The following passages represent Aquinas’ mainstream view of their being one esse in the person of Christ:
“Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing…..since the human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said above, and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2)
“Because, therefore, in Christ we posit only one subsisting thing, for the integrity of which there concurs also the humanity itself, since one supposit is of both natures, for this reason, it is necessary to say that substantial existence, which properly is attributed to the supposit, is in Christ one only, yet has unity out of the supposit itself and not out of the natures. If, nevertheless, the humanity is posited to be separated from the divinity, then the humanity will have its own existence other than from the divine existence. For nothing impeded it from having its own existence except this: that it was not subsisting essentially. This is just as if an ark were a certain individual natural thing, the whole itself only has one existence, nevertheless any of its parts separated from the ark will have its own existence.” (Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet IX, Q. 2, art. 2)
“Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2, ad 1)
“Whenever things differ in existence, one of them is not predicated of the other. But God is a man, and vice versa. Therefore there is one existence of God and the man.” (Commentary on the Sentences, III, d. 6, q. 2, art. 2)
“I answer that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, “to be” is said in two ways. In the first way, it is said as what signifies a proposition’s truth, insofar as it is a copula; and in this way, as the Commentator says, on the same passage, “being” is an accidental predicate. And this existence is not in a real thing, but in a mind that joins the predicate to the subject, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 6. So the question here is not about this. In another way, that is said “to be” which pertains to the nature of a real thing, insofar as it is divided according to the ten genera. This existence is in the thing, and is the act of a being resulting from a thing’s principles, just as lighting up is the act of what is luminous. Nevertheless, sometimes “existence” is taken for the essence according to which a thing exists; for the principles of things are customarily signified through their acts, as is done with a power or a habit. Therefore, when speaking about existence insofar as it is the act of a being, in this way I say that according to the second opinion one must assert there is only one existence, but according to the others one must assert there are two existences. For a subsisting being is what has existence as of that which exists, although it is of a nature or form as of that by which it exists. Whence neither a thing’s nature nor its parts are properly said “to be,” if “to be” is being taken in the aforesaid mode; likewise, neither are its accidents. But the complete supposit, which exists in virtue of all the others, is [properly said “to be”]. Whence also the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 2, that an accident is more properly of a being than a being.” (Commentary on the Sentences, III, d. 6, q. 2, art. 2)
In these passages, Aquinas is also basing his argument on being (esse) and unity being corresponding transcendental perfections. Therefore, a complete subsisting suppositum can only have one esse, if it is to remain one simpliciter.
In explaining the standard one-esse view (Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2), Aquinas gives the analogy of concrete parts and their existence in a complete substantial whole. Just as things like body parts, corporeality, and possessing a soul belong to the one person of Socrates, there arises only one esse of Socrates. The parts do exists over and above the whole, rather they exist in the whole.
In contrast to the part-whole relationship, accidents do communicate esse to their substance. Whiteness adds esse to Socrates, inasmuch as we now say that Socrates is white on account of this accidental quality.
However, the passage which caused the most controversy among Thomists and modern scholars of Aquinas is the following one from his Disputed Questions:
“Therefore just as Christ is one simply because of the unity of the supposit, and two relatively because of the two natures, so he has one act of existence simply because of one eternal act of existence of an eternal supposit. But there is also another esse of this suppositum, not in so far as he is eternal, but in so far as he is made man temporally. This esse—even if it is not accidental esse (since ‘man’ is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God)—is not however the principal esse of its suppositum, but secondary. If in Christ there were two supposits, then each supposit would have a principal act of existence proper to itself, and thus in Christ there would be a twofold act of existence simply.” (Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae: De Unione Verbi Incarnati, art. 4)
This passage from De Unione has been a perplexing matter to the interpreters of Aquinas for centuries. It has received more attention in present-day scholarship as well.
Aquinas is explicit here in teaching one principle esse in Christ, just as he did in his other writings. He also follows some of the same reasoning regarding the convertibility of unity and being as transcendentals:
“But on the contrary whatever is one simply is one according to the act of existence. But Christ is one simply, as was shown above. Therefore in him there is one act of existence.” (De Unione, art. 4, s.c.)
Yet, Aquinas is also clear in De Unione that this esse secundarium is distinct from the eternal esse of the Word. This seems to be in contrast to Aquinas’ account in the Summa Theologica, in which he says “That eternal being of the Son of God which is the divine nature becomes the esse of the human being, insofar as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God into personal unity.” (Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 17, art. 2, ad 2)
Some scholars like James Reichmann interpret De Unione as affirming the standard view of only one divine esse in Christ, and that the esse secundarium is simply a way of referring to the divine esse insofar as it actualizes the assumed human nature. David Tamisiea also follows this line of interpretation in his research:
“St. Thomas here speaks of a second esse in Christ only ‘insofar as it became man in time,’ and not as a supposital or substantial esse. As Reichmann observes, St. Thomas is using the term esse in an analogical sense when he refers to Christ’s human esse. For as Aquinas expressly states earlier in the article, when esse is taken in its true and proper (vere et proprie) sense it refers to the supposital esse possessed by Christ’s person. Thus, the esse principale signifies the principle of actuality that belongs to the suppositum or person of Christ. The esse secundarium, on the other hand, is the divine esse insofar as it actualizes Christ’s human nature. From the vantage point of the human nature, it does have esse or ‘act of being’ in a qualified way since Christ does begin to exist as a man. For this reason, St. Thomas states that ‘the esse of the human nature is not the esse of the divine nature.’ Yet, that principle esse by which the human nature exists is not its own, even though it is actuated by it.” (David A. Tamisiea, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the One ‘Esse’ of Christ,” Angelicum 88, no. 2 [2011], pg. 398)
I find Michael Gorman’s reading to be a bit more true to the text than Tamisiea’s:
“Christ’s humanity is here [in De Unione] said to be a principle of qualified existence for him, a principle of qualified existence of a supposit. As we have seen, Aquinas thinks that qualified existence can be multiplied without prejudice to unity of person. So, Aquinas is here saying that Christ has more than one existence, but not in a way that violates the requirement that he be one person.” (Michael Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union [Cambridge University Press, 2017], pg. 117)
Early Modern Thomists on the Esse of Christ
Later Thomistic commentators and scholastics in the early modern period also weighed in with their contributions on the two-esse debate.
Cardinal Cajetan was adamant in asserting that the teaching of De Unione was incomplete and should be read in light of Thomas’ other passages such as we find in the Summa and ninth Quodlibet. (Cardinal Cajetan, Commentarium in Tertiam Partem Summae Theologiae Divi Thomae, as found in Opera Omnia S. Thomae de Aquino [Rome: Leonine Commission, 1908], 11:224). For him, the Thomist position is that there is no substantial esse in Christ besides the divine esse existentiae.
For Cajetan, things that directly correspond to personhood and subsistence cannot have their own esse. Accidents can have a type of their own esse (whiteness is that by which Socrates is white). On the other hand, Christ’s human nature is assumed to the personality and subsistence of the Word. Therefore, it cannot have its own esse. Since Thomism teaches that subsistence is prior to esse, if a nature is assumed to the subsistence of another (which is what happens in the Incarnation), this would also entail that it is assumed to its esse as well.
The scholastics of the School of Salamanca also weighed in on the old debate regarding the interpretation of Thomas in De Unione, and the two-esse question itself.
For Salamanca, the esse of Christ can be said to be two in the sense that the human and divine natures do not bear the same relation to the divine esse. The esse of Christ is one in its abstraction, however:
“Especially because, although each nature exists through the same existence, which is one in the abstract; it can still be said that they have different beings in the concrete: insofar as this very being belongs primarily and by identity and essence to the divine nature; but it belongs secondarily and by mere communication to the human nature, retaining the real distinction.” (Collegium Salamanticense, Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 77)
The doctors of Salamanca articulate the traditional Thomist position as follows:
“It must be said that the Divine Word communicated its uncreated existence to the humanity of Christ, and that in God, the humanity of Christ does not exist through a created existence or its own existence, but exists through the divine existence of the whole suppositum……The same is also supported by the authors who believe that subsistence is nothing other than the existence of the substance, such as Giles, Zumel, Aguirre, Biescus, and many others: for it is certain that the humanity of Christ does not subsist through created subsistence, but through the divine; they are therefore obligated to say the same about existence.” (Collegium Salamanticense, Cursus Theologicus Summam Theologicam Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae complectens, tr. 21, disp. 8, dub. 3, sect. 1, n. 72)
If the Word’s uncreated and divine subsistence is communicated to the human nature, it follows naturally that the same thing would apply on the level of esse as well.
Eric A. Mabry critiques the argument of the Salamanticenses on the grounds that it falsely assumes that a mere sufficiency of the Word’s existence renders any human esse superfluous:
“Arguing that the divine existence suffices for the existence of the human nature is like arguing that a primary cause is sufficient for x to take place, so there is no need for a secondary cause, or like arguing that the divine love is sufficient to cause us to love God and neighbor, therefore, there is no need for a created habit of charity. Absolutely, speaking, yes, God’s causality and his loving contain all created causes and all created loving most eminently, and he has no need of anything further to accomplish what he wills, but it turns out to be the case that God did will that their be secondary causes, and he willed that we have a created principle of merit whereby we can love him cooperatively and meritoriously. The God revealed to us in Salvation history does not appear to have as his modus operandi sufficiency but subsidiarity; consequently, there is no reason to immediately suppose that just because the divine existence would be sufficient that this is in fact the way the humanity exists.” (Eric Andrew Mabry, “Inquantum est Temporaliter Homo factum: Background, Reception, Meaning, and Relevance of the Hypothesis of esse secundarium in the Christology of Thomas Aquinas,” [PhD diss., University of St. Michael’s College, 2018], pg. 159)
The Salmanticenses produce the following passage of John Damascene in support of their position:
“And thus it is that the holy Virgin is thought of and spoken of as the Mother of God, not only because of the nature of the Word, but also because of the deification of man's nature, the miracles of conception and of existence being wrought together, to wit, the conception the Word, and the existence of the flesh in the Word Himself.” (John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Book III, ch. 12)
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