot, and Cajetan for representing the Thomist position). 

The Scotist position is that being has one formal and objective concept that can be abstracted from its inferiors, such as infinite and finite being, God and creatures, substance and accident, etc. Scotus defines a thing as univocal if it "is so one that its unity suffices for a contradiction, by affirming and denying it of the same thing. It also suffices for a syllogistic middle term, so that the extremes united in a middle term that is one in this way are concluded to be one among themselves, without the fallacy of equivocation." (Ordinatio, 1.3.1)

This is evident since in a created intellect which has concepts of which it is certain and concepts of which it is doubtful, the concept of which it certain is other and distinct from the doubtful ones. Therefore, a created intellect could know that something is a being without knowing whether it is created or uncreated, finite or infinite, substance or accident, etc.

Thomist Objection: If three men named Peter are in a dark room, and one of them slaps me, I know that it is a Peter who slapped me, but that does not mean that "Peter" in this case signifies a single formal concept common to the three men. Similarly, I may know that being expresses a concept, but doubt whether it is equivocal or univocal.

Scotist Response: In these cases, we don't know the ultimate formal concept by which we know the things that are being signified by the word "Peter", but this cannot be said of real being. Hence, these three Peters do still convey a common concept, namely the concept of man (rational animal). In the case of being, we should recognize that a concept can be had of a word without knowing how the concept relates to its significates. This does not apply to the case of being since the question here is about the most common universal concept of being as such.

The unity of a formal concept is taken either from the unity of an objective concept or from experience, as when upon the perception of a word (such as "man") we find that our intellect tends to one thing rather than another, which is a sign that there is one formal concept corresponding to that word.

 We can know that there is one objective concept of being by knowing that affirming and denying being as such of one and the same thing will result in a contradiction. 

Since being is contracted and divided (infinite and finite, substance and accident, etc.), there must be posited a thing which has a necessary connection with them, namely the ratio of the divisible and contractible. This is the objective concept of being.

Thomist Objection: If being were one formal and objective concept, it could be posited in a definition along with an inferior difference. However, Aristotle denies that this should be done in book 8 of the Metaphysics.

Scotist Response: Being is not posited in definitions on account of it being the greatest commonality. Definitions typically are made with reference to the most proximate genus. However, the antecedent is also false since we define substance as a "being which exists in itself and is the subject of accidents."

Thomist Objection: If there were one objective concept of being, then it would be either absolute (to itself) or relative (to something other). It could not be absolute since then it would not belong to relations, and it could not be relative since then it could not belong to the other nine accidents.

Scotist Response: It is neither absolute nor respective, but prescinded from both, as is clear in all universal rationes, such that animal is neither rational nor irrational, although it is really and identically such.

As you can already probably tell, I lean more towards the Scotist position here. It is plain from intellectual experience that one can abstract a common concept of being qua being from all its inferiors.

The Univocity and Analogy of Being

The Scotist position is that being is univocal with respect to God and creation, substance and accident, etc. The Thomist view is that there is analogy of proper proportion between God and creatures when being is ascribed to each of them respectively. I will begin with some arguments in favor of the Scotist position. Once again, this material is based on writers such as Bartholomew Mastrius and Crescentius Krisper.

1) The intellect can consider substance and accident, and abstract from them that in which they agree, and leave aside that in which they differ. But they agree in being, therefore there is a unified concept between them.

2) The nature of being is something indeterminate in the mode of being. We know that something has being without knowing whether it is in itself (substance) or in another (accident). Similarly, we can know a thing has being without knowing whether it is finite (created) or infinite (God). 

3) If two things are related to each other in such a way that whatever belongs to one of them insofar as it is such, also belongs to the other insofar as it is such, then there is some formal unitary nature between them. Whatever belongs to God insofar as He is being, also belongs to a creature insofar as it is being. An example would be that being nothing is repugnant to the creature insofar as it being, which is also the case with God.

4) Whenever a definition is given with both something common and something contracting and differentiating, that common belongs to something to which the contracting does not belong. A creature is defined through being and something contracting, therefore being belongs to something which is repugnant to the contracting thing. Contracting is repugnant only to God, therefore being belongs to God.

5) It may be demonstrated that being is univocal by noting that something that is equivocal cannot result in a contradiction. For example, it is not contradictory to say "Every dog runs" and "this dog does not run." But it is contradictory to say "Every being is unlimited" and "This being is not unlimited." Thus, there is a common concept of being between them.

6) A negation does not deny more than the contradictory affirmation affirms. But "nothing" or "non-being" denies not only finite and created being, but also infinite being. Therefore being, contradictorily opposed to non-being, implies something that is common to all being.

Thomist Objection: When comparing two things, it is not necessary that they have a strict that is one between them. It is sufficient for there to be a proportional unity. For example, a flowering meadow is often compared to a laughing man insofar as laughter in a man proceeds from his inner joy just as a meadow is luxuriating in its beauty and loveliness. When God and creatures are compared in being, this does not necessarily mean that there is one univocal concept between them, but rather a proportional unity.

Scotist Response: Every proportional unity will to some degree diminish the propriety and perfection of the formality. Since a creature has being with all propriety through the formal ratio of being as such, there must be a greater unity between God and creatures than a mere proportion. Anything that is a being through proportion is not a being absolutely, but only in that certain respect of proportionality. But creatures are being absolutely in the formal aspect of being, thus it is not a mere proportional unity.

For the Scotists, when it said that God is "above being," this only means that the formal concept of being is in Him in the most eminent and perfect way, not that there is no common concept. The superlative or comparative things attributed to be God (as when He is said to be "most wise" or "most merciful") indeed presuppose some common concept(s) of wisdom and mercy. 

Thomist Objection: God and creature do not agree in the most common concept of being, since being in creatures is participated, while in God it is not. It will not work to say that this notion of being is prescinded from participated and unparticipated, since the notion itself must be either participated or unparticipated. Furthermore, if being could be prescinded from singularity and being unparticipated, it would that something which is in God (being) could not be God, since it could be participated in and of itself. 

Scotist Response: The reality of being according to what exists in God and creatures themselves is not distinct from them on the part of the thing and therefore is not contracted into finite and infinite. However, being can be prescinded from these things insofar as it is a common concept abstracted in the intellect from God and creatures inadequately conceived. 

"for nothing can be conceived in God existing on the part of the thing, which is outside uncreated and unparticipated being , positively or negatively, nor anything in the creature, which is outside created and participated being, therefore there cannot be given on the part of the thing a common reality to them through indifference, or through inexistence, which abstracts from those rationes, but only a common concept immediately abstracted from the realities of God and creature inadequately known." (Bartholomew Mastrius)

A concept can be univocal in three ways:

1) Physically Univocal - One which expresses a unity of name corresponding to a unity of the thing in reality which is not further divisible. 

2) Metaphysically Univocal - This type is fitting to a concept abstracted from thing which are not univocal by physical univocity. 

3) Logically Univocal - This type is fitting to a reality abstracted in the second intention as a universal.

We can further distinguish four different grades of univocity:

1) When the common notion corresponding to a common name exists in the inferiors according to the same mode of being, the same essential order, and the same grade of perfection. An example of this type of univocity is the way a species descends to its individuals.

2) When the common notion is participated in according to the same mode of being and essential order, but not according to the essential grade of perfection. In this way man participates in the genus of animal more perfectly than a horse since he has a more perfect contracting principle.

3) When the common noting is participated according to the same mode of being, but not according to the same order or grade of perfection. 

4) When the common notion is participated according to diverse modes of being, and diverse grades of order and perfection. 

It is not required for univocation that the common ratio be equally participated in by all of the inferiors.

Scotists confess a univocity of being between God and creatures but with a mixture of analogy (specifically, a type of analogy of attribution). In this case, being is univocal in the fourth grade as it is participated according to diverse modes of being, grades of order, and perfection (in God, being is pure and unparticipated, while in creatures it is finite and participated). 

If there is inequality in the descent of the common concept to its inferiors, then this is sufficient to constitute analogy. 

 As said earlier, this Scotist notion of univocity between God and creatures is balanced out by an analogy of attribution, with the intrinsic agreement of the form in the analogates, but still with participation and dependence on God. 

This analogy, however, does not mean that creatures have this relation to God under the most common and abstract concept of being, since under this abstraction a creature is not considered as finite but merely as existing outside nothing. 

When we say that being is contracted to God before it is contracted to a creature, this does not mean that in conceiving a common concept of being, our cognition tends to God before creatures, but only that being in creatures ex natura rei ultimately depends on God. 

Objection: For a thing to be univocal, it must be participated in equally by its inferiors. But being is infinite in God and finite in creatures. Ergo, etc.

Scotist Response: It is not required for univocity for there to be same order and essential grade of perfection in the inferiors. Indeed, the reasoning of this argument, if true, would lead to the absurd conclusion that animal cannot be predicated univocally and man and beasts, since there is an unequal participation between them in the common ratio. Furthermore, this univocity being debated is not in reality ex natura rei, but as it is prescinded in the intellect. Similarly, the ten categories are not so distant from each other that they cannot agree in a common notion of finite being. Such is also the case with God and creatures, that though they differ in their grades of being, they can still agree in the common concept of transcendental being.

Is Being Abstracted from its inferiors prior to the operation of the intellect?

Mastrius teaches that with respect to substance and accident, their common concept of being is abstracted ex natura rei. But this is not the case with respect to God and creatures. Thus we have the Scotist of doctrine of being as perfectly prescinded from its inferiors.

This is clear since being functions as a genus with respect to substance and accident, since both types are under the genus of finite being (not transcendental being). Therefore, this a common concept of being abstracted from ex natura rei. 

"A concept is said to be perfectly prescinded from its inferiors when it abstracts from them in such a way, either from the nature of the thing or at least through the intellect with the foundation of the thing, that it only expresses a certain degree of superiority in which the notions of the inferiors are in no way, either implicitly or explicitly, reflected." (Crescentius Krisper) 

Objection: For a thing to be perfectly prescinded from its inferiors, two conditions are required: 1) the two concepts must mutually exclude each other; 2) the concept of the superior is founded on a common nature found in the inferiors ex natura rei. Thus, even if being as a concept prescinds from its inferiors, the inferiors do not prescind from being. 

Scotist Response: To the first condition, it would then absurdly follow that no genus could prescind from its species because it is intrinsically included in them (as animality is included in the species of rational animals). 

If the concept of being were abstracted from God and creatures ex natura rei, it would follow that there is composition in God. This is because the common reality and the contracting principle effect a metaphysical composition as potency and act.

Some Scotists (who disagreed with Mastrius on this question) respond that this will only result in a metaphysical composition when it is contracted through specific differences, but not in the case of intrinsic modes, since the entity and the mode are one adequate reality. On the contrary, the intrinsic mode of a thing does not constitute it in its quidditative being but presupposes it as constituted.

"The first principle of contracting a common reality to another particular under that common reality pertains to the quiddity and essence of that particular, and makes it essentially differ. Also because the principles of constituting and distinguishing are the same for the Metaphysician, since therefore intrinsic modes are not the first constitutives of God and creatures, consequently they were not the first distinctive principles of them." (Bartholomew Mastrius, Cursus Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti, Disp. 2, Q. 4, art. 1)

On the part of God and creatures, the concept of being ex natura rei is abstracted secondarily and a posteriori. If it were abstracted ex natura rei in priority, then it follow that there is something prior to God. This is because the thing constituting is prior to the thing constituted. 

The foundation of this transcendental similitude between God and creatures in the intellect is that both God and creatures can cause a common concept of being in the intellect. 

Being is contracted to God and creatures through intrinsic modes, rather than a specific difference. If it were contracted to God through a specific difference, the divine simplicity would be destroyed by a metaphysical composition of the contractible and the contracted (for the difference is a reality other than the genus which it contracts). But a mode is a degree of the determinable reality, not a distinct reality from that of which it is the mode.

Objection: That which contracts being is either being or non-being. Not the first, because then it could contract itself. If it is contracted through a mode, rather than a difference, then this is basically the same as saying that being is contracted through itself.

Scotist Response: That which contracts being is being really and identically, but not formally. The contraction of being is not by way of addition (as of part to part), but being as such is so indeterminate that it descends into the inferiors by itself without any addition. The modes of being are not being from themselves, but being by reason of that which they contract. In contracting it, it receives being qua being, insofar as there is an identity between the the contracting and the contracted in the constituted thing. 

Aquinas and the Early Modern Thomists on the Number of 'Esse' in Christ

 

The following passages represent Aquinas’ mainstream view of their being one esse in the person of Christ:

“Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing…..since the human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said above, and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2)

“Because, therefore, in Christ we posit only one subsisting thing, for the integrity of which there concurs also the humanity itself, since one supposit is of both natures, for this reason, it is necessary to say that substantial existence, which properly is attributed to the supposit, is in Christ one only, yet has unity out of the supposit itself and not out of the natures. If, nevertheless, the humanity is posited to be separated from the divinity, then the humanity will have its own existence other than from the divine existence. For nothing impeded it from having its own existence except this: that it was not subsisting essentially. This is just as if an ark were a certain individual natural thing, the whole itself only has one existence, nevertheless any of its parts separated from the ark will have its own existence.” (Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet IX, Q. 2, art. 2)

“Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2, ad 1)

“Whenever things differ in existence, one of them is not predicated of the other. But God is a man, and vice versa. Therefore there is one existence of God and the man.” (Commentary on the Sentences, III, d. 6, q. 2, art. 2)

“I answer that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, “to be” is said in two ways. In the first way, it is said as what signifies a proposition’s truth, insofar as it is a copula; and in this way, as the Commentator says, on the same passage, “being” is an accidental predicate. And this existence is not in a real thing, but in a mind that joins the predicate to the subject, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 6. So the question here is not about this. In another way, that is said “to be” which pertains to the nature of a real thing, insofar as it is divided according to the ten genera. This existence is in the thing, and is the act of a being resulting from a thing’s principles, just as lighting up is the act of what is luminous. Nevertheless, sometimes “existence” is taken for the essence according to which a thing exists; for the principles of things are customarily signified through their acts, as is done with a power or a habit. Therefore, when speaking about existence insofar as it is the act of a being, in this way I say that according to the second opinion one must assert there is only one existence, but according to the others one must assert there are two existences. For a subsisting being is what has existence as of that which exists, although it is of a nature or form as of that by which it exists. Whence neither a thing’s nature nor its parts are properly said “to be,” if “to be” is being taken in the aforesaid mode; likewise, neither are its accidents. But the complete supposit, which exists in virtue of all the others, is [properly said “to be”]. Whence also the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2, that an accident is more properly of a being than a being.” (Commentary on the Sentences, III, d. 6, q. 2, art. 2)

In these passages, Aquinas is also basing his argument on being (esse) and unity being corresponding transcendental perfections. Therefore, a complete subsisting suppositum can only have one esse, if it is to remain one simpliciter.

In explaining the standard one-esse view (Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2), Aquinas gives the analogy of concrete parts and their existence in a complete substantial whole. Just as things like body parts, corporeality, and possessing a soul belong to the one person of Socrates, there arises only one esse of Socrates. The parts do exists over and above the whole, rather they exist in the whole. 

In contrast to the part-whole relationship, accidents do communicate esse to their substance. Whiteness adds esse to Socrates, inasmuch as we now say that Socrates is white on account of this accidental quality.

However, the passage which caused the most controversy among Thomists and modern scholars of Aquinas is the following one from his Disputed Questions:

“Therefore just as Christ is one simply because of the unity of the supposit, and two relatively because of the two natures, so he has one act of existence simply because of one eternal act of existence of an eternal supposit. But there is also another esse of this suppositum, not in so far as he is eternal, but in so far as he is made man temporally. This esse—even if it is not accidental esse (since ‘man’ is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God)—is not however the principal esse of its suppositum, but secondary. If in Christ there were two supposits, then each supposit would have a principal act of existence proper to itself, and thus in Christ there would be a twofold act of existence simply.” (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae: De Unione Verbi Incarnati, art. 4)

This passage from De Unione has been a perplexing matter to the interpreters of Aquinas for centuries. It has received more attention in present-day scholarship as well. 

Aquinas is explicit here in teaching one principle esse in Christ, just as he did in his other writings. He also follows some of the same reasoning regarding the convertibility of unity and being as transcendentals:

“But on the contrary whatever is one simply is one according to the act of existence. But Christ is one simply, as was shown above. Therefore in him there is one act of existence.” (De Unione, art. 4, s.c.)

Yet, Aquinas is also clear in De Unione that this esse secundarium is distinct from the eternal esse of the Word. This seems to be in contrast to Aquinas’ account in the Summa Theologica, in which he says “That eternal being of the Son of God which is the divine nature becomes the esse of the human being, insofar as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God into personal unity.” (Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2, ad 2)

Some scholars like James Reichmann interpret De Unione as affirming the standard view of only one divine esse in Christ, and that the esse secundarium is simply a way of referring to the divine esse insofar as it actualizes the assumed human nature. David Tamisiea also follows this line of interpretation in his research:

“St. Thomas here speaks of a second esse in Christ only ‘insofar as it became man in time,’ and not as a supposital or substantial esse. As Reichmann observes, St. Thomas is using the term esse in an analogical sense when he refers to Christ’s human esse. For as Aquinas expressly states earlier in the article, when esse is taken in its true and proper (vere et proprie) sense it refers to the supposital esse possessed by Christ’s person. Thus, the esse principale signifies the principle of actuality that belongs to the suppositum or person of Christ. The esse secundarium, on the other hand, is the divine esse insofar as it actualizes Christ’s human nature. From the vantage point of the human nature, it does have esse or ‘act of being’ in a qualified way since Christ does begin to exist as a man. For this reason, St. Thomas states that ‘the esse of the human nature is not the esse of the divine nature.’ Yet, that principle esse by which the human nature exists is not its own, even though it is actuated by it.” (David A. Tamisiea, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the One ‘Esse’ of Christ,” Angelicum 88, no. 2 [2011], pg. 398)

I find Michael Gorman’s reading to be a bit more true to the text than Tamisiea’s:

“Christ’s humanity is here [in De Unione] said to be a principle of qualified existence for him, a principle of qualified existence of a supposit. As we have seen, Aquinas thinks that qualified existence can be multiplied without prejudice to unity of person. So, Aquinas is here saying that Christ has more than one existence, but not in a way that violates the requirement that he be one person.” (Michael Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union [Cambridge University Press, 2017], pg. 117)

Early Modern Thomists on the Esse of Christ

Later Thomistic commentators and scholastics in the early modern period also weighed in with their contributions on the two-esse debate. 

Cardinal Cajetan was adamant in asserting that the teaching of De Unione was incomplete and should be read in light of Thomas’ other passages such as we find in the Summa and ninth Quodlibet. (Cardinal Cajetan, Commentarium in Tertiam Partem Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae, as found in Opera Omnia S. Thomae de Aquino [Rome: Leonine Commission, 1908], 11:224). For him, the Thomist position is that there is no substantial esse in Christ besides the divine esse existentiae. 

For Cajetan, things that directly correspond to personhood and subsistence cannot have their own esse. Accidents can have a type of their own esse (whiteness is that by which Socrates is white). On the other hand, Christ’s human nature is assumed to the personality and subsistence of the Word. Therefore, it cannot have its own esse. Since Thomism teaches that subsistence is prior to esse, if a nature is assumed to the subsistence of another (which is what happens in the Incarnation), this would also entail that it is assumed to its esse as well.

The scholastics of the School of Salamanca also weighed in on the old debate regarding the interpretation of Thomas in De Unione, and the two-esse question itself. 

For Salamanca, the esse of Christ can be said to be two in the sense that the human and divine natures do not bear the same relation to the divine esse. The esse of Christ is one in its abstraction, however:

“Especially because, although each nature exists through the same existence, which is one in the abstract; it can still be said that they have different beings in the concrete: insofar as this very being belongs primarily and by identity and essence to the divine nature; but it belongs secondarily and by mere communication to the human nature, retaining the real distinction.” (Collegium Salamanticense, Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 77)

The doctors of Salamanca articulate the traditional Thomist position as follows:

“It must be said that the Divine Word communicated its uncreated existence to the humanity of Christ, and that in God, the humanity of Christ does not exist through a created existence or its own existence, but exists through the divine existence of the whole suppositum……The same is also supported by the authors who believe that subsistence is nothing other than the existence of the substance, such as Giles, Zumel, Aguirre, Biescus, and many others: for it is certain that the humanity of Christ does not subsist through created subsistence, but through the divine; they are therefore obligated to say the same about existence.” (Collegium Salamanticense, Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 72)

If the Word’s uncreated and divine subsistence is communicated to the human nature, it follows naturally that the same thing would apply on the level of esse as well. 

Eric A. Mabry critiques the argument of the Salamanticenses on the grounds that it falsely assumes that a mere sufficiency of the Word’s existence renders any human esse superfluous:

“Arguing that the divine existence suffices for the existence of the human nature is like arguing that a primary cause is sufficient for x to take place, so there is no need for a secondary cause, or like arguing that the divine love is sufficient to cause us to love God and neighbor, therefore, there is no need for a created habit of charity. Absolutely, speaking, yes, God’s causality and his loving contain all created causes and all created loving most eminently, and he has no need of anything further to accomplish what he wills, but it turns out to be the case that God did will that their be secondary causes, and he willed that we have a created principle of merit whereby we can love him cooperatively and meritoriously. The God revealed to us in Salvation history does not appear to have as his modus operandi sufficiency but subsidiarity; consequently, there is no reason to immediately suppose that just because the divine existence would be sufficient that this is in fact the way the humanity exists.” (Eric Andrew Mabry, “Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo factum: Background, Reception, Meaning, and Relevance of the Hypothesis of esse secundarium in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas,” [PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2018], pg. 159)

The Salmanticenses produce the following passage of John Damascene in support of their position:

“And thus it is that the holy Virgin is thought of and spoken of as the Mother of God, not only because of the nature of the Word, but also because of the deification of man's nature, the miracles of conception and of existence being wrought together, to wit, the conception the Word, and the existence of the flesh in the Word Himself.” (John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book III, ch. 12)

Duns Scotus on the Number of 'Esse' in Christ

 

As is well known by some, John Duns Scotus holds to the position that in Christ there is a created human act of existence distinct from the divine esse. This is in direct contrast to the traditional Thomist position that there is one esse in Christ, that of the divine person of the Word, through the humanity formally exists. 

We begin with a more general Scotist metaphysic about how parts have esse in their whole(s): 

“A part coming to a whole does not give esse to the whole, but rather receives [esse], since it is perfected by the form of the whole…But the human nature united to the Word is not informed by the Word, but remains simply distinct [from the Word].....The existence (existentia) of a foot is not other than that by which I exist. But the opposite holds here [i.e. in the hypostatic union].” (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, III, d. 6, q. 1)

In this same section (Ordinatio 3.6.1), Scotus answers a number of popular objections given by Aquinas and the Thomists:

Thomist Objection: “Because the esse constitutes a being [ens], and thus, if Christ were to have two esse, Christ would be two beings.” (Ordinatio 3.6.1, n. 2)

Scotus’ Reply: “Although in Christ there are two wills, he is not however two willers, because the concrete is not numbered without numbering the supposit, – as is plain about him who has two sciences, who is not called ‘two knowers’; so in the matter at hand, if there are several esse each of which will be the esse simply of the supposit, it does not follow that the supposit is ‘two beings’. And in the form of arguing, “the esse constitutes the thing, therefore several esse are several beings,” there is a fallacy of the consequent, from destruction of the antecedent and [then] of the consequent; for the division of antecedent and consequent involves a negation about each.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)

Objection: “The infinite cannot receive esse from a creature; therefore neither does it have any created esse from the assumed nature.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)

Scotus’ Reply: “It is plain through the same thing, because the infinite receives no perfection which may inform it; however just as this nature is united to him [the Word] without the passive reception of any perfection in the Word, so the Word is from this union existent with the existence of this nature.” (Ordinatio, 3.6.1)

A number of positive arguments may also be educed for asserting that there is some created esse in Christ distinct from His divine esse:

"The foundation of a relation naturally precedes the relation, and according to actual esse precedes the notion of an actual relation. This union was an actual relation. Therefore its foundation is naturally prior to it according to actual esse. But that foundation was the total nature itself. Therefore [the total nature itself has actual esse]." (Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, 3.6.1, n. 23)

Bartholomew Mastrius (1602-1673)

“Creation is terminated first and per se to the being of existence, just as generation is a transition from non-being to being, namely of existence (Physics 5). But the soul of Christ was created, and the body of Christ was generated. Therefore, his soul receives the being of existence from an efficient [cause] through creation, just as the body [receives it] through generation; but it does not receive uncreated being, because that is not the term of creation or of human generation. Therefore, the soul and body have a being of human existence other than the being of divine existence.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 1)

“Fifthly, it is also proven by a theological argument. The uncreated existence is something absolute and essential in God, and consequently common to the three persons. Therefore, if by assumption the humanity is united to the divine existence, such that it formally exists through it and not through its own existence, it follows that the union of the incarnation was made in something essential, and so all three persons would have assumed human nature, which is repugnant to the faith. Or at least it must be conceded that in the mystery of the Incarnation two substantial unions intervene: one of the essence of the humanity with the absolute and uncreated existence of God, the other of the existing humanity with the suppositum of the Word, or with his relative subsistence, which is a great inconvenience.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, ibid.)

In response to this second argument of Mastrius, Diego Alvarez insisted that the human nature was united immediately to the subsistence of the Word and mediately or secondarily to the uncreated existence of the divine nature. On the contrary, Mastrius responds, a mediate union with the divine existence (such as the Thomists posit here) does not suffice for the human nature to exist through it, just as in order for the human nature to be truly and formally united with the divine subsistence, it must be immediately united to it. 

And yet, all sides of this question agree that the human nature exists in the Word. How can the Scotists consistently maintain this according to their view? Mastrius proposes this manner of solution:

“The humanity is said to exist in the Word, insofar as its existence is terminated by the subsistence of the Word, in which it subsists; thus also an accident is said to exist in a subject, not because it formally exists through its existence, because of itself it has its own existence, but because it does not have that terminated in itself, but in the substance; whence its existence has rather the nature of inexistence than of existence simply, and therefore it is said to inhere in another, and not to exist per se, and it is a dependence of the caused on the cause, such as is not the dependence of the humanity on the Word, which is by way of simple communication, and depends on it, as on a pure term of the union, which it founds to it, as to an alien supposit, to which it is communicated, as terminating, denominating it man.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)

Thomist Objection: Since a subsisting supposit is that which is properly said to exist (in contrast to a nature, which has esse as “that by which”), if there is one supposit, there must also be one existence. Christ is one supposit, therefore, etc.

Scotist Response: “Existence is not a personal property, as if following upon subsistence or personality, but it is a property of nature, indeed it is the very nature, as it is in act, and what receives being is the very singular nature; but the supposit is said to be made last according to the last denomination only.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)

This Scotist model is more important than we might first expect. For Mastrius, the human nature communicating esse to the Word (namely, the Word being the term of the humanity’s dependence) functions as the truth-maker for statements like “The Word is a man”:

“That the divine Word exists through created existence can be understood in two ways: in one way, as God; in another way, as man; certainly the Word does not exist through created existence insofar as it is the Word, or as to the divine nature; but there is no absurdity in the Word existing through created existence insofar as it is man, or as to the human nature; for the Word is truly and properly man for this reason, because it exists in the humanity or because the humanity exists in the Word, and just as it is truly called man from the humanity, so from the humanity it is truly called existing by created existence. You will say, hence it follows that created existence is a perfection of the personality of the Word. The consequence is denied, because the Word is the pure term of this dependent existence, not the subject, nor does it have itself as act, nor as potency.” (Bartholomew Mastrius, Disputationes theologicae in tertium librum Sententiarum, Q. 6, art. 2)