One of the disagreements between the respective schools of the Thomists and Scotists is with regards to the proper signification that obtains between being as such as the ten categories of Aristotle. I seek to outline the views and arguments of the Scotist school in this article and give my opinion on the relevant questions. I decided to address the matters in this order: 1) the formal and objective concept of being; 2) The univocity and analogy of being; 3) Is being abstracted from its inferiors prior to the operation of the intellect? For each of these issues, I have also provided some of the important Thomist objections to them along with Scotist responses.
The Formal and Objective Concept of Being
(Much of the Scotist position here is based on Crescentius Krisper's Philosophia scholae Scotisticae. I used authors such as Grenier, Poinsot, and Cajetan for representing the Thomist position).
The Scotist position is that being has one formal and objective concept that can be abstracted from its inferiors, such as infinite and finite being, God and creatures, substance and accident, etc. Scotus defines a thing as univocal if it "is so one that its unity suffices for a contradiction, by
affirming and denying it of the same thing. It also suffices for a syllogistic middle
term, so that the extremes united in a middle term that is one in this way are
concluded to be one among themselves, without the fallacy of equivocation." (Ordinatio, 1.3.1)
This is evident since in a created intellect which has concepts of which it is certain and concepts of which it is doubtful, the concept of which it certain is other and distinct from the doubtful ones. Therefore, a created intellect could know that something is a being without knowing whether it is created or uncreated, finite or infinite, substance or accident, etc.
Thomist Objection: If three men named Peter are in a dark room, and one of them slaps me, I know that it is a Peter who slapped me, but that does not mean that "Peter" in this case signifies a single formal concept common to the three men. Similarly, I may know that being expresses a concept, but doubt whether it is equivocal or univocal.
Scotist Response: In these cases, we don't know the ultimate formal concept by which we know the things that are being signified by the word "Peter", but this cannot be said of real being. Hence, these three Peters do still convey a common concept, namely the concept of man (rational animal). In the case of being, we should recognize that a concept can be had of a word without knowing how the concept relates to its significates. This does not apply to the case of being since the question here is about the most common universal concept of being as such.
The unity of a formal concept is taken either from the unity of an objective concept or from experience, as when upon the perception of a word (such as "man") we find that our intellect tends to one thing rather than another, which is a sign that there is one formal concept corresponding to that word.
We can know that there is one objective concept of being by knowing that affirming and denying being as such of one and the same thing will result in a contradiction.
Since being is contracted and divided (infinite and finite, substance and accident, etc.), there must be posited a thing which has a necessary connection with them, namely the ratio of the divisible and contractible. This is the objective concept of being.
Thomist Objection: If being were one formal and objective concept, it could be posited in a definition along with an inferior difference. However, Aristotle denies that this should be done in book 8 of the Metaphysics.
Scotist Response: Being is not posited in definitions on account of it being the greatest commonality. Definitions typically are made with reference to the most proximate genus. However, the antecedent is also false since we define substance as a "being which exists in itself and is the subject of accidents."
Thomist Objection: If there were one objective concept of being, then it would be either absolute (to itself) or relative (to something other). It could not be absolute since then it would not belong to relations, and it could not be relative since then it could not belong to the other nine accidents.
Scotist Response: It is neither absolute nor respective, but prescinded from both, as is clear in all universal rationes, such that animal is neither rational nor irrational, although it is really and identically such.
As you can already probably tell, I lean more towards the Scotist position here. It is plain from intellectual experience that one can abstract a common concept of being qua being from all its inferiors.
The Univocity and Analogy of Being
The Scotist position is that being is univocal with respect to God and creation, substance and accident, etc. The Thomist view is that there is analogy of proper proportion between God and creatures when being is ascribed to each of them respectively. I will begin with some arguments in favor of the Scotist position. Once again, this material is based on writers such as Bartholomew Mastrius and Crescentius Krisper.
1) The intellect can consider substance and accident, and abstract from them that in which they agree, and leave aside that in which they differ. But they agree in being, therefore there is a unified concept between them.
2) The nature of being is something indeterminate in the mode of being. We know that something has being without knowing whether it is in itself (substance) or in another (accident). Similarly, we can know a thing has being without knowing whether it is finite (created) or infinite (God).
3) If two things are related to each other in such a way that whatever belongs to one of them insofar as it is such, also belongs to the other insofar as it is such, then there is some formal unitary nature between them. Whatever belongs to God insofar as He is being, also belongs to a creature insofar as it is being. An example would be that being nothing is repugnant to the creature insofar as it being, which is also the case with God.
4) Whenever a definition is given with both something common and something contracting and differentiating, that common belongs to something to which the contracting does not belong. A creature is defined through being and something contracting, therefore being belongs to something which is repugnant to the contracting thing. Contracting is repugnant only to God, therefore being belongs to God.
5) It may be demonstrated that being is univocal by noting that something that is equivocal cannot result in a contradiction. For example, it is not contradictory to say "Every dog runs" and "this dog does not run." But it is contradictory to say "Every being is unlimited" and "This being is not unlimited." Thus, there is a common concept of being between them.
6) A negation does not deny more than the contradictory affirmation affirms. But "nothing" or "non-being" denies not only finite and created being, but also infinite being. Therefore being, contradictorily opposed to non-being, implies something that is common to all being.
Thomist Objection: When comparing two things, it is not necessary that they have a strict that is one between them. It is sufficient for there to be a proportional unity. For example, a flowering meadow is often compared to a laughing man insofar as laughter in a man proceeds from his inner joy just as a meadow is luxuriating in its beauty and loveliness. When God and creatures are compared in being, this does not necessarily mean that there is one univocal concept between them, but rather a proportional unity.
Scotist Response: Every proportional unity will to some degree diminish the propriety and perfection of the formality. Since a creature has being with all propriety through the formal ratio of being as such, there must be a greater unity between God and creatures than a mere proportion. Anything that is a being through proportion is not a being absolutely, but only in that certain respect of proportionality. But creatures are being absolutely in the formal aspect of being, thus it is not a mere proportional unity.
For the Scotists, when it said that God is "above being," this only means that the formal concept of being is in Him in the most eminent and perfect way, not that there is no common concept. The superlative or comparative things attributed to be God (as when He is said to be "most wise" or "most merciful") indeed presuppose some common concept(s) of wisdom and mercy.
Thomist Objection: God and creature do not agree in the most common concept of being, since being in creatures is participated, while in God it is not. It will not work to say that this notion of being is prescinded from participated and unparticipated, since the notion itself must be either participated or unparticipated. Furthermore, if being could be prescinded from singularity and being unparticipated, it would that something which is in God (being) could not be God, since it could be participated in and of itself.
Scotist Response: The reality of being according to what exists in God and creatures themselves is not distinct from them on the part of the thing and therefore is not contracted into finite and infinite. However, being can be prescinded from these things insofar as it is a common concept abstracted in the intellect from God and creatures inadequately conceived.
"for nothing can be conceived in God existing on the part of the thing, which is outside uncreated and unparticipated being , positively or negatively, nor anything in the creature, which is outside created and participated being, therefore there cannot be given on the part of the thing a common reality to them through indifference, or through inexistence, which abstracts from those rationes, but only a common concept immediately abstracted from the realities of God and creature inadequately known." (Bartholomew Mastrius)
A concept can be univocal in three ways:
1) Physically Univocal - One which expresses a unity of name corresponding to a unity of the thing in reality which is not further divisible.
2) Metaphysically Univocal - This type is fitting to a concept abstracted from thing which are not univocal by physical univocity.
3) Logically Univocal - This type is fitting to a reality abstracted in the second intention as a universal.
We can further distinguish four different grades of univocity:
1) When the common notion corresponding to a common name exists in the inferiors according to the same mode of being, the same essential order, and the same grade of perfection. An example of this type of univocity is the way a species descends to its individuals.
2) When the common notion is participated in according to the same mode of being and essential order, but not according to the essential grade of perfection. In this way man participates in the genus of animal more perfectly than a horse since he has a more perfect contracting principle.
3) When the common noting is participated according to the same mode of being, but not according to the same order or grade of perfection.
4) When the common notion is participated according to diverse modes of being, and diverse grades of order and perfection.
It is not required for univocation that the common ratio be equally participated in by all of the inferiors.
Scotists confess a univocity of being between God and creatures but with a mixture of analogy (specifically, a type of analogy of attribution). In this case, being is univocal in the fourth grade as it is participated according to diverse modes of being, grades of order, and perfection (in God, being is pure and unparticipated, while in creatures it is finite and participated).
If there is inequality in the descent of the common concept to its inferiors, then this is sufficient to constitute analogy.
As said earlier, this Scotist notion of univocity between God and creatures is balanced out by an analogy of attribution, with the intrinsic agreement of the form in the analogates, but still with participation and dependence on God.
This analogy, however, does not mean that creatures have this relation to God under the most common and abstract concept of being, since under this abstraction a creature is not considered as finite but merely as existing outside nothing.
When we say that being is contracted to God before it is contracted to a creature, this does not mean that in conceiving a common concept of being, our cognition tends to God before creatures, but only that being in creatures ex natura rei ultimately depends on God.
Objection: For a thing to be univocal, it must be participated in equally by its inferiors. But being is infinite in God and finite in creatures. Ergo, etc.
Scotist Response: It is not required for univocity for there to be same order and essential grade of perfection in the inferiors. Indeed, the reasoning of this argument, if true, would lead to the absurd conclusion that animal cannot be predicated univocally and man and beasts, since there is an unequal participation between them in the common ratio. Furthermore, this univocity being debated is not in reality ex natura rei, but as it is prescinded in the intellect. Similarly, the ten categories are not so distant from each other that they cannot agree in a common notion of finite being. Such is also the case with God and creatures, that though they differ in their grades of being, they can still agree in the common concept of transcendental being.
Is Being Abstracted from its inferiors prior to the operation of the intellect?
Mastrius teaches that with respect to substance and accident, their common concept of being is abstracted ex natura rei. But this is not the case with respect to God and creatures. Thus we have the Scotist of doctrine of being as perfectly prescinded from its inferiors.
This is clear since being functions as a genus with respect to substance and accident, since both types are under the genus of finite being (not transcendental being). Therefore, this a common concept of being abstracted from ex natura rei.
"A concept is said to be perfectly prescinded from its inferiors when it abstracts from them in such a way, either from the nature of the thing or at least through the intellect with the foundation of the thing, that it only expresses a certain degree of superiority in which the notions of the inferiors are in no way, either implicitly or explicitly, reflected." (Crescentius Krisper)
Objection: For a thing to be perfectly prescinded from its inferiors, two conditions are required: 1) the two concepts must mutually exclude each other; 2) the concept of the superior is founded on a common nature found in the inferiors ex natura rei. Thus, even if being as a concept prescinds from its inferiors, the inferiors do not prescind from being.
Scotist Response: To the first condition, it would then absurdly follow that no genus could prescind from its species because it is intrinsically included in them (as animality is included in the species of rational animals).
If the concept of being were abstracted from God and creatures ex natura rei, it would follow that there is composition in God. This is because the common reality and the contracting principle effect a metaphysical composition as potency and act.
Some Scotists (who disagreed with Mastrius on this question) respond that this will only result in a metaphysical composition when it is contracted through specific differences, but not in the case of intrinsic modes, since the entity and the mode are one adequate reality. On the contrary, the intrinsic mode of a thing does not constitute it in its quidditative being but presupposes it as constituted.
"The first principle of contracting a common reality to another particular under that common reality pertains to the quiddity and essence of that particular, and makes it essentially differ. Also because the principles of constituting and distinguishing are the same for the Metaphysician, since therefore intrinsic modes are not the first constitutives of God and creatures, consequently they were not the first distinctive principles of them." (Bartholomew Mastrius, Cursus Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti, Disp. 2, Q. 4, art. 1)
On the part of God and creatures, the concept of being ex natura rei is abstracted secondarily and a posteriori. If it were abstracted ex natura rei in priority, then it follow that there is something prior to God. This is because the thing constituting is prior to the thing constituted.
The foundation of this transcendental similitude between God and creatures in the intellect is that both God and creatures can cause a common concept of being in the intellect.
Being is contracted to God and creatures through intrinsic modes, rather than a specific difference. If it were contracted to God through a specific difference, the divine simplicity would be destroyed by a metaphysical composition of the contractible and the contracted (for the difference is a reality other than the genus which it contracts). But a mode is a degree of the determinable reality, not a distinct reality from that of which it is the mode.
Objection: That which contracts being is either being or non-being. Not the first, because then it could contract itself. If it is contracted through a mode, rather than a difference, then this is basically the same as saying that being is contracted through itself.
Scotist Response: That which contracts being is being really and identically, but not formally. The contraction of being is not by way of addition (as of part to part), but being as such is so indeterminate that it descends into the inferiors by itself without any addition. The modes of being are not being from themselves, but being by reason of that which they contract. In contracting it, it receives being qua being, insofar as there is an identity between the the contracting and the contracted in the constituted thing.
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